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This study explores the changing nature of employment and employment 
management within multi-ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ  ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉƐ ? ? /Ŷ ůŝŶĞ ǁŝƚŚ
international trends, a major feature of the 1997- ? ? ? ? EĞǁ >ĂďŽƵƌ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
public policy was encouraging partnerships between organisations of all sectors to 
run public services. Within healthcare, central government has increasingly been 
seen as taking on a role of market regulator, with organisations from all sectors 
allowed to plan as well as provide public services (Illife and Munro, 2000). As part of 
this picture, bringing private companies into partnership arrangements with the 
National Health Service has been seen as a catalyst for workforce re-configuration 
and employment change through furthering the reach of private sector type Human 
Resource Management. However, research has illustrated how inter-organisational 
contracts can also restrict an organisations choice of employment practice, disrupt 
the direct relationship between managers and employees, and undermine any 
aspirations for fair or consistent employment (Marchington et al, 2005). In more 
recent healthcare partnerships, employment is further complicated as partnerships 
involve powerful professional groups with their own protected employment systems 
and established norms of practice. This study seeks to investigate the prospects for 
HRM within such a professionalised partnership context through comparative case 
study of two Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) operating under differing 
employment regulations and contractual agreements. In both cases, private sector 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ƐŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŽ ŝŵƉŽƐĞĂŵŽƌĞ  ‘ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŝƐĞĚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ
work with a greater focus on outputs and productivity, placing ISTCs at the forefront 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ &ŽƌĚŝƐƚ  ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ-ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐ ?  ?,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ŵĞĚŝĐŝŶĞ ?
However, the study identifies a number of limits to the degree to which the 
management of the private health care companies could shape HRM practices in line 
with these aims. The thesis also examines how being separate from, or integrated 
with, existing National Health Service organisations can lead to different types of 
contingencies affecting work and employment, and multiple varieties of 
inconsistency across the workforce. The findings of the study are explored in terms of 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Thesis Background 
Shrinking the divide between the public and the private sector has been a recurring 
theme in public policy. Under New Labour, creating a mixed public and private 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐǁĂƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂ  ‘ĐŽƌŶĞƌƐƚŽŶĞŽĨ ƚŚĞ
'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ? ?ůĂŶDŝůďƵƌŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƋƵŽƚĞĚŝŶĚǁĂƌĚƐ ?
Shaoul, 2003). Early policy announcements from the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition government elected in 2010 strongly suggest that the pattern for ever 
greater levels of private sector involvement in public services looks set to continue 
(Guardian, 2010; People Management, 2010). This can be seen as part of wider policy 
debates around forms of public service control, markets, networks and the role of 
the state in contemporary society (Exworthy et al, 1999; Ferlie and McGIvern, 2003; 
Thompson et al, 1991; Field and Peck, 2003; Castells, 2000). From this view, 
increasing private industry involvement in public services indicates a move away 
from traditional notions of public and private, towards a mixed system of governance 
(Kirkpatrick, 1999; Broadbent et al 2000; Exworthy, et al 1999). More broadly, the 
changing relations between the public and private sector can be seen in view of long 
term neoliberal international economic and political trends (Saint Martin, 2000, 
Harvey, 2005). Political rhetoric surrounding public services over the past thirty years 
has continually emphasised market mechanisms, competition, entrepreneurialism, 
performance measures, decentralisation, increasing efficiency, as well as changing 
the relationship between the public sector and private industry (Hood, 1991; Hughes, 
2003).  
In line with these trends and supported by central government policy, numerous 
form of partnership between the public and private sector have sprung up over the 
past decade. Within the field of healthcare, all mainstream parties routinely state 
their commitment to the founding NHS principle of universal health care free at the 
point of delivery. At the same time, there is a growing sense of central government 
taking on a role of market regulator, seeking to allow local NHS Trusts to manage 
their own affairs where possible, including the option for them to bring organisations 
from all sectors to plan as well as provide public services (Illife and Munro, 2000). The 
private sector is now heavily involved in many of the current developments in health 
infrastructure, as well as seeking to become involved in other core services. Profit 
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making companies are routinely designing, building, and to some extent operating, 
new hospitals, primary care facilities and treatment centres (Pollock, 2004). Various 
explanations, rationales and justifications have been given for these developments, 
ranging from notions of resource efficiency to improved financial management and 
greater innovation. For example, from a strategic perspective, it is suggested that 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) bring in resources that would be otherwise 
unavailable to the public sector, such as finance, knowledge, legislative power or land 
(McQuaid, 2000). Alternatively they may improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
services, or increase the legitimacy of public actions by involving a number of 
stakeholders within project development (Osborn, 2000). Researchers have also 
pointed to possible state level financial inducements, such as transferring risks to the 
private sector and diversifying sources of investment and borrowing (Broadbent et. 
al. 2000). Partnerships have been advocated as allowing the benefits from both 
markets and hierarchies, such as improvement through competition and state 
leadership, while avoiding some of the negatives such as market failure and 
constrictive top down control (Entwistle and Martin, 2005; Francis et al, 1991; IPPR, 
2001).  The increase in private business in running public services has also been 
linked to more covert motivations, such as pressure from global financial institutions 
(Price et al 1999), the widespread use of management consultants (Saint-Martin, 
2000) and the declining power of the nation state (Castells, 2000).  
Intimately tied to these changes is the management of labour and the nature of work 
and employment in the public ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?  ‘DŽĚĞƌŶŝƐŝŶŐ ?ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶ
identified as an underlying premise of many New Labour public administration 
reforms since their election in 1997 (Harrison, 2002). The past decade has witnessed 
a sustained top-down push for transformation in public sector employment and 
workforce re-configuration (Buchan, 2000; Boyne et al, 1999; Nutley 1999; 
Arrowsmith and Sisson 2002). This is generally presented as a push away from 
collective industrial labour action, historical segmentation of professional work and 
paternalistic welfare-focused Personnel Administration, toward the individualistic, 
 ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ? ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŽĨ ,ƵŵĂŶ ZĞƐŽƵƌĐĞ DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ  ?>ƵĐŝŽ ĂŶĚ ^ƚƵĂƌƚ ?  ? ? ? ? ?
Arrowsmith and Sisson, 2002). At the broadest level, mainstream HRM has sought to 
identify how the adoption of certain employment practices can lead to 
improvements in organisational performance, for example through matching 
employment practices with the overall objectives of the organisation, the demands 
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of the industry sector and the requirements wider operating environment. The 
introduction of private providers into public service provision been advocated as 
supporting the introduction of HRM into the public services and the rationalisation of 
employment management (CBI, 2008).  Indeed, changing work and employment 
management is often cited as the decisive rational for private sector involvement 
(DoH, 2002b). Most basically stated, this logic runs that devolving responsibility for 
employment to a much greater number of smaller more independent units will drive 
the system to more locally appropriate forms of employment (Bosanquet et al 2006). 
For example, local managers will be able to tailor practices such as the design of 
work, staff roles and pay structures to meet specific organisational demands and the 
operating environment and therefore improve performance. 
However, entering into inter-organisational partnership also presents significant 
challenges to employment and employment management.  Recent research 
examining work within inter-organisational networks and partnerships has identified 
how aspects of the employment relationship are affected when organisational 
boundaries become blurred and existing hierarchies and lines of authority are 
disturbed (Marchington et al 2005a), for instance when the responsibility for 
employment is outsourced to external agencies (Grimshaw et al 2005b) or when the 
activities of smaller suppliers are closely controlled by dominant contractors 
(Scarborough, 2000). This work highlights the challenges of employment within such 
 ‘ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ŽŶ ŽŶĞ ŚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ƚŽ ƐŚĂƉĞ
employment in the face of contract specifications and client demands and on the 
other the vulnerability of employees to the actions of those which they have no 
direct contract or recourse for having their voice heard (Marchington et al 2005b). In 
this way, public private partnerships introduce new inter-organisational and sectoral 
relationships, which may bring additional complexities and sources of tension to 
already fraught attempts to rationalise HRM within in the public sector. 
Recent case studies of employment in PPPs have so far focused on instances in which 
non-clinical services have been supplied by the private sector (Grimshaw et al, 2002; 
Fischbacher and Beaumont, 2003; Hebson et al, 2003). This has been commonly done 
through the Private Finance initiative in which the private sector have provide 
property and equipment, such as hospitals and primary care centres, and in some 
cases facilities management services such as cleaning, property maintenance and 
catering (Broadbent et. al. 2000). These studies have brought to light a number of 
10 
 
important issues, including the pressures on work from contract managers, the mix 
of different values on the public service ethos and the additional tensions of the 
 ‘ŵƵůƚŝ-ĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ?ǁŽƌŬƉůĂĐĞ ?/ŶŐĞŶĞƌĂůƚŚĞƐĞŚĂǀĞŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚŚŽǁƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐƚĂĨĨŵĂǇ
ůŽƐĞŽƵƚ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ŝŶƉƌŝǀĂƚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŽƌƐ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŽŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƐŽĨĂ  ‘ƚǁŽƚŝĞƌ
ǁŽƌŬĨŽƌĐĞ ?  ?DŽƌŐĂŶ ĂŶĚ ůůŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?  ? ?02). However, more recent forms of public 
private partnership in healthcare go further in the transfer of services, for example 
ŵŽǀŝŶŐ ‘ĐŽƌĞ ?E,^ƐƵƌŐŝĐĂůĂŶĚĚŝĂŐŶŽƐƚŝĐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐƚŽƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ?dŚŝƐŝƐďĞŝŶŐ
done through the establishments of Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs), 
mobile treatment clinics and privately sponsored primary care walk in centres, 
outsourcing professional functions, and bringing in private sector companies to 
manage NHS organisations. These instance involve different dynamics within the 
employment relationship, as they cover traditionally more powerful professional and 
occupational groups who have strong national associations, deeply embedded norms 
and cultures and already potentially conflicting allegiances to their profession and 
their employer (Hutton and Masey, 2006; Harrison, 2002). Therefore this thesis asks 
 ‘ǁŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƌĞĐĞŶƚ ƉƵďůŝĐ-private partnerships for human 
resource management as a means of managing the employment relationship and for 
ƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨǁŽƌŬŝŶƉƵďůŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ? ? 
To explore these issues, this thesis takes a comparative case study approach, 
focusing on two Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs). ISTCs are healthcare 
organisations operated mainly by for-profit companies that offer elective care 
services to NHS patients, but outside or in partnership with established NHS (public) 
providers. These were introduced to increase the capacity for elective care and 
diagnostic procedures, offering greater choice to patients and stimulating innovation 
in the provision of healthcare. ISTC were chosen as an appropriate site for the 
research as they were slated by the government as embodying new forms of 
collaboration between the public and private sector, rather than merely being an 
additional example of contracted out services (DoH 2005a). This claim holds 
particular significance within healthcare, as the NHS is often described as the 
paradigmatic public service, as well as being the most resistant to change. In addition 
the proliferation of ISTCs has been somewhat ad hoc and experimental, with 
organisations demonstrating different types of partnership, structure and regulatory 
framework.  This allowed the research to focus on two sites which differed 
significantly in their approach to employment, offering opportunities for comparison 
11 
 
along important dimensions. The first ISTC largely replaced existing services in an 
adjacent general hospital, and involved the transfer of a large proportion of its staff 
from the local NHS trust. The second ISTC on the other hand was forced by regulation 
to employ people only from outside the NHS, and so was brought together clinical 
and administrative staff from a wide variety of cultural and organisational 
backgrounds, in many ways building the new hospital service from scratch.  
Data is presented from approximately 72 semi-structured qualitative interviews with 
a cross section of employees and managers, 8 months observational research in 
clinical and administrative settings, and supporting documentary evidence. Findings 
from the two sites illustrate two very different organisations, with HRM emerging 
along divergent trajectories. In the ISTC involving a transfer of staff from the NHS, 
many HRM practices were inherited and translated from the parent organisation, but 
into a context of new employment tensions, including directly employed and 
transferred staff working side by side, people working in the same role under 
different contracts, as well as people working day to day across the public and 
private sector. Accordingly there were large constraints on the choices of HRM, 
which was forced to contend with existing inter-professional relations, managing 
non-employees and the challenges of the multi-employer workplace. On the other 
hand, the ISTC that was developed separately from NHS facilities had far fewer pre-
existing templates for employment and HRM practices, with management allowed 
greater scope to shape employment to the terms of the service contract. However, 
being prevented from recruiting from within the NHS led to ongoing labour market 
shortages and contributed to a relatively transient workforce with low levels of 
commitment. This in turn created difficulties stemming from the transactional 
approach to employment, high turnover, and large uncertainties over the fit between 
the emerging practices and employment relations and requirements for maintaining 
quality in health care services. The production of health services within two sites are 
described in detail in relation to identified themes in the literature, focusing on the 
foundations of the organisations, the character of employment and the nature of 
work roles. These findings are discussed in terms of their implications for theories of 
HRM, the changing nature of public service employment, and how the issues raised 
relate to public policy in health care. 
12 
 
1.2 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is presented in three parts. The first part (Chapter 2) covers the relevant 
literature and is divided into three sections which examine overlapping areas of 
literature (see figure 1 overleaf). These locate the current study against the extant 
literature and lead to a number of questions to be answered about HRM in the 
context of PPPs. The sections are as follows:  1) the foundations for the concept of 
HRM and its application in current practice. This includes intra-paradigm debates on 
the link between HRM and overall organisational strategy and performance, and 
inter-paradigm debates that have challenged the foundations of HRM as an academic 
discipline as well as a legitimate area of social activity. This section concludes with a 
ƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĂůŽĨŚŽǁƚŚĞůĂďĞůŽĨ ‘,ZD ?ŝƐƵƐĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞƐ ŶƚƐƚƵĚǇ ? ? )dŚĞďĂƐŝƐĨŽƌ
HRM in the public sector including the policy background and its translation to the 
public services. This includes consideration of the influence of professional groups, 
the distinctive employment and industrial relations culture and the dominant norms 
and values within healthcare. 3) The nature of the employment relationship within 
 ‘ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬĞĚ ? ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐations such as PPPs. This includes discussion of the challenges 
posed to integrated employment within the multi-employer or permeable workplace. 
These areas of literature highlight three categories of relationships of potential 
importance in shaping HRM within PPPs: namely those between employees and 
managers, between occupational and professional groups, and between the 
organisations in constellations of supply and service delivery. These are considered in 
the final section of literature which identifies a series of questions related to the 
prospects for HRM within PPPs.  
13 
 











The second section presents the research context and methodology. Chapter 3 
presents the policy background to ISTCs, and how ISTCs relate to the research 
questions.  Chapter 4 presents the research methodology. The emphasis here is on 
describing personal experience of conducting the research, and relating this process 
to relevant methodological literature.  This includes discussion of qualitative research 
and the comparative case study approach.  
The third section presents the results, discussion and conclusion. Chapters 5 and 6 
present descriptions of the employment environment within each of the case study 
sites. Each chapter covers the foundations of the ISTC with respect to employment, 
the dominant employment culture, and the work roles of doctors, nurses and other 
staff groups. Chapter 7 compares the two case sites, focusing on the relationships 
between organisations, between occupational/professional groups and between 
employees and managers. Chapter 8 then discusses the comparative findings with 
respect to the reviewed literature. Chapter 9 draws a number of conclusions from 
this discussion and comments on the practical implications, limitations and 
suggestions for future research.  
 
HRM in the Public Sector 
The Foundations of HRM 






Chapter 2 Human Resource Issues in Public Private 
Partnerships: Three Levels of Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
Literature on Human Resource Management is vast and comes from a wide range of 
theoretical perspectives. Accordingly there are a great number of contrasting 
ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ĐŽŶǀĞǇ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ĂŶĚ ƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?  ?tĂƚƐŽŶ ?  ? ?95b) of HRM. 
ĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞůǇ ?  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ĂƌĞ ŶŽǁ
ĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇƵƐĞĚŝŶƐĞƚƚŝŶŐƐŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽ ‘ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ
and everything associated with the management of employment relations in the 
Ĩŝƌŵ ?  ?ŽǆĞll and Purcell, 2000). The emergence of HRM as a concept for managing 
ƚŚĞĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉŝƐƵƐƵĂůůǇƚƌĂĐĞĚďĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞĞĂƌůǇ ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ƚŝĞĚƚŽǁŝĚĞƌ
changes in society, the industrial environment and academic theorising, including the 
growth of neo-liberal economics, changes in the global market, increased 
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ  ‘ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ ĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ? ? tŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐ ĨŽĐƵƐ ŽŶ ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞ ĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ?  ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ? ŚĂƐ
generally been replaced throughout both the public and private sector with more 
managerially powerful ideas of HRM (Legge, 2004).  There is however no consensus 
on the meaning or affect of this change. 
Projecting ideas of Human Resource management on to Public-Private Partnerships 
brings to light a large number of challenges, contradictions and conflicts both in 
terms of theory and practical application. These can be seen on three overlapping 
levels. At the broadest level are the issues associated with HRM as a generic concept 
and how useful, comprehensive and ethical it is as a guide to contemporary 
employment relations management. These include intra-paradigm debates regarding 
the advantages of different models of HRM and their applicability to particular 
contexts, as well as cross-paradigm critiques that challenge more fundamentally the 
assumptions of the approach. On the second level are the challenges of transferring 
ideas of HRM from the private sector in which they were originally envisaged to the 
somewhat contrasting environment of the public sector. Research has identified a 
number of contextual issues including the high prevalence of professionalism, as well 
as different norms, values and industrial relations history that pose problems for 
directly transferring managerial practices to the public sector. On the third level are 
the additional issues opened up by considering HRM in non-conventional 
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organisational environments such as public private partnerships. These often alter 
the nature of the relationship between management and employees, especially in 
the case of PPPs which introduce both cross-organisational as well as cross-sectoral 
divisions into the workplace. This chapter examines these three levels, and derives a 
number of questions for the research based on the application of HRM theory to 
PPPs.    
 
2.2 1st Level:  The Foundations of HRM 
2.2.1 Intra-Paradigm Debates: Style, Strategy and Organisational 
Performance 
This section focuses on the literature that broadly supports HRM as an approach to 
employee relations management and forms thĞ ďĂƐŝƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ ? ,ZD
perspective. This area of literature has tended to focus on the classification of 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐŵŽĚĞůƐ ?ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ‘ƐƚǇůĞƐŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨ
organisational practice. Moreover, it has sought to relate these to organisational 
level outcomes such as financial performance, productivity or staff turnover. From 
this perspective, definitions of HRM state that it is a distinctive approach to 
employment management, usually emphasise valuing people and their skills as the 
most important organisational resource and often suggest how these can be made to 
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ůƐŽǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚŝƐŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ,ZD
work a link is commonly assumed between different patterns of purposeful 
management action, such as selection, job design, rewards, involvement in decision 
making and levels of training, and particular desired behaviours in employees, such 
as commitment, flexibility, initiative or indeed compliance. In this way, HRM is seen 
as contributing to the overall success of the organisation (Huselid, 1995; Philpott, 
2002; Guest and Conway, 1999: Wall and Wood, 2005). Based on this, claims are 
made to the importance of including the HRM function in strategic decision making 
alongside other functions that have otherwise taken precedent such as accounting 
and finance.  This picture of HRM is painted largely in contrast with previous 
approaches to managing employee relations, and views of personnel management as 
ĂďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞ ‘ŚĂŶĚŵĂŝĚĞŶ ?ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?'ƵĞƐƚ ? ? ? ?  ?^ƚŽƌĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
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While the range of HRM activities may differ greatly from one organisation to the 
next, two contrasting styles are frequently called upon to characterise employment 
practice. The first of these is commonly rĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ŚĂƌĚ ?Žƌ ‘ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ǀŝĞǁĂŶĚ
focuses on close managerial direction of employees, coercively enforcing work 
around tightly prescribed task (Storey, 1992; Legge, 2004). This version has been 
linked to instrumentalist Wutilitarian philosophical views of organisations (Hendry and 
WĞƚƚŝŐƌĞǁ ?  ? ? ? ? )ĂŶĚĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŶĂƚƵƌĞƌŽƵŐŚůǇ ƌĞƐĞŵďůŝŶŐDĐ'ƌĞŐŽƌ ?Ɛ
theory X (Truss, et al, 1997) stressing the need for tight controls over the workforce 
and closely monitored performance management (Walton, 1985). This approach also 
stresses a managerial approach of tight strategic planning and quantitative allocation 
of human resources; through head count and skill mix in order to meet pre-specified 
organisational outputs (Truss, et al 1997). Secondly the  ‘ƐŽĨƚ ?Žƌ ‘ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?ǀŝĞǁ
ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ ? ŝŶƚƌŝŶƐŝĐ ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚƌƵƐƚ ? ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ?
This is said to rest on more developmental-humanist views roughly equated with 
DĐ'ƌĞŐŽƌ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇz ?ƐƚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞďĞƚƚĞƌƐĞƌǀĞĚďǇďuilding employee 
commitment and high trust relationships (Walton, 1985; Truss, et al, 1997). This 
language of hard and soft has come to be seen as intrinsic to the concept of HRM; 
however many aspects and characteristics of the two styles echo debates from 
previous eras of thinking on employment relations management styles (Purcell and 
Sisson, 1983; Legge, 2004). The language of HRM can be seen as in many ways 
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐ ĚƵĂůŝƐŵƐ ůŽŶŐ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ  ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ? ƐƵĐŚ ĐĂƌĞ ĂŶĚ
control, (Watson 1977), of investment and efficiency, of (feminine) welfare and 
(masculine) industrial union relations bargaining (Legge, 2004), of individualism and 
collectivism (Torrington, 1989) (See Niven, 1967 for more detailed history). 
More uniquely central to HRM however are attempts to identify how different 
approaches to employment relations management can contribute to the overall 
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ Ĩŝƌŵ  ?'ƵĞƐƚ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? dŚŝƐ ĨŝĞůĚ ŽĨ  ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞ
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?  ?^,ZD ) ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵent practices; with 
each other to form a consistent system, and with desired outcomes of the 
organisational. Two versions of SHM are generally considered as illustrative of the 
approach (Boxell and Purcell, 2000). The first of these is commonly referred to ĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞ
 ‘ďĞƐƚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ Ăůů ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ĨƌŽŵ
adopting a specific overriding identifiable HRM strategy, usually emphasising those 
ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ‘ƐŽĨƚ ?Žƌ ‘ŚŝŐŚĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƚǇůĞƐŽĨ,ZD ?WĨĞĨĨĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )has 
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provided perhaps the most well known version of best practice approach, arguing for 
the universal adoption of the following practices; employment security, selective 
ŚŝƌŝŶŐ ? ƐĞůĨ ŵĂŶĂŐĞĚ ƚĞĂŵƐ ? ‘ƚĞĂŵ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ? ? ŚŝŐŚ ĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽ  ĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚ ŽŶ
organisational performance, extensive training, reduction in status differences, 
employee involvement and information sharing. Supporter of this view maintain that 
by investing in such high commitment management practices, organisations will gain 
the maximum possible contribution from employees who are committed and 
involved, giving the organisation the best possible chance for success (Blyton and 
Turnbull, 1992; Pfeffer, 1998; Guest, et al 2000). A more complete list of advocated 
best practice activities, along with complimentary lists from other researchers are 
presented in table 1 (overleaf).  
Perhaps unsurprisingly the best practice view has been attractive for academics and 
practitioners. On the face of it this presents a win-win situation for employers and 
employees, changing the employment relationship from one of conflict and tension 
towards one of harmonious working towards shared goals. It would in many ways 
ĂƉƉĞĂƌ Ă ǀŝƌƚƵŽƵƐ ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? ĂƉƉĞĂůŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ? ďĞƐƚ ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ŝŶǀĞƐƚ ŝŶ ĂŶĚ
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ ? Őƌowth, and warning against coercion, ill treatment or 
ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŶŽƚ ŵĞƌĞůǇ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ ? ƐĂŬĞ ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ
(Marchington and Grugulis, 2000; Guest, 1990). Accordingly this approach has 
received much attention and support (e.g. Wood, 1995; Huselid, 1995; Wood and 
Albansese, 1995; Guest 1997; Gould-Williams, 2004; West et al 2002), to the extent 
that many commentators have announced that the link between the adoption of 
high commitment HRM and increased business performance has been categorically 
proven (Pfeffer, 1998; Appelbaum et al 2000; CIPD, 2001). 
18 
 









Source Youndt et at (1996) 
 
However, despite the attractiveness of the approach there are numerous deep-
seated problems with attempts to concretely prove a link between combinations of 
 ‘ŐŽŽĚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ,ZD ĂŶĚ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ? &ŝƌƐƚ ? ƚŚŝƐ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ
suggests that a single style of employment management both should and could be 
applied across all organisations, as well as all divisions and functions within 
organisations, regardless of the context, business, sector or cultural context. In stark 
contrast to this, studies of individual managerial practices and general styles almost 
inevitably find a high degree of variation within and between different organisations. 
Large variations in the nature of employment management are usually found 
between types of industry, cultural context, size and ownership of the organisation 
and its operating environment (Guest, 1997; Marginson et al 1988; Purcell, 1999). 
hŶĚĞƌůŝŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĚŝƐĐƌĞƉĂŶĐŝĞƐ ? ŝƚ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƉŽŝŶƚĞĚ ŽƵƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ďĞƐƚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?
model is insufficient to explain the success of organisations which adopt employment 
practices which are contradictory to the advocated approach (Purcell, 1999). In 
addition there have been serious methodological limitations identified in many 
studies held up in support of this approach, including the difficulties of using 
correlation studies to establish a causal link between overall HRM strategy and 
outcome measures. In summary, despite numerous reviews and meta-analysis of the 
area, a consistent causal relationship is yet to be definitively established between 
best practice HRM and organisational performance (Wall and Wood, 2005). 
Partially responding to some of these problems of treating HRM practice in such 
universal terms, a large amount of research is now directed at the alternative model 
ŽĨ  ‘ďĞƐƚ ? Žƌ  ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚ ? Ĩŝƚ ? ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐ Ă ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ ĚĞŐƌĞĞ ŽĨ ǀĂƌŝĞƚǇ ŝŶ ,ZD
practices and contexts. Broadly this argues that HR practice becomes more effective 
ǁŚĞŶŝƚŝƐĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽŵĂƚĐŚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŝƌŵ ?ƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŵĂƌŬĞƚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽƌ
its strategic approach. Generic contingencies are usually identified along the lines of 
product life cycle, market positioning or chosen strategy (Marchington and 
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Wilkinsion, 2005). At the broadest level this suggests that business strategies which 
seek to capitalise ŽŶ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚ ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶĂƌĞďĞƐƚƐĞƌǀĞĚďǇƚŚĞ  ‘ƐŽĨƚ ? ?
 ‘ŚŝŐŚĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ?,ZDƐƚǇůĞƐƚŚĂƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŶŐŝŶĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ?
development, internal career planning, more equitable pay scales and additional 
benefits. It is hoped thaƚƚŚĞƐĞĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐƚŽ  ‘ďƵǇ ŝŶ ? ƚŽƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŽĨ
the organisation and in return for their energy, creativity, and resourcefulness 
receive a share of the rewards of their work and long term job security. On the other 
hand, low cost business straƚĞŐŝĞƐ ĂƌĞ ƐĞƌǀĞĚ ďǇ  ‘ŚĂƌĚ ? ?  ‘ůŽǁ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ? ,ZD
which minimise costs in order to achieve immediate efficiencies. This is said to be 
more suitable for routine production apparently requiring little development or 
initiative. Employees are more interchangeable and are expected to meet only 
minimum standard of output quality for lower levels of reward.  
 
Table 2 Table 2 Model of Employee Role Behaviour Associated with Generic Business 
Strategy 
Strategy Employee Role Behaviour HRM Policies 
Innovation 
A high degree of creative 
behaviour 
Jobs that require close interaction and 
coordination among groups of 
individuals 
A high Tolerance of ambiguity 
and unpredictability 
Performance appraisals that are more 
likely to reflect longer-term and group-
based achievements 
A moderate degree of concern 
for quality 
Jobs that allow employees to develop 
skills that can be used in other positions 
in the firm 
A relatively high level of 
cooperative, interdependent 
behaviour 
Compensation systems that emphasise 
internal equity rather than external or 
market-based equity 
A Moderate concern for quality Broad career paths to reinforce the 
development of a broad range of skills 
An equal decree of concern for 
process and results 
Pay rates that tend to be low, but that 
allow employees to be stockholders and 
have more freedom to choose the mix 
of components that make up their pay 
package 




A more long-term or 
intermediate focus 




Relatively repetitive and 
predictable behaviours 
High levels of employee participation in 
decisions relevant to immediate work 
conditions and the job itself 
A moderate amount of 
cooperative, interdependent 
behaviour 
A mix of individual and group criteria for 
performance appraisal that is mostly 
short-term and results orientated 
A modest concern for quantity 
of output 
A relatively egalitarian treatment of 
employees and some guarantees of 
employment security 
A high concern for quality Extensive and continuous training and 
development of employees 
High concern for process 
Low risk-taking activity 
Commitment to the goals of 
the organisation 
Cost Reduction 
Relatively repetitive and 
predictable behaviour 
Relatively fixed and explicit job 
descriptions that allow little room for 
ambiguity 
A rather short-term focus Narrowly designed jobs and narrowly 
defined career paths that encourage 
specialisation, expertise and efficiency 
Primarily autonomous or 
individual activity 
Short-term results orientated 
performance appraisals 
Moderate concern for quality Cole monitoring of market pay levels for 
use in making compensation decisions 
High concern for quantity of 
output 
Minimal levels of employee training and 
development 
Primary Concern for results 
Low risk taking activity 
Relatively high degree of 
comfort with stability 





This approach addresses some of the apparent failings of the best practice approach 
and dealing with HRM in such universal terms.  However, critiques relating to the 
definition, measurement and multiplicity of management practice remain a key 
problem in this area of research. Also, the best-fit view suggests that organisations 
act consistently in response to certain external circumstances such as market 
opportunities or customer demands. However, external pressures are likely to act 
differently across various departments at various times (Purcell, 1999), creating a 
difficulty for the concept of a single, integrated approach to HRM (Purcell and 
Ahlstrand, 1994). In light of this, researchers have often reigned in the scope of 
study, to look for a link between ŵŝǆĞƐ ŽĨ ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ  ?ďƵŶĚůĞƐ ? ŽĨ ,ZD ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ĂŶĚ
performance, taking into account the wider environment, the nature of work and 
ƚǇƉĞ ŽĨ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ  ?ĂĐŚ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? Ɛ ĂŶ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ? ŝĚĞĂƐ ŽĨ  ‘ĨůĞǆŝďůĞ ?
organisations have sought to differentiate between groups of employees, with 
different groups subject to different regimes of HRM practice. In particular the 
ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŚĂƐďĞĞŶĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚŽĨĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚŝŶŐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽƌĞ ?ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐǁŚŽĂƌĞ
central to developing the strategic activities of the business, as ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ  ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌĂů ?
workers who are either outside the central focus of the organisation or are otherwise 
deemed more easily replaceable in the eyes of the management (Atkinson, 1984; 
Ackroyd and Procter, 1998). The core workforce are likely to be permanent and 
offered a higher degree of security and a share in rewards with HR practices intended 
to develop their capabilities in return for higher level of commitment, energy, 
inventiveness and openness to change. These attributes are less required of the 
periphery workforce who may be dealt with more instrumentally on a unit cost basis, 
or even externalised by subcontracting work out to suppliers or other agencies when 
this is deemed economically advantageous.  
Ideas of such flexible firms bring to light the prospect of a link between HRM 
practices and the decision to outsource particular areas of organisational activity. It 
may then be possible to consider public sector contracting, networks, and PPPs in 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƐƵĐŚ ‘ĨůĞǆŝďůĞ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽ,ZD ?'ƌŽƵƉƐof staff central to the provision 
of a service remain within the public sector, with suitable HRM practices supporting 
their work, while non-core work areas are outsourced to other organisations 
specialising in appropriate forms of management for these groups. However, this also 
ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞƐ ĂŶ ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ƐĞƚ ŽĨ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? tŚŝůĞ  ‘ĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ŝŶ
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normative best practice approaches to HRM is felt to be indicative of employees 
commitment and willingness to learn and take on new roles in the face of changing 
market environments and changing operations for competitive advantage (Guest, 
 ? ? ? ? ) ?ŚĞƌĞ  ‘ĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽĨŶŽŶ-core staff. Also, in 
ŵĂŶǇĐĂƐĞƐŶŽĐůĞĂƌůŝŶĞŵĂǇĞǆŝƐƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽƌĞĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ?ĂĐtivities of 
a company (Purcell and Purcell, 1998), and externalising activities has been seen on 
ƐŽŵĞ ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ Žƌ ĚĞƐƚĂďŝůŝƐŝŶŐ ƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐ  ‘ĐŽƌĞ ? ƐƚĂĨĨ ?
creating more  precarious work environments rather than protective or supportive 
ones (Ackroyd and Proctor, 1998; Rubery, et al 2004a). Moreover, new organisational 
forms encourage increasingly close relationships between contracting and contractor 
parties. This poses a problem for the vast majority of literature on HRM, which is 
predicated on the assumption of single employing organisation, capable of 
determining its own employment practice to their advantage (Marchington and 
Wilkinson, 2005: Rubery, 2004b). The blurring of boundaries between different 
organisations is of central importance to the current study and is explored in much 
greater detail in the section 2.4.  
In summary, mainstream literature of HRM has attempted to identify the most 
appropriate approaches to employment relations management, often in fairly 
universal terms. The focus in on the individual employee and how to gain the 
maximum contribution from them, with respect to identified organisational goals. 
Crudely put this often involves some calculation of the costs and benefits of treating 
employees as human beings or as an expendable resource. Given this, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that researchers have sought to emphasis the benefits of the former 
and warned against the latter, despite the fact that elements of both approaches 
have been widely identified in contemporary organisational practice. A key area of 
research is the ongoing attempts to establish a link between particular employment 
management practices and organisational performance. However difficulties in 
establishing a causal link bring to light complexities in employment relations often set 
aside by mainstream HRM. These are outlined below.   
2.2.2 Cross Paradigm Debates: the Use of HRM 
The literature on HRM extends further than that which seeks to improve on existing 
models, create new ones, or render them more applicable to practice. More 
fundamental criticisms of HRM have also been well explored and come from a 
number of diverse theoretical perspectives. With reference to Burrell and Morgans 
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(1979) classification of perspectives within organisational studies Legge (2004) 
describes four categories of analysis on HRM, each with different worldviews, 
assumptions, research methods and implications. The normative perspective 
introduced above focuses on what HRM ideally should do, and can be generally seen 
as seeking to advance the case for HRM as an organisational function and as a subject 
of academic interest.  Critiques of this perspective often point to the foundations on 
ǁŚŝĐŚ ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ŵŽĚĞůƐ ŽĨ ,ZD ĂƌĞ ďĂƐĞĚ ? &Žƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ƚŚĞĨŽĐƵƐ ŽŶ  ‘ŵƵƚƵĂůŝƚǇ ?
(Walton, 1985) has generally been seen to imply a unitary understanding of 
employment relations, in which similar goals are shared by all stakeholders, 
employers, managers and employees alike. Further, it also invokes particular 
conceptions of human nature as a whole, for example the view of the enterprising, 
self-ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚ ? ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ƐĞĞŬŝŶŐ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ĐŽŶǀĞǇĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ďĞƐƚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ĂŶĚ
 ‘ƐŽĨƚ ?ǀĂƌŝĂŶƚƐ ? 
/ŶǀĂƌŝŽƵƐǁĂǇƐƚŚĞƐĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĞĚďǇǁŽƌŬĨŝƚƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŽ>ĞŐŐĞ ?Ɛ
three other categories of writing on HRM. These are the descriptive-functional, 
descriptive-behavioural, and critical evaluative approaches. The descriptive-
ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂů ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ĨŽĐƵƐĞƐ ŽŶ ǁŚĂƚ ,ZD  ‘ŝƐ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ǁŚĂƚ ŝ   ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ? ? ĂŶĚ
conveys a greater pluralism in the understanding of employment relations.  In other 
words, it does not assume shared goals between employees and managers. Instead it 
looks at the role of the HRM function in balancing wishes on both sides of the 
relationship; although still tend to view HRM as integral to all management activity 
(Torrington, Hall and Taylor, 2008).  The critical evaluative approach takes a more 
radical stand against the normative view, focusing on HRM in relation to asymmetries 
of power between organisations and individual employees, often in view of more 
general questions on the role of organisations in contemporary capitalist societies. 
This commonly pays close attention to the rhetoric of HRM, what it conveys and 
ǁŚĂƚŝƚĐŽŶĐĞĂůƐŝŶŝƚƐǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŝƚƐ ‘ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?dŚĞƐĞŽĨƚĞŶƉŽƐŝƚ
alternative accounts of employment (and unemployment) that include the full range 
of experiences of work in modern societies, including negative emotional responses 
such as powerlessness, boredom, loss of esteem, loss of identity and insecurity, as 
well as the more insidious motives and actions of businesses and managers, 
including, discrimination, oppression, redundancy, coercion and pursuit of profit 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶ ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ? >ĞŐŐĞ ?Ɛ ĨŝŶĂů ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ŽĨ ,ZD ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞ
descriptive-behavioural approach, focuses on what HRM actually does within 
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organisations without an explicit agenda to support or undermine it, but with a more 
full appreciation of the various constraints, limitations and criticisms than functional 
writing on the subject.  
As described by Legge (2004), underpinning much critique is the large distance 
between the expectations created by the normative models of HRM and accounts of 
ǁŽƌŬĂŶĚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůůŝĨĞŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĂůǁŽƌůĚ ? ?ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇŝĚĞŶƚŝfy 
the numerous ways in which peoples experiences within organisations differ 
dramatically from the idealised representations of employment relations in HRM and 
SHRM theory. Models of HRM envisage organisations as applying a certain pre-
planned, explicit approach to employment management with some degree of 
consistency either across the whole organisation, or to particular parts of it. They 
also envisage employees and managers working in harmony towards explicit and 
accepted goals, so long as certain conditions are met.  In depth examination of day to 
day organisational life typically finds this vision lacking as description of employment. 
Employment practices within organisations are often highly fragmented and 
inconsistent in their application (Truss, et al 1997; Marchington and Grugulis 2000; 
Legge, 2004).  Practices are usually applied variously across departments or different 
groups of staff, with policy from the central HRM function interpreted and enacted 
differently by managers with respect to their own local circumstances and pressures. 
Within the UK, wide scale survey evidence has suggested that even within large 
organisations there is often very little common understanding of HRM policy 
ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐďĞǇŽŶĚǀĂŐƵĞƉůĂƚŝƚƵĚĞƐŽŶ ‘ĐĂƌŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĨĂŝƌŶĞƐƐ ? ?DĂƌŐŝŶƐŽŶ ?Ğƚ
al, 1988; 1993). Instead, it is suggested the overarching guiding principle for 
employee relations in most areas of industry is that of pragmatism and opportunism 
with regards to their internal and external environment, including the state of 
industrial relations, market and economic conditions, political and regulatory 
limitations, and socio-cultural norms and values (Marginson, et al, 1988; 1993; Legge, 
2004).  Related to this are difficulties in meaningfully defining and comparing HRM 
practices across organisational, sectoral and cultural contexts (Dyer and Reeves, 
1995) that involve different norms and expectations in the workplace, where 
managerial actions are likely to be interpreted in different ways. Within this picture, 
the role of the HRM department and function has not necessarily achieved the 
transformation presented in theory. Instead, like personnel before it, HRM has often 
been seen as struggling with perceptions of status and legitimacy. Although there 
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may have been some changes to the activities and perceptions of HRM departments, 
they are still often marginal to decision making, lack a consistent role and identity 
amongst other managers and employees (Calwell, 2003).   
dŚĞƐĞ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ƚŚĞŵĞƐ ŽĨ ,ZD  ‘ŝŶ ƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ? ĂƌĞ ĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚin far greater detail with 
respect to the context of this study in the sections on the HRM in PPPs below. 
However, literature critical of HRM amounts to more than just outlining a problem of 
incomplete implementation. It has been suggested that the limitations with generic 
HRM models are inevitable as they rest on flawed representations of the nature of 
organisations. Generic models of HRM tend to assume a rationally defined strategy, 
and the possibility of purposefully selecting a uniform HR practices at the will of 
management. This is particularly apparent in work which advocates organisations 
ŵĂǇ ŝŶ ƐŽŵĞ ǁĂǇ  ‘Ĩŝƚ ? ,ZD ƐƚǇůĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ǁŝĚĞƌ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ? dŚŝƐ ƚƌĞĂƚƐ
organisations as instrumental social structures which act according to objective 
naturĂů ůĂǁƐ ĂŶĚ ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ĐĂƐĐĂĚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚŽƐĞ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƚŽƉ ĚŽǁŶ  ‘ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ? ƚŽ ƚŚŽƐĞ  ‘ĚŽŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬ ? Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ďŽƚƚŽŵ  ?ŽďďŝŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? ĂǀŝĞǁ ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ
ďĞƐƚ ƐƵŵŵĞĚ ƵƉ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů-ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐ ? ŵŽĚĞů ŽĨ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?  tĂƚƐŽŶ
(2004) characterises ŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ,ZDƐǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ ‘ĂƐĂďůĂĐŬ-
box system which functions more-or-ůĞƐƐ ǁĞůů ŝŶ ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ Žƌ  ‘ŽƵƚƉƵƚ ? ƚĞƌŵƐ
according to the structural arrangements that are made to convert human resource 
 ‘ŝŶƉƵƚƐ ? ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞƐĞ ŽƵƚƉƵƚƐ ?  ?tĂƚƐŽn, 2004: 453). This notion has frequently been 
invalidated, not only in work on HRM, but across a wide range of research and theory 
on organisations in general. To give some indication of this, dramatically departing 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞǀŝĞǁŽĨŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƐĂ  ‘ďůĂĐŬďŽǆ ?ĂƌĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽĨĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?
for example those that view the organisation as a subjective social construction 
(Chia, 1995), as a negotiated order (Strauss, 1979), as shaped in the face of intense 
institutional pressures for conformity (DeMaggio and Powell, 1983), or as the site for 
ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ?ƐĞǆƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŽĨŝƚĨƌŽŵůĂďŽƵƌ ?ƌĂǀĞƌŵĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? )  
Perhaps the most well known rebuttal of the rational design of organisations from a 
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŝƐƚŚĂƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďǇDŝŶƚǌďĞƌŐ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ?) view of emergent 
strategy. This rejects the notion of top down, centralised strategic planning as 
unrepresentative of reality. Instead, Mintzberg saw strategy as formed through an 
incremental process, as actors distributed throughout the organisation interact with 
the existing internal and external environment. From a public policy perspective, 
Lipsky (1980) made comparable statements regarding employees of state 
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organisations who in part create public policy through exercising their discretion 
whilst carrying out their work on the front line. Others areas of research have 
extended the emphasis on the socio-cultural constitution of the organisation further. 
Research in the social constructionist tradition has explored more thoroughly the 
social contexts and processes in which managerial actions such as strategy formation 
are conceived of and embedded. This has presented numerous challenges to 
instrumental-rationalist notions of managerial decision making, including the 
situated nature of knowledge, the construction of social identities, the importance of 
language to meaning, and multiple subjective interpretations of the nature of the 
organisation (Downing, 2005; Nicolini and Meznar, 1995; Dobbin, 1995; Whittington, 
1993). This work also often includes consideration of common features of social life 
often left out of management academic thinking about management, including social 
class, gender, and ethnic and national cultural norms and values. Rather than 
ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐďǇŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?these play an ongoing role in 
how the organisation is understood and enacted, and prevent uniform replications of 
the managerial visions which emanate from the centre. Also relevant here is research 
which examines individual managers own situated identities, self interests and 
individual strategies in terms of career progression and political manoeuvring 
(Watson, 2004). Empirical illustrations of the social processes that partially constitute 
everyday organisation life have often come from detailed qualitative case studies. 
For example these have shown organisational change can be a slow, complex and 
highly fragmented process, such as the longitudinal study of strategic change in the 
NHS (Pettigrew et al, 1992) that examine how variations in circumstances can lead to 
essentially different interpretations and realisations of strategy.  
Leading on from this, it has also been said that mainstream HRM presents only a very 
limited account of the employment relationship. Not only does it view the 
organisation as populated by essentially similar individuals interested in growth and 
development, but also that these can be unified around common purpose in working 
towards organisational goals. This, it has been suggested, tends to obfuscate tensions 
within employment management such as the conflict created by multiple and 
divergent employer and employee interests (Knights and Willmott, 1990), whether 
these are profit, income, security, job satisfaction or meaning through work (Blyton 
and Turnbull, 2004).  It plays down employee resistance to managerial control 
(Flemming and Spicer, 2003) as well as the contradictory requirement of employers 
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to gain the active input of employees while maintaining control over them (Watson, 
 ? ? ? ? ) ? ,ŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ ƚŚŝƐ ?  ‘ƐŽĨƚ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ďĞƐƚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ,ZD ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ƚŽ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ƚŚĂƚ
managers should do all they can to ensure employee wellbeing, leaving out any 
indication that this may only be done so as long it serves the controlling interests of 
the employer such as profit or growth (Watson, 1986). Further, HRM focuses on 
managerial solutions to labour problems, rather than the input of the workforce or 
wider society through for example, government policy and legal regulation (Blyton 
and Turnbull, 2004).  
Recognition of such tensions and conflicting interests in employment were of far 
greater central focus in previously dominant approaches to employment 
management, namely industrial relations based around union representations of the 
workforce and collective bargaining. This gave primacy to notions of redressing 
power imbalances inherent within the employment relationship, including 
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ ? ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ƐƵďŵŝƚ ƚŽ ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂů ĐŽŶƚƌŽů Ăƚ ǁŽƌŬ ? ƚŚĞ ŽĨƚĞŶ ůĂƌŐĞ
differences in resources between employers and employees, as well as the uneven 
negative consequences of the relationship ending. For employees this could mean 
the loss of their livelihood and sense of purpose, whereas for organisation individual 
workers leaving may be less detrimental and may often be more easily replaced 
 ?ůǇƚŽŶ ĂŶĚ dƵƌŶďƵůů ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? Ǉ ĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐ ŽŶ  ‘ŵƵƚƵĂů ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ? ? ĂŶǇ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ
tensions over the purpose of work are largely absent from HRM.  For some, this 
represents a deliberate attempt by management to hide the real conflict and 
resistance that is fundamental to the work organisation by extending control through 
ideological means (Thompson, and Ackroyd, 1993). Under HRM employees are 
expected to see work quality as their individual responsibility, monitor their own 
ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ Žƌ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƉĞĞƌƐ ?  ‘ďƵǇ ŝŶ ? ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĨ ƚŚĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ
wilfully accept managerial control (Gabriel, 1999).  For others drawing on post-
structuralist theories, managerialist discourses such as HRM are not merely a tool for 
those in power, but a constitutive part of existing power relations, in which 
subjective knowledge of the organisation and individual identities are formed 
 ?<ŶŝŐŚƚƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ?  ‘,ZD ? ŝŶ ƉĂƌƚ ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ǀĂůƵĞ ŽĨ ǁŽƌŬ ŝƐ
understood, ordered, and divided and the way the employee understands their 
(subordinate) position in relation to the employer (Townley, 1993). In light of this 
interpretation, understandably some have cast HRM as a fundamentally or 
 ‘ƚŽƚĂůŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ ?ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?tŝůůŵŽƚƚ ? ? ? ?  ) ? 
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Based on these far reaching critiques of normative HRM and the problematic way in 
which it represents the organisation, employees and the employment relationship, 
there have been a number of suggestions as to how study of HRM should proceed. 
Legge (2004) advocates greater prominence of the descriptive behavioural approach 
to investigation of HRM, which compares normative modĞůƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵĞĚ
ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ,ZD ŝŶ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ǁŚŝůĞ ƉĂǇŝŶŐ ĐůŽƐĞ ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
problems and complexities identified above. Bach (2005) suggests that the meaning 
of HRM today has lost some of its most aspirational and prescriptive connotations 
and is now usually used to refer to all aspects of personnel and employment practice 
rather than specific high commitment styles. This move he suggests has dampened 
down some of the ideological concerns, with analysis now more fully taking into 
account the evolving political and economic context inside and outside the 
workplace. Down (1999), in an essay generally negative about the use of the term 
,ZD ƐƚĂƚĞƐ  ‘dŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ Ă ƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ? ĂŶĚ ,ZD ĚŽĞƐ
reflect a general but less than consistent shift to unitarist and individualised 
employment control practices, and it is that reality we should be interested in, not 
ďĂŶĂů ƵŶĂŶƐǁĞƌĂďůĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ǁŚĂƚ ŶĂŵĞƐ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂǀĞ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ? ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?
Watson (2004) advocates using some of the labels presented by normative HRM only 
in terms of the provision of a framework and language with which to view and 
describe different employment activities within contemporary business; so long it is 
kept in mind that the models represent an ideal (in the Weberian sense) rather than 
directly represent organisational reality. Taking this view, certain forms of description 
and labels can be argued to be more appropriate, fair and instructive than others. As 
an example of this, in talking about HRM straƚĞŐŝĞƐ  ‘ŚŝŐŚ ?ůŽǁ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ? ŝƐ
ƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽ ‘ŚĂƌĚ ?ƐŽĨƚ ? ?ĂƐŝƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĐŽŶĐĞĂůĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌƐ ?ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƚŽƵƐĞ
peoples efforts to further organisational goals.  
Bearing this in mind, this study seeks to investigate HRM from a descriptive 
behavioural perspective, with particular attention to the socio-cultural environment 
in which HRM practices are formed.  This includes recognition that the meaning of 
HRM can encompass a set of ideas, a management function, a department and 
specific activities. TherĞĨŽƌĞ  ‘,ZD ? ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĚŽŶĞƐŽůĞůǇ Žƌ ĞǀĞŶŵĂŝŶůǇ ďǇ
those in a HRM department, but is used as a term to cover all activities associated 
with managing work and employment dispersed throughout the organisation. The 
study seeks to describe the character of employment and of particular work 
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practices, and the consequences of these, particularly in terms of how they relate to 
perceptions of work and commitment, compliance and resistance to employer and 
managerial wishes, and particularly given the focus of the current study in relation to 
the objectives of public policy. This also points to the need for thorough examination 
of the constraints, conflicts and contingencies within the workplace. It is also 
acknowledged here that understanding and experience of HRM is not formed solely 
within the narrow confines of the individual organisation, but shaped within the 
wider organisational, societal and historical context. Ii is in view of this approach that 
the next two sections focus on relating HRM to the specific context of the study and 
identifying salient issues that are likely to have a bearing on the nature of HRM 
within Public-Private Partnerships.  
 
2.3 2nd Level: HRM in the Public Sector 
Following the proliferation of HRM throughout industry, in recent years there has 
been an ongoing push to reform labour relations in the public sector. However, the 
rise of HRM in this context has been far from straightforward. Alongside the generic 
tensions in employment management introduced above, the public sector has a 
number of additional characteristics which further problematises the realisation of 
particular models of HRM. Underpinning all discussions of public sector reform is 
recognition of the strong influence of various professional groups. Professions have 
played a key role in shaping the nature of many public services; particularly in 
healthcare where the powerful medical profession often continues to provide the 
dominant voice (Kitchener, 2002). In view of the influence of such professional 
groups as well as different structures and objectives, labour relations in the public 
sector have taken a historically divergent course, with a more enduring role of union 
representation and national employment agreements. This relates to the complex 
nature of many public services, the endemic challenges of the social problems they 
seek to address, and the political basis for resource allocation and decision making 
(Stewart and Ranson, 1994). Focusing on healthcare, this section presents an 
overview of attempts to implant HRM into the public sector, relating this to 
characteristics of the employment relationship within the public sector and the 
prospects for management.  
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2.3.1 NPM and the Push for HRM 
Related to many of the same themes of public sector change that gave rise to PPPs, 
the past decade has witnessed a sustained top-down push for transformation in 
public sector employment and change in the employment relationship (Buchan, 
2000; Boyne et al, 1999; Nutley 1999; Arrowsmith and Sisson 2002). Given the nature 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƚŚird-ǁĂǇ ? ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐůĂŝŵƐ Ă ďĂůĂŶĐĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŶĞŽ-liberalism of the 
ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝƐŵŽĨ  ‘KůĚ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?  ?'ŝĚĚĞŶƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? ƚŚĞ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽůĂďŽƵƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂĐĞŶƚƌĂůĂƌĞĂŽĨƉŽůŝĐǇƌĞĨŽƌŵ
and also the focus of much debate. In terms of union negotiation and participation of 
ƐƚĂƚĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ ? ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŚĂǀĞ ƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚ  ‘ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚŝŶŐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?
which emphasise constructive ongoing relationships (Legge, 2004). At the same time 
reform to employment management has been at the forefront of NPM attempts to 
increase efficiency, performance and value for money. Within public sector 
organisations, employment often represents by far the largest area of spending 
(Bailey, 1994), and the government has been under pressure to emulate private 
sector models to reduce costs and increase productivity (Horton, 2003). For some, 
the re-ordering of labour relations has been the central tenant of public sector 
change, with successive governments seeking to replace the traditional professional 
appeasement with decentralised corporate management (Arrowsmith and Sisson, 
2002). With respect to these trends, there has been a continued push from the top 
away from paternalistic welfare-focused Personnel Administration, toward the more 
individualistic, managerially led approach of Human Resource Management (Lucio 
and Stuart, 2002; Arrowsmith and Sisson, 2002).  
As with the generic approaches to HRM identified above, within the public sector a 
new emphasis has been placed on the strategic alignment between employment 
practices and policy aspirations (Lucio and Stuart, 2002; Arrowsmith and Sisson, 
2002). Rather than a focus on employee welfare within a context of national 
agreements, in principle the nature of employment management now promoted by 
the government is based around local decision making at the organisational level 
 ‘ĚƌŝǀĞŶ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚŽƐĞ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ũŽď
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ? ŚŝŐŚ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ŽƵƚƉƵƚ ? ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ƚŽ ĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ǀĂůƵĞ ĨŽƌ ŵŽŶĞǇ ?
(Farnham and Horton, 1996: 331). As identified above, strategic HRM theories have 
made a general assumption that managers have the discretion to shape the 
employment practices of their own organisation based on their own choices and 
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particular internal or external circumstances. In line with this, it has been argued that 
public sector restructuring that devolves responsibility to smaller, more independent 
units will be more capable of responding effectively and efficiently to local needs and 
circumstances. Encapsulating this view is the idea that breaking up existing state 
bureaucracies through handing power to independent trusts and introducing new 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ďĂƐĞĚ ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐ  ‘ǁŝůů ĚƌŝǀĞ ƚŚĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ŵƵĐŚ
more local and flexible systems of stafĨ ƌŽůĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƉĂǇ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ? ?  ?ŽƐĂŶƋƵĞƚ Ğƚ Ăů
 ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐǁĞůůĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝǀĞ,ZƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ‘ǁŚŝĐŚǁŝůů
ĐƌĞĂƚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌũŽďƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƉƌŝĚĞ ? ? ?ŽƐĂŶƋƵĞƚĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? 
Translating this logic into practice, New labour have consistently promoted new 
employment policies and strategies for public sector organisations that have 
emphasised rational decision-making, formalising the workforce needs in accordance 
with organisational performance requirements, and designing employment practices 
accordingly (Gould-Williams, 2003). In general there has been a move away from 
uniformity and standardisation, towards flexibility and differentiation based on local 
needs and circumstance (Boyne et al, 1999). Key aspects of HRM imported from the 
private sector have been performance-based rewards, reducing employment costs, 
ĂŶĚ ĂŶ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ŽŶ ,ZD ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐ ƚĂŬŝŶŐ Ă  ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ƌŽůĞ ?  ?dƌƵƐƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? /Ŷ
addition there has been a push for breaking down traditional boundaries between 
organisations and professional groups, reconfiguring the historical segregation of 
professional work towards more consumer-oriented practices that align with 
contemporary demands for service re-organisation, quality improvement, value for 
money and customer service (Farnham and Horton, 1996). In line with these general 
ĂƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘ǁŽƌŬĨŽƌĐĞ ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ŝŶ Ă
number of public sector organisations, designed to link pay and terms and conditions 
to specific tasks and markers of performance, rather that seniority and hierarchy 
(DoH, 2002; Loveday, 2006, Hyde et al, 2005). 
In many ways, healthcare has been at the forefront of these debates. Healthcare is 
one of the largest areas of budgetary expenditure, and the focus of much political 
attention (Pettigrew et al, 1992). Changes to employment have been a central 
component of New Labours reform policies for the NHS. Following up from the 2000 
ŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞƌĞĨŽƌŵĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŽ,ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ ‘,ZŝŶƚŚĞE,^WůĂŶ PŵŽƌĞ
staff wŽƌŬŝŶŐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůǇ ? ?dŚŝƐŽƵƚůŝŶĞĚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ĨŽƌ,ZD ?ƉƵƚƚŝŶŐ
forward a number of objectives and actions plans, including redesigning jobs, 
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changing career structures, improving staff moral, and promoting the HRM function. 
It particular, this outlined the plans for changing the composition of the NHS 
ǁŽƌŬĨŽƌĐĞ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŶĞǁƌŽůĞƐ ?ĂůƚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ƐŬŝůůŵŝǆ ?ĂŶĚĨŝůŝŶŐĂƌĞĂƐ
of previous staff shortages. During this period, the NHS underwent a significant 
expansion in the size of the workforce, with staff numbers increasing on average 
38,000 a year between 1997 and 2005, reaching a total of approximately 1.3 million 
in 2005 (IC, 2006). The HRM plan can be seen as attempting to consolidate these 
increases, matching the new resources with improvements in efficiency, through for 
example improving recruitment, retention and the output of the growing workforce. 
As well as outlining plans for reform, this document also reiterated aspirations from 
the previous era for the NHS to remain a  ‘ŵŽĚĞů ĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ? ? ŽƵƚůŝŶŝŶŐ ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ĨŽƌ
improved working conditions and work-life balance, lifelong learning, supportive 
leadership, and the involvement of staff in decision making.  
In putting these aspirations into practice, comprehensive new frameworks for 
employment were introduced. Perhaps the most high profile of all recent public 
ƐĞĐƚŽƌĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ E,^  ‘ŐĞŶĚĂ
ĨŽƌŚĂŶŐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚďĞŐĂŶƚŽďĞŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƌĂĚŝĐĂů
change to health employment since the NHS was founded in 1948, (DoH, 2002) this 
involved the analysis and re-grading of 650 professional and non-professional posts 
covering all NHS staff other than doctors, dentists and senior managers into nine pay 
bands based on job content rather than title or professional membership (DoH, 
2004a, 2005d). This intended to link pay structures to training programs such as the 
Skills Escalator and continuing efforts at role redesign (DoH, 2002a), in a way that 
made the link between work done and rewards more explicit, fair and manageable. 
Groups not covered have also undergone revisions in pay arrangements, such as the 
new consultant contracts (DoH, 2003b). These new frameworks have reported as 
leading to increases in the basic pay of most groups affected and harmonising pay 
levels, at least in the short term (Staines, 2009), while in theory giving management 
more control over workforce planning, providing them with tools for monitoring staff 
levels and skill mix, and allowing them to plan and enact organisationally appropriate 
personnel policies. 
Importantly, throughout the policy documents associated with these reforms it can 
ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŝƐ ůĂƌŐĞůǇ ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ ƵƉŽŶ ŝĚĞĂůƐ ŽĨ  ‘ŚŝŐŚ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?
 ‘ƐŽĨƚ ? Žƌ  ‘ďĞƐƚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝve approaches to HRM. The common principle 
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ƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƚĞǆƚƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ŵƵƚƵĂůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ ?ũŽď ƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞŝƌ
personal growth and organisational performance. The rhetoric of policy stresses the 
mutual benefits of supportive employment environments which encourage 
individuals to progress and fulfil their potential, while also contributing to the wider 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůŐŽĂůƐ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĂƌĞĂŽĨƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ‘ůŝĨĞůŽŶŐ
ůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ ? ŝƐ ĂďŽƵƚ  ‘ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ĂŶĚ ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ? ĂďŽƵƚ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƐƵƌe that our staff, the 
teams and organisations they relate to, and work in, can acquire new knowledge and 
skills, both to realise their potential and to help shape and change things for the 
ďĞƚƚĞƌ ? ?  ?Ž, ?  ? ? ? ? P ŝ ) ?ŽŶƐƚĂŶƚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶŵĂĚĞƚŽƚŚĞŶĞed to integrate 
the efforts of recruitment and retention, training and development, career 
progression and job design along generic best practice lines. Echoing aspects of 
WĨĞĨĨĞƌ ?ƐďĞƐƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ,ZD ?ƚŚĞŽ,ĂĚǀŝƐĞƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ P 
 ‘DŽĚĞƌŶŝƐŝŶŐ ǁŽƌŬĨŽƌĐĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽpment, education and training; increasing 
training places and widening access to training; developing substantial 
recruitment and retention and return to practice programmes; continuing 
action to improve the working lives of staff and helping NHS organisations to 
re-design jobs, career pathways and work roles so that staff can use their 
ƐŬŝůůƐŵŽƌĞĨůĞǆŝďůǇ ? ?Ž, ? ? ? ? ? ) 
Frequent links are made between rational HRM planning, quantitative monitoring of 
performance and capacity, individual achievement and improvements in overall 
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?EĞǁƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐǇƐƚĞŵƐĂƌĞƐĂŝĚƚŽ ‘ƌĞŶĞǁĂŶĚĞǆƚĞŶĚ
[employees] skills and knowledge so they can move up the escalator. At the same 
time roles and workload pass down where appropriate, giving greater job satisfaction 
ĂŶĚ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ŐĂŝŶƐ ?  ?Ž,  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? /Ŷ ŽƚŚĞƌ ǁ ƌĚƐ ? ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ
development systems create win-win scenarios as staff continue to progress upwards 
with roles that are increasingly enriching and productive for themselves and the 
organŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚŝƐ  ‘ďĞƐƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚĂĐƌŽƐƐ ƚŚĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ
the HRM model including flexible working practices, inclusive management styles, job 
design and appraisal systems. 
This approach promoted by the government has received some support in theory 
and in practice. In view of strategic models of HRM, many of the employment 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞĚǁŽƵůĚĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽĨŝƚǁŝƚŚŐŽĂůƐŽĨ ‘ƋƵĂůŝƚǇĞŶŚĂŶĐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?^ĐŚƵůĞƌ
and Jackson, 1987). Traditionally employment in the public sector is often 
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represented as already involving some aspects of best practice found in the private 
sector (Hughes, 2003) and public sector managers have been found to place more 
emphasis on training, involvement in decision-making and equal opportunities 
(Boyne et al 1999) ? DĂŶǇ ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ? ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞ ? ŝŶǀŽůǀĞ  ‘ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů
ůĂďŽƵƌ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂů ǁŽƌŬ ?  ?ĂƌůĞǇ ĂŶĚ <ƵŶĚĂ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ŝŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
service is to some extent created within the interpersonal interaction between the 
employees and consumers (or patients), requiring empathy, emotional involvement 
and the application of tacit knowledge particular to each case. Accordingly, outcome 
quality has been commonly seen as dependent on the cooperative involvement and 
commitment of employees throughout the organisation (Morgan and Allington 2002; 
Lucio and Stewart, 2002; Siddiqui and Kleiner, 1998). High commitment practices 
have been linked with both improvements in public sector organisational 
performance and employee satisfaction and motivation (Gould-Williams, 2004). 
tŝƚŚŝŶŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞ ?ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŽĨ ‘ŚŝŐŚĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ?ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ
linked empirically with various positive clinical outcomes, for example increases in 
overall quality of care (Aiken at al, 2002), lower infection rates and patient 
satisfaction (Needleman at al, 2002) and reduced mortality (West et al, 2002).  
dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ĂƉƉĞĂƌ ƚŽ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƐŽŵĞ ĨŽƌŵƐ ŽĨ  ‘ŚŝŐŚ
ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ?,ZDƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĂŶĚŚĂǀĞŵŽƌĞůĞĞǁĂǇƚŽƚĂŬĞĂůŽŶŐ-term approach to 
staff investment than some other areas of industry. However, the multiplicity of their 
aims and complexity of operations mean that linking specific models of HRM to 
outcomes is perhaps more, not less, difficult. Further, while often not subject to 
immediate market competition, they do not operate outside the common pressures 
on employment. Within the NHS a recent major review of current evidence has 
pointed out the complications in linking particular employment practices with 
organisational outcomes and concludes that despite some interesting study results, 
ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇ ŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ůŝŶŬ ĂŶǇ ƐŝŶŐůĞ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ,ZD  ‘ŐŽŽĚ
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?,ǇĚĞĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŚŽƐƚŽĨƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŵƉůŝĞƐƚŚĂƚ
even if definite links could be found between the HRM approach and positive 
organisational outcomes, extending these practices through policy reform has been 
far from straightforward. As already identified, even within a single organisation, 
there may be a number of constraints on choice between HRM practices (Purcell and 
ŚůƐƚƌĂĚ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ĂƐ  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ƉŽůŝĐǇ ƉƌĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ǁĞůů ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ
institutions, procedures, values and expectations may serve to influence the exercise 
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of choice on management style, the deployment of corporate personnel resources 
ĂŶĚďĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐůĞǀĞů ? ?<ĞƐƐůĞƌĂŶĚWƵƌĐĞůů ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐĞǆƉůŽƌĞ
some of these particular constraints to HRM within the public sector, focusing in on 
professional autonomy, labour relations, and the multiplicity of values. 
2.3.2 Professional Organisation of Work 
A major feature of public sector life with significant implications for how work is 
organised is the pervasive influence of multiple professional groups. Analysis of the 
professions represents a rich stream of sociological research, and extensive literature 
from has covered the definitions, histories, influence, characteristics and structures 
of professions and professional organisations. Relevant to the current study, 
influential texts have identified how protection and control over domains of work 
and expertise are key elements of professional occupations (Freidson, 1970, Abbott, 
1988). Rather than merely specialists in particular skills or knowledge, professions are 
also signifiers of social stratification, with professional groups indicative of claims to 
authority over a particular subject matter, work area or collection of tasks. The status 
of such professional groups affords rewards such as legitimacy and autonomy in 
decision making and control over the content and terms of their work, and in broad 
ƚĞƌŵƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ůŝĐĞŶƐĞ ƚŽ ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞ ǁŚĂƚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĚŽŶĞ ? ŚŽǁ ŝƚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĚŽŶĞ ĂŶĚ
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐďĞŝŶŐĚŽŶĞƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ ? ?ƵĐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ZĞĐĞŶƚůǇƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ
as to whether professions have retained this license, with some associating the wide 
ƐĐĂůĞĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐŽĨ ‘ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ?ĂƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝǀĞŽĨĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƐ
to display competence, certainty and self-motivation in more insecure or competitive 
environments (Fourneir, 2002). Within traditional professional occupations however, 
professional autonomy has continued to be seen as tending to limit the degree to 
which others, including managers and policy makers, are able to dictate the way 
work is divided and carried out (Currie et al, 2009b).  
To this end, some professions have over time become strongly embedded, and are 
ǁŝĚĞůǇ ĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ ĂƐ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ĂůŵŽƐƚ ĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ Žƌ  ‘ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ŵĂŶĚĂƚĞƐ ?
(Halliday, 1985) over a particular area of expertise or service.  A paradigmatic 
example of professional control is that of the standing of medicine in relation to 
diagnosing and treating illness (Freidson, 1970). In western societies, medicines 
dominance over this domain is largely unchallenged with the status of doctors as 
practitioners of medicine protected in numerous ways including mandatory training 
and qualification, national associations, standard career paths, formal and informal 
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networks, accepted hierarchies of command and intricate segmentation, as well as 
legal rights and responsibilities. Through their long history, professions in health care 
and medicine have gained a broadly recognised and legitimate cultural status 
(Hafferty and Light, 1995). These institutional practices are passed on to individual 
members, reinforced by long period of socialisation through extended generalist 
training followed by increasing specialisation (Becker et al, 1961). Professional groups 
are therefore usually seen as a primary source of workplace identity, support and 
shared organisational meaning. Professionals in organisations are far more likely to 
be the recipients of new information within their fields, and have the legitimacy to 
promote innovations. Further, the intensity of professional membership entails the 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?  ‘ĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŝĐ ĐƵůƚƵƌĞƐ ?  ?&Ğƌlie et al, 2005) and 
ongoing interactions with people practicing similar day to day work, with similar 
values and aspirations. For such reasons, professions within health have been usually 
observed as the fundamental peer reference group for sharing norms, values, 
knowledge and advice (Waring, 2009; Swan and Newell, 1995). 
In addition, this dominance of the medical profession has played a large role in 
shaping national health systems throughout the world, with many of the norms, 
cultures and regulations within healthcare strongly influenced by those of the 
medical profession (Kitchener, 2002). At its inception, and to some extent continuing 
to the present day, the organisation and structure of the NHS reflects and maintains 
the authority and internal social structure of pre-existing medical groups (Klein, 
2006).  There is some indication that this is changing, with doctors increasingly vocal 
about being left out of managerial and policy decisions and processes, and 
constrained by regulation and accountability (Rosenthal, 2002), or adopting new 
professional identities in light of public sector reforms and cultural changes (Jones 
and Green, 2006). However, there is also little doubt that various professions play a 
key role in shaping healthcare practice at the local level (Waring, 2007), and also 
maintain a unique relationship with the state.  
In this respect, not all professions or branches within each profession are equal. 
Rather professional and occupational groups are located within structures of 
relationships, in terms of status, hierarchy, division of tasks and acceptable modes of 
interaction and collaboration. A prime example of this is the relationship between 
doctors and nurses. Although nurses have taken on different roles throughout their 
history, with recent moves towards professionalisation (Dingwall and Allen 2000; 
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While 2005), they are still today usually viewed as subordinate to doctors, acting as 
ŚĂŶĚŵĂŝĚĞŶƐ Žƌ ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶƚƐ ? ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ ĐĂƌĞ ĂŶĚ  ‘ǁĂŝƚŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ƚŽ ŐĞƚ ďĞƚƚĞƌ ?
(Radcliffe 2000: 1085), while doctors apply expert medical knowledge to provide 
ĚŝĂŐŶŽƐŝƐ ĂŶĚ ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ĐƵƌĞ ƚŚĞŵ  ?&ĂŐŝŶ ĂŶĚ 'ĂƌĞůŝĐŬ ?  ? ?   ) ? tŚŝůĞ ĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ?
professional status is largely uncontested, nursing as a profession is seen as more 
problematic (Liaschenko and Peter, 2004; Crawford et al, 2008; Kirpal, 2004). Within 
medicine itself, numerous sources of stratification can be seen that have all played at 
different times and in different ways a significant part in shaping how health services 
are organised.  These include divisions between surgeons and physicians; between 
primary and hospital care; between medical divisions and specialties; between those 
involved in different collegial activities such as research, teaching, and the spread of 
innovations; between ranks and across locations. 
Further, structured relations between professional groups are not stable or fixed, but 
liable to change in response to social, technological and market change and inter-
professional competition. Through historical and contemporary comparative analysis, 
Abbott (1988) portrayed how each profession does not practice independently, but 
exists within an interdependent system, with shifting jurisdictional boundaries 
dividing the contested terrain of professional practice. This analysis proposes that 
professionals provide expert services for human problems which can contain both 
objective and subjective elements that are in part culturally defined. As societies and 
technologies change, new problems emerge and existing problems are understood in 
different ways, the tasks involved in the practice of a service are also modified. This 
opens space for various challenges to existing jurisdictions, for example as new 
occupations are established or existing professions claim control over the new tasks. 
Further, ongoing ambiguities in the routines of practice and division of tasks open 
space for negotiations over the precise role of each professional group (Svensson, 
1996). In the contest or negotiations for control, numerous factors come into play, 
includŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĂŐƌŽƵƉ ?ƐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĨŽƌŵĂůŝƐĞĚĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ůĞŐĂů
or political mandates, integration into national infrastructure, perceptions of 
legitimacy, and the type of concrete or abstract knowledge professed. Based on 
these attributes, professional practice is formed in a dynamic system of negotiated 
power and control.  
In light of these processes, the professionalised environment of public organisations 
has widespread implications for healthcare employment reform. A wide range of 
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recent studies have considered the relationship between organisational change and 
public sector professional/occupational groups, focusing on the challenges posed on 
both sides by the incompatibility of professional autonomy and the rationalising 
tendencies of management (Alford, 1975; Harrison, 1999; Hunter, 1996; Light, 1995). 
Two recent and relevant examples illustrate how the dynamics of professions relate 
to government policy in the re-organisation of healthcare work. First, Currie et al 
(2009a) investigate the introduction of a new professional role, the modern matron, 
and their ability to tackle healthcare acquired infections. Although modern matrons 
were mandated by policy, they find limited scope for them to enact their envisaged 
role in the face of existing professional hierarchies. In the drive for professional 
status, nursing has established new structures of nursing management, and norms of 
practice based on expert technical tasks, with certain technical tasks inherited from 
medics, and certain care tasks handed down to health care assistants. These were 
ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ĂƐ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŶŐ ŵĂƚƌŽŶƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƌĞƚƵƌŶŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŚĂŶĚƐ ŽŶ ? ĚŝƌĞĐƚ
departmental authority based on holistic patient care they had held in the past. 
Second, Hyde et al (2005) looks at attempts at role redesign in the Changing 
Workforce Programme. They found that redesign initiatives were most successful 
when matched by changes in remuneration, accountability and training. However, 
when role redesign led to the alteration of professional boundaries, imposing change 
was more difficult, as for example they clashed with existing pay scales, management 
structures, or threatened territories of professional practice.  
In summary, while reforms have sought to reduce ability of professional groups to 
dictate their own term and conditions of employment, as well as the character and 
design of work, the above literature suggests that professional groups continue to 
play an important role. This has important implications for HRM within PPPs, as the 
degree to which management can design systems of employment is then likely to be 
strongly influenced by the professional groups that constitute the workforce. 
2.3.3 Industrial Relations and Employment Culture 
Aside from the widespread professionalisation, public sector organisations can be 
said to be distinct from those of private enterprise in a number of ways (Boyne, 2002; 
McDonough, 2006; Pratchet and Wingfield, 1996; Supiot, 1996; Stackman, 2006). 
Differences in ownership, funding, organisational structures, legal and social 
responsibilities can all be seen as having an impact on the nature of employment and 
the relations between employees and managers. Two related characteristics that 
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have a large bearing on the degree to which the organisation of work is subject to 
managerial control are the continuing role of collective industrial relations, as well as 
ƚŚĞƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐŶŽƌŵƐĂŶĚǀĂůƵĞƐ ?ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂƐƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐƐĞĐƚŽƌ ‘ĞƚŚŽƐ ? ? 
According to Farnham and Horton (1996), employment management in the public 
sector has been traditionally distinguishable by four key factors; a more paternalistic 
style, greater standardisation of employment practices across organisations, more 
ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀŝƐĞĚ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ Ă ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĂƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ  ‘ŵŽĚĞů
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ? ǁŝƚŚregard to such things as equal opportunities and fair terms and 
conditions (Farnham and Horton, 1996). From the viewpoint of industrial relations, 
current public sector reforms can be seen as attempting to shift the basis of fair 
employment away from collective standardised agreements, towards an approach 
ƚŚĂƚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ Ă  ‘ĨĂŝƌ ĚĞĂů ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ůŝŶŬŝŶŐ ƌĞǁĂƌĚƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ǁŽƌŬ ƚĂƐŬƐ ĂŶĚ
employee skills and performance (Boyne et al 1999). In a extension of third way 
ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂŶĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶĂ ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽ
locate new management-union relations within the context of a broader set of 
interests such as those of the individual and, in particular, those of the employer and 
ƚŚĞ ĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌ ?  ?>ƵĐŝŽ ĂŶĚ ^ƚƵĂƌƚ ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ?  ŐƌĞĂƚer stress is placed on joint 
decision making in order to find ways in which organisational activities can lead to 
mutual gains for both the individual employee and the wider organisation; 
 ‘WĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ĂƐƐƵŵĞƐ Ă ƐŚŝĨƚ ƚŽ  ‘ƐŽĨƚ ? ? ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚ-driven HRM strategies that are 
ƐĞĞŶĂƐďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂůƚŽĂůůƐŝĚĞƐ ? ?>ƵĐŝŽĂŶĚ^ƚƵĂƌƚ ? ? ? ? ? P ?   )  
Recent research has suggested that in the public sector there remains a much greater 
focus on standardised and collective employment relations (Boyne, et al, 1999) with 
pay agreements continuing to be set at the national level and greater union 
membership and staff participation (Farnham et al, 2003; Buchan, 2000). Within UK 
industry as a whole, the last thirty years has seen the proportion of employees 
covered by collective agreements drop from around four fifths to currently around 
two fifths (Brown et al, 2000). However, within the public sector their remains a 
much stronger role for unions and national agreements, with currently 60% of 
employees covered (Millward et al, 2000). ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ? ‘ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
conventional state role as a model employer, such as staff training and the 
promotion of equal opportunities, are still more likely to be found in public 
organisationƐ ? ?ŽǇŶĞĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?,ĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞŝŶƉarticular has been found to be 
highly resistant to changes to national agreements. Attempts to introduce more 
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flexible, locally determined approaches to pay have been seen as difficult in light of 
ongoing employee expectations of pay in line with occupational skills, professional 
status and the perpetuation of the national industrial relations framework (Grimshaw 
2000). Similarly, Arrowsmith and Sissons (2002) conclude in a study of the impact of 
HRM reforms in the NHS that local pay deals or performance based pay have failed to 
materialise. However, they do suggest that HRM departments have been more 
instrumental in pushing through other areas of local flexibility, particularly in relation 
to working time arrangements.    
Other studies have further explored the role of the HRM function within individual 
NPM or post NPM era public sector organisations in more detail. As already discussed 
even within the private sector, the ability of the personnel function to take on a 
 ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ? ƌŽůĞ  ?hůƌŝĐŚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? WƵƌĐĞůů ? 1989) is often limited (e.g. Purcell and 
Ahlstrand, 1994), and in the public sector unique cultural and political factors come 
into play. To give illustrative examples, Oswick and Grant (1996) point to centrally 
imposed financial constraints shaping and restricting the practices of local human 
resource departments. Harris (2005) and Givan (2005) find the drive for greater 
performance monitoring of HR activities was problematic due to a number of 
contextual factors such as a distrust of externally generated guidelines, the 
inappropriateness of centrally defined targets, and continuing time and resource 
constraints that hinder full and effective evaluation. Truss (2003) outlines how a 
number of common public sector considerations can restrict the strategic role of 
personnel, including the centrally set national policy and targets, the dominance of 
professional bodies that reinforce established training systems and career pathways, 
and the embedded administrative role of the HR function. Finally, a collection of 
associated studies (Proctor and Currie, 1999; Currie and Proctor, 2001) show how 
multifarious groups play some part in determining the personnel role, with 
perceptions of what these roles are may vary throughout the organisation. In these 
studies, while the personnel department itself may portray it has successfully taken 
on a strategic role, divisional middle managers viewed the personnel department as 
having merely retreated from day to day activities, both dumping extra work on 
divisions, as well as policing their output.  
Further analysis has argued that the introduction of private sector HRM models and 
non-standard employment has over the past 20 years created a number of 
differences in employment relationships, but these have been most strongly felt on 
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the periphery of the workforce, for example most strongly affecting non-professional 
workers, or site services staff such as cleaners, catering or maintenance staff. For 
example in one study of health care, local government and higher education, Morgan 
and Allington (2002) conclude that there has been a large increase in flexible 
workers, casual and agency staff and fixed term contracts and a reduction in the size 
of the permanent workforce, as well as changes to industrial relations practice. This 
has already led to much greater differentiation across the workforce: 
 ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨũŽďƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽďĞĂƚůĞĂƐƚĂƚǁŽ-tier system 
of employment operating in the public sector where a minority now have 
permanent jobs and a majority have a mixture of temporary, part-time, 
short-and fixed-term contracts. The job insecurity this engenders seems likely 
to continue, further fractionalising public services and creating divisions 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌ ? ?DŽƌŐĂŶĂŶĚůůŝŶŐƚŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) 
However, amongst the more powerful groups there remains a resistance to 
corporate level HRM.  This would appear to indicate a possible link between 
prevailing norms and values and expectations over the collective and individualised 
aspects of employment. Distinctive values of the public sector are captured in the 
ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ŝĚĞĂ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ĞƚŚŽƐ ? ? dƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ?ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ƐŽĐŝĂů ǀĂůƵĞƐ ĂƌĞ
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ ? ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ
political neutrality, loyalty, honesty, trustworthiness, fairness, incorruptibility and 
serving the public interest, (Farnham and Horton, 1996).  Pratchett and Winfield 
 ? ? ? ? ? ) ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚ ƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ  ‘ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?  ‘ƉƵďůŝĐ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ?  ‘ĂůƚƌƵŝƐŵ ? ĂŶĚ
 ‘ůŽǇĂůƚǇ ? ? dŚĞƐĞ ĐĂŶ Ăůů ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ ĂĨĨĞĐƚŝŶŐ ƉĞƌĐĞƉtions of what constitute fair 
employment practices, levels of commitment, effort and responsibilities at work and 
can be related to various features of public employment such as differences in 
ownership, social orientation and institutional history (Du Gay, 2000). These could 
also be reflective of the specific demographic characteristics of the public sector, in 
which older and female workers are overrepresented in comparison to the workforce 
in general. There is however some suggesting that a distinctive ethos is diminishing in 
the context of ongoing public service reforms (McDonough 2006), with such fears 
widely cited in opposition to the introduction of change. In contrast to this, John and 
Johnson (2008) based on the British Social Attitudes Survey find a continued and 
significant difference in the values of public and private sector employees, with 
public sector employees much more likely to emphasis the social value in their work, 
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autonomy in their job role, and intrinsic rewards outside of pay and direct benefits. 
Aside from these differences in measurement, the public sector ethos is commonly 
accepted as conducive to a number of desirable organisational and employee 
ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ƵƐƵĂůůǇ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ  ‘ŚŝŐŚ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ? ĨŽƌŵƐ ŽĨ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
private sector, such as greater commitment, motivation, loyalty and satisfaction, 
even in the face of increasing job insecurity and negative assessments of 
management policies (Guest and Conway, 2001). 
In summary, certain aspects of public service make it both conducive to and 
ƌĞĐĞƉƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ  ‘ŚŝŐŚ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ? ƚǇƉĞ ,ZD ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?
professionalisation, national agreements on terms and conditions, and the distinctive 
ethos of the public sector may all stand in opposition to instrumental managerial 
control (Kessler and Purcell, 1996; Buchan 2000), and contribute to an environment 
that is in many ways unsuitable for the direct transplant of normative models of 
managerially designed HRM practices.  Changes to pay and working conditions are 
commonly resisted (Arrowsmith and Sisson, 2002) and the intentions of centralised, 
top-down HR policy and strategy are often ignored, re-interpreted or dramatically 
modified by managers and employees with respect to their local context (Proctor and 
Currie, 1999; Stewart and Walsh, 1992). In addition, the HRM function often has to 
deal with the potentially conflicting demands of employers, employees and 
professional norms (Truss, 2008). 
 
2.4 3rd Level: HRM in Public Private Partnerships 
The final level of literature is that which points to new challenges posed for HRM in 
public-private partnership arrangements. This section first briefly outlines the 
emergence of recent public private partnership and their common forms. It then 
goes on to explore non-traditional organisational forms disrupt notions of an 
integrated employment relationship. This is then applied to the particular case of 
PPPs and the prospects for the HRM agenda. It looks at how this creates additional 
limitations over HRM styles and strategies, challenges for the HRM function and their 
ability to reconfigure working practices, as well as issues of training and learning, 
consistency in employment and existing forms of commitment. Following this, a 
number of questions are derived regarding the prospects for HRM in recent 
healthcare PPPS.  
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2.4.1 Public Private Partnerships: Emergence and Recent Developments 
Although examples of joint ventures between public and private institutions can be 
found throughout history (Wettenhall, 2005; Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Saint Martin, 
2000), the current era of Public Private Partnerships is most frequently examined 
alongside similar trends that led to push for HRM. Namely the New Public 
DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?EWD )ĂƌŝƐŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞEĞǁZŝŐŚƚƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŽĨ ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?'ƌŝŵƐŚĂǁ ?Ğƚ ?Ăů ?
2002). While many services were privatised during this period, others like the NHS 
were less straightforwardly removed from state ownership and control (Le Grand, 
1999; Iliffe and Munro 2000). However, there were efforts to subject the health 
ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ‘ƚŽƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞŽĨ ƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚĂƐĂǁĂǇƚŽĚŽ ‘ŵŽƌĞǁŝƚŚůĞƐƐ ? ? ?^ĂŝŶƚDĂƌƚŝŶ ?
2000:9). Within the subsequent market reforms of the NHS (Klein, 2006), several 
steps were taken that allowed increasing private capital involvement. GPs were 
encouraged to manage the budgets provided to them and act as gatekeepers to 
services. Together with regional health authorities they purchased health services 
from a number of providers such as hospitals and mental health organisations who 
themselves were reorganised into NHS Trusts. This decentralisation opened the door 
for increasing private sector involvement. For example, external contractors were 
increasingly employed to supply services such as care for the elderly as well as 
infrastructure building projects (Laing and Buisson, 2004; Curwin, 1999). Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering (CCT) was introduced for ancillary services such as cleaning 
and catering. This initiative stated that internal departments within organisation had 
to compete with other private sector providers for service contracts to demonstrate 
they were getting the best value for public money (Grimshaw et. al, 2000; Kelliher, 
1996).  
When New Labour came to power in 1997 they professed a move away from 
Conservative market control mechanisms and privatisation, towards a vision of 
 ‘ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ  ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?  ?ůĂƌĞŶĐĞĂŶĚWĂŝŶƚĞƌ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ?Ɛ
the largest, and to some extent archetypal public service (Klein, 2006), the NHS has 
been a consistent focus of New Labour governance reforms, with ideals of 
partnership and networks consistently held up within policy (Entwistle and Martin, 
2005). Initiatives at all levels have been put forward as embodying the network 
approach, seeking to link professionals from primary, secondary and tertiary care 
 ‘ƵŶĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚ ďǇ ĞǆŝƐting professional and organisational boundaries to ensure 
ĞƋƵŝƚĂďůĞ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ŚŝŐŚ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? ĐůŝŶŝĐĂůůǇ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?  ?Ž, ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ) ?
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However, many aspects of the New Public Management agenda have remained at 
the centre of health service thinking. Managerial ideals such as efficiency, 
competition, value for money and entrepreneurialism are unquestioningly accepted 
 ?'ƌŝŵƐŚĂǁ Ğƚ ? Ăů ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? tŚĂƚ ?Ɛ ŵŽƌĞ ? ƚŚĞ ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ĨŽƌ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐ
private businesses into health care investment and delivery have been fully 
embraced (Gafney, 1999). Indeed private sector involvement, invariably labelled as 
Public-Private Partnership, became far more widespread under the New Labour 
government than the Conservatives (Robinson, 2000). Rather than straight-up 
privatisation, this was portrayed as being a new approach, capable of creating public 
services that are distinct from those that existed in the past. For example, an IPPR 
report advocating partnerships between sectors succinctly captures government 
rhetoric of the time: 
 ‘KŶ ƚŚĞŽŶĞŚĂŶĚǁĞ ƚŽƚĂůůǇ ƌĞũĞĐƚ ƚŚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĞƌƐ ?ǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨƉƵďůŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ P
their aim is always and everywhere to increase the role of the private sector 
ŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂŶĚĨƵŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƉƵďůŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ? Q ?KŶƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?ǁĞĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ
ourselves from a public monopoly perspective which holds that as a matter 
of principle public services should always and everywhere be provided by the 
ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ  ? Q ? 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŚĂƐ ƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ ƌĞůǇ ŽŶ ƚŽŽ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ Ă ƉŽŽů ŽĨ
service providers and too restrictive an approach towards undertaking large 
capital projects. This has resulted in public services missing out on the skills, 
creativity, and areas of expertise that reside in a wide range of private and 
ǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ?/WWZ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) 
Partnerships are often seen as the public sector equivalent of networks, capable of 
overcoming the problems associated with both the hierarchical and the quasi-market 
and promoted as capable of delivering increases to the efficiency and effectiveness 
of state run activities (Ferlie and Pettigrew, 1996; Ferlie, and McGivern 2003: 16).  In 
line with the key characteristics of networks, partnerships are said to involve 
altruism, trust, cooperation, collaboration, alliances, multi-agency work, inter-agency 
work, and working together (Exworthy, 1999). Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) describe 
ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉƐ ĂƐ  ‘ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝǀĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ǁŝƚŚ ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞƐ ? ǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇ  ?Žƌ ŶŽŶ-
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂů )ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶŶĞĚďǇĨŽƌŵĂůŝƐĞĚ
 ‘ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ǁŚich is given concrete expression through the 
creation of an organisational structure  W ĂƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉďŽĂƌĚŽƌĨŽƌƵŵ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ? 
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In seeking to describe current relationships between the public and private sector, 
Linder (1999) spells out a widely recognised paradox. During the privatisation in 
1980s, the underlying rationale was that private providers would provide higher 
quality goods and services at lower cost due to discipline provided by competitive 
market pressures. Conversely, the hallmark of partnership is supposedly cooperation 
rather than competition. Rather than customer exit and profit, partnerships intend to 
stabilise volatile markets and work to lessen direct competitive pressures. Therefore 
private firms are advocated as a good thing due to competitive advantages shaped 
under market pressures, but then expected to continue to develop such advantages 
when protected from market failure. Proponents of PPPs argue that this paradox is 
mitigated by a coming together of values that gives rise to trust and understanding 
between partners and allow additional competencies to develop. The most recent 
ƌĞƉŽƌƚ  ?DĂƌĐŚ  ? ? ? ? ) ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ WƌŝǀĂƚĞ &ŝŶĂŶĐĞ /ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚ  ‘W&/ P
^ƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐ >ŽŶŐ dĞƌŵ WĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ W&/ ƐĐŚĞŵĞƐ ĞŵďŽĚǇ Ă  ‘ƐƉŝƌŝƚof 
ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŽƌƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ĨŽƌƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ  “ƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ
ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŽƌƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ĂůǁĂǇƐ ƐĞĞŬ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ĞĂĐŚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞƐ ĂŶĚ
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ Ă ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ  ? Q ? ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ Ă ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ǀŝƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŚŽǁ ƚŚĞǇ ǁŝůů
work together tŽ ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĂ ŵƵƚƵĂůůǇ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ? ?  ?dƌĞĂƐƵƌǇ
report, 2006 p14) 
However, these aspirations of trust and mutual understanding are stated as desirable 
characteristics, not necessary conditions for a PPP to be founded. Indeed studies 
have ŽĨƚĞŶ ĨŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ŽĨ  ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚůǇ ůĂĐŬŝŶŐ
(Teisman and Klijn, 2002; Pollock, 2004). In practice, within the context of the NHS 
the term PPP has been applied loosely, with the Department of Health using 
 ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ‘ƚo describe the relationship between public and private sectors in any 
ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƐŽŵĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂůŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ‘ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌƐŚŽƌƚƚĞƌŵ
Žƌ ŝŶƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ?  ?&ŝĞůĚ ĂŶĚ WĞĐŬ ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ) ?  /ƚ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƉŽŝŶƚĞĚ ŽƵƚ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ
definition of PPP is often constructed at a local level, varying greatly depending on 
the purpose, location, actors involved, timescale, and process by which the 
partnership is carried out (Atkinson, 1999, cited in Mcquaid, 2000: McQuaid, 2000). 
Similarly Wettenhall (2003: 80) ƐƚĂƚĞƐ  ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ŽĨƚĞŶ ůŝƚƚůĞ ƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ŝŶ ŚŽǁ
 ‘ ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ?ŝƐƵƐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚďĞůŝĞĨƚŚĂƚǁŚĂƚŝƚƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽŝƐ ‘ ‘ĂŐŽŽĚƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?ƐĞĞŵƐŵƵĐŚ
ŵŽƌĞ Ă ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ŽĨ ĨĂŝƚŚ ƚŚĂŶ ŽĨ ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? 'ŝǀĞŶ ƚŚŝƐ ? Ă ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂů ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ WƵďůŝĐ
Private Partnerships is problematic. However, the term has widely applied to a 
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number of schemes within healthcare. For example under PFI arrangements first 
embarked upon under the conservative government in 1992 (Curwin, 1999) but 
greatly expanded by New Labour, the private sector supply capital investment for 
public services, usually involving the provision of property and frequently ongoing 
facilities management services such as cleaning, property maintenance and catering, 
over a long time span (typically 20-30 years), in return for an annual charge, with 
varying degrees of flexibilities and contingencies (Broadbent et. al. 2000). In some 
cases this has seen the work of services staff transferred to the private sector, or in 
others, work is subcontracted further to other companies. With the introduction of 
ƚŚĞƐĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ ?ŝƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉƵďůŝĐĂŶĚƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ
ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ďĞĐŽŵĞ ƐŽ ďůƵƌƌĞĚ ĂƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ǀŝƌƚƵĂůůǇ ƵŶƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĂďůĞ ?  ?/ůŝĨĨĞ ĂŶĚ DƵŶƌŽ ?
2000:322). 
Aside from PFI, the private sector has also become involved in a number of additional 
services. Many parts of long term care has been in the process of being transferred to 
the private sector since the Community Care Act in 1990 (OPSI, 1990), in which the 
cost of care was shifted to local authorities, who then encouraged individuals to fund 
their own care when possible, particularly the case with nursing care for older 
people. This was been extended under the New Labour government who encouraged 
further use of the private sector for intermediate care for patients recovering from 
ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚďƵƚƵŶĨŝƚƚŽƌĞƚƵƌŶŚŽŵĞ ?hŶĚĞƌƚŚĞůĂďĞůŽĨ ‘ĞƐƚsĂůƵĞ ? ?ĂƉŽůŝĐǇ
ƚŚĂƚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ ůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐƚŽĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐĂƌĞ  ‘ĐŽƐƚ-ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?
by comparison with those of other providers, most long term care, especially for 
older people, is now carried out by independent sector organisations (Laing and 
Buisson, 2004). In primary care, new nurse led walk-in centres and GP practices have 
opened in commercial spaces (Guardian, 2007). There is currently discussion as to 
how these types of services can be extended, with private primary care providers 
opening facilities in connection with private retailers and supermarkets to be paid for 
on a per visit basis. Furthermore there has been a slight increase in the role for 
pharmacies that may offer immunisation jabs and routine surgery. In secondary care, 
various forms private sector diagnostic and treatment services are regularly 
ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞĚďǇE,^ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ?dŚŝƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚŽŶĞďŽƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ƐƉŽƚĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ ?




One way of seeking to understand these partnerships is in the structure of inter-
organisational agreements. Helping to categorise emerging partnership, researchers 
have attempted to identify different features of contractual inter-organisational 
relationships. Away from of public services research, Child (1987) explores a number 
of contractual arrangements that offer various points in between full hierarchical 
integration and pure market based contracting-out, some of which contain features 
of partnership working in various degrees. Within this framework, four different 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂů ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶ ?dŚƌĞĞŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ?  ‘Ž-ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚŝŶŐ ? ?  ‘ŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚ
ŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚ >ŝŶŬƐ ? Ăůů ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐ  ŽĨ ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉƐ
working, but are structured in different ways. Co-contracting occurs when a small 
number of firms with different resources and expertise become involved in a joint 
venture to share the same market. Policy and division of labour is jointly decided, 
resources are expertise are pooled and risks and benefits of success are shared. 
Alternatively, the coordinated contracting mode involves a single principle and a 
number of subcontractors as agents who supply goods or services to an agreed 
performance specification. The relationship here is ongoing and trust and 
cooperation may be sufficient to handle contingencies. Finally, coordinated revenue 
links primarily refer to franchising operation, and are usually underpinned by tight 
but ongoing contract, with the relationship dependent on the reputation of the 
agent. A spot network on the other hand more closely resembles more conventional 
notions of market relationship, with tight contractual controls on the behaviour of 




Table 3 Modes of Organising Transactions, adapted from Child (1987) 
Organising Mode Control & Coordination Common Examples 
Integrated hierarchy Direct authority relations  Single product firm 
 
Semi hierarchy Arms length control & 
periodic review 
Multi-division firm holding 
company  
 
Co-contracting  Arms-length control but the 
organisation also mediates 
between co-contractors  
 
Mutual organisation joint 
ventures 
Coordinated contracting  Use of agreed specifications 





Spot network  Limited to the terms of the 
contract 
Market transacting between 
independent traders 
 
   
Within public services, Bovaird (2006) explores how the different structure of 
suppliers and purchases may impact on the current scene of public sector 
contracting. He outlines the possibility that in house (hierarchical) provision and 
conventional contracting-out (based on market choice of several providers) is being 
joined by a number new forms of public sector procurement. Collaborations of 
varying nature affect single commissioners and contractors (relational contracting), 
multiple commissioning bodies with a unified procurement policy (partnership 
procurement) and multiple commissioning bodies with diverse procurement policies 
empowered by a single purchasing body (distributed commissioning).  
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Table 4 New Contractual Forms in the NHS, Bovaird (2006) 
 
 ‘ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐ ? ? ŽǀĂŝƌĚ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ŚĂƐ ďĞĐŽŵĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů
ǁŝƐĚŽŵ ?  ?Ɖ ? ? )ŽĨƉƵďůŝĐƐĞĐƚŽƌĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚ ? ůŝŬĞƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐ ƚƌƵƐƚĂŶĚ
ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? dŚĞ ƚǇƉŽůŽŐǇ ŽĨ  ‘WĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ WƌŽĐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?ŵĂǇ ĐŽŵĞ ŝŶ many forms 
including PFI and PPP, but in order to become a genuine partnership, it must involve 
a number of organisations across sectors, each of which contributes a particular 
expertise to some part of the commissioning, purchasing of providing process. 
FŝŶĂůůǇ ?  ‘ŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐ ? ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐ Ă ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞƌ ĂĐƚŝŶŐ ŽŶ
behalf number of smaller public agencies to plan and procure a variety of services 
from a collective budget. Again implied in this approach is some level of collaboration 
between the various parties involved. 
These types of public service outsourcing relationships have been slated to achieve a 
large number of objectives; value for money, reducing costs, a greater diversity of 
service provision, meeting targets around waiting times, increasing resource input, 
ďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐ ŝŶ ŶĞǁ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ĂŶĚ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚĂĐŬůŝŶŐ  ‘ǁŝĐŬĞĚ ? ƐŽĐŝĂů
problems, as well as altering public service control. Some deal of research has now 
attempted to evaluate the possibility of achieving these aims and the costs and 
benefits of pursuing these types of outsourcing arrangements. In many instances, 
these have identified significant barriers to reaching prior financial expectations, and 
the difficulties in establishing balanced, trusting relationships between sectors with 
different norms, purpose and socio-cultural environment (Teisman and Klijn, 2002; 
Price et. al 2004; Edwards and Shaoul 2003; Gaffney & Pollock, 1999; Edwards, 2005; 
Robinson, 2000). However, what has been less well considered is the impact that 
these news types of inter-organisational relationships have on the nature of 
employment and the way in which public service labour is managed. As previously 
outlined, the move to decentralise public services and bring in additional providers 
was in part intended to hand greater control to local managers to enact changes in 
employment. However, a collection of recent studies have investigated how the type 
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of partnerships created by these policies can break the direct relationship between 
the employers and employee, and can have a significant impact on the nature of 
employment (Marchington et al, 2005a; Rubery et al, 2002; 2003; 2004a&b; 
Grimshaw et al, 2003; Scarbrough, 2000; Beaumont et al, 1996). 
2.4.2 Inter-Organisational Contracts and Multi-Employer Workplaces  
Traditionally, notions of employment are conceived in both social science literature 
and in employment law as constituted by a relationship between a single employer 
and an employee (Simon, 1951; Rubery, et al 2004a). For example, defŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ƚŚĞ
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞ ? ŚĂǀĞ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚƵƚǇ ƚŽ ŽďĞǇ ůĂǁĨƵů ĂŶĚ ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ŽƌĚĞƌƐ ? ƚŽ ĂĐƚ
faithfully to the employer and use care and skill in the execution of the performance 
of their employment ?  ?'ŝůůŚĂŵƐ ?ĐŽŵ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? /Ŷ ƚƵƌŶ ? ŶŽƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ďŽƚŚ ŝŶĚƵƐtrial 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ŚƵŵĂŶ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ĂƌĞ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ  ‘ŽĨ Ă
hierarchical and bounded relationship between an individual employer and its 
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ ?  ?ZƵďĞƌǇ Ğƚ Ăů  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? KŶŐŽŝŶŐ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ŚĂƐ ĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚ ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
standard employment contract in relation to changing career patters and the 
employment market. Regularly cited directions of change include an increase in 
employment flexibility, lower job security, an increase of short-term contracts, more 
indirect employment, uncertainty oǀĞƌĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƐƚĂƚƵƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ŵĂƌŬĞƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ
the employment relationship (Doogan, 2001; Burchill, et al 1999; Cappelli, 1997; 
Cappelli, 1995). In the main, this has focused on intra-organisational employer-
employee relationships associated with the reshaping of the standard bureaucratic 
organisational form.  
A collection of recent studies on employment across organisational boundaries and 
 ‘ƉĞƌŵĞĂďůĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŚĂƐ ƚĂŬĞŶƵƉ ƚŚŝƐ ƚŚĞŵĞĂŶĚ ƌĞ-examined employment in 
light of close and complex inter-organisational relationships (Roper and Grimshaw, 
2007; Marchington et al, 2005a; Rubery et al 2003; Rubery et al 2002 & 2004a; 
Grimshaw et al, 2003; Scarbrough, 2000; Beaumont et al, 1996).  Issues of work, 
employment and HRM have been frequently disconnected in analysis with other 
aspects of organisational theory, such as strategy, structure and performance 
(Rubery, et al. 2002). Similarly, analysis of network forms have concentrated on 
structural features of inter-organisational relations, but with little regard for how this 
affects or is affected by the relationship between employees and employers 
(Grimshaw, et al. 2005). Given the interaction between these areas, this has been 
seen as problematic. As Barley and Kunda (2001) state,  ‘ǁŽƌŬĂŶĚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂƌĞ 
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bound in dynamic tension because organisational structures are, by definition, 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ĂŶĚ ƚĞŵƉůĂƚĞƐ ĨŽƌ ŽŶŐŽŝŶŐ ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐ ŽĨ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?  ? ? ? ) ? dŽ ƌĞĐƚŝĨǇ ƚŚŝƐ ?
Marchington and colleagues place changing employment relationships within and 
alongside changing inter-organisational arrangements. They argue that complexities 
and tensions arise not only from the internal and external conditions surrounding the 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽ ŽƵƚ ŽĨ  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌ-organisational relationships which create 
confusions and ambiguities in the shaping of the employment relationship in both its 
ůĞŐĂůĂŶĚŝƚƐƐŽĐŝĂů ?ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĨŽƌŵ ? ?ZƵďĞƌǇ ?ĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
Within close working partnerships, lines of control may become unclear as all parties 
may have an interest in, and potentially try to influence, employment practices 
across the partnership or network. Outsourcing agreements, agency workers and 
multi-employer sites all create situations where an organisations performance may 
be dependent on the action of workers who are not directly employed by them. 
Therefore, organisations management may seek to monitor performance of external 
employees or attempt manipulate the employment practices in external 
organisations (Rubery, et al 2002; Marchington, et al 2005). Particular arrangements 
highlight this possibility. For example, when a worker or group of workers are 
constantly employed to fulfil a single long-standing contract, the client may have a 
greater stake in the day-to-day actions and output of the worker(s) than the 
ĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽŶ-ĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐ ?ĐůŝĞŶƚŵĂǇƐĞĞŬƚŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ
the workers terms and conditions, which workers are used (and not used), check the 
standard of the work being done and encourage rewards and discipline to be handled 
in ways beneficial to them. There may be even greater imperatives for direct control 
over the work of contractors in situations where the client retains a legal duty to 
ensure the quality or accuracy of the service provided, as is often the case in public 
sector contracting (Grimshaw, et al 2002; Grimshaw and Hebson, 2005; Rubery et al 
2002). These situations can be yet further complicated when contracting 
organisations themselves use temporary and agency staff, legally employed 
elsewhere. 
These scenarios create a number of potential areas for tension, increased complexity 
and conflict for employment management (Rubery, et al 2004a). Much of 
employment law is based around the principle that those in the same workplace 
share common terms and conditions. However, inter-organisational relations of the 
type seen in PPPs can create situations where employees from different 
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organisations work alongside each other on the same site, with different pay and 
rewards and subject to different management practices. Alternatively employees 
may be answerable on an everyday basis to those outside of their organisations with 
whom they have no employment contract (non-employers) (Rubery et al 2005). 
Employees may be monitored, disciplined and have their roles and positions decided 
or influenced by people outside of their organisation. The responsibility for providing 
employment rights, normally resting with the employer in traditional hierarchical 
bureaucracies, may, in certain circumstances become unclear. In instances of 
grievance or health and safety while under the control of a non-employer, workers 
may be left without the channels of formal procedures normally open to them 
(Marchington et al, 2005b).  
/ƚ ŝƐ ĂůƐŽ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŚĂƚ ĂŶ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůǇ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ĂƐƉects of 
employment, or susceptibility to being influenced, may be spread unevenly across a 
set of inter-organisational relationships. Although all organisations may have to 
ŵŽĚŝĨǇĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ŝŶ ůŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐŽĨĂŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ?  ‘ƐŽŵĞĂƌĞ 
more powerful than others and are able to buffer themselves against the external 
ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚǁŚĞƌĞĂƐŽƚŚĞƌƐĂƌĞŵŽƌĞĞǆƉŽƐĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ƐƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĞĚŝŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ
PPPs (section 2.4.1) it has been claimed that networks can provide a number of 
benefits when based on strong, equal trusting relationships (e.g. Powell, 1990; 
Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Field and Peck, 2003; Ferlie and Pettigrew, 1996) but 
empirical evidence has shown that in many instances, this type of ideal is not realised 
in practice (e.g. Hunter et al, 1996; Teisman & Klijn, 2002; Kirkpatrick, 1999). 
Contractual arrangements have been frequently made on a short term, ad-hoc basis 
in response to financial pressures and immediate need, rather than the long term 
partnership ideal with similarly high levels of commitment from all stakeholders (e.g. 
Klijn and Teisman, 2003). Collaboration is often restricted to the terms of the 
contract bound within other competitive pressures, and inter-organisational 
relationships are frequently unbalanced in terms of distribution of risk, access to 
resources or influence over outcomes with political and possibly opportunistic or 
exploitative behaviour likely to result.  
While the effects of such unequal relationships have been well observed in their 
impact on financial and strategic risk, they are also involved in shaping aspects of 
ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? /Ŷ  ‘ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬĞĚ ? ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ,ZD ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ŵĂǇ ĂůƐŽ
become a site for negotiation and conflict alongside other areas of the contract 
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agreement (Scarborough, 2000), with dominant parties seeking to play an 
instrumental role in shaping employment in external organisations and minimising 
their own commitments and risk. Opportunistic behaviour has been particularly 
observed where organisations have a deep interest in the work processes of external 
organisations over who they are in a position of power and influence. For instance, 
when a supplier is dependent on a single customer for resources, they may be 
particularly susceptible to influence, changing their employment practices to suit the 
requirements of the customer (Hunter et al, 1996).  In the case of outsourcing 
production or services, the responsibility and liability associated with the direct 
employment of workers is shifted to the supplying firm. In doing so, the client 
potentially increases their own flexibility and limits their risk by replacing their 
commitment to fulfil the standard employment contract with a purchasing decision 
or fixed term service contract. At the same time, they may then seek to steer the 
employment practices, pay structures and staffing of the supplier or contractor in a 
favourable direction (Rubery and Earnshaw, 2005; Rubery et al, 2004; Grimshaw et al 
2005b).  
Equally, just as some organisations are more open to manipulation than others, 
certain employee groups may be more to be marginalised by inter-organisational 
relations. In light of close interdependence with clients and suppliers, employers may 
seek to increase their own flexibility by transferring the increased risks onto 
individual employees, offer less protection for employees, reduce job security, and 
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƐƚĂĨĨŽƌƉĂƌƚƚŝŵĞƐƚĂĨĨ ? ‘dŚĞďĂƌŐĂŝŶƚŚĂƚƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶƐ
the employment relationship can be seen to be embedded in a set or inter-capitalist 
relations that may shift risk and responsibilities both between organisations and 
between employers and employees ?  ?ZƵďĞƌǇ ĂŶĚ ĂƌŶƐŚĂǁ ?  ? ? ? ? P 176). 
Furthermore, the bargaining position of some employee groups such as part time 
workers, temporary workers, or agency staff employed through a third party may be 
reduced as communication channels with management are unclear and the 
workforce is fragmeŶƚĞĚ ? /Ŷ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ  ‘ƚŚŽƐĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ŽŶ ƉƌĞĐĂƌŝŽƵƐ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ
across organisational boundaries lack the collective strength to make their voice 
ŚĞĂƌĚ ? ?DĂƌĐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶĞƚĂů ? ? ? ?ď ? ? ? ? ) ?ZƵďĞƌǇĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? )ŽƵƚůŝŶĞŚŽǁŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ
in a weaker position and are particularly susceptible to external influence, are far less 
likely to develop either strong industrial relations, or a defined human resource 
management approach:  
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 ‘DĂŶǇƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌorganisations can be expected to fall into this black hole as 
their capacity to develop consistent and strong human resource policies is 
moderated by the need to manage external pressures, particularly those of 
clients. We need to move towards a more general framework where internal 
and external influences on the management of human resources are seen as 
mutually constituted, iterative and interactive. It is the interplay between 
these factors in a dynamic context that provides the basis for analysing 
human resource policy in permeable organisationƐ ? ? ?ZƵďĞƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ) 
In this way the division of work in multi-employer relationships have been observed 
as creating additional pressures on employment. Even within single organisations 
there are problems in balancing efforts to control and monitor the workforce with 
attempts to capture the capacities of employees to contribute to performance 
(Rubery et al, 2002). Third party interests make this balance more difficult. It has 
already been stated above that processual issues of management and employment 
are often considered only after decisions have been made on financial terms whether 
to open up public services to private sector contractors (Shield et al 2002). The work 
outlined here takes this argument further by suggesting that increasing inter-
organisational relations are often used to intentionally externalise and further 
obscure problematic employment issues and employment responsibilities which 
involve a cost to the employer. Grimshaw and Hebson (2005) point to a paradoxical 
element of this logic, namely the continuing or even greater need for active 
cooperation of labour to produce goods and services when collaborating with others 
across organisational boundaries:  ‘dŚĞ ƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ŚĞĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ
relationship that derives from the dual imperatives towards conflict and cooperation 
is thus exacerbated, and certainly not resolved, by the formation of employment 
relationships in a multi-ĂŐĞŶĐǇ ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ?  ? ? ? ?-177). A summary of the ambiguities 
created by employment across supply chains is presented in table 5 below. The next 
section considers the research questions to be tackled in this thesis presented by this 
changing employment relationship and in light of policy aspirations for HRM. 
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Table 5 Main areas of ambiguity in employment in inter-organisational arrangements 
Employment Issue Ambiguities in the Employment Relationship  
Supervision and 
control 
Employer not present at workplace or more than one 
 ‘ĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ?ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?ŵƉůŽǇĞĞŽŶůŽĂŶŽŶƐĞĐŽŶĚŵĞŶƚƚŽ
ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ‘ĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ? ?
Discipline DifferenceƐŝŶƌƵůĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌƐ ? ?ǁŚŽŝƐ
responsible for monitoring performance, identifying 
disciplinary issues, initiating actions, verifying information 
Grievance For example, duties not to harass staff apply to contract 
staff, not just direct employees; can employees have a 
grievance against employer if harassed by 
manager/employee of another organisation? 
Terms and 
conditions  W equal 
pay issues 
Outsourcing may result in different pay for work of same or 
broadly equivalent value for either employees of same 
organisation or employees of different organisations but 
working side by side in same workplace. 




Responsibility for health and safety of workers/general 
public lies with main employer/owner of site, but can 
managers of main employer instruct employees of other 
employers not to behave in ways which endanger health 
and safety? 
Main employer may have responsibility for overall delivery 
of service (e.g. hospital); responsibilities indirectly enforced 
on non-employees through performance-related contracts 
with other employers 
Loyalty and 
confidentiality 
Duties of loyalty and confidentiality to employer may be 
difficult to interpret where conflicts of interest arise 
between own employer and those of the employer in the 
workplace where employee is located 
Trade union 
recognition 
Multi-employer relationship may complicate the definition 
and constitution of appropriate bargaining units for trade 
union recognition 
Source: Adapted from Rubery et al (2004a) 
2.5 Research Questions and Emerging Issues on the Prospects 
for HRM in PPPs 
Given the complex and political nature of public services, the changes to employment 
and tensions created by fragmenting work and blurring organisational boundaries 
have been seen as occurring nowhere more so than in the changing interface 
between the public and private organisations (Grimshaw et al 2005c). In light of the 
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literature so far covered, the overall research questions of the thesis can be stated as 
follows:  
x What are the implications of public-private partnerships for human resource 
management as a means of managing the employment relationship in public 
services? 
x What are the implications of public-private partnerships for the nature of 
work in public services?  
In particular the focus here is on recent forms of PPP which involve the transfer of 
what have hitherto beeŶƐĞĞŶĂƐ ‘ĐŽƌĞ ?ĂƌĞĂƐŽĨƉƵďůŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ to the private sector. 
These increasingly involve high status professional groups having their work moved 
out from public bureaucracies to independent and for profit organisations. Each 
example of recent PPP is likely to take on a unique form and involve different 
relationships between the various contractors and suppliers involved. This thesis 
concentrates primarily on partnerships in healthcare and the contracting out of 
surgical services in Independent Sector Treatment Centres.  
Building on the insights of employment within inter-organisational relationships 
covered in the previous section along with the issues of HRM in general and HRM and 
employment in the public sector context, the overall research questions can be 
further elucidated by considering in turn different aspects of HRM that are likely to 
be affected by ongoing structural change. The next sub-sections discuss implications 
for specific areas of HRM, drawing out more detailed consideration points to guide 
the research. 
2.5.1 HRM Strategy and Style 
As identified in section 2.3, an important driver of public sector restructuring has 
been the push to devolve HRM decision making to local organisations, giving 
corporate managers greater freedom and encourage flexibility in approaches to 
employment (CBI, 2008). However, the above analysis of employment across 
organisational boundaries has suggested that close partnerships potentially multiply 
the external influences on HRM and further limit an organisations input into their 
own HRM styles and strategies.  




within which the firm operates. This includes the network conditions, which generate 
positive effects for firms as well as the darker side where some members of the 
network benefit at the expense of others (Kinnie et al, 2005: 1024). Kinnie et al 
(2005) characterise network relationships as either generally collaborative, allowing 
advantageous HRM practices to be established across the network, or coercive, in 
which dominant parties are able to exert influence over particular employment 
practices of others to their own advantage. Similarly, Hunter et al (1996) speculates 
that when one partner is highly dominant, there are large imbalances of risk, or lack 
of trusting relations, the value of HR practices likely to emerge could decrease. They 
ĂƐŬ  ‘ƌĞ  ‘ŚĂƌĚ ? Žƌ  ‘ƐŽĨƚ ? ,ZD ŵŽĚĞůƐ ŵŽƌĞ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŽ ďĞ ĂĚŽƉƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌ
organisationƐ  ‘ĂƐƐŝƐƚĞĚ ? ĂůŽŶŐ ƚŚĞ ,ZD ƌŽƵƚĞ ďǇ ƚŚĞŝƌ customers? Are the gains 
available to the commercial partners in part paid for by increasing effort and reduced 
ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
Certain features of public sector contracting out may indeed suggest more directly 
controlling foƌŵƐŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ ‘ŚĂƌĚ ?ŽƌůŽǁĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ,ZDƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ may 
arise. First, when in a dominant position, private organisations may seek to directly 
influence the HRM practices of partners, customers and suppliers in directions that 
are commercially beneficial to them. As they are no longer directly responsible for 
the employees carrying out the work or concerned with employee commitment to 
them, this is more likely to be in terms of bottom line costs rather than long term 
HRM planning (Hunter et al, 1996). Second, PPPs may increase the use of tight 
contractual terms that require employment to be designed to meet the needs of 
predefined output levels, quality standards and costs. This may encourage 
employment to be dealt with on a more instrumental and transactional basis, rather 
than in a long term relationship between employees and employers. Finally, close 
partnership may expose public sector organisations to a host of new private sector 
institutions, practices and values that alter the public sector context. These have all 
been shown as important in studies of recent outsourcing arrangements, which have 
commonly found an increase in low commitment HRM practices. For example, 
studies of private sector involvement in the NHS have shown narrowing jobs and 
work intensification, increasing isolation, irregular shift patters, less room for 
initiative or innovation, a reduction in staff levels, downgrading or introducing 
charges for staff facilities, and management seeking to de-skill jobs and replace 
trained nurses with untrained staff wherever possible (Pollock, 2004). Similarly, 
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Hebson et al (2003) and Grimshaw and Hebson (2005) reported for staff transferred 
from the public to the private, a frequent reduction in job security and an increase in 
work intensification, and very tight control of work contracted out to external firms 
or staffed through temporary agency workers. 
This does not necessarily mean that particular types of contract will alone dictate a 
particular approach to HRM. The ability or will of a particular organisation to actively 
shape their own human resource approach is likely to depend on the specific 
interaction of several contextual factors, of which the formal structure of inter-
organisational relations are just one part. For example, even when public sector 
contract managers are in an ostensibly more powerful position as service purchaser, 
they may not be able to unilaterally dictate employment practices, either to drive 
ĚŽǁŶ ĐŽƐƚƐ ? Žƌ ƚŽ ŝŶƐƚĂůů  ‘ŚŝŐŚ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ? ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉ Žƌ Ɖƌotect the 
healthcare workforce. Aspects of the public sector environment identified in section 
2.3, such as professional autonomy and national agreements may contribute to the 
bargaining position of management to negotiate changes in internal or external 
employment, or of a group of employees to limit the power of management to 
dictate employment terms and working practices. Institutional norms, strength in the 
market, experience of managing/being managed by contracts and regulatory 
protection have all been seen to play a part in mediating the types of HRM practice 
that emerge in a given context. This study therefore aims to investigate how these 






2.5.2 Innovation and Workforce Reconfiguration 
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƉƌŝŵĂƌǇŐŽĂůĨŽƌWWWƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶƚŚĞ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ  ‘ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
private sector and new ways of working (DoH, 2002b; 2003a; CBD, 2008).  PPPs have 
been seen not just as a way to introduce new providers into the system, stimulating 
competition and choice, but also as a way of introducing new and innovative ways of 
working to the NHS in general. In promoting private sector HRM, the government has 
laid out a vision of organisations installing HRM practices designed around local 
operational and market requirements, such as altering pay structures, introducing 
new job roles, changing the skill mix of employees, designing new workflows and 
processes, changing divisions of work, or designing unique training, development and 
career plans (DoH 2002a).  A commonly cited example of innovation leading to 
greater efficiencies is that of rationalising the responsibilities and work tasks of 
professional groups, with a ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ĨŽƌ  ‘ŚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ĚŽǁŶ ? ůĞƐƐ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ĂƌĞĂƐ ŽĨ
work to less specialist occupational groups. In doing so higher professional groups 
will benefit by ridding themselves of more routine aspects of their work, while lower 
groups will benefit from learning new tasks above their current level of expertise 
x How do the emerging styles and strategies of HRM fit with 
dominant normative models? For example, can public-private 
partnership be described in terms of best practice/best fit 
HRM, or is there no clear strategic approach? 
 
x What are the inconsistencies and tensions in the emerging 
HRM approach? 
 
x How does the interplay of different organisations impact upon 
HR strategy? This could be in the form of purposeful 
interventions of management between organisations, or 
through more unintentional, undirected or processual 
influence.  
 
x How is the HR strategy influenced by influenced by 
professional or occupational groups across the public private 
partnership? 
 
x Do PPPs differentiate their strategy ± For example, high 




(DoH, 2002a). This creates a win-win of efficiency savings as tasks are carried out by 
appropriate grades of staff and the opportunity for individual development as staff 
take on higher grades associated with increasingly complex tasks.  
However, already identified as problematic in the public sector, the capacity of 
organisational management to enact such changes and change working practices 
may be further restricted by entering into partnership working. Constraints such as 
professional norms and embedded employment values may be more strongly felt 
when the personnel department is exerting influence from an external organisation 
with no formal lines of communication or responsibilities for workers. As Hunter 
 ? ? ? ? ? )ƐƚĂƚĞƐĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŽǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ‘ŵĂǇďĞƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞ when introduced in the 
confines of a single organisation, at the behest of HQ or divisional management, but 
ƚŚĞǇŵĂǇďĞĞǀĞŶŵŽƌĞƐŽǁŚĞŶƉƌĞƐƐĞĚĨŽƌďǇĂŶĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?/Ŷ
particular, this may involve a greater diversity of agendas, more distrust of 
performance targets set externally, and greater resistance to being monitored when 
this does is not matched by formal responsibility for employment. Grimshaw and 
Hebson (2005) report that for transferred public sector employees, private sector 
type workplace practices were commonly seen as manipulative and unable to 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ŶŽƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ůŽǇĂůƚǇĂŶĚ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ?  ‘ĨŽƌŵĂŶǇ ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ
not managers, there was a direct rejection of the strategies that had been developed 
to generate commitment, either because they conflicted with existing values or were 
ƐĞĞŶĂƐĐŽŶƚƌŽůĚĞǀŝĐĞƐ ? ?'ƌŝŵƐŚĂǁĂŶĚ,ĞďƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ?   )  
 
 
2.5.3 Training, Learning and Development 
A further element of HRM activity of specific importance in PPPs is that of training, 
learning and development. This is of particular importance given one of the primary 
justifications for entering into partnerships with the private sector, as well as 
network forms of organisation in general, is that of increasing the knowledge and 
resources available for use in public services. The present government has espoused 
a focus both on improving the opportunities for training and increasing workers skills 
x Can PPPs introduce new working practices? For example are 
more autonomous organisations able to further policy objectives 
for performance orientated pay/skills mix?  
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(Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005), as well as increasing organisational learning, the 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ŶĞǁ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐ ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?   ‘hŶder the 
ŵĂŶƚƌĂ ŽĨ  ‘ũŽŝŶĞĚ-ƵƉ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ŵĂũŽƌ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐ ƚŽ ĐŽƌĂů ?
ĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŶ ƚŽ ŵĂŶĂŐĞ ĂŶĚ ƐŚĂƌĞ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ Q  ?ĂŶĚ ? ƐŚĂƌĞ ŐŽŽĚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ
ĂŶĚ ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞ ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨƵƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ƚŽ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ ?  ?,ĂƌƚůĞǇ
and Bennington, 2006: 101),  
Inter-organisational relationships and PPPs have been promoted as advantageous to 
this agenda, as they potentially allow public services to gain access into previously 
untapped sources of experience and expertise (IPPR, 2001, Bate and Robert, 2002). In 
addition network organisational forms have been said to open up new roles and 
opportunities for skill development (Kunda et al 2002) and provide greater 
opportunities for sharing knowledge, skills and innovative practice (Wenger, 1998). 
There has been some focus on the different skills likely to emerge in network 
organisations, with the break down in bureaucratic hierarchy and closer inter-group 
ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ  ‘ƐŽĨƚ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĨĞŵŝŶŝŶĞ ? ŝŶƚĞƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ƐƚǇůĞƐ
(Arthur and Rousseau 1996; Hebson and Grugulis, 2005), such as empathy (Trevillion, 
 ? ? ? ? ) ?  ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ĂŶĚorganisationƐ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽǁŶ ĐŝƌĐůĞƐ ?
(Williams, 2002: 110), communication (Engel, 1994), reciprocity and trust (Hornby, 
1993). Also, in the particular context of public private contracting, public sector 
workers and managers may gain access to competencies primarily associated with 
the private sector such as entrepreneurship, cost effectiveness (Cooke, 2006), 
contractual negotiation, and performance management (Hebson et al, 2003). 
However, aspects of emerging public-private relationships cause potential problems 
for this analysis. For instance, it may become unclear how the formal responsibility 
for training and development is to be organised. There have been some fears that 
private partners could use advantageous contractual arrangements in order to 
benefit from public sector training without providing similar opportunities for 
themselves (Pollock, 2004). Alternatively contracting out individual services, such as 
the treatment for a single medical specialty, would mean that the employees 
transferred to the contractor would gain only experience of single, perhaps routine, 
service, while remaining employees will have no opportunity for training on the areas 
contracted out, unless this is written into the original contract (HSC, 2006). This was 
seen as a particular risk surrounding the introduction of ISTCs, discussed in the next 
chapter. Further, the increased likelihood of a focus on short-term economic 
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efficiencies may mean they are less conducive to providing long-term training and 
development (Cappelli, 1995). This may be particularly acute for employees who are 
ĂůƌĞĂĚǇĐůĂƐƐĞĚĂƐ ‘ůŽǁƐŬŝůůĞĚ ?ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐǁŚŽĂƌĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇĐůŽƐĞůǇƐƵƉĞƌǀŝƐĞĚĂŶĚƚŝŐŚƚůǇ
controlled, leaving little room for skill development (Grugulis and Vincent, 2005).  
The tight contractual arrangements and performance monitoring that has been 
observed in outsourced organisations  ‘ŶŽƚŽŶůǇĞǆĐůƵĚĞĚƐŬŝůůĞŶŚĂŶĐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽ
de-skilled tŚĞ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŚĞǇ ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚ ?  ?'ƌƵŐƵůŝƐ ĂŶĚ sŝŶĐĞŶƚ ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? )  ŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů
evidence has suggested that crossing organisational boundaries may lead to more 
learning opportunities for isolated indiviĚƵĂůƐ ŝŶ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ  ‘ŚŝŐŚĞƌ ? ƌŽůĞƐ that 
increasingly emphasise interpersonal skills to work within and between different 
groups and organisations, but this does not necessarily translate to a general focus 
on changing skills of workers throughout a partnership (Hebson and Grugulis, 2005). 
 
 
2.5.4 The role of the HRM function  
Alongside the drive for more local control over employment, reform has been 
intended to promote the HRM function within local public service organisations, 
giving it more scope to design specific activities and take on a more strategic role at 
the organisational level. Increasing the range of independent service providers to the 
health economy is promoted as an oppŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽ  ‘ĞǆƚĞŶĚ,ZŝŶƚŽǁŝĚĞƌ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ
and management, for example mainstreaming HR across other management 
functions and integrating HR into the service development and governance elements 
of the organisation to ensure staff and members realise the benefits and the 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇƐŬŝůůĞĚƚŽŵĞĞƚƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐĚĞŵĂŶĚƐŽĨƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ ?
(DoH, 2006: 13). 
In literature on partnerships and inter-organisational relations there has been some 
suggestion that HRM could play a role in militating against some of the problematic 
elements of coordination and working across sectors so far discussed. For example 
,ZD ĐŽƵůĚ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨƵƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ  ‘ďĞƐƚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ? ĂĐƌŽƐƐ ƚŚĞ
partnership or assist in organisational change across boundaries. The HRM function 
has been encouraged to take a proactive part in changing employment practices 




ĂĐƌŽƐƐƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉƐ ?ĂŶĚĂĐƚĂƐĂ ‘ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇƐƉĂŶŶĞƌ ? ?tŝůůŝĂŵƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?
ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐŝŶŚĞĂůƚŚĂƌĞĂĚǀŝƐĞĚƚŽ ‘ĂĐƚĂƐƌŽůĞŵŽĚĞůƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŶĞǁĐƵltures 
ĂŶĚ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ĂŶĚ ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝǀĞ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ?  ?Ž, ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ?
Hunter et al (1996) identifies several specific activities that HR managers may be able 
to carry out across a network. These include quality and audit visits to suppliers, 
promoting different management styles through for example training programs and 
conferences, improving the internal status and rewards for those involved in forming 
inter-organisational relations and direct assistance to set up compatible processes in 
suppliers and partners. It is also proposed that managerial practice could help to 
promote loyalty and commitment across the partnerships. Shield et al (2002) 
suggests that active HRM may can help reshaping employees orientation to work 
following the merger of ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůůǇ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ  ‘ŝƚ ƐĞĞŵƐ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ
merger [of two hospitals] would have benefited from better HRM activity [ Q] such 
activity might have improved the morale of individual employees and so the overall 
organisationĂůƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?  ? ? ?5). Literature on networks and networking has also 
suggested that new skills and competencies may aid public sector managers to exert 
influence across a partnership. For example, Ferlie and Pettigrew (1996) stress that 
 ‘ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐŝŶƉŽůǇĐĞŶƚƌŝĐorganisations will need to be adept at crossing boundaries 
ĂŶĚ Ăƚ ŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐ ŝŶƚĞƌĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƐ ?  ?Ɖ^ ? ? ) ? ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ? tŝůůŝĂŵƐ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĂƌŐƵĞƐ
ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ  ‘ƐƉĂŶ ďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐ ? ǁŝůů ĚĞƉĞŶĚ ŵŽƌĞ ŽŶ ‘ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞƌ-
personal attributes designed to build social capital. They will build cultures of trust, 
improve levels of cognitive ability to understand complexity and be able to operate 
within non-hierarchical environments with dispersed configurations of power 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ? 
However, inter-organisational relationships may also foster new hurdles for the HRM 
function to overcome. Both public and private organisations involved are likely to 
have independent human resource departments, operating at different levels within 
the organisation dependent on their own agendas, institutions and strategies (Ferlie 
and Pettigrew, 1996), and therefore personnel managers may be required to 
overcome conflict, or negotiate with counterparts in other networked organisations. 
It is so far unclear within partnerships how responsibility for HRM will be resolved 
and the role different departments will play. As previously discussed, public sector 
reforms are likely to cause an increasing focus of financial performance, in some 
instances limiting the budget of personnel departments to make decisions based on 
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short term needs rather than to coherent, long term plans (Siddiqui and Kleiner, 
 ? ? ? ? ) ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ǁĂǇ  ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƐ ĂƌŝƐŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƚƐŽƵƌĐŝŶŐ
context may diminish the size and authority of HR within organisations, undermining 
any capacity for the complex inter-organisationĂů ůŝĂŝƐŽŶ ?  ?ŽůůŝŶŐ ?  ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞƐĞ
pressures have indeed been seen to increase during contractual arrangements for 
PPPs, increasing the propensity to overlook processual issues such as HRM. 
Fischbacher and Beaumont (2003) report that even when personnel specialists were 
involved in the process of setting up a PFI, the focus on outcomes meant that they 
were often not fully utilised or consulted, but paradoxically their involvement took 
them away from their core function for a substantial time period.  
 
 
2.5.5 Consistency in Employment 
Consistency in HRM practice has been seen as a key feature not only of academic 
literature on human resource management (Schuler and Jackson, 1996) but also of 
industrial relations agreements and employment law (Blyton and Turnbull, 2004). In 
the past, centrally governed, integrated public sector organisations have been seen 
as providing a greater level of consistency in employment terms and conditions 
based around collective agreements and professional groupings than industry in 
general.  
AccoƌĚŝŶŐƚŽŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĚŝƐĐƌĞƉĂŶĐǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ŐŽŽĚ
ǀĂůƵĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ ŚŝŐŚ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ĂŶĚĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
management of employment signalled by HRM. For example the code of practice for 
workforce matters in public sector service contracts (built upon the Transfer of 
x What role does the HRM function play in PPPs? For example how are 
responsibilities and powers of employment management shared 
across partnership organisations?  
 
x Are HRM functions able to take on any additional roles in advancing 





Undertakings (Protection of Employment)- TUPE - Regulations 1981 and 2006) from 
the Office of Government Commerce states: 
 ‘dŚĞ ŽĚĞ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ŶŽ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶŐŽŽĚ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ
practice, value for money and quality of service. On the contrary, quality and 
good value will not be provided by organisations who do not manage 
workforce issues well.  The intention of the public sector organisation is 
therefore to select only those providers who offer staff a package of terms 
and conditions which will secure high quality service delivery throughout the 
life of the contract. These must be sufficient to recruit and motivate high 
quality staff to work on the contract and designed to prevent the emergence 
of a two-ƚŝĞƌǁŽƌŬĨŽƌĐĞ ? ?ĚŝǀŝĚŝŶŐƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌĞĞƐĂŶĚŶĞǁũŽŝŶĞƌƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐďĞƐŝĚĞ
eĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌŽŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ ? ?K' ? ? ? ? ? )   
However, there are signs that such a two-tier workforce is indeed being encouraged 
by recent public sector reforms (Morgan and Allington, 2002). There have been 
widespread fears that breaking up state organisations threatens this aspect of public 
employment. For example, while pay reforms such as the agenda for change in 
health may bring full time, permanent staff within the organisation under a common 
ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚĞǇĚŽŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇĞǆƚĞŶĚƚŽůĞƐƐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚĨŽƌŵƐ ? ‘ŶŽŶ-
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ ? ? and temporary and agency staff that play a part in the delivery of a many 
services (Morgan and Allington, 2002). It is suggested that changing inter-
organisational relationships in PPPs are likely to contribute to this further and 
promote even greater inconsistencies in employment. Clearly demonstrating the 
disorder that can arise, Rubery et al (2002) discusses the implications for employees 
transferred from public to private sector companies. This can result in instances in 
which workers are legally employed by the private sector, but in many respects 
remain a part of, and answerable to, the public sector organisation from which they 
were transferred. Union action and legislation may seek to protect workers, such as 
recent code of practice has had to be passed that urges Agenda for Change wage 
structures and training and development plans to be applied to contracted-out 
facilities staff (DoH 2005b). However, legislation may also create additional problems 
when it applies differently to employee groups working together.  
Of particular relevance here are questions surrounding TUPE [Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment)] arrangements frequently applied to public 
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sector workers transferred to the private sector organisations. While this legally 
protects the pay and conditions of transferred workers, it often leads to situations in 
which transferred staff work alongside other employees of the contractor or agencies 
staff with no such protection/limitations on their employment. When there are 
differences between the pay, terms and conditions between the transferred staff and 
the contractors own staff to begin with, this would impose almost unavoidable 
inconsistencies. In this case, management would be unable to harmonise 
employment, leading to a number of potential tensions between employee groups or 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐĂŶĚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ  ?ŽŽŬĞĞƚĂů ?  ? ? ? ? ) ?  ‘dhW ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ůĞĂǀĞƐ
employees in a kind of limbo, cut off from their previous employer and the right to 
maintain terms and conditions in line with that employer, but also separated from 
ĂŶĚ ŶŽƚ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌƐ ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ĂŶĚ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ?  ?ZƵďĞƌǇ ? Ğƚ Ăů
2002: 667).   
Aside from these instances where differences are written into the formal terms of 
the contract, the employment practice may be negotiated differently across the 
partnership. As already identified, different organisations may seek to influence the 
working conditions of non-employees in contradictory directions; 
 ‘dŚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŶŐ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ QƌĞƐƵůƚ ŝŶ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ
conflicting influences on internal employment policies and practices, 
particularly where there are multiple non-employers involved. Thus some 
clients may seek to push down prices and wages while others may focus on 
ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?ƌĞůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĨŽƐƚĞƌŝŶŐŽĨĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?'ƌŝŵƐŚĂǁĂŶĚ,ĞďƐŽŶ
2005) 
Within PPPs, the potential for tensions would appear particularly large given the 
differences in the public and private sectors organisations and the apparent 
imbalance of power and risk in emerging partnerships. Further, differences in risks 
between categories of workers are likely to mean that inconsistencies will emerge 
variably depending on the nature of the employment contract, institutional norms, 
regulatory framework and type of work. Those in low skilled, part time and manual 
occupations have been seen to be particularly vulnerable. With women much more 
likely to be in these positions (Hebson and Grugulis, 2005) this also may lead to PPPs 





2.5.6 Commitment and Ethos 
Multi-organisational relationships pose additional problems for traditional notions of 
employee commitment and loyalty. Managerial ideals of commitment often involve 
the assumption that workers will forge a bond with a single employer. But as has 
ďĞĞŶƉŽŝŶƚĞĚŽƵƚ ?ƚŚŝƐŶŽƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ  ‘ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŵŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚŽƐĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ
employer, as supplier, must respond to the changing demands of the client 
organisation (Hebson, et al 2003: 483). Even within a single organisation, 
commitments are often multifaceted; employees potentially identify simultaneously 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌǁŽƌŬŐƌŽƵƉ ?ƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůďŽĚǇ ?ƚŚĞŝƌĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌĞƚĐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ‘ƚĂŬŝŶŐ
on board the further dimension of multiple employers renders these concepts even 
more complex ? (Rubery et al, 2004: 9). For example, new forms of commitment have 
been observed when employees from different organisations work together, cut off 
from their respective employers or in a multi-employer site, or when workers spend 
the majority of their time on one particular client contract, interacting with 
employees, managers and customers of the client over and above others within their 
own organisation (Marchington, et al 2005).  
In addition, during periods of large organisational change or transformation 
employee commitment and involvement have been seen as even more crucial as 
staff are required to actively engage with and respond to change. Paradoxically, 
periods of change may be marked by an increase in conflict and tension, both 
between employee groups, and employees and management, lack of employee 
x Do PPPs introduce inconsistencies in the workplace? 
 
x What are the key employment tensions resulting from PPP arrangements? 
 
x Does the multi-employer relationship create uncertainty in the nature of 
employment, for example problems related to defining who is the 
employer? 
 




involvement in managerial decision-making and employee resistance (Shield, et al 
2002; Veenswijk and Hakvoort, 2002). 
Straightforward notions of commitment have already been seen as overly simplistic, 
particularly in the public sector where strong professional identities and loyalties may 
contrast with employers ? goals (Hutton and Massey, 2006). Additionally, there have 
been longstanding views that any introduction of the profit motive will negatively 
affect employees will or ability to work for the public good (e.g. Sachdev, 2001, 
Pollock, 2004). Academics and employment groups have frequently expressed 
concern that in blurring the boundaries between the public and private sector there 
ŝƐ  ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐĂĚĂŶŐĞƌ ƚŚĂƚorganisations in the public domain will neglect the values 
ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĂƚĚŽŵĂŝŶ ? ?^ƚĞǁĂƌƚĂŶĚtĂůƐŚ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?WWWƐŵĂǇƐĞƌǀĞƚŽŽďƐĐƵƌĞ
these distinctions further and create additional difficulties for the public sector ethos, 
as they encourage new forms of relationship between actors from the public and 
private sector. 
Case studies presented by Marchington et al (2005a), Hebson et al (2003), Grimshaw 
and Hebson (2005) directly investigate the impact on the public ethos in PPPs, finding 
wide ranging consequences for all employee groups. For managers transferred from 
the public sector there were some positive connotations of private sector practices 
that led to identification towards their new employer;  ‘DĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ǁŚŽ ŚĂĚ
transferred to the private sector felt empowered by their new roles and for some this 
had led to a direct transfer of commitment, not only for one employer to another, 
ďƵƚĨƌŽŵŽŶĞƐĞĐƚŽƌƚŽĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?,ĞďƐŽŶĂnd Grimshaw, 2005: 190). Other aspects of 
private practice led to a change in how this commitment was displayed. For example 
ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ  ‘ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉŽǁĞƌ ŽĨ ƐŚĂƌĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ĂŶĚŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐ ŽĨ Ă
performance-based bones system in shaping the actions of their colleagues (some of 
them ex-NHS managers) working ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?  ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) and a new self-
interested approach was assumed by the public sector managers in order to get the 
most out of the private companies. They had to hold formalised meetings, constantly 
monitor work activities and frequently involve solicitors in order to enforce 
contractual arrangements such as cleaning quality and maintenance. Managers came 
to realise that the service they received depended on continually questioning the 
contractual obligation, rather than assuming interests were aligned to a common 
notion of working for the public service. This was seen as  ‘ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐďŽƚŚĂƐŚŝĨƚƚŽ
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new lines of accountability (private sector shareholders) and a vicious circle of 
monitoring and distrust between partner organisationƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ? 
For the workers transferred to the private sector in these case studies, loyalties were 
not straightforwardly redirected to the new employer, with a general reluctance to 
identify with private sector interests (also reported elsewhere, by Leys (2001) and 
Pollock (2004)). There has also been the suggestion that managerial practices 
ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶ ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ĐĂƉĂbility to serve the public good:  ‘ǁŚŝůĞ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ĂƉƉĞĂƌ
resilient, the cost cutting and work intensification associated with PPPs present a 
significant threat to the long-ƚĞƌŵ ƐƵƌǀŝǀĂů ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ĞƚŚŽƐ ?
(Hebson et al, 2003: 482). However, this rejection of the employing private sector did 
not mean that workers necessarily continued to identify with the public sector 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? dŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ  ‘ŶŽŶ-ĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ? ǁĂƐ ĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ
broken the promise of providing job security and as enforcing tight contractual terms 
onto the workers new employer, therefore increasing pressure and monitoring on 
workers without responsibility for employment. 
Instead of commitment to a single organisation, a more generalised notion of 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ǁĂƐŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ?ǁŝƚŚǁŽƌŬĞƌƐƐĞĞŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƐĂĐƚŝŶŐ
for public interest, co-workers and for their ŽǁŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĐĂƌĞĞƌƐ ? ‘dhe coordination 
of public services through PPPs must depend on a relatively dysfunctional 
relationship between public sector client, private sector supplier and public services 
ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ůŽǇĂůƚǇ ƚŽƚŚĞĐůŝĞŶƚ ?Žƌ ƚŽƚŚĞŝƌnew employer, is not part of the 
ĞƋƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?,ĞďƐŽŶĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?KŶƚŽƉŽĨƚŚŝƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂůƐŽĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶƚŚĞ
 ‘ĨŽƌĐĞĚ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ? ďƌŽƵŐŚt about by reduced job security. This ensured that 
despite increased tensions and lack of loyalty, workers made sure that organisational 
ŐŽĂůƐ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ŵĞƚ ĂŶĚ  ‘ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŽƌƐ ĂŶĚ ĐůŝĞŶƚƐ ƌĂŶ
ŵŽƌĞƐŵŽŽƚŚůǇƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƵĂůĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐƐŚŽƵůĚŝŶƚŚĞŽƌǇĂůůŽǁ ? ?'ƌŝŵƐŚĂǁ
and Hebson, 2005: 191). However, given the uneven distributions of risks noted 
across partnerships, this is likely to vary greatly between different employee groups 









2.6 Summary of Literature Review  
The previous three sections have reviewed generic models of HRM, HRM in the 
Public Sector and HRM across organisational boundaries. In summary, it can be said 
that on a normative level, HRM assumes a unitarist perspective in which all 
managers, staff and other stakeholders share similar values, purpose and objectives.  
In public-private partnerships, these assumptions are challenged by three 
overlapping areas of literature. That is the literature which has questioned the 
appropriateness of HRM as a lens for analysing the employment relationship in any 
context, literature which has questioned the suitability and success of transferring 
private sector models of HRM into the public sector, and literature which has 
identified the conflicts and tensions of involved in employment within 
unconventional organisational forms and close inter-organisational relationships. 
Strongly implicated across much of the literature reviewed are three relationships 
which simultaneously involve varying degrees of cooperation, trust, tension, 
competition and conflict. These are the relationships between employees and 
employers, the relationships within and between professional and occupational 
groups, and the relationships between organisations across partnerships and supply 
chains. All of these provide potential challenges to standard models of HRM founded 
on notions of integrated organisations, workplace harmony, shared values, 
understanding and mutual interests. In answering the questions relating to prospects 
for notions of HRM within PPPs, analysis should take account of and be informed by 
the basis and nature of these relationships. The next chapter presents the specific 
context for the case studies of this research, namely the introduction of Independent 
Sector Treatment Centres into the UK health economy, mandated by central 
government. 
x How is employee commitment spread across the PPP? For example do 
employees within PPP tend to identify themselves with their workplace or 
the public partner, or their occupation or profession?   
 
x Do employees/managers/professionals retain a public service ethos? - Or is 
this replaced by new forms of commitment? This could be either to the 
organisation, or to practices and ways of working. 
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Chapter 3 Research Context: Independent Sector 
Treatment Centres 
3.1 ISTC: A Contested Policy 
A significant aspect of the NHS modernisation agenda outlined in the NHS Plan (DH, 
2000), was the introduction of Diagnostic and Treatment Centres (now Treatment 
Centres - dƐ ) ? dŚĞƐĞ ǁĞƌĞ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ĂƐ ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ  “ŽŶĞ-ƐƚŽƉ ? ĐĞŶƚƌĞƐ ĚĞůŝǀĞƌŝŶŐ
elective (pre-planned) services, normally ŽŶĂ ‘ĚĂǇ-ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ďĂƐŝƐ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞďƵƌĚĞŶ
of managing unplanned emergency care or hospitalisation. Treatment Centres (TCs) 
were described as working within and alongside the NHS providing extra capacity, 
helping to reduce waiting times, offering patients greater diversity in provision and 
stimulating innovation in the delivery of services (DH, 2006a; 2005a). Six months 
after the initial announcement for Diagnostic Treatment Centres, it was declared that 
a number would be developed in partnership with the private sector in the form of 
Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs), which would be owned and run by 
private companies (DoH, 2002b). At the launch of the initiative, the principle aim of 
the ISTC project was increasing capacity in the NHS (DoH, 2005a). This was seen as 
important both for reducing waiting times for common procedures including 
ŽƌƚŚŽƉĂĞĚŝĐĂŶĚĐĂƚĂƌĂĐƚŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐĐŚŽŝĐĞďǇ  ‘ĞǆƉĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ƉůƵƌĂůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?  ?Ž, ?  ? ? ? ?Ă ) ? ůƐŽ ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂůůǇ ƐƚƌĞƐƐes the 
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽďƌŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂŶĚƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ
sector with promised improvements including (DoH, 2006a): 
x Construction of new facilities designed around the clinical flow of patients 
x Process design to improve the ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞďǇŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƉƵƚ 
x Taking extraneous administrative processes off-line so that surgery is not 
delayed and commence at the start of the working day 
x Stocking smaller ranges of prostheses allowing theatre staff to become more 
proficient and productive 
x Administering local rather than general anaesthetics 




in the NHS by providing a challenge to traditional service delivery methods and in 
doing so to create a self-ŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐE,^ ? ?/ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?EŽƚǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ
on innovation, policies have continually reiterated that patients are still treated in 
line with the pƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞE,^ ?ǁŝƚŚĐĂƌĞ ‘ĨƌĞĞĂƚƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨƵƐĞ ?ĂŶĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
same high-standards (DoH, 2000; 2004b):  
 “dŚŝƐ ĞŶĂďůĞƐ ƚŚĞ E,^ ƚŽ ůĞĂƌŶ ĨƌŽŵ ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ
independent sector while retaining and transferring the strength of the NHS 
and protecting the high standards of care that have been developed in NHS 
ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ? ?Ž, ? ? ? ? ?Ă P ? ) 
While also fitting with ideals of partnership working: 
 ‘ƚŚĞ /^d WƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚ ƚŽ ĂůůŽǁ ƚŚĞ /^ƚŽ ǁŽƌŬ ŝŶ
partnership with local healthcare economies to provide solutions which 
reflect and cater to local requirements. The ISTCs are being set up and run by 
leading international companies which have extensive experience of running 
ĞůĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƵƌŐŝĐĂůĐĞŶƚƌĞƐĂŶĚĚŝĂŐŶŽƐƚŝĐĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?Ž, ? ? ? ? ?Ă P5) 
/^dƉƌŽĐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚŚĂƐƚĂŬĞŶƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚǁŽĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚ ‘ǁĂǀĞƐ ? ?dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚǁĂǀĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĐŝŶŐ
in 2003 consisted of 25 fixed-site centres and two chains of mobile units. The second 
wave initially involved 24 schemes, but was later scaled back to 10, of which nine 
were operational by 2009. Many of the wave 2 centres were larger in scope and 
scale, involving a wider range of procedures and covering services provided over 
multiple sites (Naylor and Gregory, 2009). Within the year 2007/08, ISTCs carried out 
approximately 6 million elective care procedures, 1.8% of the NHS total (Audit 
Commission, 2008), including around 7% of hip procedures and 9% of arthroscopies.   
ISTCs have a varied and often complex contractual structure, which have legally 
binding contracts with both the Department of Health and a number of sponsoring 
PCTs, although considerable variation exists between sites. In addition they are 
regulated by inspection by the Care Quality Commission (previously Healthcare 
Commission). ISTCs also report to the DoH on 26 key performance indicators 
including measures clinical procedures, complaints and patient satisfaction.   
The ISTC Programme has been a highly controversial reform often resisted and 
publicly criticised by medical and campaign groups supportive of an integrated NHS 
(Player and Leys, 2008).  Their performance and impact has been under heavy 
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scrutiny by contract managers, central government regulators, staff groups and the 
general public. Three particular controversies have most frequently been bought to 
public attention with discussion in the BMJ as well as local and national press; namely 
the value for money of ISTC contracts, the safety of new facilities outside of the NHS 
and run by independent organisations, and the impact on the wider NHS as routine 
procedures are taken out of the system (Wallace, 2006; Squires, 2007; Kelly et al, 
2007; Pollock and Kirkwood, 2009). While investigating these criticisms is not a 
primary focus of the current study, they do form part of the context for ISTCs and 
could often be seen to inform the perceptions and discussions of ISTCs by staff and 
management within the case studies. They are therefore worth briefly exploring 
here.  
 In relation to the value for money of ISTCs, Allison Pollock (Pollock, 2004; 2007; 
Pollock and Kirkwood, 2009) has been highly critical of the nature of current 
contracts. She argues that to encourage new companies into the market, the price 
paid is often slightly higher than the amount paid to NHS providers stipulated in the 
national tariff. The government has responded that this price (on average 11.2% 
higher than NHS tariff (HSC, 2006) reflects the full economic costs associated with 
building new facilities, not fully taken into account in the NHS tariff price (HSC, 2006). 
In addition, and perhaps with more serious consequences, patient numbers have 
ďĞĞŶ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ĂŶĚ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ďƵĚŐĞƚ  ‘ƌŝŶŐ-ĨĞŶĐĞĚ ? ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ
guarantee income to the private providers investing in new centres. This, Pollock 
states, has led in places to extreme overpayments to the private sector, with the 
state contracting about £2.7bn worth of services and uncertainty around the value 
for money. As an example, the Scottish Regional Treatment Centre (SRTC) opened in 
2006 with the company Netcare contracted to supply a specific number of 
procedures over for a period of three years at a cost of £18.7m. However, she 
calculates the actual take up of the service was in the first year approximately 32% of 
capacity. Adjusting for types of procedures and payments, she estimates that within 
the first year, approximately 1.6m of payments had been made for services not used 
(Pollock and Kirkwood, 2009). Based on these figures and others availably, Pollock 
estimated that this could amount to some £927m unused capacity paid for by the 
state, although she admits these figures are based on wide extrapolations from little 
data. Although all of the above figures have been disputed, for example by the Chief 
Operating Officer of the Trust in which SRTC was based (Marr, 2009), Pollock states 
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that many of the payments remain unaccounted for and difficult to trace due to 
missing data returns, with fewer than half providing any of the compulsory data to 
Hospital Episodes Statistics:  ‘>ĂĐŬ ŽĨ ĚĂƚĂ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ĂŶĚ ƉŽŽƌ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ĚĂƚĂ
ƌĞƚƵƌŶƐ ĂƌĞ ŚĂůůŵĂƌŬƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ /^d ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?  ?WŽůůŽĐŬ Ğƚ Ăů ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? dŚŝƐview was 
supported by the Health Select Committee (HSC, 2006) which was established to 
investigate the first wave of ISTCs as well as the proposals for the second wave. 
Investigating value for money they concluded in that  ‘ƐŝŶĐĞ ǁĞ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ŬŶŽǁ ƚŚĞ
details of the contracts, what figure was used for the NHS Equivalent Cost or how it 
was arrived at, and since the benefits of ISTCs have not been quantified, it is 
impossible to assess whether ISTC schemes have in practice proved good value for 
ŵŽŶĞǇ ? ?,^ ? ? ? ? ?38)
The second major concern has been around the quality and safety of care provided 
by ISTCs. This was again picked up by the HSC (2006). Following the evidence from a 
number of different stakeholders, including members of the government, hospital 
consultants and managers from the NHS and private organisations, they found a 
number of problems potentially affecting quality and safety. These included concerns 
over arrangements for patients being transferred between ISTC facilities and NHS 
sites in case of emergency, regulation and checks over safety procedures, poor 
quality of staff, lack of training and again lack of data on which to base judgements of 
quality. Further, the safety concerns over ISTCs gained national attention following 
the death of a patient caused by haemorrhage during in a routine gall bladder 
operation in 2007 at the Eccleshill Treatment Centre (West, 2009). Insufficient blood 
was held at the ISTC to cope with the emergency, and a series of problems led to long 
delays in emergency treatment including a porter having to fetch blood from a 
nearby hospital in his own car rather than pre-planned courier service, no telephone 
in the operating theatre to call for help and a lack of equipment to stem the bleeding 
Žƌ ǁĂƌŵ ƚŚĞ ďůŽŽĚ ǁŚĞŶ ŝƚ ĂƌƌŝǀĞĚ ? dŚĞ ĐŽƌŽŶĞƌ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƚŝŵĞ ƉƌŽŶŽƵŶĐĞĚ  ‘ŐůŽďĂů
ĨůĂǁƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ  ‘ŐƌŽƐƐĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ?  ?ĂůĚǁŝŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ?ĂŶĚĂƌĞǀŝĞǁ
into the centre is currently underway.  Aside from this, doctors have made frequent 
complaints in medical, local and national press about the quality of the services 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ?tĂůůůĂĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?K ?ŽǁĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?<ĞůůǇĞƚal, 2007).  
Two recent academic reviews of quality outcomes of ISTCs provide slightly 
contradictory findings. First, research by orthopaedic consultants examined the 
results of patients from Cardiff Vale NHS Trust who had been sent to a single ISTC in 
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Weston-super-Mare for hip (136 patients) and knee (224 patients) operations. 
Following up patients later within the Trust with they found dramatically worse 
outcomes for operations carried out within the ISTC than the NHS average. Revision 
rates within three years of hip operations stood at 18%, compared to 0.9% average 
within the NHS, and two thirds showed evidence of poor surgical technique (White et 
al, 2009). Similarly, significantly higher rates of revision, and significantly lower 
survival rates after three years, were found amongst patients undergoing knee 
operations at the ISTC (Kempshall, et al 2009). Second, Brown et al (2009) looked at 
outcomes for a range of day and orthopaedic surgery procedures in patients treated 
in either an IS or NHS Treatment Centre. This involved a larger group of patients 
(2664), and a larger group of Treatment centres (6) and NHS sites (20). They found 
ISTC patients undergoing cataract surgery or hip replacement achieved a slightly 
greater improvement in functional status and quality of life than those treated in 
NHS facilities while the opposite was true for those undergoing hernia repair. No 
significant difference was found for those undergoing knee replacements or varicose 
vein surgery. For some conditions patients treated in ISTCs were less likely to report 
post-ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĂĚũƵƐƚĞĚĨŽƌ  ‘ĐĂƐĞ ŵŝǆ ? ? ĨŽƌ
example in terms of the relative health of the patients entering treatment, the 
authors do warn against over interpretation of the results given the large differences 
in patients treated. In most cases, patients entering ISTC treatment are risk assessed, 
ǁŝƚŚ ŽŶůǇ ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞůǇ  ‘ŚĞĂůƚŚǇ ? patients with lower co-morbidities or risk factors 
such as diabetes or obesity accepted.   
The third area of controversy was the impact that ISTCs are likely to have on existing 
NHS facilities. Medics suggested that they were being forced to send patients to 
ISTCs against their preference, as contracts were ďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂ ‘ƚĂŬĞŽƌƉĂǇ ?ďĂƐŝƐ ?ƚhat 
the Primary Care Trusts would have made payments to the ISTC companies 
regardless of the take up of the scheme (Moore, 2007). In addition, there were a 
number of reports that ISTCs bought in an oversupply of services in places where 
waiting lists were already being reduced. As PCT were encouraged to send patients to 
the new facilities, existing NHS were becoming underused as a result (Ferris, 2005). 
The negative impact of separate elective surgical facilities on overall efficiency is 
supported in part by operations management research, which suggests that this may 
lead to loss of flexibility, as well as difficulty constructing theatre lists consisting only 
of more complex operation to fit time slots, and therefore counter intuitively actually 
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decrease utilisation of theatre departments (Bowers and Mould, 2005). As ISTCs only 
tend to carry out less complicated, high volume and low risk procedures on generally 
ŚĞĂůƚŚǇ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ĂĐĐƵƐĞĚ ŽĨ  ‘ĐŚĞƌƌǇ ƉŝĐŬŝŶŐ ? Žƌ  ‘ĐƌĞĂŵŝŶŐ ŽĨĨ ? ƚŚĞ
most straightforward aspects of healthcare. This is seen as taking away an important 
income stream from the NHS, without IS providers having to pay for the more costly 
emergency care and support services (Player and Leys, 2008). The HSC (2006) report 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ŐŽŽĚ ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐfor thinking that ISTCs could have a more 
significant affect on the finances of NHS hospitals. We do not know how big that 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ Žƌ ŚŽǁ ŐƌĞĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĚĂŶŐĞƌƐ ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ ? ?  ?Ɖ ? ) ? /Ŷ ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ
initial treatment centres subject to rules of additionally, which stated no NHS staff 
could be employed (see section 3.2 below) there was no provision for training NHS 
staff. As it was the more routine procedures being outsourced, this was seen as 
potentially leading to the loss of opportunities for junior doctors to train and 
develop. This was again strongly criticised by the HSC, which stated: 
 ‘dŚĞƌĞ ǁĞƌĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ /^dƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƉŽŽƌůǇ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ E,^ ĂŶĚ
that they were not training doctors. These concerns are well-founded. The 
additionality [see section 3.2] policy was felt by many to have hindered 
integration between ISTCs and their local NHS facilities, while the reliance on 
overseas staff which additionality had necessitated raised concerns about 
clinical quality and continuity of care. We concluded that there was no hard, 
quantifiable evidence to prove that standards in ISTCs differed from those in 
the NHS; however, there are failings in the quality of data collection by both 
E,^ĂŶĚ/^ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ? ? ?Ɖ ? ) 
In general, medical and campaign groups have argued the introduction of private 
providers will lead to fragmentation of the health service. Summing up this position, 
the President of the British Society for Rheumatology wrote in the BJM (Bamji, 2008) 
 ‘ůůŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞƉĞƌǀĞƌƐĞ ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐ ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶ ƚŚe pattern of specialist care and 
the establishment and maintenance of multidisciplinary working. They also 
help to encourage unnecessary activity, particularly in diagnostics, where it 
becomes reasonable to send all back pain patients for MRI scans (because 
patients want them) despite both the expense and lack of clinical utility. So 
there is more to all of this than simply a lack of evidence of clinical benefit 
from independent services; some may be more expensive, and some less, but 
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all of them will threaten the existence of current provision without any 
ŽǀĞƌĂůůƉƌŽŽĨƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĂƌĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůůǇƉƌƵĚĞŶƚ ?(1187) 
In addition to these public debates, the limited academic research on TCs has shown 
conceptual ambiguity in the principles and interpretation of policy. Bate and Robert 
 ? ? ? ? ? ) ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐ ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ dƐ ŝŶ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞ ƚ ?Ɛ ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ƚŽ ĞǆƉĂŶĚ
patient choice. Echoing debates around PPPs in general, they identify a number of 
paradoxes that render policy implementation ambiguous. For example they note that 
choice is being imposed upon patients, TCs undermine the goal of seamless 
integrated care, and current contracts privilege the IS to the detriment of NHS service 
providers. Pope et al (2006) suggest that at the local level the translation of policy 
has been shaped by various strategic actors with different expectations about the 
role of the private sector. This has led, for example, to significant variations in TCs, 
ranging from single ward initiatives in which existing departments were relabelled in 
response to central government policy leading to limited or incomplete change on 
the ground, to the construction of large infrastructure builds (Pope, et al. 2006). 
ISTCs are often presented as falling into the latter category, however again 
consŝĚĞƌĂďůĞĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇĞǆŝƐƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŽ, ?Ɛ
ŽǁŶ ǁŽƌĚƐ ? /^d ĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ƌĂŶŐĞ ĨƌŽŵ  ‘ŵŽďŝůĞ ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƉŽƌƚĂďůĞ ƵŶŝƚƐ ĨŽƌ
ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŐ ĐĂƚĂƌĂĐƚ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?  ‘ŶĞǁ ĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ŽŶ ďŽƚŚ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ E,^ ƐŝƚĞƐ ?
 ‘ƵƚŝůŝƐŝŶŐ ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ /^ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƌĞĨƵƌďŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ E,^ ĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?  ?Ž, ?
2005a). The latter two of these has created situations in which single corridors and 
operating theatres are run by the private sector, with their own administrative and 
management staff, within existing general NHS hospitals. Further, the diversity of 
centres, as well as the contradictions in the rationale for ISTCs was picked up in the 
HSC (2006) report, which stated in response to the decision for later services to be 
part of  ‘ƌĞĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶƉůĂŶƐ ?ƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚƐĞĞĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐŽƌĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐĐůŽƐĞĚ
down: 
 ‘dŚĞ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ƚŽ ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ƐƉĞŶĚ  ? ? ? ? ŵŝůůŝŽŶ ƉĞƌ ǇĞĂƌ
despite changing circumstances has not been explained, and seems to sit 
uncomfortably with the SeĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “ŝŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ĂƌĞĂƐ ?
it has become clear that the level of capacity required by the local NHS does 
ŶŽƚũƵƐƚŝĨǇŶĞǁ/^dƐĐŚĞŵĞƐ ? ?/ƚŝƐŶŽƚĐůĞĂƌǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚŝƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƐŝŵƉůǇĂ
failure coherently to articulate the situation or a more profound incoherence 
in terms of policy as opposed to presentation. There are also real concerns 
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that the expansion of the ISTC programme will destabilise local NHS Trusts, 
ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇƚŚŽƐĞǁŝƚŚĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĚĞĨŝĐŝƚƐ ? ? ?Ɖ ? ) 
Importantly for the current study, this diversity and conceptual ambiguity is also 
reflected in the arrangements for employment and staffing of ISTCs, which have 
changed dramatically over the period of the programmes introduction. ISTCs 
ĞǆĞŵƉůŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ŽĨ ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ Žƌ  ‘ƉĞƌŵĞĂďůĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ ŽĨ
public services. Many of the contracts were mandated by central government, and 
involved introducing new companies to the UK market in an array of structured 
partnership arrangements with existing healthcare organisations. Therefore rather 
than a single distinct employment context, ISTCs in fact involve a diverse range of 
employment arrangements, explored below.  
 ?Ǥ ?Ǯǯ  
Central government procurement of the ISTC program took place in two distinct 
waves. While similar in many respects, one important difference is in the rules 
governing employment for the two phases of commissioning. Specifically, blanket 
 ‘ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ? ƌƵůĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĞĂƌůǇ /^dƐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƐƚĂƚĞd that they were 
prohibited from employing or engaging any healthcare professionals who were 
working in the NHS at the time, or had worked in the NHS at any time in the last six 
months (DoH, 2007). This followed concerns from all parties involved in negotiations 
that ISTCs should provide genuine additional capacity. In effect, this meant that 
Wave 1 treatment centres would have to source clinical staff from overseas or from 
existing private sector providers. This caused a number of difficulties, in particular 
the challenge faced by early ISTCs in recruiting suitable staff given the dominance of 
the NHS as an employer. This was joined by pressure from staff groups and unions 
within the NHS who objected that barring them from employment within ISTC was 
unfair practice, and that employment within ISTCs was unregulated and could lead to 
unequal treatment across the workforce. In addition to this, criticism in the Health 
Select Committee (2006) over the potential impact on training opportunities led to 
calls for greater integration with existing NHS employment systems including 
allowing junior doctors and other groups to train within ISTC facilities. As a result, by 
ƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚǁĂǀĞŽĨ/^dƉƌŽĐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĞĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇƌƵůĞƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ‘ƌĞĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ ?ƚŽ
 ‘ĂůůŽǁE,^ĞŵƉůŽǇĞes maximum choice and mobility in their careers and to ensure 
ƚŚĂƚ/^ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞĂǀŝĂďůĞƉŽŽůĨƌŽŵǁŚŝĐŚƚŽƌĞĐƌƵŝƚ ? ?E,^ŵƉůŽǇĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?
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Addressing concerns over lack of training opportunities, Wave 2 ISTCs were 
contractually obliged to make at least one-third of all activity available for the 
training of junior clinical staff. 
Aside from the external pressures, it also appears likely that the decision to open up 
employment in ISTCs to NHS staff had already been made by the government, given 
that a number of the wave 2 ISTCs were partial replacements existing services. For 
the most part these had already been decided upon when the new employment 
regulations were formally agreed. Although the DoH stated that there was local 
choice over where the ISTCs were commissioned, other local health service managers 
complained that there had been considerable pressure from the DoH to accept plans 
for ISTCs against their own wishes (HSC, 2006).  
The removal of additionality meant that management of local Trusts were, alongside 
the contracted ISTC providers, expected to begin arrangements for the wholesale 
transfer of staff from local hospital departments to the ISTCs. Certain specialties 
under short supply were excluded from complete transfer, but even these were given 
greater leeway to work uncontracted hours in ISTCs. For certain medics therefore 
ISTCs would replace private hospitals in supplementing NHS income. Accordingly, 
many Wave 2 treatment centres were largely made up of staff transferred from local 
NHS organisations, as well as additional staff employed by the private sector health 
company themselves.  
In looking at HR issues in ISTCs, and public-private partnerships in general, the two 
waves of centres represent an important site for research, in many ways embodying 
the permeable workplaces and blurring of organisational boundaries. ISTCs are 
ŽƐƚĞŶƐŝďůǇ  ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌŽŶŐ ŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐǁŝƚŚ
NHS facilities. They were promoted not in reference to market competition but on 
grounds that they would supply  ‘ƵŶŝƋƵĞ ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ĂůƐŽ
commercial ventures, with evidence of tension, mistrust and divergent values and 
interests between actors within the public and private sectors.   
Many of the research questions identified in section 2.5 relate to the difficulties of 
translating a private sector HRM approach to a context in which public sector 
institutions and professions dominate, even when contained with a private company. 
Therefore Wave 1 and Wave 2 ISTCs could be seen as providing a useful site for 
comparative study, in which two ostensibly similar forms of organisation are created, 
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different in one key aspect. Both operate within similar contexts, carrying out largely 
similar functions, and with similar policy aims, pressures, paradoxes and constraints. 
However, while Wave 2 centres are largely composed of actors from within the NHS 
and in some ways tied to existing NHS facilities, Wave 1 centres are formed by actors 
drawn from a much wider variety of backgrounds.   
The different rules governing employment in the two waves of ISTC therefore 
provide an opportunity to investigate how different partnership structures relate to 
different contexts for HRM activity. For example, are ISTCs involving no existing NHS 
actors more able to promote corporate HRM and instil distinct HRM practices? 
Alternatively, are they likely to establish low commitment HRM approaches in the 
face of commercial pressures and greater exposure to private sector practices? These 
issues are explored in much greater detail within the study findings. The next chapter 




Chapter 4 Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research methodology and process of carrying out the 
study. This includes discussion of the choices made during the design and conduct of 
the research, the process of data collection and means of analysis. This introduces 
relevant literature on qualitative and case study research which informed the study. 
It does not engage in lengthy discussions of the competing research paradigms which 
would be difficult to do justice to here (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Guba and Lincoln, 
2005; Benton and Craib, 2001; Burell and Morgan, 1979). The chapter also includes 
reflections my own changing personal and employment circumstances, developing 
interests and the numerous practical challenges as well as opportunities that 
presented themselves during the course of the study. These had perhaps 
unavoidable consequences for all aspects of the research, including the topics 
selected, the course of data collection and the duration of the study. Rather than 
attempting to erase these elements completely from the work, this section will 
include personal reflections on how and why the research emerged as it did.  In 
contrast to the rest of the thesis, I do not avoid writing from the first person where 
this helps to provide a more open account of the choices made during the course of 
the research.  The first two sections describe the foundations of the research, 
introducing the principles of qualitative and case study research. The later sections 
describe the process of carrying out the study. This introduces the comparative case 
design and justifies this as an appropriate respond to the exploratory research 
questions. It also describes how the study was carried out including detail on the 
data collected, process of analysis and ethical considerations of the study.   
4.2 Qualitative Research  
In planning the research it was necessary to consider possible approaches to the 
study. Organisational study does not relate to a single methodology but stems from a 
variety of academic roots: economics, political science, psychology, sociology and 
anthropology (Knights and Willmott, 1997). Because of this, the spectrum of 
paradigms of interpretation used to examine organisations is as wide as those in use 
in social science in general. A number of epistemological and ontological positions 
have been used to justify the truth claims of research, with different approaches 
83 
 
gaining and loosing status over time and across research contexts. Contrasting 
schools of thought point us towards various methodologies and aims of research. 
Some writers have warned against strict adherence to these paradigms (Willmot, 
 ? ? ? ? ) ? Žƌ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ  ‘ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ?Žƌ ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂƌĞ ĂƌƚŝĨŝĐŝĂůĂŶĚ ƐƚƵůƚŝĨǇŝŶŐ ?  ?tĂƚƐŽŶ ?
1997:5) based upon them. This study does not claim to exactly replicate any 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐƚƌĞĂŵŽĨ ‘ƉƵƌĞ ?ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ ?ZĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ
sought to pragmatically draw upon various insights and methods to produce 
plausible and worthwhile research findings (Watson, 1997). 
This said, the study can broadly be described as qualitative research. Primarily, this 
choice was driven by the nature of the research questions and subject of the study. 
Quantitative research is usually seen as appropriate for testing theories that have 
been previously constructed, or looking for a suspected relationship between two 
well defined variables (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Quantitative research 
could have been employed if the research was concerned with, for example, the co-
variance of partnership models and financial performance or the relationship 
between the adoption of certain employment practices and employee turnover. 
However, due to some of the issues identified in the preceding literature chapters, 
many of the concepts on which measurement could be based are currently not clear. 
&Žƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŵŽǀĞ ƚŽ  ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞďŽƵŶĚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ
ŵĂǇ ďĞ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ƚŽ ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇ ĚĞĨŝŶĞ ? ĚĞƉĞŶĚ ŽŶ ŚŽǁ ďŽƚŚ  ‘ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŶŽŶ-
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ ?ĐĂƌƌǇŽƵƚ ƚŚĞŝƌĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞseveral smaller organisations each 
with potentially complementary or competing objectives. Qualitative research on the 
other hand, while preventing straightforward generalisations, allows investigation of 
issues which are unclear prior to commencing the research. Qualitative research is 
usually seen as appropriate for tackling open ended questions (Lincoln and Guba, 
 ? ? ? ? ) ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘ůĂƌŐĞ-ƐĐĂůĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ĂŶĚ situations that involve 
 ‘ƵŶŝƋƵĞ ? ŶŽŶƌĞƉĞĂƚĂďůĞ ? ĂŶĚ Ğǆ-ante highly improbable complex ŽĨ ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?
(Hirschman, 1970: 343). It is also used to explore the phenomenon of interest in 
detail and within their local context, as they emerge and change over a period of 
time (Jonson and Onwuegnuzie, 2004).   
While there are a large variety of research methods that could be employed in 
qualitative research, certain common characteristics are features generally 
characteristic of a qualitative mode of enquiry (Bryman, 2001). Contemporary 
qualitative research has built on the notion that social scientific study is 
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fundamentally different from the natural sciences as it is concerned with meaningful 
ŚƵŵĂŶĂĐƚŝŽŶĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐ  ?ĞŶƚŽŶĂŶĚƌĂŝď ?  ? ? ? ? ) ?  ‘,ƵŵĂŶ
ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƌĞ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐŝďůĞ ŝŶ ǁĂǇƐ ƚŚĞ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ŽĨ ŶŽŶŚƵŵĂŶ ŽďũĞĐƚƐ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ?  ?^ƚƌŝŬe, 
1972, quoted in Patton, 2002: 28). It also has roots in interpretive study, in which 
ƐŽĐŝĂů ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ  ‘ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝǀĞ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ
ĂƌƌŝǀĞĂƚĂĐĂƵƐĂůĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝƚƐĐŽƵƌƐĞĂŶĚĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ? ?tĞď ƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?/ŶŐĞneral, 
qualitative research places a greater emphasis on subjective meanings above wholly 
generaliseable objective laws. Rather than entering the research environment with 
ƉƌĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐŽƌďŝŶĂƌǇŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐĞƐ ?ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐƐĞĞŬƚŽĂůůŽǁ ‘ŽŶĞ ?ƐƐƵďũĞĐƚ
to unfold its nature and characteristics during the process of investigation ? (Burrell 
ĂŶĚ DŽƌŐĂŶ ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ) ?  ŬĞǇ ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ŶĞĞĚ ĨŽƌ  ‘ǀĞƌƐƚĞŚĞŶ ? Žƌ  ‘ĞŵƉĂƚŚĞƚŝĐ
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ ‘ŐĞƚŝŶƐŝĚĞƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŽĨĂŶĂĐƚŽƌƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚŚĞŽƌ
she iƐ ƵƉ ƚŽ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ŵŽƚŝǀĞƐ ? ďĞůŝĞĨƐ ? ĚĞƐŝƌĞƐ ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƐŽ ŽŶ ?  ?^ĐŚǁĂŶĚƚ ?
2000:192). Therefore there is usually felt to be a need to explore a social 
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ŝŶ Ă ŶĂƚƵƌĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ?  ‘ƌĞĂů ǁŽƌůĚ ? ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ  ?WĂƚƚŽŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ĞŵŝĐ
perspective (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005), capturing the actors own voice, and using 
language defined by the actors relating to situations with which they are familiar 
(Schwandt, 2000). Flexibility is also advocated so research can be adapted as 
understanding of the researched situation deepens and situations change (Patton, 
2002). Qualitative researchers tend to take into account the context specific 
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐŽƌ ‘ƐŝƚƵĂƚĞĚŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?ƐŽƚŚĂƚŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŶŽƚĚĞƚĂĐŚĞĚĨƌŽŵ
the social and physical environment in which they occurred. Analysis must usually 
ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚ ‘ƚŚŝĐŬĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĞĚǁŽƌůĚ ?'ĞĞƌƚǌ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌ, 
qualitative researchers are advised to take into account the active nature of their 
personal influence in the outcome of the study (Patton, 2002) and retain a degree of 
ƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀŝƚǇ ?dŚĂƚŝƐ ‘ĂŶĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ
of meanings throughout the research process, and an acknowledgment of the 
impossibility of remaining 'outside of' one's subject matter while conducting 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ?EŝŐŚƚŝŶŐĂůĞĂŶĚƌŽŵďǇ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
Although the precise order of any research project may vary, qualitative researches 
usually see research as an inductive process, by which they search for meanings and 
structures in their interpretation of the data (Thorne, 2000). Rather than beginning 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ǁŝƚŚ Ă ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐ ƚŽ ƚĞƐƚ ? ƚŚŝƐ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ Ă  ‘ďŽƚƚŽŵ ƵƉ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ǁŚĞƌĞďǇ
researcher begins with an area of interest, but then develops ideas through the 
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ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨŐĂƚŚĞƌŝŶŐĚĂƚĂ ?  ?ƌĞsswell, 2007: 28). Analysis is then based on the data 
gathered, for example through looking for categories, patterns, hierarchies that 
suggest theoretical generalisations (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The process of 
analysis for this study is discussed in more detail below.  
These positions lead to a set of responsibilities for qualitative social researchers that 
are partially distinct from the role of researchers in the quantitative tradition or the 
natural sciences. They cannot appeal to universally applicable truths in order to 
incontrovertibly prove a proffered position or derive laws or theories that transcend 
the context in which they were formed. Just as our own interpretations will be 
moulded by our existing world-view, they do not then take on an absolute form that 
can be directly or neutrally presented to others. The process of mediating 
interpretations into textual representation requires several further steps of 
interpretation (Schwandt, 2000). The representations presented by researchers will 
then ĂůǁĂǇƐďĞƉĂƌƚŝĂů ?ĂŶĚŝƐ ‘ĐƌĂĨƚĞĚ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ
 ?tĂƚƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?Ă ?ƌŽǁŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?tƌŝƚŝŶŐ ‘ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ?ŝƐ ŶŽƚŵĞƌĞůǇĂ ‘ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇ
or mop-ƵƉ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ŝŶ ŽƵƌ ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ƉƵƌƐƵŝƚƐ ?  ?ǀĂŶ DĂĂŶĞŶ ?  ? ? ?  P  ? ? ? ) ? ďƵƚ Ă
motivated process of shaping of an account that we wish to present to an audience; 
 ‘dŚĞǁŽƌĚƐŽŶĞƐĐŚŽŽƐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞƚƌŽƉĞƐŽŶĞĂĚŽƉƚƐ ?ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐŽŶĞƵƚŝůŝses significantly 
influence how that research enters into broader discourses and how, potentially at 
least, they influence human action. It is almost as if one is choosing a reality when 
ŽŶĞ ǁƌŝƚĞƐ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ŐŝǀŝŶŐ ĂŶ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ŽŶĞ ?  ?tĂƚƐŽŶ ?  ? ? ?  ) ? dŚĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ
must therefore be reflexive about the version of reality they put forward and 
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ  ‘ŚŽǁǁĞĂƐƌesearchers and practitioners constitute meaning through 
our own taken-for-ŐƌĂŶƚĞĚ ƐƵƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĂŶĚ ůŝŶŐƵŝƐƚŝĐ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ? ?ƵŶůŝĨĨĞ ?
2003: 989).  
Reliability and validity in the quantitative conception of the words are then not 
usually seen as adequate tests of the value of qualitative research. Instead strengths 
are usually appealed to such as the persuasiveness of their arguments, the 
trustworthiness and authenticity of their voice, and the practical value of their 
research (Guba and Lincoln; 1994). Triangulation of different sources and methods 
while not a source of validation, can add depth and breadth (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2005). Theorising is itself a social process, (Van Maanen, 1995: 134) and is perhaps 
best seen as a ongoing activity rather than the finalised end product of research; all 
 ‘ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?  ?ƐŚŽƵůĚ ƌĞŵĂŝŶ ?  ‘ĂƐ Ă ǁŽƌŬ ŝŶ ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ŽƉĞŶ ƚŽ ƌĞĐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ďǇ
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ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?  ?ĂƐƚĞůůƐ ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ) ?Qualitative research is usually judged by 
ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉůĂƵƐŝďŝůŝty to the reader of the particular texts 
produced from the research, as something yielding insight of understandings felt to 
be worthwhile to that reader in light of their own situation or projects-in-ůŝĨĞ ?
(Watson, 1997; 5-6). In order to achieve this, the researcher must constantly hold in 
mind their motivated role in theory construction, the importance of language in their 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƐĞĂƌĐŚĨŽƌ ‘ůŽĐĂů ?ƐŵĂůů-scale theories fitted to specific problems 
ĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ĞŶǌŝŶĂŶĚ>ŝŶĐŽůn, 2005: 17). 
4.3 Case Study Research 
As the previous chapters have argued, the current research is not dealing with 
variables that could be easily isolated or removed from their context. Rather it is 
asking exploratory questions about intricate and complex systems of social action, 
diverse political discourse, contested historical accounts and has ethical implications 
which resist straightforward theoretical reductionism. Because of this, and taking 
into account the methodological insights above, it was felt that qualitative case study 
was the most appropriate and feasible approach for the research. In general, 
qualitative research has been seen as consistent with the understanding of 
knowledge of the social world as influenced by processes of social construction. It 
also enables the researcher to capture knowledge within its wider social context 
 ?DŝŶĞƌ  ? DĞǌŝĂƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ĐĂƐĞ ƐƚƵĚǇ ? ŝƐ ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐ ĂŶĚ ĐŽƵůĚ
conceivably be applied to all research that includes a unit of analysis that could be 
ƚĞƌŵĞĚĂ ‘ĐĂƐĞ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĐĂƐĞƐƚƵĚǇĂƐĂƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĚĞƐŝŐŶŝĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶ-depth 
 ‘ŚŽůŝƐƚŝĐ ? ŝŶǀĞstigation of the case, usually over a number of dimensions, over a 
certain period of time, and possibly through a number of methods (Hammersley and 
'Žŵŵ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ?  ‘te could study it analytically or holistically, entirely by repeated 
measures or hermeneutically, organically or culturally, and by mixed methods - but 
ǁĞĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĂƚůĞĂƐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞƚŝŵĞďĞŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ ? ?^ƚĂŬĞ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞŐƵŝĚŝng 
supposition that directed the current research towards the case study approach is 
that it would be almost inconceivable to study or attempt to purposefully control the 
ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ĨŽĐƵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƐƚƵĚǇ ĚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĞĂů
worlĚ ?ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇŽĐĐƵƌ ?dŚĞĐĂƐĞƐƚƵĚǇƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĂůůŽǁƐƵƐƚŽŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞƚŚŝƐ
ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞǇ ĨŽƌŵ  ‘ĂŶ ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů ŝŶƋƵŝƌǇ ƚŚĂƚ
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, when the 
boundaries betweĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ĐůĞĂƌůǇ ĞǀŝĚĞŶƚ ‘ (Yin, 
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2003: 23). Case study research actively encourages detailed descriptions of the 
uniqueness and complexity of the particular instance (Stake, 2000; Mitchell, 1983) 
and seeks ƚŽ  ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?  ^ƚĂŬĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ?
xi).  
Case studies are extensively used within organisational studies (Grunrow, 1995) as 
they can help us include a number of aspects of interest that would be difficult for 
other approaches to capture. These include: exploring different character of intra-
organisational relationships (e.g. Fincham, 1999); demonstrate organisational 
processes, including the decision-making process (Teisman and Klijn, 2002), 
organisational change (Pettigrew, et al, 1992; Pettigrew, 1985), the process of 
organisational sensemaking (Weick, 1993), human resource development 
(Newbronner et al, 2001), constructing narratives (Brown, 1998: Currie and Brown 
2003), constructing organisational practices (Rutherford, 2002), personal identity 
(Coupland, 2001), organisational culture (Bate, 2000; Schein, 1996), emergent 
strategy (Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985); and the details of organisational life that 
ďƌŝŶŐ  ‘ƵŶĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚ ĂŶĚ ŽĨƚĞŶ ƵŶĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚ ƐŚŽƌƚĐŽŵŝŶŐƐĂŶĚ ĐŽƐƚƐ ƚŽ ůŝŐŚƚ ?
(Grimshaw et al. 2002: 476). 
Due to the level of analysis required, researchers usually concentrate on one or a 
small number of cases, seeking to utilise many sources of qualitative or quantitative 
and qualitative data as appropriate (Yin 2003). Each case is not merely one of many 
examples whose sole purpose is to yield data for the wider goal of the study, but 
ŵƵƐƚďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƚŽƐŽŵĞĞǆƚĞŶƚĂƐ ‘ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ?ƵŶŝƋƵĞ ? ?^ƚĂŬĞ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?ĞŵďƌĂĐŝŶŐ
rather than disregarding subjective experience, narrative integrity, uniqueness and 
individual characteristics (Ragin, 1997). Because of this, the type replicable research 
and generalisability associated with scientific enquiry is not an option from case 
study research. However, such generalisation is not seen as essential for research to 
provide benefit. Indeed, many have pointed to the problems of promoting blanket 
laws that are supposedly free from time and context, formed by actors with their 
own subjective views of the world and self-interests, over the experiences of 
particular cases (Lincoln and Guba 1985), and especially so in applied fields in which 
there is an interest in the individual and not just the aggregate (Donmoyor, 1990). 
Frequently though, despite denying the importance of law-like generalisation, case 
study research usually does proffer some kind of wider relevance of the findings, or 
at least generalise within the case (Gomm, Hammersly and Foster, 2000). Therefore, 
88 
 
other purposes for case research that do not imply deterministic prediction have 
been suggested.  
4.4 Purpose of Case Study Research 
Stake (1978) outlines a process of generalisation through the tacit understanding that 
is gained through the vicarious experience of reading detailed case study research.  
The particulars of an individual case add to our existing experiences and memories, 
and can be assimilated into and build upon what we already know in the process of 
 ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ?^ƚĂŬĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ^ƚĂŬĞ ĂŶĚ dƌƵŵďƵůů ?  ? ? ? ? ) ?  ‘EĂƚƵƌĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ?
ethnographic case material, to some extent parallel actual experience, feeding into 
ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ŽĨ ĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐ ĂŶĚ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ  Q dŚĞ ƌĞĂĚĞƌ
comes to know some things told, as if he or she had experienced it. Enduring 
meanings come from encounter, and are modified and reinforced by encŽƵŶƚĞƌ ?
(Stake, 2000; 442). Similarly, Watson (1997) states that the depiction of the case 
ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝĨƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌŐŽĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŝŵĞŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůƐĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ
they have read about, either as a manager or as an academic observer, they will feel 
ďĞƚƚĞƌƉůĂĐĞĚƚŽĐŽƉĞƚŚĂŶŝĨƚŚĞǇŚĂĚŶŽƚƌĞĂĚŝƚ ? ?tĂƚƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ) ? 
Others have argued that more explicit generalisations can be elucidated from case 
ƐƚƵĚǇ ? >ŝŶĐŽůŶ ĂŶĚ 'ƵďĂ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ĨŽƌŵ  ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐĞƐ ? ?
prepositional type interpretations arising from the case that can be potentially 
applicable across contexts. Unlike scientific generalisation these are highly tentative 
and cannot be statistically extrapolated to all other settings but are dependent on an 
inquirer appreciaƚŝŶŐ ŚŽǁ ĂŶĚ ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů  ‘ƌƵůĞ ? ŝƐ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ƚŽ Ă ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ
context. As all cases are unique and contextualised, strict ceteris paribus conditions 
can never be met to apply in a law like fashion the interpretations of one situation to 
another. However, ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ‘ŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
circumstances which connect the events in the case, the analyst might be able to 
show how the general principles being examined manifest themselves in changed 
ĨŽƌŵ ?  ?DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? /n order for a hypothesis formed in one setting to by 
applicable to another, some feature must be recognised familiar enough for the 
hypotheses to be applied and appropriately qualified.  
Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that contexts must be overtly similar enough for 
generalised statements to apply and so selecting potentially representative cases is 
important for generalisation. Others propose that generalisation is based more on 
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the internal processes fitting the learning from one context into another and so 
selecting representative cases is less important (Mitchell, 1983; Donmoyor, 1990). 
Schofield (1990) argues that as a guiding principle, researchers would do well to look 
ĨŽƌŝŶƐŽŵĞǁĂǇƐ ‘ƚǇƉŝĐĂů ?ĐĂƐĞƐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌĂƉƉůŝĐĂďŝůity but 
ƚŚŝƐƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƚĂŬĞŶƚŽĞǆƚƌĞŵĞƐ ‘ĞǀĞŶŝĨŽŶĞĐŽƵůĚĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚǇƉŝĐĂůŝƚǇŝŶĂůůŵĂũŽƌ
dimensions that seem relevant, it is nonetheless clearly true that there would be 
enough idiosyncrasy in any particular situation studied so that one could not transfer 
ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ŝŶ ĂŶ ƵŶƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ǁĂǇ ĨƌŽŵ ŽŶĞ ƚǇƉŝĐĂů ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?  ?Ɖ ? ? ) ?Others 
have suggested the opposite approach, suggesting that extreme or atypical cases 
may more clearly highlight the processes that are the topic of investigation (Hartley, 
1994). In either case, for others to fully assess the significance of the ideas proposed, 
and apply them meaningfully to other instances, the researcher must always include 
sufficient information and thick description about the context in which they was 
formed.    
This would appear to fit with the form of theory advocated within interpretive 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ  ‘ůŽĐĂů ? ƐŵĂůů-scale theories fitted to specific problems and particular 
ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ĞŶǌŝŶĂŶĚ>ŝŶĐŽůŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?KƚŚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇůŝŶŬĞĚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐs of 
ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŽƌǇďƵŝůĚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĐĂƐĞƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ  ‘dŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵůŝĞƐ ŝŶƚŚĞ
ǀĞƌǇ ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝǌŝŶŐ  ? Q ? ĂŶ ĂŶĂůǇƐƚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ƚƌǇ ƚŽ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝǌĞ ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ƚŽ
 “ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?ĂŶĂůŽŐŽƵƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞǁĂǇĂ ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝses from experimental results to 
theŽƌǇ ?  ?zŝŶ ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ?ƐŝĞŶŚĂƌĚ  ? ? ? ? ? )ŽƵƚůŝŶĞƐĂ ƌŝŐŽƌŽƵƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚŝĐŚ
we define constructs, look for patterns, derive hypotheses, and then systematically 
compare them with the evidence from each case in order to assess how well or 
poorly it fits ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ĚĂƚĂ ?  ‘dŚĞ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ŝĚĞĂ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐ ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇ
compare theory and data  W ŝƚĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ Ă ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐůŽƐĞůǇ ĨŝƚƐ ƚŚĞ ĚĂƚĂ ?
(Eisenhard, 1989: 541). However, other have warned against over-formalisation of 
this process or concentrating on measuring and testing constructs between cases at 
ƚŚĞĞǆƉĞŶƐĞŽĨƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ ‘ĂƌŝĐŚďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚƚŽĞĂĐŚĐĂƐĞ ? QƚŚĞ ?ƐƚŽƌǇĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŚŝĐŚ
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐĐĂŶĐŽŵƉĂƌĞƚŚĞŝƌĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐĂŶĚŐĂŝŶƌŝĐŚƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ ? ?ǇĞƌ ?
Wilkins, 1991: 613).  
As well as the possibility of deriving some sort of generalisable findings, case studies 
have also been stated as particularly useful for testing existing theories as they 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ‘ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ?ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐƚŚĂƚĐĂŶ ‘ŝŵƉƵŐŶĞƐƚĂďůŝshed theories if the theories ought 
ƚŽĨŝƚŝƚďƵƚĚŽŶŽƚ ? ?ĐŬƐƚĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?/ŶƐŽŵĞŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? ‘ĞǆƉůŽƌĂƚŽƌǇ ? ? ‘ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ ?
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ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞŽƌǇƚĞƐƚŝŶŐ ?ĂƌĞƐĞĞŶĂƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨŽƌŵƐŽĨĐĂƐĞƐƚƵĚǇ ?zŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝƚ
would also seem possible that in the process of researching the case, a number of 
preliminary working hypothesis may be formed, and a number of examples that are 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐƚŽĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐĂƌĞďŽƚŚĨŽƵŶĚ ?  ‘ƚŚĞĐŚĂŝŶŽĨ ŝŶƋƵŝƌǇ  ? Q ?ƌƵŶƐĨƌŽŵ
comparatively tested theory to case interpretation, and thence, perhaps, via ad hoc 
additions, newly discovered puzzles and systematised prudence, to new candidate-
ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ?  ?ĐŬƐƚĞŝŶ ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ŝƚĐŽƵůĚďĞ ƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞĚƵĂůƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨ
the cases presented in this research are to explore the questions posed in section 2.5 
and, in addition to propose new propositions for the nature of HRM within the 
changing public sector. 
4.5 Research Design and Case Selection 
Textbooks on methodology usually suggest that the research design is the first step in 
conducting a piece of research, to be completed before data collection in embarked 
upon (Gunrow, 1995). This is seen as the ideal for many reasons, such as developing 
a clear picture of what it is that is under investigation, tailoring the research to fit the 
questions and objectives, and adhering to time and resource constraints. While as 
clear a picture as possible was developed prior to commencing the research during 
the first year of study, a number of major changes took place when the study was 
already underway. Of importance here, the design of the research was closely tied to 
the process of finding and defining appropriate cases to study.  Having previously 
discussed the theoretical appropriateness of case study for this research, the two 
elements of design discussed in detail here are the selection and boundaries of the 
cases.  
This study took the form of comparative case study of two ISTCs, one providing 
exclusively orthopaedic services to both in and outpatients (Orthe-ISTC), and one 
providing a wider range of day surgery and outpatient services (General-ISTC).  One 
of these, Orthe-ISTC was subject to rules of  ‘ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ?ƐĞĞĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?) and had to 
employ from outside the NHS, while the other, General-ISTC, involved the 
secondment of NHS staff to the ISTC to work under private management and 
alongside a minority of private sector staff.  In practice the selection of the cases was 
opportunistic. The first was recruited when the Managing Director of private 
healthcare company responded positively to a letter I sent out about the research to 
a number of ISTCs. The second was only selected to be part of my PhD research after 
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I had taken a job as a research associate on a project looking at knowledge sharing 
within ISTCs.  This position led to several changes in the focus of my PhD and the 
process of carrying out the research. However, certain justifications can be made for 
ƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞƐƚƵĚŝĞĚ ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ/ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽƐƚƵĚǇ ‘/^dƐ ? ?ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ
work on TCs (Pope et al, 2004) and publically available information suggested that 
there was a large degree of variation in the realisation of ISTCs. While some ISTCs 
were small scale mobile units or single ward initiatives both of the study sites in this 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚǁĞƌĞŵŽƌĞƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚ ‘ĨůĂŐƐŚŝƉ ?ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽĨŝƚǁĞůůǁŝƚŚ the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂůƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĂůŽĨ/^dƐĂƐĂŵĂũŽƌŶĞǁŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?dŚĞƐĞƐƚƵĚǇƐŝƚĞƐ
were both multi-million pound contracts with new build facilities, set to run for an 
initial five year period. The cases that were selected had caused considerable local 
political debate and media attention and were among the largest of their type in the 
country. Therefore, the case selection in this instance could be seen to be both 
 ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ?  ?zŝŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? tŚŝůĞ ƚŚŝƐ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ůĞĂĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞƐ ďĞŝŶŐ
 ‘ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ? Žƌ  ‘ƚǇƉŝĐĂů ?  ?zŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ) ŽĨ /^dƐ ŝŶ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ? ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ
approach did provide other important opportunities for the research. Looking at 
these prominent examples provided a chance to investigate cases that were likely to 
be of interest in their own right as at the forefront of private sector involvement in 
ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ‘ĐŽƌĞ ?E,^ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ůƐŽŝƚǁĂƐĨĞůƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞĐĂƐĞƐǁĞƌĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇůŝŬĞůǇ
to provide further insight into the issues raised in chapter 2 and likely to yield data 
relevant to the research questions.  
In addition to this, the changing employment laws surrounding ISTCs opened the 
possibility of studying cases with different arrangements for employment. It has been 
suggested that multiple, comparative cases can increase the depth of evidence and 
can make the case study more compelling and robust (Yin, 2003; Zartman, 2005). 
Finding similar or comparable results in multiple sites does not necessarily mean a 
more reliable set of results in the positivist sense, but may shed further light on the 
processes in question. In this research it was felt that comparing cases that involved 
the transfer of NHS staff to cases of ISTCs employing their own staff provided a good 
basis for exploring the ideas presented in the literature. A key question identified in 
relation to workforce reconfiguration and innovation was the extent to which 
managers within ISTCs are able to introduce new practices. Comparing Orthe-ISTC 
with directly employed staff to General-ISTC with seconded NHS staff helped to draw 
out the relative influence of various factors that may assist or prevent new practices 
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from being implemented. Where staff were seconded, issues relating to the break in 
the direct employment relationship between managers and staff were borne out. 
Looking at a comparable site in which staff were directly employed helped me to 
separate this effect from other distinctive features of working in an ISTC, such as 
working under private management and a greater degree of separation from wider 
NHS institutions.  Although these justifications of the comparative cases were not 
firmly in place before the cases were chosen, they were not only considered after the 
research was completed. Rather, the emerging comparative issues in part shaped the 
process of research, data collected and interview schedules at each site.  
A second important point in this design was identifying the limits of the case study 
sites under investigation, with two boundaries guiding the research. First I decided to 
focus the investigation primarily on the activities taking place within the two ISTC 
facilities, which were purpose built at both sites. Given the research context including 
the blurred boundaries, non-standard employment relationships and multi-employer 
workplaces discusƐĞĚŝŶƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?ĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐ ‘dŚĞ/^d ?ǁĂƐƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ?
and could be conceptualised in a number of ways. They could be seen as legal 
entities, in terms of the nature of the contract; they could be seen structurally, in 
terms of the different organisations involved and the relationship between them; or 
they could be seen functionally, looking across the supply chain of their service 
production. Each of these approaches may have certain strengths and weaknesses. If 
I had concentrated solely on the private company responsible for managing the ISTC, 
this would have prohibited me from examining the important issues relating to non-
employees, and inter-employer relationships. On the other hand, if the study were to 
ŚĂǀĞ ƐƉĂŶŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ ǁŚŽůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ĂĐƵƚĞ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ĐĂƌĞ
organisations this would have made the study unmanageable and may have led to a 
lack of depth on the specific issues within the ISTCs themselves.  Therefore it was 
decided to limit the scope of the study to the bounds of the purpose built ISTC 
building. This also helped in terms of management permission, as it was the private 
company management that largely had jurisdiction over these spaces. However there 
were a number of exceptions to this, for example during the early part of the study, 
the senior HR manager at Orthe-ISTC was based at a corporate head quarters in a 
separate town from where the ISTC was based1 and this is where the initial meeting 
                                                          
1
 During the course of the study, the HR department moved into the ISTC building, in part to 
deal with the myriad HR challenges in the development of the ISTC explored in chapter 5  
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took place. Perhaps more significantly, some initial contact was made with the staff 
in General-ISTC while they were still working within the partner NHS hospital, prior to 
their move to the ISTC and there was some continued contact with actors within this 
hospital. This is discussed further in the next section.  
The second limit on the focus of the study was concentrating on the production of 
clinical activities, and the staff groups whose work was focused on the production of 
clinical services. Only limited attention is paid to the staff groups whose work was 
less directly involved in clinical production, such as IT technicians, cleaners, caterers 
engineers and security staff. This was only decided during the course of the study 
after a certain amount of data had been collected on these support services groups, 
for example with one week spent within Orthe-ISTC conducting interviews and 
meeting with the service subcontractor staff. The main reason for this decision was 
the development of a coherent narrative that was comparable between the two sites 
and narrow enough to allow sufficient detail. This was a difficult decision as it has 
been well recognised that support service groups are often some of those that are 
first and most negatively affected when work is contracted out to the private sector. 
Leaving them out in some ways plays into perceptions that these areas of work are 
less than essential in the production of public services, which is far from the case. 
Further, by not including them this study does not fully capture the complexity of the 
multi-employer workplace. However, contracting out these services has been a 
feature of the public sector for a number of years and the consequences of 
contracting-out for these types of roles that have been covered elsewhere 
(Marchington et al, 2005a). More uniquely, this study had the opportunity to 
investigate diagnostic and surgical activities usually seen as core part of NHS 
hospitals being handed to external providers.  Therefore here I concentrated on roles 
that directly contribute to the provision of these clinical services that have hitherto 
remained predominantly within the NHS: namely the doctors, nurses, healthcare 
assistants, medical secretaries and the associated administration and management of 
these groups of staff.  
4.6 Research process 
Just as the design of the research was strongly influenced by the cases that 
presented themselves, the research process was shaped by my access and 
engagement with these study sites.  Reflecting back on the research process as a 
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whole, the overriding personal challenge in the research procesƐǁĂƐƚŚĂƚŽĨ ‘ŐĞƚƚŝŶŐ
ƚŽŬŶŽǁ ?ƚŚĞŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƚƚŚĞƐƚĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞWŚĐŽƵƌƐĞ/ĨĞůƚŵǇƐĞůĨƚŽ
be a complete outsider to the healthcare work environment, with only the usual 
experiences of the NHS in the role of patient and visiting relative to draw upon. 
Indeed, my initial interest was not in healthcare in particular, but in the rise of Public-
Private Partnerships across the UK public sector. My interest was initially spiked by 
political debate around the notion that PPPs represented a new form of organisation 
and governance that mitigated some of the failing of purely publicly or privately 
owned public services, and counter claims that the ƉŽůŝĐǇǁĂƐ ‘ŵĞƌĞůǇ ?ĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂƚŝŽŶ
of trends towards increasing privatisation. Over the subsequent period of study, in 
which I switched to part time PhD study and a full time research associate role, and 
spent a significant amount of time in the hospital environment, the research became 
more specifically focused on healthcare and how PPPs related to a social context 
characterised by a split between managerial verses professional control. Further, 
during this time, my feeling of being an outsider changed somewhat. Although there 
is inevitably far more about healthcare organisational life that I do not know or 
understand than that which I do, I began to feel comfortable with the limits to my 
knowledge.  One example of this was by the end of the research it was far less 
common to be concerned before asking a question that I should already know the 
ĂŶƐǁĞƌ ?Žƌ ƚŚĂƚ Ă  ‘ƌĞĂů ? ŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞ ƉĞƌƐŽŶǁŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ŵĂŬĞ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ judgments or 
mistakes. This process occurred gradually over the course of the research, and 
involved not just the present research, but was helped by the various contacts made 
and side projects I was involved in during the period.  
Prior to entering the first case study site, some level of planning was undertaken in 
terms of the number of interviews I intended to carry out, with which staff groups, 
and writing research schedules and questions for each. Reading research manuscripts 
and talking to supervisors and colleagues experienced in healthcare organisational 
research helped a great deal in preparing me for my research and provided me with a 
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨ ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞƌ ?ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ
in professional groups and the tensions between management and medics. However, 
without any direct experience of healthcare work, the full significance of these 
insights was hard to grasp. Although I had conducted numerous qualitative 
interviews prior to the current study in previous roles, I felt I needed more 
ƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ďĞĨŽƌĞ ĞŶƚĞƌŝŶŐ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ĐĂƐĞ ƐƚƵĚǇ ƐŝƚĞ ? dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ Ă ƐŵĂůů  ‘ƉŝůŽƚ ?
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study was carried out, interviewing three people from within the NHS contacted 
through university links who were involved in setting up an additional ISTC.  These 
initial interviews helped me to understand the weight of the issues at hand for those 
involved. For example, speaking to an NHS manager involved in identifying how 
services were being co-ordinated with the ISTC gave me the first indication of some 
of the emotional as well as technical effort that was being required to re-organise 
services in addition to her  ‘ĚĂǇ ũŽď ? ?ŶĞĂƌůǇĂůĞƌƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚǇŽĨ ƚŚĞ
initiative was when one of these respondents asked to see my universiƚǇ /ƚŽ ‘ũƵƐƚ
ĐŚĞĐŬǇŽƵĂƌĞŶŽƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞůŽĐĂůŶĞǁƐƉĂƉĞƌ ? ?
Following this introduction to research in healthcare, over the next five months the 
majority of the interviews for the first case study, Orthe-ISTC took place. Initial 
interviews were arranged bǇ ƚŚĞ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?Ɛ ƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ? ďƵƚ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƐĞ
respondents were recruited on a snowball basis, with respondents asking if they 
know of anyone else who may be willing to take part with the numbers of 
respondents from each group provided below. Appointments with nursing staff were 
usually made on an ad-hoc basis, depending on who was available on the day when I 
was present at the ISTC. Managers and medics on the other hand were pre-booked 
to fit around their schedule. One difference between these two groups was that 
management interviews often took place in quiet offices away from clinical practice, 
free time carefully allotted in diaries. Interviews with medics were often fitted 
around clinical or theatre sessions, during lunch breaks and wherever a quiet corner 
could be found. This process of finding respondents may well have impacted on who 
took part in the research, the type of responses they gave and how much time they 
felt they had to answer the questions. Therefore, it may not be possible to consider 
ƚŚŝƐĂĨĂŝƌŽƌƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐĂŵƉůĞ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƌƌĂŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞƐ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐĂŶĚ ‘ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐ
ŵǇǁĂǇ ?ĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĚŝĚŚĞůƉŵĞƚŽĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌŝƐĞŵǇƐĞůĨǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ/^d ?&Žƌ
example, while secretaries in the main administrative office were extremely helpful 
in putting me in touch with departmental managers, it proved difficult for them to 
arrange interviews with individual nurses or clinical staff, and it was only through the 
nursing managers and their equivalent in other departments such as imaging and 
physiotherapy that contacts within each clinical group began to be made. This was 
perhaps my first experiences of the inter-occupational boundaries between 
administrative management and clinical staff.   
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The introduction to the second case study - General-ISTC - was rather different. As 
already mentioned, this case study was initially contacted as part of a separate 
research project. Therefore the initial negotiations were made by the project 
principle investigator, and were in the first instance with the NHS managers of the 
departments due to move over to ISTC.  Following this, we undertook several 
interviews with members of staff within the NHS hospital about their work prior to 
the move. In order to keep the boundaries of the comparative cases roughly similar 
as identified above most of these interviews were not considered here as part of the 
analysis on General-ISTC. Some however were called upon to illustrate the process of 
transferring the staff over from the general hospital. In addition, these interviews 
undoubtedly had an influence on the rest of the research at within the ISTC. For 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝƚǁĂƐŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞƚŚĂƚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚďĂĐŬƚŽǁŽƌŬ ‘ŝŶƚŚĞŽůĚƉůĂĐĞ ?
and discussion about the ISTC between myself and the respondents took on a 
comparative nature. As well as this heightened awareness of the background and 
prior working conditions of the transferred staff groups, the process of this case 
study took a different course. In addition to the qualitative interviews, eight months 
of observational field work were also undertaken within General-ISTC. Details of the 
data collected during this period is covered below, but included time spent in 
administrative and managerial settings, clinical areas including operating theatres 
and ward areas and staff rest areas such as the coffee room.  
One issue raised by the course that this research took is the differing level of detail in 
the data collected at each site. Spending the same amount of time within the Orthe-
ISTC as in the General-ISTC would not have been possible. This certainly could be 
considered a limitation in the comparative basis of the study. Mitigating this to some 
extent was the fact that during the period of observation in General-ISTC a number 
of trips were made back to Orthe-ISTC in order to gain additional data for the ESRC 
research project. This then allowed me to revisit ideas and emerging categories of 
analysis in light of my growing experience of the healthcare environment. For 
example, although I had read plenty of illustrations of medical autonomy and 
resistance to managerial control, it was not until the period of observation that I 
recognised the numerous ways this could be manifest in everyday practice. Returning 
to the Orthe-ISTC then allowed me to explore these themes further on this site in 
light of this experience. In addition, although no formal period was spent observing 
clinical practice in Orthe-ISTC, numerous informal conversations with staff took place 
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in addition to the recorded interviews and considerable time was spent in the 
inpatient ward adjacent to where most of the interviews took place. Further, part of 
the ESRC project involved conducting a social network analysis survey on ISTC staff. 
Because of space considerations, details of this data are not included here. However, 
collecting this data involved returning to Orthe-ISTC for an additional week 
conducting the survey often on a one to one basis. Nevertheless, despite these 
additional opportunities to experience the working life across both sites it is fully 
recognised that the far greater detail of observations in General-ISTCs may have 
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ ? 
4.7 Data collected 
A case study strategy allows for collecting multiple sources of data, with collection 
described by Yin (2003) as a flexible process that: 
 ‘ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ĨŽůůŽǁ Ă ĨŽƌŵĂů ƉůĂŶ ? ďƵƚ ƚŚĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŵĂǇ
become relevant to a case study is not readily predictable. As you collect case 
study evidence, you must quickly review the evidence and continually ask 
yourself why events or actors appear as they do. Your judgments may lead to 
ƚŚĞŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƐĞĂƌĐŚĨŽƌĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ) 
ĂƐĞƐƚƵĚŝĞƐĂůƐŽĂůůŽǁĨŽƌ ‘ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƚƌŝĂŶŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ ‘ƚŚĞĨůĂǁƐŽĨŽŶĞ
ŵĞƚŚŽĚ ĂƌĞ ŽĨƚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚƐ ŽĨ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?  ?ĞŶǌŝŶ ?  ? ? ? ?). Triangulation is one of 
ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚǁŝĚĞůǇƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚŵĞƚŚŽĚƐŽĨĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐĞŶǌŝŶĂŶĚ>ŝŶĐŽůŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ
for good research: trustworthiness, credibility, transferability and confirm ability. 
Therefore, several sources of data were collected across the sites.  
A key source of data collection across both sites was semi structured qualitative 
interviews, with 72 interviews conducted across both sites (details listed in tables 4 
and 5 below). The length of these interviews ranged from 30 minutes to 1 hour 20 
minute, with the mean length of approximately 55 minutes. Each of these was fully 
transcribed. There was some effort placed in gaining respondents from across the 
organisation and in different professional groups (given the clinical focus outlined 
above) that would provide insight relevant to the research questions. This is roughly 
ŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚŝĚĞĂƐŽĨ ‘ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞĨƵů ?Žƌ ‘ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ?ƐĂŵƉůŝŶŐ ?'ůĂƐĞƌĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƵƐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Mason, 1996), which has been seen as more appropriate for case study research than 
random sampling based on the need for statistical generalisability (Murphy et al 
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1998). More specifically several groups were actively sought out, having been 
frequently identified in the previous literature as important constituencies shaping 
and affected by HRM. Namely;  
x HR Managers within the ISTC company 
x KƚŚĞƌ ‘ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐĨƌŽŵǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ/^dĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ 
x ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĂů ‘ŵŝĚĚůĞ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ 
x Medical staff 
x  ‘&ƌŽŶƚ>ŝŶĞ ?ĐůŝŶŝĐĂůƐƚĂĨĨ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐŶƵƌƐĞƐ ?ŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶƚƐĂŶĚ
physiotherapists 
Semi-structureĚ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ  ‘ĂƚǇƉĞŽĨĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĂƌĞ
 ‘ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚĞĚďǇ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞƌ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨŽďƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ
information and focused by him [sic] on content specified by research objectives of 
systematic descriƉƚŝŽŶ ? ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ Žƌ ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?(Cohen and Manion, 1989: 307). 
Interview schedules were taken to each interview, although these were used only as 
a rough guide.  A semi-structured format, with certain topics mapped out, allowed 
me to respond to the subject, letting them lead the content of the interview and to 
explore ideas or important issues that they bought up. The process of questioning in 
semi-ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐ ŝƐ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ďǇ &ĞƚƚĞƌŵĂŶ  ? ? ? ? ? P  ?? )  ‘dŚĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ
typically emerge from the conversation. In some cases, they are serendipitous and 
ƌĞƐƵůƚ ĨƌŽŵ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĐĂƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ŚĂƐ Ă
series of questions to ask the participant and will wait for the most appropriate time 
ƚŽĂƐŬƚŚĞŵĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ůƐŽƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐĐĂŶ ‘ĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĞǁĂǇƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ
worded, give explanations, leave out particular questions which seem inappropriate 
ǁŝƚŚ Ă ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞ Žƌ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶĞƐ ?  ?ZŽďƐŽŶ ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ?
Changing the initial questions was almost always necessary, as answers to one 
question invariably covered aspects of others. Therefore, sticking rigidly to the 
questions would have meant repeating the same ground, and ignoring interesting or 
important points volunteered by the respondent.  
In line the methodological insights previously discussed, a fluid and flexible structure 
operates from the position that knowledge is situated and contextual, and gives the 
subject the opportunity to form the basis of the narrative (Mason, 2002). Kvale 
(1996) suggests thĂƚ ƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ŝƐ ƚŽ  ‘ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
ǁŽƌůĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚ ?ƐƉŽŝŶƚŽĨǀŝĞǁ ?ƚŽƵŶĨŽůĚƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?
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ƚŽĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŝƌůŝǀĞĚǁŽƌůĚƐƉƌŝŽƌƚŽƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?Ɖ ? ) ?dŚŝƐŵĞĂŶƚďĞŝŶŐ
attentive to issues that were seemingly important to the respondent in their own 
terms, rather than putting words into their mouths. It is not claimed however that in 
so doing I was able to elicit a complete or authentic retelling of the organisation or 
ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ? experiences. It also does not mean privileging interviews above 
other forms of social interaction. Interviews themselves are complex social situations 
(Alvesson, 2003), in which respondents ? accounts are in part produced to fulfil the 
social requirements of the specific interaction. Interview responses may reflect 
certain aspects of peoples ? perspectives or moral forms, but these may not 
necessarily be manifest in daily life outside of interview (Silverman, 1993). In my 
view, and given my experience of comparing interview with observational data, the 
responses did capture something of the respondents work life outside the room (or 
corner of the coffee area) in which the interview took place. The type of talk 
respondents engaged in with me during interview did not differ completely from that 
which they engaged in with others across the organisation. Similar to the reflections 
of Parker (2000), the tone and formality of the interviews certainly changed 
dramatically depending on the age, gender, but particularly the seniority and 
profession of the respondent. However this also captured something of their role and 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? &Žƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ƐĞŶŝŽƌ ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ? ŐůŽƐƐǇ ƐƉŝŶ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŶĨĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ  ‘ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ? ? ǁĞƌĞ
repeated in meetings and peer group contexts (at least while I was present). Equally 
the troubles and complaints put forward to me by nursing staff were often those that 
were heard in general talk around the lunch table. Therefore, while not taken as 
directly representative of a concrete social reality, the interview data was used to 
build as complete a descriptive account of the ISTCs as possible, in ways that allowed 
adequate response to the research questions. Mason (2002) states that the semi-
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚŽƌƵŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚ ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞ ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ  ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ?ŵĞƚŚŽĚ ĨŽƌĂůů
qualitative researchers, and certainly within the limits of PhD study, they appeared 
ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ŽďǀŝŽƵƐ ĞŶƚƌǇ ƉŽŝŶƚ ƚŽ ĨŝŶĚ ŽƵƚ ǁŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ /^d  ‘ǁĞƌĞ ůŝŬĞ ? ? &ƵƌƚŚĞƌ ? ƚŚŝƐ
interview evidence was not seen in isolation but read in relation to wider knowledge 
of the context of the organisations, supplemented by other sources of data, 










Managing Director 1 
WorldHealth Theatre Sister  1 
WorldHealth Ward Sister  
WorldHealth Nurse 6 
Agency Nurse 2 
Company HR Manager 1 (interviewed twice) 
Training and Development Manager 1 
ISTC HR Manager 1 
WorldHealth Healthcare Assistant 3 
Director of Nursing Services 1  
Physiotherapist  1 
Occupational Therapist 1 
Therapy Manager 1 
Consultant Anaesthetists 4 
Consultant Surgeon 4 
Director of Medicine 1 
Radiographer 2 
Radiography Manager 1 










NHS employed Theatre Manger (Band 7 
Nurse) 
1 
NHS employed Seconded Sister 3 
NHS employed Seconded Nurse 7 
NHS employed Seconded ODP 2 
BritHealth directly employed Sister 1 
BritHealth directly employed Nurse 2 
BritHealth directly employed ODP 2 
BritHealth directly employed HCA 2 
Administration Booking Manager 1 
Consultant Anaesthetist  3 
Consultant Surgeons 8 
BritHealth HRM manager 1 
BritHealth Medical Director 2 
BritHealth Managing Director 1 
Risk and Safety Manger 1 
Brithealth Clinical Planning Manager (prior to 
ISTC opening) 
1 






Within General ISTC, observations were undertaken on 85 separate days, mostly over 
an 8 month period. This amounted to approximately 220 hours of observations in 
clinical settings, such as wards, theatre and recovery, and a further 150 hours in non-
clinical, administrative, social settings and staff rooms. This included shadowing 62 
complete patient journeys through the day surgery process from admission, through 
surgical procedure, to discharge and also shadowing several members of nursing staff 
and middle managers to build a picture of the content and pattern of their working 
day. Whilst on site, observation notes were made including descriptions of events. 
When appropriate and possible to make more extensive notes these were added to 
with immediate reflections on the relationship of these events to existing theories, 
emerging concepts and new ideas about the ISTC. During the period of conducting 
these observations, I was on site for approximately three days per week. The time 
spent each day on site varied considerably, from attending a single meeting, to 
ĂƌƌŝǀŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĞĂƌůǇ ƐƚĂƌƚĞƌƐ Ăƚ  ? ? ? ?Ăŵ ĂŶĚ ůĞĂǀŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚƚ Ğ  ‘ůĂƚĞƐ ?at 7.30pm. 
During this time I engaged in periods of formal observation, particularly within the 
theatre sessions, where I sought permission from all of those present before entering 
ĂŶĚĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐŝŶŽŶůǇĨĂŝƌůǇĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƌŽůĞƐŽĨ ‘ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?
ĂŶĚ  ‘ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞĚ ? ǁĞƌĞ ĐůĞĂƌ ? ƚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƉŽŝŶƚƐ  ‘ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ĨĂƌ ŵŽƌĞ
informal conversations with ISTC staff (Gold, 1969). My role during this period is 
ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐďĞƐƚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐŽŶĞŽĨ  ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌĂůŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?  ?ĚůĞƌĂŶĚůĚĞƌ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ?
with my status made clear to all those present where possible. Although I 
occasionally offered opinions to managers when asked, and did undertake mundane 
ƚĂƐŬƐ ĨŽƌ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ĐĂƌƌǇŝŶŐ ĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ ǁŚĞŶ  ‘ŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ? ĐůŝŶŝĐĂů
ĂƌĞĂƐ ?ĂŶǇ ‘ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƌŽůĞǁĂƐŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ? 
Aside from the notes generated during this sustained period within the ISTC, equally 
important was the familiarity it gave me with routine aspects of the work 
environment. These included the language commonly in use for conditions, 
treatments and equipment, the frequency and type of contact between individuals 
and groups, the changes in atmosphere and pace of work throughout the working 
day, the hold-up, delays and tensions that often occurred, the humour and routines 
of social interaction, and the wide individual differences in how people went about 
their tasks. In addition to these, the direct observations of practice allowed me to see 
certain incidents and processes that were revealing as to the character of 
employment and employment management. One example relating particularly to job 
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planning was in the transfer of the haemochomatosis service from the main hospital 
building to the ISTC.  Over the course of several days, I attended numerous short 
formal and informal meetings between nurse managers in the department in which 
the service was to be housed. Wide ranging discussions took place including 
deliberation over work responsibility in terms of the administration of the service, 
questions of job design in terms of who would conduct the phlebotomy treatment 
and how it would fit with their other tasks, and logistical issues including finding 
space and time for the service to go ahead. During this period a healthcare assistant 
(HCA) was asked to temporarily carry out the treatment on an ad hoc basis while 
these issues was sorted out.  Three weeks later, I asked the HCA what had happened 
to the service. Clearly upset, she showed me a handwritten list of patients and phone 
ŶƵŵďĞƌƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƐĐƌŝďďůŝŶŐ ŽƵƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ŝůůĞŐŝďůĞ ƚĞǆƚ ? ĂŶĚ ƐĂŝĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƐŚĞ  ‘ŚĂĚ
ďĞĞŶ ŐŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĂŶĚ ũƵƐƚ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ƚŽ ŐĞƚ ŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ŝƚ ? ? ǀĞŶ ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ? ƐŚĞ ƐĂŝĚ ? ƐŚĞ
ŚĂĚŶ ?ƚ ďĞĞŶ ŐŝǀĞŶ ĂŶǇ ƐƉĞĐŝĂů ƚƌĂŝning, a number of the patient details appeared 
incorrect or incomplete, she did not have easy access to a phone to contact the 
patients or use of a room and there was no thorough administration system in place 
to keep track of the patients. Later, one of the sisters told that they were still thinking 
about the best way to handle the service, and ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞŵĞĂŶƚŝŵĞƐŚĞǁĂƐ  ‘ŚĞůƉŝŶŐ
[the HCA] to stay on top of it ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ůŽŽŬŝŶŐ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŽƌĚ ŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ ?
This arrangement stayed in place for the remainder of the time I spent in 
observation. Although no conclusions can be drawn from this incident in isolation, it 
could be seen to draw attention to several  issues pertinent to the research themes 
including the role of the middle nurse managers in designing clinical services and 
jobs, the absence of HR managers from this process which was seen as a clinical 
responsibility, issues of rewards and responsibility, resource allocation, the 
interaction between the main hospital and the ISTC, the relations between the 
middle managers and the front line staff and issues of training and development.  
In addition to the primary data collected from interviews and observations, 
numerous forms of supporting documentary evidence were also collected. This 
included; government documentation surrounding ISTCs, such as legislation and 
guides to good practice; national, local and trade press, which often included opinion 
pieces from local NHS clinicians and were illustrative of the political interests 
surrounding ISTCs; publically available minutes of meetings leading up to the ISTC 
contracts being awarded; company documentation such as publicity material; HR 
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documentation and internal communications. Particularly useful in providing an 
idealised overview of clinical processes were the detailed patient pathways produced 
in each site.  Also, the key performance measures for both sites were obtained from 
the department of health following a freedom of information request. These all 
informed my understanding of the ISTC.  
4.8 Data analysis 
tŚŝůĞƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞĚĂƚĂŚĂƐďĞĞŶƐĞĞŶĂƐ  ‘ĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝǀĞĨŽƌŵĂŶǇƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ PƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƌŝĐŚ ?
ĨƵůů ? ĞĂƌƚŚǇ ? ŚŽůŝƐƚŝĐ ?  “ƌĞĂů ? ?  ?DŝůĞƐ ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? ĂŶĂůǇƐŝŶŐ ƋƵĂůŝƚ ƚŝǀĞ ĚĂƚĂ  ‘ŝƐ ŶŽƚ Ă
simple or quick task. Done properly, it is systematic and rigorous, and therefore 
ůĂďŽƵƌŝŶƚĞŶƐŝǀĞĂŶĚƚŝŵĞĐŽŶƐƵŵŝŶŐ ? Q ?ĂƚŝƚƐŚĞĂƌƚŐŽŽĚƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐƌĞůŝĞƐ
on the skill vision and integrity of the research doing that analysis ? ?WŽƉĞ ?ĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? P
116). In qualitative research, analysis usually begins during data collection, as the 
information already gathered is thought about and influences the remainder of the 
research (Pope, et. al. 2000). That was certainly the case in this instance. As 
previously discussed, it was only in the ongoing process of becoming familiar with the 
nuances of the healthcare environment that the full implications and meaning of the 
ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐƚƵĚǇ ǁĞƌĞ ĨƵůůǇ ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶĚĞĚ ?  ‘ŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŽŽŬ
place on a continual basis, as the data was gathered, as I became more involved with 
the research sites, and as I continued to explore relevant literature and previous 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? Ɛ ZĂŐŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ƚŚŝƐ ĂĚĂƉƚŝǀĞůǇ ŝƐ ĐŽŵŵŽŶĂƐ  ‘ĐĂƐĞ-orientated 
scholars use flexible analytic frames that can be modified in light of the knowledge of 
ĐĂƐĞƐƚŚĂƚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐŐĂŝŶŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ?ZĂŐŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? 
Away from the research site, interview transcripts, formal documents and written 
ŶŽƚĞƐŽĨŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐĂůůƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚƚĞǆƚĨŽƌĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ‘ƚŚĞ “ŐŽŽĚƐƚƵĨĨ ?ŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?
 ?ZǇĂŶ ĂŶĚ ĞƌŶĂƌĚ ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞ  ‘ŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?  ?'ůĂƐ ƌ ĂŶĚ ^ƚƌĂƵƐƐ ?  ? ? ? ? )
approach to analysis encourages a systematic (purportedly) inductive approach to 
dealing with the research material, by a process of thorough coding, classify codes, 
grouping themes, identification of emerging key concepts, and testing them with 
other parts of the data (Miles, 1979; Bloor, 1978). Although I did not adopt fully 
grounded approach, as I developed themes around pre-identified consideration 
points (section 2.5) as well around the research data, this did provide a basis for 
systematically handling qualitative data. In careful reading of the text, I sought to 
identify themes and draw emerging themes together in hierarchical relationships. 
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Following the initial coding, the themes were checked for consistency, with 
contradictory ideas placed against each other for further consideration. The 
emerging ideas were continually related to the initial research questions and 
important aspects of the literature. Yin (2003) descrŝďĞƐ Ă ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ  ‘ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶ
ŵĂƚĐŚŝŶŐ ? ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ƐŚĂƉĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚĂƚĂ ĨƌŽŵ ĞĂĐŚƵŶŝƚ ŽĨ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŝƐ
compared to the predicted outcome scenarios. Others have described qualitative 
analysis in terms of the cognitive process involved in building themes from data:   
 ‘dĞǆƚƵĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐŵĞĚŝĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĨƌĂŵĞƐŽĨƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
researcher and those who produced the text. The aim of the dialogue is to 
ŵŽǀĞ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŚĞƌŵĞŶĞƵƚŝĐ ĐŝƌĐůĞ ? ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĞ ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶĚ Ă ƚĞǆƚ ďǇ
understanding that frame of reference from which it was produced, and 
appreciate that form of reference by understanding the text. The researchers 
own frame of reference becomes the springboard from which that circle is 
entered, and so the circle reaches back to encompass the dialogue between 
ƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞƚĞǆƚ ? ?^ĐŽƚƚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
A central part of this type of reading is paying close attention to what is being said by 
the respondent themselves, rather than attempting to squeeze the data into 
predefined concepts or theoretical points of view. That is not to say that my ongoing 
reading of related literature did not impact on the questions asked, who I sought to 
talk to or the way I heard the responses. Instead it was a question of engaging with 
the respondents answers and reflecting back on what I had understood from them. 
In order to handle the text and record the codes for emerging themes I considered 
various computer software programs and attended training for NVivo. Eventually 
however, the analysis was done in a Microsoft word document, using colour codes 
ĨŽƌĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐĂŶĚŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂůůĞǀĞůƐŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ŽƵƚůŝŶĞǀŝĞǁ ?ƚŽŽƌĚĞƌƚŚĞŵĞƐ
and sub themes. The primary reason for this choice was flexibility and familiarity of 
use. In part this was also to facilitate collaboration with the PI on the ESRC funded 
project.  
4.9 Ethical considerations 
As already discussed, ISTCs have been a highly politically sensitive policy initiative. 
This is equally true of the employee terms and conditions and managerial actions 
within the private sector healthcare companies. Therefore common ethical concerns 
of social science research needed to be seen in this context.  
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In practical terms, the most pressing ethical concerns of the study related to seeking, 
recording and interpreting peoples ? opinions, personal information and private 
concerns, and publishing them to a wider audience. The respondents could each be 
thought of as having an interest in how the ISTCs were viewed and presented, and 
also potentially harmed or adversely affected by certain portrayals. In particular, 
there was a concern prior to the study of managers seeking access to and controlling 
interview and observational data. This was discussed as part of the negotiations over 
access, and it was accepted that managers would have no privileged access to data 
above that which would be made publically available and details of specific 
respondents would not be discussed. That said it was often managers who were most 
interested in the process of the study and my impressions of the organisation. 
Therefore, aspects of finding were discussed with managers where this did not to 
break agreements for confidentiality and anonymity.  
In addition to this, I sought informed consent from each of the research participants 
where this was possible. This is considered important in order to allow research 
participants to make a decision over taking part in a study in light of what the study 
involves and how their responses are likely to be used. Therefore before 
commencing each interview I provided participants with a brief summary of the 
research project, including its objectives, methods and outcomes. I also explained 
that their responses would be anonymised in any publically available outputs 
emanating from the research. During the process of interviewing and observation, 
much data was disclosed that could have been considered sensitive. This covered 
ĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ ŝŶƚŽ ǁŚǇ ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂů ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘ƌĞĂůůǇ ? ŵĂĚĞ ? ĚŝƌĞĐƚ
criticisms of management, personal conversations about family, to ƉĞŽƉůĞ  ‘ĚŝƐŚŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞĚŝƌƚ ?ŽŶĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ?KŶƐĞǀĞƌĂůŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚ
 ‘ŐŽŶŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐďĞŝŶŐƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚ ?ƵƐƵĂůůǇǁŝƚŚ
a knowing look to the Dictaphone. This was most common when staff were speaking 
in terms they saw as potentially defamatory towards the management of the ISTC, or 
when management were speaking in similar terms against their NHS counterparts. 
Occasionally people indicated to stop the recorder and continued stories and 
accounts in more personal terms. While these incidents were evidently indicative of 
the power relationships within the cases and shaped my own understanding, there 
was obviously a need to deal with this sensitively and confidentially, with these 
stories not reproduced in the findings.  
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The most challenging aspect of handling the issue of informed consent was during 
ƉĞƌŝŽĚƐŽĨŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇ  ‘ŽƉĞŶ ?ĂƌĞĂƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞǁĂƌĚĂŶĚĐŽĨĨĞĞĂƌĞĂƐ ?
Given the large number of people passing through these areas from different 
departments, including junior doctors and student nurses, it would have been 
ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ƚŽ ŵĂŬĞ ƐƵƌĞ ĞǀĞƌǇ ƉĞƌƐŽŶ /  ‘ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ? ŚĂĚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ? &Žƌ
example, I often found myself present when visiting doctors, who were in a rush to 
get started on their theatre session, discussed issues with ward nurses. Where 
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ/ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŽƚŚŽƐĞǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŝŶ ‘ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƌĞĂƐǁŚĂƚ/ǁĂƐĚŽŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŚĞ
purpose of the research and asked if they were happy for me to be present. As with 
the interviews I explained how observation notes would be used and assured them of 
their confidentiality. Over time, this covered a large proportion of the full time ISTC 
staff. However there were frequently peripheral visitors who it would have been 
unfeasible to have interrupted and ƐƉŽŬĞŶƚŽĂƐƚŚĞǇ ‘ƉŽƉƉĞĚďǇ ? ?In general I sought 
to be sensitive to the situation, and excuse myself from situations in which someone 
who had not given consent discussed potentially sensitive issues. In the instances of 
observing patient journeys, I spoke to each patient and provided them with study 
information. I also sought signed consent prior to the patient entering clinical areas. 
In addition, only adult patients (over 18) were approached to take part. 
4.10 The Case Descriptions 
In the portrayals of the two ISTCs that follow, it has been attempted to represent the 
structure and nature of work within each organisation, informed and supported by 
the various sources of data and previous concepts discussed in the literature. Each 
study is presented in four sections which focus on the foundations of the 
organisation and background to the staff working in the centre, the overriding 
character of employment, the roles of the doctors, and the roles of the other staff 
groups. In forming the accounts, consistent attention was paid to the possible 
foundations of the expressed views on clinical practices, wider organisational 
behaviour, work activities, whole jobs and treatment processes, taking into account 
the themes of the informing literature. In particular, this included reflection on the 
divergent interests and perspectives of the different groups based on job role, 
professional background, occupational background and other demographic 
characteristics. Also crucially important were potential tensions between the 
management and employees. In each case, both the name for the ISTC (Orthe-ISTC 
and General-ISTC) is used as well as the name for the private company managing the 
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ISTC (WorldHealth and BritHealth). This was felt to be necessary in order to 
distinguish between the ISTC encompassing staff members of various companies, and 
the more discrete unit of the private management company.   
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Chapter 5 Case Study One: Orthopaedic ISTC 
5.1 Introduction 
The first case study focuses on a relatively large orthopaedic Treatment Centre 
(Orthe-ISTC) in an English industrial town. The opening of the treatment centre was 
announced in 2005, when an UK subsidiary of an international health company 
 ? ‘tŽƌůĚ,ĞĂůƚŚ ? ) ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ŝŶ EŽƌƚŚ ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ DŝĚĚůĞĂƐƚ ? ǁĂƐ ĂǁĂƌded its 
first contract in the UK by the Department of Health following a period of open 
tender during the first wave of the Independent Sector Treatment Centre 
procurement program. The initial contract term was for five years, with the 
possibility of a further two year extension following review. Although the contract 
bidding process was largely run by central government, the contract itself was 
managed by the regional Strategic Health Authority. Payment was guaranteed at 
approximately £120million over five years on target for 5000 operations a years, with 
referrals primarily coming from seven local Primary Care Trusts, with extra payments 
made for additional operations outside of this area.  
The ISTC was built by a large contractor commissioned by WorldHealth UK, on waste 
ŐƌŽƵŶĚĂĚũĂĐĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞƚŽǁŶ ?ƐĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐŐĞŶĞƌĂůŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůĂďŽƵƚ ? ? ?ǇĂƌĚƐĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵ
the nearest building. Although not a direct replacement for any single department 
within the existing hospital, a number of related services had been cut back during a 
merger with a larger nearby hospital over the year previous to the ISTC opening. 
tŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐŝŐŶ ůŽŽƐĞůǇ ďĂƐĞĚ ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ŵŽĚĞůƐ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ŝŶ tŽƌůĚ,ĞĂůƚŚ ?Ɛ EŽƌƚŚ
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ?tŽƌůĚ,ĞĂůƚŚh<ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚƚŚĞ /^dĂƐĂ  ‘ŽŶĞƐƚŽƉƐŚŽƉ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ
patients receive all diagnostic procedures, for instance MRI or CT scan, on the same 
day as their consultation, and receive a date for their operation in most cases within 
ƚŚĞ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ Ɛŝǆ ǁĞĞŬƐ ? WƌŽĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐ Ă ĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ  ‘ĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌ ĨŽĐƵƐ ? ? ƚŚĞ ŽǀĞƌĂƌĐŚŝŶŐ
 ‘ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ŝƐ ƚŽ ƌĞĚƵĐĞ ƚŚĞ ƚŝŵĞ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ƐƉĞŶĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ďŽƚŚ ŝŶ
terms of the wait between referral and treatment, and in terms of length of stay in 
the hospital through reduced waiting times, standardisation of  procedures and short 
recovery times. The ISTC was build over three floors, with the top floor housing four 
theatres, recovery ward and administration offices, the first floor holding a single 
ward, with 44 inpatient beds split into two sections. On the ground floor stood the 
outpatient clinic, physical therapy department, reception, a café serving both the 
general public and staff, and offices for the site services sub-contractor. 
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Approximately 3500 surgical procedures were carried out in the first year, and 5100 
in the second year (Hospital Episode Statistics). As there was no intensive care unit 
on site, and no accident and emergency facilities at the adjacent general hospital, the 
ISTC accepted patients only within lower risk categories for a limited range of 
procedures. However, over time, as waiting lists were reduced, a different case mix 
began to be accepted with more day-case treatments, and more complex hand and 
foot procedures. Patients that experienced complications such as blood clots during 
the operation were transferred to the partner hospital about 10 miles away. 
In line with rules on additionality, Orthe-ISTC was prohibited from employing or 
engaging any healthcare professionals who were working in the NHS at the time, or 
had worked in the NHS at any time in the last six months (NHS Employers, 2006). This 
ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ƚŽ Ăůů ŵĞĚŝĐĂů ƐƚĂĨĨ ĂŶĚ ŶƵƌƐŝŶŐ ƐƚĂĨĨ ĂďŽǀĞ  ‘ďĂŶĚ ƚŚƌĞĞ ?  ?,ĞĂůƚŚ ĂƌĞ
Assistants).  Following the initial building phase, Orthe-ISTC was mainly composed of 
people employed through two organisations. Namely WorldHealth, responsible for 
clinical activity on the ISTC site and a national property support services company 
 ? ‘ŝŐ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ >ƚĚ ? ? ) ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ĨŽƌ ĐůĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ĐĂƚĞƌŝŶŐ ? Ğ ŐŝŶĞĞƌŝŶŐ ? ƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ
security. In addition to this there was often a large number of agency staff working in 
the ISTC, as well as two pharmacists employed by the local NHS Acute Trust. 
The UK operations of WorldHealth were incorporated as a separate subsidiary of the 
parent company, with the headquarters in North America. The senior management 
team within Orthe-ISTC consisted of the registered manager, largely responsible for 
financial and administrative management, a Chief Medical Officer, responsible for 
managing the Orthopaedic Surgeons, Anaesthetists and Radiologists, and the Chief of 
Nursing and Quality, responsible for Nursing staff. These reported to the company 
Chief Executive, located in a separate head office. The dedicated HRM function 
consisted of a company senior HR manager, an ISTC HR manager and a HR 
administrator.  
Forming a backdrop to establishment of the ISTC was the relationship with other 
local health providers and wider NHS. As with other ISTC projects there had been 
resistance and protest by local professional and community groups to the 
involvement of the private sector. A letter from GPs had appeared in the local and 
professional press complaining that they were being forced to refer patients to 
Orthe-ISTC above other hospitals in order to use the contracted value. And although 
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the ISdĐĂůůĞĚŝƚƐĞůĨĂ ‘ŽŶĞ-ƐƚŽƉƐŚŽƉ ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞ day to day running of the centre there 
was often a need to work directly with external organisations and general fit into the 
wider community. For instance, certain sterilisation and equipment services were 
carried out in the adjacent hospital, patients had to be referred from PCT and also 
 ‘ƌĞƉĂƚƌŝĂƚĞĚ ?ƚŽƚŚĞE,^ĨŽƌŽŶŐŽŝŶŐĐĂƌĞĂƌƌĂŶŐĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ'WƐĂŶĚƉŚǇƐŝŽƚŚĞƌĂƉŝƐƚƐ ?
and certain clinicians looked to the other organisations for training and advice.  
The following is a portrayal of the ISd ?ƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞs, concentrating on the character of 
work and employment present in the ISTC and the forces shaping it. The first two 
sections outline the challenges of recruitment and building HR practices from scratch 
and the rapid turnover of staff related to short term nature of employment practices. 
The nature of work in the ISTC is then described, explaining the effort to arrange 
clinical work into a production line process, firstly in the push for standardisation of 
medical work and secondly in the increased regulation and control of other staff 
groups in the face of high levels of contingency and change.. 
5.2 Foundations of the ISTC: Recruiting outside the NHS 
Given the arrangements for employment Orthe-ISTC could be seen as representing a 
 ‘ĐůĞĂŶ ďƌĞĂŬ ? ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ E,^ and presented an opportunity for a new approach to 
health service delivery. It was supplying a new dedicated elective orthopaedic 
service, within modern purpose built facilities, operated by an organisation new to 
the UK health market, composed of staff from a wide variety of organisational and 
cultural backgrounds. As such, the managers of Orthe-ISTC had to start many aspects 
from scratch with very few of the practices of the centre firmly set in place. In many 
ways the commercial objectives of the ISTC were clear, as the level of output, as well 
as payment, were agreed in the original contract. Further income could be made on 
referrals outside of the agreement made with sponsoring PCTs. Complimenting these 
comparative straightforward operating aims was a relatively shallow hierarchy within 
the hospital, with one manager in each day-case in-patient and out-patient care 
department, reporting to the general manager.  
A fairly explicit set of aims were put forward by the general manager, chief medical 
officer and head of nursing services. The emphasis from the point of view of senior 
management based on the contract was on getting as many patients through the 
system, with as few complications as possible, in the shortest time while maintaining 
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quality and patient satisfaction scores. This approach was spelled out clearly by the 
CMO:  
 ‘zŽƵǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĐĂƌƐƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚďǇĂƐƚĂƚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƚũƵƐƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬ ?
And medicine always has this humanity aspect to it, but in general of course 
ŝƚ ?ƐĂƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ, the same as every other product and process and 
that applies to who pays for it and that also applies to the managerial 
ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐŝŶƉůĂĐĞ ? ?ŚŝĞĨDĞĚŝĐĂůKĨĨŝĐĞƌ ) 
However, before the production system could get up and running, the management 
needed to recruit sufficient staff to fulfil the production requirements. Given that for 
the most part NHS staff could not be recruited, a major initial activity for the HRM as 
well as the management group in general was finding the number of staff needed to 
supply the contracted volume of service. In light of the dominance of the NHS as an 
employer for clinical health staff this posed a serious challenge and the struggle to 
recruit and maintain staffing levels continued throughout the course of the research, 
taking up the majority of the time for the HRM department. An initial Mobilising 
Staffing Plan was put in place by a consultant who had worked with the parent 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ŽǀĞƌƐĞĂƐ ƐŝƚĞƐ ? dŚŝƐ ƐƚĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ŵŝŶŝŵƵŵ ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ĞĂĐŚ ƚǇƉĞ ŽĨ ƐƚĂĨĨ
needed to get services up and running and the minimum type of qualifications 
required. Initially based on overseas operations, this had to be adapted to the nature 
of operations, the regulations of UK practice, shortages of available staff and, 
moreover, the necessities of clinical work in practice:  
 ‘ǁĞŚĂǀĞƚŚŝƐŵŽĚĞůĂŶĚǁŚĂƚǁĞĨŽƵŶĚǁĂƐŝƚǁĂƐƋƵŝƚĞƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝǀĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
ǁĞ ǁĞƌĞ ǀĞƌǇ ŵƵĐŚ ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ ŽŶ  ‘ZŝŐŚƚ ? ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ ŽƵƌ ŵŽĚĞů ? ƐŽ ǁĞ ŶĞĞĚ ŽŶĞ
clinical nurse, five operating department practitioners and we need 20 
nurses for examplĞ ? ?ŶĚŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇǇŽƵŚĂǀĞƚŽŚĂǀĞƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŽǁŽƌŬƚŽ
for obviously budget reasons and everything else but as we were going on 
and as things become operational, you realise that actually this model is fine 
in sort of theory but in practice things are verǇǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ? ? ?ŽŵƉĂŶǇ,Z
manager) 
Clinical staff other than medics were recruited from a wide variety of places; directly 
from qualifying, from private hospitals, directly from overseas, or from the NHS 
following a career break. Further, there was a divide between the routes for finding 
staff for more generic nursing roles, such as ward nurses, and the more specialised 
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positions, including doctors, therapy and imaging staff. Non specialised nurses were 
largely recruited from other lower paying nursing jobs in the local health economy, 
including nursing homes and private hospitals, as well as in some instances from 
overseas, (although restrictions were again in place for this). Pay levels and terms 
and conditions of employment were based on market rates for other private 
healthcare organisations: 
 ‘/ ?ǀĞ ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶ Ă ďĞŶĐŚŵĂƌŬŝŶŐ ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚǁŽ ŽƚŚĞƌ
ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ?  ĞĐĂƵƐĞ ǇŽƵ ŬŶŽǁ ? / ĨĞĞů ŶŽǁ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĞ ?ƌĞ Ă ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚŽǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŵƉĂƌŝŶŐǁŝƚŚďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛactually 
ǁŚĞƌĞǁĞ ?ƌĞƉƵůůŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƚĂĨĨĨƌŽŵ ?ĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞĐĂŶ ?ƚƉƵůůƚŚĞŵĨƌŽŵƚŚĞE,^
ĂŶǇǁĂǇ ? ?ŽŵƉĂŶǇ,ZDĂŶĂŐĞƌ ) 
However, there remained a large difficulty in recruiting sufficient number of staff. 
Given the amount of staff required to become operational, the focus in the first 
instance remained on reaching minimal numbers, rather than proactively recruiting 
based on the nature of the service or a nuanced understanding of the required skill 
mix:  
 ‘^ƚĂĨĨ ǁĞƌĞ ƚĂŬĞŶ ŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ ŶƵƌƐŝŶŐ ŚŽŵĞƐ ? ǁŚŽ ?Ě ŚĂĚ ŶŽ ĂĐƵƚĞ nursing 
knowledge for the previous six months.  They were taking on students, so 
they had no post-qualification experience and were learning bad habits from 
ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŽ ?Ě ďĞĞŶ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ŝŶ ŶƵƌƐŝŶŐ ŚŽŵĞƐ ?  ^Ž ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ
years but not in acute nursŝŶŐ ? ? ?ŝƐĐŚĂƌŐĞEƵƌƐĞ ) 
 ‘^ŽŵĞŶƵƌƐĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞ ?ǀĞŚĂĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƚƌĂŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞE,^ĂŶĚĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŐĞƚ
ũŽďƐ ? ƐŽ ŽĨ ĐŽƵƌƐĞ ƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞ ǁŽƌŬĞĚ ĂŐĞŶĐǇ ĨŽƌ Ă ǁŚŝůĞ ? ƚŚĞŶ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚŚĞƌĞĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĂƚƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨƚŝŵĞ ? ? ?tĂƌĚ^ŝƐƚĞƌ ) 
Accordingly, there were large variations in the knowledge of the nursing workforce 
employed, particularly in relation to the type of orthopaedic surgery being carried 
out.  
 ‘ůŝŬĞĂƉĂƚŝĞŶƚĂĨĞǁŵŽŶƚŚƐĂŐŽĚĞƚĞƌŝŽƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŶŝŐŚƚĂŶĚǁŚĞŶ/ĐĂŵĞ/
ƐĂŝĚƚŽƚŚĞŶƵƌƐĞ ‘ǁŚĂƚ ?ƐŚŝƐDt^ƐĐŽre? [Moderated Early Warning Score 
ŽĨ ǀŝƚĂů ƐŝŐŶƐ ? ? ŶĚ / ũƵƐƚ ŐŽƚ Ă ůŽŽŬ ŽĨ  ‘ǁŚĂƚ ?Ɛ Ă Dt^ƐĐŽƌĞ ? ?  EŽǁ /
ƉƌĞƐƵŵĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĂǀŝŶŐĚŽŶĞƚŚĞďĂƐŝĐŶƵƌƐĞƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚ
ĂDt^ƐĐŽƌĞǁĂƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞǇĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ ? ? ?tĂƌĚ^ŝƐƚĞƌ ) 
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On the other hand, staff in more specialist positions tended to have been recruited 
through personal networks; in the case of medical staff beginning with the Chief 
Medical Officer, and often based on home-country ties. In this way orthopaedic 
surgeons and anaesthetists were recruited around three national clusters, with the 
final group consisting of three Swedish, five German and eight Hungarians. In order 
ƚŽ ĨŽƌ ƐƵƌŐĞŽŶƐ ƚŽ  ‘Śŝƚ ƚŚĞ ŐƌŽƵŶĚ ƌƵŶŶŝŶŐ ? ǁŝƚŚ ŶŽ ŶĞĞĚ ĨŽƌ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞ
company looked only for consultant surgeons. Again however, the lack of staff 
availability did not allow the option of adhering to strict criteria above having the 
correct clinical skills in the selection process:  
 ‘ŽŶĞ Ğǆ-colleague of mine knows a surgeon here and I just asked him if I 
could just ĐŽŵĞŽŶĞĚĂǇ ?ƚŽƐĞĞŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?/ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚĂƉƉůǇĨŽƌũŽď/ũƵƐƚǁĂŶƚĞĚ
ƚŽƐĞĞŚŽǁƚŚĞǇǁŽƌŬ ? Q ?ŵǇŶŐůŝƐŚǁĂƐƌĞĂůůǇ ?ƌĞĂůůǇďĂĚ/ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƚŽĐŽŵĞ
at first for a few weeks before to go to language school but they needed [me] 
urgeŶƚůǇ ? ?ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚist) 
 ‘ŶĚƚŚĞŶ/ƚŚŝŶŬ ?ŵǇŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?ĂŶŽƌƚŚŽƉĂĞĚŝĐƐƵƌŐĞŽŶ ?ǁĂƐ ŚĞĂĚ-hunted by 
 ?ƚŚĞDK ? ?ŶĚ ?ŚĞ ?ƐĂŝĚŶŽĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞDK ?ĂƐŬĞĚŚŝŵ ‘ǁŚǇ ? ? ?  ‘ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŵǇ
ǁŝĨĞĐĂŶ ?ƚ ůĞĂǀĞŚĞƌũŽď ?ƐŚĞŚĂƐŐŽƚŚĞƌŽǁŶĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ĂŶĚďůĂŚ-blah-blah. 
ŶĚ  ‘ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐ ƐŚĞ ĚŽŝŶŐ ? ? ?  ‘ƐŚĞ ?Ɛ Ă ƉŚǇƐŝŽ ? ?  ‘ĞǆĐĞůůĞŶƚ ? / Ŷ ĞĚ ŽŶĞ ?
(Physiotherapist) 
As the second quote illustrates, similar pattern was also seen in other specialist areas 
such as radiography, physiotherapy and specialist theatre nurses. But whereas 
sufficient medical staff were found, many of the more specialist roles proved 
impossible to fill. Especially so as to a large extent the nature of certain roles are 
defined within the NHS, and therefore do not exist outside of that system.  
 ‘/ ƌĞĂůŝƐĞĚ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂĚ ŶŽ ŝŶĨĞĐƚŝŽŶ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ŶƵƌƐĞ Q again, people who do 
infection control work in the NHS and we needed an infection control nurse.  
Now there are no nurses not working in the NHS who are infection control, 
ƐŽ ǁĞ ?ǀĞ ŚĂĚ Ă ŶŝŐŚƚŵĂƌĞ ŐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ƐŽŵĞďŽĚǇ ƚŽ ĚŽ ŝƚ ?  ?dƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ
Development Manager) 
Accordingly, the treatment centre was opened with a large amount of agency staff 
filling these roles. It could be said that the use of agency staff did provide the 
company some degree of control over who was employed through a system of trial 
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and error, as some of these agency staff were later taken on full time by WorldHealth 
h< ?ĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂů ‘ƚĞŵƉƚŽƉĞƌŵ ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ ?&ŽƌĚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? )ǁŚĞƌĞďǇĂŐĞŶĐǇ
use acts as a prolonged screening process), while others werĞ ‘ǁĞĞĚĞĚŽƵƚ ? ?dŚĞĂƚƌĞ
Sister). This temporary employment relationship did not though work only one way; 
at least one agency theatre nurse spoken to informally turned down an offer of a full 
time role due to the higher rates of daily agency pay, with agency staff mentioning on 
a number of occasions during conversation that they would not mind working full 
time for the company, but that they could not afford to. Regardless of the pros and 
cons of using agency staff, given the difficulties in recruiting for certain roles, ending 
the use of agency staff was often not possible in reality, at a high cost to 
WorldHealth: 
 ‘/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐĂŶĚŬŶŽǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞĂŐĞŶĐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞǇ
ĐŽƵůĚďĞůĂŝĚŽĨĨĂƚĂŶǇƚŝŵĞ ?ŶĚĂƐŝƚŚĂƉƉĞŶƐƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚďĞĞŶďƵƚƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ
simply because you know ǁĞŶĞĞĚƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌƐ ? ?ŽŵƉĂŶǇ,ZŵĂŶŐĞƌ ) 
The ad hoc character of the recruitment process can be seen recurring across many 
activities of the HR function. In many instances there were large uncertainties due to 
a lack of specific policies and organisational templates for action, as well as the 
nature the clinical activities and regulatory environment of the Treatment Centre. 
Both illustrating, and in part, explaining this, none of the dedicated human resource 
managers of the main contractor had themselves worked previously in health care, 
and starting the ISTC involved piecing together practices and key resources as it went 
along, as well as for the individuals learning to cope in a medical environment. For 
example, the senior HRM manager of WorldHealth had previously worked for mainly 
leisure and fitness companies, and found many of the common procedures of 
healthcare new to her; 
 ‘ůŝŬĞZƐ ?ŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚĞĂůƚŚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŝŶƐƵƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐŽĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƵƉ
on everything you know, the work permits from workers coming across from 
obviously like the more recent European countries since 2004.  So all these 
ƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚǇŽƵũƵƐƚƐŽƌƚŽĨƐƚƵŵďůĞĂĐƌŽƐƐĂŶĚŝƚ ?ƐǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚůŝŬĞĨŝŶĚŝŶŐǇŽƵƌ
ǁĂǇŝŶƚŚĞĚĂƌŬ ? ?ŽŵƉĂŶǇ,ZDĂŶĂŐĞƌ ) 
In light of this lack of pre-existing familiarity of healthcare systems, key ingredients 
and resources for HRM were brought in from a wide variety of places. For example, 
specific legal guidelines for employment in health were researched directly from the 
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CIPD and rough guidelines for minimum level of pay from comparison with other 
private providers. The nature of clinical processes were in the beginning bought in 
from the international parent company, although this changed over time as 
individual managers and employees to bought in additional health practices. 
Demonstrating the need to find policies where they could, a number of specific 
employment policies, such as health and safety, infection control, and victimisation 
policies were in fact transferred from the property services contractor. BigServices 
Ltd already had contracts within a number of NHS and private hospitals, as well as 
working in many other industries including airports, hotel and leisure, and had far 
more developed and standardised employment practices than WorldHealth, 
including for example, pension plans, integrated pay scales and national training and 
development schemes.  
In fitting these many restrictions and contingencies were central to how HR selected 
and translated practices. Aside from the key regulations of additionally, other aspects 
of recruitment, training, qualifications and terms and conditions are regulated by the 
Healthcare Commission, including audit and quality regimes. 
 ‘zĞĂŚ ?/ŵĞĂŶǁĞĂƌĞƐĐƌƵƚŝŶŝƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĞŶƚŚĚĞŐƌĞĞ ?/ŵĞĂŶĂƐĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?
just talking about infection control still, we had a Healthcare Commission 
ǀŝƐŝƚ ŝŶ  Q /ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ ?ŵĂǇďĞ:ƵŶĞ ?:ƵůǇ ƚŝŵĞ ? EŽǁĂƚƚŚ ƚŝŵĞ ?ǁĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ
have an infection control nurse, dedicated nurse on site. So anyway, we had 
ƚŚŝƐǀŝƐŝƚĂŶĚĂŵĂǌŝŶŐůǇ QǁĞůůŶŽƚĂŵĂǌŝŶŐůǇ but our infection rates were like 
ǌĞƌŽ ? ŶĚ ǁĞ ǁĞƌĞ ŵĂƌŬĞĚ  Q ĂŶĚ ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ ǁŚĂƚ / ?Ě ĐĂůů Ă ƚǇƉŝĐĂů E,^
bureaucracy and public sector bureaucracy, we were marked as having not 
ŵĞƚƚŚĞŵŝŶŝŵƵŵůĞǀĞůŽĨŝŶĨĞĐƚŝŽŶĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŶ ?ƚůŽŽŬŝŶŐĂƚ
the oƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞůŽŽŬŝŶŐĂƚƚŚĂƚǁĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĂƚƉĞƌƐŽŶŽŶƐŝƚĞ ? ?
(Company HR Manager) 
 /ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ďŽƚŚƚŚĞƋƵĂŶƚŝƚǇŽĨ ‘ŽƵƚƉƵƚ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝŶŐŽĨƚŚŝƐŚĂĚĂůƌĞĂĚǇďĞĞŶ
agreed. In order to make an acceptable level of profit over the length of the contract, 
staff costs had to be kept within a fairly specific range. Given the difference between 
the planned level of staff and the numbers needed in practice, this meant tight 
budget constraints on what could be offered. Further, the activities of the HR 
function had to be frequently re-configured to a rapidly changing workforce, 
explored in the next section. 
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5.3 The Nature of Employment: Transient Production Work 
Closely tied in with the difficulties of recruiting staff, were the connected problems of 
retaining staff, and training the workforce up to the minimum required standard. 
Throughout the six month research period, staff turnover remained very high in the 
ISTC, although the actual degree of turnover varied greatly between departments 
and clinical specialities. For example, following a period of rapid turnover to begin 
with where they had to often turn to locum doctors, a relatively stable group of 
consultant surgeons was established. On the other hand, there was a fairly 
continuous turnover of staff nurses and other clinicians such as radiography and 
physiotherapy. For the most part, this resulted in perceptions of a fluid workforce. 
 ‘zĞĂŚ ? ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇ ?  / ƚŚŝŶŬ ŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ǁĞ ŚĂǀĞ ŚĂĚ ƋƵŝƚĞ Ă ŚŝŐŚ ƚƵƌŶŽǀĞƌ ŽĨ
ƐƚĂĨĨƐŝŶĐĞǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?ǁĞ ?ǀĞŽƉĞŶĞĚĂŶĚǁĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƐƚĂƌƚƌĞƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƚĂĨĨ
ƚŚĂƚǁĞ ?ǀĞŐŽƚ ? ?ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨEƵƌƐŝŶŐ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ) 
 ‘tĞ ?ǀĞŚĂĚ ŽŶĞŽƌ ƚǁŽƚŚĂƚ ?ƐďĞĞŶŚĞƌĞ ĨŽƌ ůŝŬĞƐŝǆŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?ƚŚĞŶŐŽŶĞĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞŶĐŽŵĞďĂĐŬĂĨƚĞƌĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƚǁŽŽƌƚŚƌĞĞŵŽŶƚŚƐ ?tĞ ?ƌĞƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽŬĞĞƉƚŚĞ
same ƐƚĂĨĨ ? (Ward Sister) 
After only 20 months of being open, with a total WorldHealth workforce of 
approximately 150, (of which approximately 45 were trained nurses) a ward nurse 
ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚ  ‘/ ƚŚŝŶŬ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ƐƚĂĨĨ ŶƵƌƐĞƐ / ?ŵ ƚŚĞ ŽŶůǇ ŽŶĞ ůĞĨƚ ŚĞƌĞ ? ?  ?tĂƌĚ
Nurse 1).  
In some ways the temporary nature of work in the Treatment Centre was written 
into the terms of the contract. For staff, the finite end point created by the five year 
contract length added to the uncertainty of the new venture. Although the treatment 
centre was in the early stages of its life cycle, there were already concerns being 
voiced by staff about the future of the centre, with different suggestions and 
rumours being frequently mentioned;  
 ‘ǁĞ ?ƌĞŶŽƚƌĞĂůůǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƉŝĐƚƵƌĞĂƐ ƚŽǁŚĂƚ ?ƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽŚĂƉƉĞŶ ?ŶĚǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚ
ƌĞĂůůǇ ŬŶŽǁ ǁŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞ ŐŽƚ ƉůĂŶŶĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǆƚ ƐƚĂŐĞ ƌĞĂůůǇ ? ƐŽ ƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ




Amongst managers, there was an awareness of the approaching time for re-
negotiation, as well as a degree of uncertainty as to the intentions of either national 
and regional public bodies to place the contract up for renewal, the terms on which 
re-negotiation would be based, or indeed the possibility that the centre could be 
transferred to the local NHS Acute Trust. Therefore, while there was the possibility of 
the contract being renewed, there was also widespread realisation that the ISTC, and 
therefore their jobs, was not necessarily permanent.  
More immediately, in several other ways the rapid turnover of staff was closely tied 
in to the nature of the ISTC and the type of work it offered. Work in the ISTC was 
focused on a very narrow group of orthopaedic treatments on healthy patients with 
no risk of complications, and therefore little room for variety in medical practice. 
Leading on from this, systems and procedures were intended to be highly 
ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŝƐĞĚ ? ǁŝƚŚ ǀĞƌǇ ůŝƚƚůĞ ƌŽŽŵ ĨŽƌ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ĚĞǀŝĂƚŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ  ‘ďĞƐƚ
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ? ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇ ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?
people were employed to do a single highly defined job, rather than into a career 
structure. The effect of this was made even more dramatic by the fact that ISTC was 
seen as cut off from the rest of the NHS system with antagonised relationships with 
other local healthcare organisations leading to a sense of isolation. In addition, and 
related to the finances of the contract, employment benefits found in the NHS, such 
as pensions were not offered, and time off for sickness and doctors appointments 
were closely monitored. Each of these was a significant factor in the work of the ISTC 
and each is explored further in the following sections. However, in general these can 
be seen as manifesting themselves simultaneously, with the TC primarily viewed as a 
source of short to medium term employment by most of the respondents. It was the 
restriction of immediate development that was most frequently cited as a reason 
people were either considering leaving the Treatment Centre, or limiting the degree 
to which they saw the treatment centre as a source of long term employment.   
 ‘tĞŚĂĚŽŶĞ ?ƚǁŽ ?ƚŚƌĞĞ Q/ƚŚŝŶŬǁĞŚĂĚĨŽƵƌŶƵƌƐĞƐ ?ƚŚƌĞĞĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚƐ Q
ƚŚƌĞĞ ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚ ĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚƐ ĂŶĚ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ Kd ?Ɛ ŝƐ ŐŽŝŶŐ ? ƐŚĞ ?Ɛ ŐŽŝŶŐ ƚŽ
ƐĞŶŝŽƌƉŽƐƚďĂĐŬŝŶƚŚĞE,^ ?dŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŶŽǁŚĞƌĞƚŽŵŽǀĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŶŽƌŽŽŵƚŽ




Again this resulted in further agency nurses and temporary staff being required. The 
agency staff themselves often had more acute experience than the direct hire staff, 
and were often praised by management as being some of the best staff, although 
others saw them as a burden that had to be carried. In addition, there were attempts 
to keep the same temporary staff over time to provide week by week stability, 
although this was often not possible, with the presence of agency workers 
contributed further to perceptions of instability of the workforce.  
 ‘ƚŚŝƐ ƉůĂĐĞ ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ƐƵŶŬ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ĂŐĞŶĐǇ ƐƚĂĨĨ ?  dŚĞǇ ǁŽƌŬĞĚ ƌĞĂůůǇ
ŚĂƌĚ ? ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ƉĂŝĚ Ă ŐŽŽĚ ƌĂƚĞ ŽĨ ƉĂǇ ďƵƚ ƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞ ĚŽŶĞ ƌĞĂůůǇ ǁĞůů ĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞǁŽƌŬĞĚƌĞĂůůǇŚĂƌĚĂŶĚƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞďĞĞŶŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƚƚŝŶŐƵƉĂŶĚ
ĐŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶŐŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ  Q ǁŚŝĐŚ / ƚŚŝŶŬ ŝƐ ƌĞĂůůǇ ŐŽŽĚ ?  ŶĚ
ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞĚ ďƵƚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŚĂŶĚ ? ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ĂůƐŽ  Q
ƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞĂůƐŽƐŽŵĞƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞŶ ?ƚĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞĚ ? ?ŝƐĐŚĂƌŐĞEƵƌƐĞ ) ? 
 ‘ QŶŽƚŚĞƌďŝŐĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĨŽƌĞĐŬƐĂŶĚ/ǁĞƌĞƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌƐŽĨůŽĐƵŵƐĐŽŵŝŶŐ
through at the time, to try and fill the gaps for us. Even though we had 
locums here we were doing very long hours. When you have locums coming 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ? ĂŶĚ ǇŽƵ ĐĂŶ ?ƚ ůĞĂǀĞ ƚŚĞŵ ŝŶ ŚĞƌĞ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ŬŶŽǁ ǁŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞĚŽŝŶŐ ? ? ?ZĂĚŝŽŐƌĂƉŚĞƌ ) 
This more transient nature of the workforce undoubtedly had a bearing on the 
process of the research. Attempting to build report with groups outside the senior 
management team was problematic, as there were consistently large changes in the 
middle management within clinical departments. Over the period of research, the 
three ward sisters, two specialist theatre nurses, the manager of the physical 
therapies department and lead radiographer with whom I had had contact all 
changed at least once. Many of the staff interviewed had moved on by the end of the 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?ŵĂŬŝŶŐŝƚĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽďƵŝůĚƵƉĂĨĞĞůŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŽŬŶŽǁ ?ƚŚĞƉůĂĐĞ ?
or follow up specific points with people over time. Interestingly the property services 
company had a relatively stable group of staff, with only three people reported as 
leaving during the first year. Throughout the research, reception and security staff 
acted as a point of contact and familiarity as they were often more aware than 
clinical staff of the layout of the building, which rooms were likely to be free for 




It was also evident that the issue of staff turnover was strongly related to the type of 
training and more importantly opportunities for career developed offered by the 
centre. As part of the first wave of treatment centres, Orthe-ISTC was not required to 
provide training to medical or nursing students, and were to a certain extent free to 
provide their own models of training and development. Given the number of staff 
being employed that were new to acute care in general and orthopaedic care in 
particular, training resources had to cater in the first instance for those to get the 
required skill levels to practice, defined by both professional associations, local 
contract performance indicators and national regulations monitored by the 
Healthcare Commission. Although not in the initial plan for the centre, after only a 
few months a training department needed to be set up run by an experienced NHS 
nursing tutor who had recently set up training schemes in other private hospitals. 
Given the lack of knowledge of healthcare in the HRM department, the responsibility 
for identifying training needs and finding time to carry out sessions was then 
ĚĞǀŽůǀĞĚ ƚŽ ŚĞƌ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĨŽĐƵƐ ĨŝƌŵůǇ ŽŶ  ‘ƌĞĂĚ ĂŶĚ ƵƚƚĞƌ ?  ?dƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ
development Manager) aspects of nursing. In some ways this internal training model 
gave the company some flexibility as to the courses it supplied, and design training 
around the needs of the ISTC. For example, key skills training was offered to both 
WorldHealth and the site services staff when required. However, perhaps on a more 
fundamental level, the need to focus on generic skills resulted in a kind of a catch 22, 
in which the turnover of staff lowered the standards of the training provided, and the 
lack of training and development opportunities leading to the exit of the more highly 
skilled staff.   
 ‘^Žŝƚ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞ ?ŝƚƐĨŝƌĞĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƌĞĂůůǇ ?/ǁĂŶƚƚŽŵŽǀĞĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨŝƌĞ
fighting, to this kind of professional development.  I want all our nurses to go 
ŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĚĞŐƌĞĞ ŵŽĚƵůĞ ĨŽƌ ŽƌƚŚŽƉĂĞĚŝĐ ŶƵƌƐŝŶŐ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ ?Ɛ ƐƵĐŚ Ă
ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƚǇ ?  ŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ ǁŚĂƚ ǁĞ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐ ŽŶ ďƵƚ ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ?ƚ ǇĞƚ ?
 ?dƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚDĂŶŐĞƌ ) ? 
As this quote suggests there was some hope that the situation will improve over 
ƚŝŵĞ ? ďƵƚ ŐŝǀĞŶ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ  ‘ĐĂŶ ?ƚ ǇĞƚ ? ? dŚŝƐ ǀŝĞǁ ĞĐŚŽĞĚ ďǇ ĂŶ
occupational therapist that was in the process of leaving the TC, having already found 
a position within the NHS. 
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 ‘/ƚ ?ƐŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚĂůŽƚŝŶƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ/ ?ǀĞďĞĞŶŚĞƌĞďƵƚŝƚ ?ƐŶŽƚĂƐǁĞůů-established, 
ĂƐŝƚŝƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞE,^ǁŚĞƌĞ/ ?ǀĞǁŽƌŬĞĚďĞĨŽƌĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞ
in-house training.  Which is starting to happen here but we would do it 
maybe once or twice a month, have an afternoon or an hour session with 
ĞŝƚŚĞƌ Ă ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ŽƵƌ ŽǁŶ ƚĞĂŵ Žƌ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ dƌƵƐƚ ? Ƶƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ?Ɛ
ŶŽǁŚĞƌĞŶĞĂƌĂƐŵƵĐŚŽĨƚŚĂƚŚĞƌĞ ? ?KĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶĂůdŚĞrapist) 
In order to deal with this a number of staff had gone to fairly long lengths to organise 
training opportunities individually. For example, one theatre nurse had arranged to 
work one day per week in her own time within a private hospital doing a wider span 
of surgical procedures. The NHS pharmacists on the other hand were allowed as part 
of the Service Level Agreement with the local trust to work elsewhere for part of 
their time in order to stay in touch with changes to practice and a wider social 
neƚǁŽƌŬ ?dŚŝƐƚǇƉĞŽĨƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐƌĞůŝĞĚŽŶƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐĂŶĚĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĨŝŶĚ
time to train outside of normal working hours and normal working environment. 
Given the strained political relationships with other local healthcare providers this 
was not always easy. Three other nursing and one other medical respondent 
reported getting in touch with other local health organisations with a view to 
receiving specific training or to build more general links with professional colleagues, 
but met with resistance or hostility. For example one nurse approached the adjacent 
hospital for training; 
 ‘ŶĚƚŚĞǇƐĂŝĚŶŽďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƐĞĞŵĞĂƐĂĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞ ?ƚŚĞǇƐĂǁŵĞĂƐ
an enemy. She said that directly to me.  But I can see their point of view, they 
can see loƚƐŽĨŵŽŶĞǇďĞŝŶŐƉŽƵƌĞĚŝŶƚŽŚĞƌĞĂŶĚƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞŐŽƚǁĂƌĚƐĐůŽƐŝŶŐ
ĚŽǁŶ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞůŽƐŝŶŐũŽďƐ ? ?dŚĞĂƚƌĞEƵƌƐĞ ) ? 
This hostility also points to a final challenge the ISTC faced in retaining staff. The 
separation from other local healthcare organisations and wider professional 
communities left many people feeling isolated and cut off from outside networks. In 
some cases this also included growing feelings of resentment to the NHS for 
excluding them and dealing with the ISTCs unfairly. On an individual level, people did 
manage to form some connections outside of the ISTC. This was usually based on 
previous places they had happened to work, or through persevering with making 
contacts and joining professional groups in the face of antagonism. This problem was 
exacerbated for overseas staff who were not connected to national professional 
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institutions or personal networks, for example an anaesthetist seeking to join the 
Royal College reported she was unable to as this required nominations from two 
existing members. Others felt excluded from the informal knowledge exchange that 
was more freely available as part of the NHS: 
 ‘dŚĞďŝŐŐĞƐƚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝƐƚŚĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ?tŚĞŶ/ǁĂƐŝŶƚŚĞE,^ ?/ǁŽƵůĚ Q
if I had a problem, I could network with the other senior nurses within the 
dƌƵƐƚ ? ^Ž ŝŶ ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĂƚ ? / ?ŵ ǀĞƌǇ ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚ ŚĞƌĞ ? ĂƐ ƚŽǁŚĞƌĞ / ĐĂŶ
ƉƵůůŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵ ?tŚĞƌĞĂƐƚŚĞƌĞ/ĐŽƵůĚŐŽŽƵƚĂŶĚŶĞƚǁŽƌŬĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ
ƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŚŽǁ/ĨĞĞů / ĨĞĞů /Ăŵŝƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐŶŽďŽĚǇĞůƐĞ ? ŝƚ ?ƐŵĞ ? ?
(Ward Nurse)  
5.4 Medical Roles in Orthe-ISTC 
As previously indicated, there were a number of differences in the organisation of 
work in Orthe-ISTC compared to traditional NHS models. To begin with, the ISTC was 
designed specifically around a narrow group of surgical procedures and the 
associated support functions such as radiology and post-operative therapies. The 
emphasis from the point of view of senior management based on the contract was 
on getting as many patients through the system, with as few complications as 
possible, in the shortest time. The ethos was put across clearly by one of the 
consultant surgeons; 
 ‘ǇŽƵ ĐĂŶ ƐĂǇ ŝƚ ?Ɛ ůŝŬĞ Ă ZǇĂŶ ŝƌ ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ? ǁĞ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ĚŽ ĂŶǇ ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
Patients who actually need more input with a diabetic nurse or a patient 
ǁŚŽ ?ƐƌĞĂůůǇŝůůƚŚĂƚŶĞĞĚƐĂŶĞǁŚŝƉ ?ƚŚĞǇƐŚŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚďĞŽƉĞƌĂƚĞĚŚĞƌĞ ? Q ?ǁĞ
cherry-pick them and we should cherry-pick them because the contract is set 
up like a cherry-ƉŝĐŬŝŶŐ ? ?ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚ^ƵƌŐĞŽŶ ) 
tŚŝůĞ  ‘ĐŚĞƌƌǇ ƉŝĐŬŝŶŐ ? ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ŝƐ ŽĨƚĞŶ ůĞǀĞůůĞĚ ĂƐ ĂĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ĂŐĂinst new private 
sector providers in both public discussions and statements by health professions 
(BMA, 2005), here it appeared to be embraced through logic of economies of scale 
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ŽĨ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?  ‘,ĞĂůƚŚǇ ? ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ƌĞƋƵŝƌŝŶŐ ƐŝŵƉůĞƌ ? ůŽǁer cost 
ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ĂƌĞ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ  ‘ƐŝĐŬ ? ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ǁŚŽ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵŽƌĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŝƐĞĚ
(expensive) treatment. Over the first year, the average length of stay following joint 
replacement of 3.28 days against an average in a local NHS hospital of 9.4 days (NHS 
Improvement Network, 2008). This should not be taken as a direct comparison as the 
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ISTC only accepted low risk patients (up to ASA level 3), with some research actually 
showing that the ISTC programme has pushed the average time of treatment for the 
remaining patients in the NHS up (Sayana, Wynn-Jones, 2008). However, it is 
indicative of the ISTC approach, seeking to limit the variety of patients, as well as 
variations in practice. Overall, the role of medics proscribed by the company can be 
characterised as one of highly skilled production workers.  
This required a move away from the established professional role of hospital doctors 
seen in the NHS, with multiple areas of authority and responsibility, towards one of 
 ‘ũŽďďŝŶŐ ĐůŝŶŝĐŝĂŶ ? ? ZĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ĞŵƉůŽǇing a range of doctors at different career 
levels, the company employed only consultant orthopaedic surgeons and consultant 
anaesthetists that required no further training or development to practice within the 
 ‘ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ƌŽůĞƐ ? &ƵƌƚŚĞƌ ? ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚ ƚŽ  ‘ƵƐƵĂů ? ǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚŝŶ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ? ƚŚĞ
roles and routines of these doctors were more highly standardised, with a push for 
consensus over procedures and equipment.  Although the medics came from a 
variety of cultural backgrounds with a variety of health practices, some pressure was 
put on them to converge on a single approach to each type of condition, for example, 
all surgeons using the same type of joint replacement. Although this was not 
contractually forced, deviation from TC standard procedure required a long process 
of research and evidence presented to the other consultants, in particular the CMO.  
 ‘ǁĞƚƌŝĞĚŚĞƌĞƚŽƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŝƐĞƚŚĞƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚŵǇǀŝĞǁŝƐƚƌǇƚŽŬĞĞƉŝƚĂƐ
simple as possible and the ones who do things more complicated has to 
prove the ǀĂůƵĞŽĨŝƚ ?^ŽǁĞ ?ǀĞŚĂĚĂůŽƚŽĨĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĂƚďƵƚƐƚŝůůŝŶ
ƚŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ǁĞ ŚĂǀĞ ĂŐƌĞĞĚ ŽŶ Ă ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ŚŽǁ ƚŽ ĚŽ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ? ?
 ?ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚ^ƵƌŐĞŽŶ ) ? 
As well as a standardisation of practices, the ISTC also involved a certain narrowing of 
the dŽĐƚŽƌ ?ƐƌŽůĞ ?ǁŝƚŚĂƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ŝŶƉƵƚ ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞǁĂǇǁŽƌŬǁĂƐŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚ ?tŝƚŚ
the exception of one self-employed surgeon, all of the anaesthetists and surgeons 
were employed directly by WorldHealth on a full time basis, with their time and 
activity largely planned by the ISTC management and administration. Usually, this 
involved seven clinical sessions a week, either in theatre or consulting with patients, 
and three session of administration. In addition, they were also offered payments for 
doing additional cases by doing extra sessions or adding patients to existing lists. The 
lists were compiled by the group of schedulers who for the most part were in control 
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of managing the waiting times and arranging appointment dates, with some 
negotiation with the operating surgeon. While this might be ostensibly similar to 
other hospitals and theatre departments, consultants elsewhere may be expected to 
carry out a number of other duties, such as training other clinicians, involvement in 
administration and contributing to hospital policies. As many of these extra 
responsibilities were not present in the ISTC, in effect this allowed ISTC management 
ƚŝŐŚƚĞƌ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ? ƚŝŵĞ Ăƚ ǁŽƌŬ ? ĂƐ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĞƌ  ůĞƐƐ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐ
pressures on them.  
 ‘/ŵĞĂŶ/ ?ŵŚĂƉƉǇƚŽĐŽŵĞŝŶĂŶĚĚŽŵǇŚŽƵƌƐ ?ƚŚĞŶǁŚĞŶ/ ?ŵĨŝŶŝƐŚŝŶŐ/ ?ŵ
ŐŽŝŶŐŚŽŵĞ ?/Ĩ/ŚĂǀĞĂƚŚĞĂƚƌĞƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?/ ?ŵĚŽŝŶŐĂƚŚĞĂƚƌĞƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ŝĨ/ ?ŵŽŶ-
ĐĂůů ? / ?ŵ ůŽŽŬŝŶŐ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ǁŚŽ ĂƌĞ ŐŽŝŶŐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ĐůŝŶŝĐƐ ?
(Consultant Anaesthetist) 
In certain ways this extended to passing on responsibilities to other employees, as 
well as becoming more responsive to the flow of patients. As one of the major 
 ‘ƐĞůůŝŶŐ ƉŽŝŶƚƐ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞISTC was that all pre-assessment as well as the consultation 
with the operating surgeon were to be done on the same day, this involved 
consultants making themselves available until all patients had been seen, even if they 
arrived on the wrong date, and allowing the nursing and administrative staff to 
organise their time:  
 ‘/ ŵĞĂŶ ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ƌĞĂůůǇ because we work closely with the surgeons 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǇŽƵ ?ƌĞƌƵŶŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĐůŝŶŝĐ ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵƐĂŝĚƚŽŵĞ
 ‘tŝůů ǇŽƵ ĐŽŵĞ ĂŶĚ ďĞ ŵǇ ďŽƐƐ ƚŽĚĂǇ ? ? ŚĞ ůŝŬĞĚ ŵĞ ďŽƐƐŝŶŐ Śŝŵ ĂďŽƵƚ
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ/ƌƵŶŚŝƐĐůŝŶŝĐƐĨŽƌŚŝŵ ? ?,ĞĂůƚŚĂƌĞƐƐŝƐƚĂŶƚ ?KƵƚƉĂƚŝents)  
From the surgeons point of view this perhaps fitted in with their simplified role, 
ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵ ƚŽ ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ  ‘ĐŽƌĞ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ƚĂƐŬƐ ? ? ŽĨ ƐƵƌŐĞƌǇ ĂŶĚ
consultation. Although none of the consultants had come from the NHS, in general 
the move to the ISTC represented a move to more straightforward, undemanding, 
routine work. In different ways all of the surgeons and anaesthetists staff recognised 
this changed nature of their role within the company. They clearly saw the 
orientation of the ISTC towards high speed, uncomplicated and routine operations, 
and replication of practice, with a relatively small role for development either in 
terms of personal learning or in terms of input into the way the treatment centre was 
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run. Therefore, all of the medics remaining in the employment of WorldHealth were 
to some extent either explicitly or implicitly accepting this new role.  
A key question then was the extent to which this was willingly embraced. For most, 
there was some feeling that overall the ISTC represented a simplification of their 
ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐůŝĨĞ ?ŝŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ?ŵĞĚŝĐĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĞǁŽƌŬĂƐƚŚĞƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ
centre was seen as straightforward and well rewarded.  
 ‘^Ž/ĐĂŶŐŽďĂĐŬƚŽ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇďƵƚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽĚŽŝƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞĂƐ/ƐĂǇƚŽyou, 
it was a really difficult job, Much more interesting than here, as a position, as 
an anaesthetist, much more interesting but difficult because all the nights, 
ƌĞƐƵƐĐŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƉůƵƐŽƚŚĞƌƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƐŝĂĐĂƌĞ QƐŽ/ĐĂŶ ?ƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞ/ŐŽƚ
older, I can ?ƚĚŽŝƚůŽŶŐĞƌ ? ?ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ) 
In some instances this feeling was tied into expressions of the health systems which 
they had left behind which required deep involvement in the large organisations and 
the associated politics, the demands on their time, multiple roles, the need to 
manage and teach others and take responsibility for difficult and messy medical 
practices.  
 ‘/Ŷ,ƵŶŐĂƌǇ/ĚŝĚŶŽƚŬŶŽǁŝŶƚŚĞŵŽƌŶŝŶŐǁŚĂƚ/ŚĂĚƚŽĚŽƚŚĂƚĚĂǇ ?ĞǀĞŶŝŶ
ƚŚĞŶĞǆƚƚŚƌĞĞŚŽƵƌƐƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ?/ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚƐƚŽƉ ?/ŚĂd to see patients and I had 
to work in the theatre, I had a lot of patients up on ICU and I had to go for 
ƐĞǀĞƌĂůŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐ ?/ƚǁĂƐĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇĐƌĂǌǇ ?ŶĚŝƚǁĂƐŶ ?ƚũƵƐƚŵǇĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?
ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ ? ?ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ) 
Most clearly stated, the work in the ISTC was described as a professional break from 
normal practice, a chance to live temporarily in the UK, follow other life pursuits and 
ůĞĂƌŶ ŶŐůŝƐŚ P  ‘/ ƚĞůů ĞǀĞƌǇďŽĚǇ / Ăŵ ŽŶ Ă ďŝŐ ŚŽůŝĚĂǇĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŵŽŵĞŶƚ ? ŶĚ ŝƚ ?Ɛ ŶŽƚ
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ/ ?ŵŶŽƚŚĂƉƉǇ ƚŽǁŽƌŬďƵƚ/ƐƚŝůůĨĞĞůŝƚ ?ƐĂŚŽůŝĚĂǇ ? ?ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚŶĂĞƐƚŚĞ ŝƐƚ ) ?
This perhaps offers an explanation as to why doctors may have been willing to accept 
ĂŵŽƌĞƚŝŐŚƚůǇĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚƌŽůĞ ?ƐĂǁĞůůƉĂŝĚ ‘ŚŽůŝĚĂǇ ? ?ƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŝŶƚŚĞ/^dǁĂƐƐĞĞŶ
as an addition to, rather than alternative from, normal practice and everyday 
working lives. Indeed, most respondents talked about possibly returning to their own 
country, or moving on to other ventures or activities; in one case possibly exporting 
the ISTC model elsewhere, or in another case saving enough money to participate in 
voluntary work before retirement. 
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In this way, the ISTC could be seen as providing a type of choice in the employment 
market, allowing doctors to opt for a different type of work in a different type of 
health organisation, (although this choice is heavily curtailed by the employment 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ/^d ?Ɛ ) ?ƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞ ?ŵĂŶǇĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƌŽůĞƐŽŶŽĨĨĞƌ
presented other concerns. Anaesthetists who had previously worked on a greater 
variety of treatments were concerned about their wider professional role and access 
to training and development opportunities, as well as the general downgrading of 
their skills through the routinisation of work. For this reason, one anaesthetist had 
arrangĞĚ ƚŽ ƐƉĞŶĚ ƚǁŽ ǁĞĞŬƐ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ /^d ĂŶĚ ƚǁŽ ǁĞĞŬƐ ĚŽŝŶŐ  ‘ƉƌŽƉĞƌ ?
cardiac work: 
 ‘Anaesthetists do not only orthopaedic surgery, they can do other surgeon, 
ƚŚŽƌĂĐŝĐƐƵƌŐĞƌǇ ?ŶĞƵƌŽƐƵƌŐĞƌǇ QďƵƚǁĞŚĂǀĞŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŚĞƌ  ?/ƚŵĞĂŶƐŝĨǁĞ
just stay here, after a while we will be de-ƐŬŝůůĞĚ ? ? ?ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ) 
Furthermore, it well recognised that by working in the ISTC they were giving up some 
of the status and support that they enjoyed within general teaching hospitals: 
 ‘ƚ&ƌĂŶŬĨƵƌƚhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇĨŽƌĞǆĂmple, I was used to working with two younger 
surgeons at the table, doing a hip or knee joint replacement.  In this country, 
I have a leg holder, which is a nurse, holding the leg and maybe a colleague 
doing some sections but all the rest I have to do myseůĨ ? ?ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚ^ƵƌŐĞŽŶ ) 
In light of this narrower role and the more temporary nature of the employment 
relationship, the level of pay was often cited as a key incentive for staying at the ISTC, 
with an idea that routine nature of the work was counterbalanced by the level of pay 
they received, above what could be expected elsewhere. While this was slightly less 
than similar levels in the NHS and countered some aspects of NHS employment with 
consistently higher pay for Surgeons than Anaesthetists, given the international 
cohort, this was usually measured against their home, and other European countries: 
 ‘DǇĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ŝƐ ŝƚ ?ƐŶŽƚƐƚƌĞƐƐĨƵůĂŶĚƚŚĞƉĂǇŵĞŶƚ ŝƐǀĞƌǇŚŝŐŚĨŽƌĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐ
ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚ ƚŽ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ŝƚ ?Ɛ ǀĞƌǇ ŚŝŐŚ ?  /Ĩ ǇŽƵ ĂƐŬŵĞ ? /ǁŽƵůĚ  QŵĂǇďĞ ŝƚ ?Ɛ
stupiĚďƵƚ/ƚŚŝŶŬŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚŝƚ ? ? ?ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ) 
In addition, amongst the respondents then there was a range of reactions as to how 
much their own circumstances allowed them to buy into the idea of the ISTC as a 
health production line. While this may have depended on many things, a key point 
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would appear to be how able they felt they were to give up some of the autonomy of 
usual practice in return for a more straightforward working life. Such a sacrifice 
would appear closely tied to the stage of their career, personal ambitions and 
opportunities and risks created for future employment. For some, it was seen as a 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ? ĂƐ ůŽŶŐ ĂƐ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ŬĞƉƚ ŝŶ ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?  ‘ŝƚ ?Ɛ ĞĂƐǇ ŚĞƌĞ ŝĨ ǇŽƵ ŚĂǀĞ Ă
straightforward approach and try to keep it simple and heƌĞ ? ? ĂŶĚ ǁĞƌĞ ŚĂƉƉǇ ƚŽ
ƉƵƐŚ ĨŽƌ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ƐĞĞŶĂƐĂŶ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?  ‘tĞĐĂŶ ?ƚ ƌĞĂĐŚ  ? ? ?A?
but we are, even the Germans now, they are closing together and they change their 
ƌŽƵƚŝŶĞƐĂŶĚƐŽĂĨƚĞƌĂǁŚŝůĞ ?ŵĂǇďĞǁĞŐĞƚĐůŽƐĞƌĂŶĚĐůŽƐĞƌ ? ?ŽŶƐƵůtant Surgeon). 
Others however described more reticence towards the ISTC and its management, 
and working in the TC was more matter of more passive acceptance rather than 
active engagement: 
 ‘zĞĂŚ ?ŝĨǇŽƵǁĂŶƚƚŽŵĂŬĞĂŶǇĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ƐŽǇŽƵŚĂǀĞƚŽƉƌŽǀĞŝƚƚŚĂƚ it works 
ĚŽŝŶŐŝƚĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůůǇ ?ĚŽŝŶŐ Qŝƚ ?ƐǁŽƌƚŚĚŽŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ŝƚ ?ƐďĞƚƚĞƌĨŽƌƚŚĞ
ĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ? ŝƚ ?Ɛ ďĞƚƚĞƌ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŶƵƌƐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ǇŽƵ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŽ ĚŽ ĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ
ĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐĂŶĚĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?^ŽƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ/ĨĞĞůƚŚĂƚŝƚ ?ƐĞĂƐŝĞƌũƵƐƚƚŽŐŝǀĞŝƚ
ƵƉ ? ? ?ŽŶƐƵůtant Surgeon) 
More overt medical resistance was reported in anecdotal evidence, such as a story 
repeated on a number of occasions of an anaesthetist who would insist on accepting 
patients above the recommended risk level, in spite of warnings from the pre-
operative nurses. However, and perhaps again illustrative of the employment 
relationship between medics and the ISTC, by the time the research was undertaken 
this doctor had left.  
5.5 Nursing and Other Work Roles in Orthe-ISTC 
For the non-medical staff, similar themes of increasing efficiency and standardisation 
of practice could again be identified. To begin with, nursing roles were designed 
around the three separate areas of outpatients/pre-assessments, theatre, recovery 
and ward. For the content of day to day work, within each of these departments, the 
nature of nursing care was based around traditional roles and hierarchies, with tasks 
divided between senior nurses, registered nurses, operating department 
practitioners and health care assistants, with little directed push to dramatically re-
configure these roles around new models of care. Equally, other staff groups were 
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often expected to get on with the proscribed work as best they could, according to 
training and previous experience.  
 ‘tŚĞƌĞǀĞƌǇŽƵŐŽ ?ƚŚĂƚƌŽůĞĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĂůƚĞƌ ?ǇŽƵƐƚŝůůŚĂǀĞƚŚ ƐĂŵĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ?
ǇŽƵƐƚŝůůŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨĐĂƌĞ ? ĞĨŽƌĞ / ?ĚůĞĨƚƚŚĞE,^ ?/ǁĂƐĂ
ǁĂƌĚŶƵƌƐĞĂŶǇǁĂǇ ?ƐŽ/ ?ĚďĞĞŶĂƐĞŶŝŽƌǁĂƌĚŶƵƌƐĞĨŽƌƋƵŝƚĞƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞ ?^Ž
my role here is virtually the same, although obviously the patients are 
ŽƌƚŚŽƉĂĞĚŝĐĂŶĚ/ǁĂƐŶ ?ƚĂŶŽƌƚŚŽƉĂĞĚŝĐŶƵƌƐĞďĞĨŽƌĞ ?/ǁĂƐĐĂƌĚŝŽ-thoracic.  
ƵƚƚŚĞŶďĂƐŝĐŶƵƌƐŝŶŐĐĂƌĞŝƐĞǆĂĐƚůǇƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ? ?tĂƌĚEƵƌƐĞ ) 
However, before the centre opened there was some effort to more thoroughly make 
the content of these job roles more explicit, with detailed patient pathways and 
decision trees with standard operating procedures describing the order of work to be 
done for each treatment. This also conveyed which job roles were to carry out each 
part of the pathway and the minimum level of training and qualifications needed to 
do so. Although in the first instance these were developed with assistance from 
management consultants from the international parent company, these were also 
tailored specifically for the centre by the Head of Nursing Services, who had worked 
in previously in private hospitals on NHS contracts. Again the emphasis was on 
standardising practice and making sure all staff followed the same guidelines and 
procedures. From the management point of view, spelling out the exact nature of 
each role was felt to be necessary given the experience and short tenure of most of 
the staff: 
 ‘/ĨǇŽƵŐĞƚĂŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƐƚĂĨĨĐŽŵŝŶŐ ŝŶƐĂǇŝŶŐ  ‘ŽŚǁĞ ?ǀĞŐŽƚƚŚŝƐƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƚŽ
ƚƌĞĂƚďƵƚǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚƚŽĚŽĂďŽƵƚŝƚ ? ?ƵƚŝĨǇŽƵ ?ǀĞŐŽƚĂƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚ
procedure in place, they can say oh yeah, if this kind of patient comes to us, 
ǁĞŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?ǁĞĨŽůůŽǁƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ? ? ?ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨ
Nursing Services)  
 ‘dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ ůŽƚƐ ŽĨ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ. Policies for everything. You have to follow all of 
ƚŚĞ ŐƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ ƐĞƚ ĂŶĚ ǇŽƵ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ƌĞĂůůǇ ĚĞǀŝĂƚĞ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĂƚ ƵŶůĞƐƐ
ƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂŐŽŽĚƌĞĂƐŽŶ ?ŶĚƚŚĞŶŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ǇŽƵŚĂǀĞƚŽĚ ĐƵŵĞŶƚĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ




This could be seen as an attempt by management to control nursing work, and make 
the activities of individuals and departments more accountable for each part of the 
process, taking away some of the requirements for individual input and autonomy. In 
making people stick closely to the rules, the ISTC was seen as reducing the scope of 
the nursing role, so that people could only act if officially sanctioned to do so. The 
pressure to work to guidelines set by management was clearly put across by a 
number of respondents. For some there was a feeling that the emphasis on explicit 
work guidelines meant certain aspects of nursing work were being removed or 
curtailed. This included a view that the ISTC was undermining the some aspects of 
the nursing role. For example one nurse stated the emphasis on set roles were 
reducing the degree of autonomy and individual judgment involved in nursing: 
 ‘ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐǁŚŽĚŽŶ ?ƚůŽŽŬĂƚƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŝŶƚŚĞƌŽůĞ ?ƚŚĞǇŽŶůǇ
look at the role and hŽǁƚŚĂƚƌŽůĞ ?ƐďĞŝŶŐĚŽŶĞ ?ŶĚŝĨŝƚ ?ƐŶŽƚ QĂŶĚŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ
of helping that person to do that role, they would rather slap them on the 
ŚĞĂĚĂŶĚƐĂǇ ‘ǇŽƵ ?ƌĞŶŽƚĚŽŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƌŽůĞ ?ǇŽƵĚŽŝƚŚŽǁ/ƚĞůů ǇŽƵŽƌŶŽƚĂƚĂůů ? ?
(Theatre Nurse) 
In other cases it was the more caring aspects of the nursing that were being 
removed: 
 ‘Ɛ ŶƵƌƐĞƐ ? ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ƚƌǇŝŶŐ ƚŽ ůŽŽŬ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ŚŽůŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇ ? ƐŽ ĂƐ Ă ǁŚŽůĞ ?
ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞ ŶŽƚ ũƵƐƚ Ă ŬŶĞĞ ? ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞ ŶŽƚ ũƵƐƚ Ă ƐŚŽƵůĚĞƌ ? ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞ ŶŽƚ ũƵƐƚ Ă ŚŝƉ ?
ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞ Ă ǁŚŽůĞ ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂǀĞ Ğverything surrounding them, their 
ĨĂŵŝůǇ QǁĞŚĂǀĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚƚŚŝƐƚŽĚĂǇ ?ƚŚĞĞƚŚŽƐŚĞƌĞ QƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƚŚĞĞƚŚŽƐ
ŽĨ QŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞĂũŽŝŶƚŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĚŽŽƌ ? ? ?tĂƌĚEƵƌƐĞ ) 
/ŶŐĞŶĞƌĂůƚŚŝƐǁĂƐƐĞĞŶĂƐĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ?ĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨŶƵƌƐŝŶŐ P 
 ‘Here, a nurse is a nurse, not an extended practitioner.  We can do some 
extended roles but not as freely as we could within the NHS.  There is no 
longer a recognised scope of practice as there used to be. Whether it will 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉ ŝŶƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ ? /ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶow, with competencies and evidence-based 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? Ƶƚ ŝƚ ?Ɛ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐ ŚĞƌĞ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞ ƚŚŽƐĞ
competencies and that evidence-ďĂƐĞĚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ŶĚ ŝƚ ?Ɛ Ă ďĞůŝĞĨ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ
nurses are professionals not just their handmaidens. Within the NHS ǁĞ ?ƌĞ
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ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐ ? ŚĞƌĞ ? ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚůǇ ? ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ũƵƐƚ ŶƵƌƐĞƐ ? ƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ ǁŚĂƚ / ?ŵ ƚƌǇŝŶŐ ƚŽ
ƐĂǇ ? ? ?dŚĞĂƚƌĞEƵƌƐĞ ) 
/Ŷ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ĂŶ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ďĞŝŶŐ Ă  ‘ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ? ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ďĞŝŶŐ  ‘ũƵƐƚ
ŶƵƌƐĞƐ ? ?ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚĨŽƌƚŚŝƐƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?ĂĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶǁas being made 
between their role in the ISTC and what a professional should be. In this case, the 
ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽĨƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵŝƐŽŶ ‘ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ? ‘ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ-ďĂƐĞĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ
involvement in wider roles. For the most part, these views of reducing 
professionalism were most strongly perceived by staff who had worked at some 
point in the NHS, rather than nurses from the private sector or straight from training. 
Nurses from the private sector were far less overtly resistant to the work practices 
within the ISTC. While they also recognised that audit processes and paperwork 
played a large part in shaping their practice, they did not see this as something that 
was unique to WorldHealth and was common across many private healthcare 
companies:  
 ‘zĞĂŚ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬ ŝƚ ?ƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŽƌƚŽĨĂƚŵŽƐƉŚĞƌĞŽĨůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ ?ƐĂƌŽƵŶĚ
ďƵƚŝƚ ?ƐĨŽƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐƐĂĨĞƚǇ ?/ƚ ?ƐĂďŝƚŽĨĂƉĂŝŶƐŽŵĞƚŝŵƐǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
sometimes you think if you just use your common sense or whatever, you 
ŚĂǀĞƚŽ Q^ŽƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐƋƵŝƚĞĂůŽƚŽĨƌĞĚƚĂƉĞƌĞĂůůǇ ?Ƶƚŝƚ ?ƐĂĐƵůƚƵƌĞƚŚĂƚ/ ?ŵ
certainly quite familiar with from [a private sector hospital].  And so are the 
ƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽǁŽƌŬŚĞƌĞ ? ? ?tĂƌĚEƵƌƐĞ ) 
As well as an attempt to control nursing work, this emphasis on regulating and 
explicating practŝĐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇ ? ?ĐŽƵůĚĂůƐŽďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ŝŶ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶŽ ƚŚĞƚŝŐŚƚ
quality and performance measures the ISTC was under. Given the basis for 
commissioning, the management were under pressure to fulfil contractual and 
regulatory targets. Therefore, certain behaviours and activities that were to be 
subject to measurement and inspection sought to be tightly controlled. Aside from 
an emphasis on output, this included an increasing focus on waiting list times, audit 
trails, safety and legal procedures and scores of patient satisfaction. 
Given the sensitivity of the ISTC project in the public eye, this final point of patient 
satisfaction was of particular importance for management seeking to establish a 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ‘ƵƐƚŽŵĞƌ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ? ǁĂƐ ƐƵƉƉůŝed by an external 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƚŚĂƚƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽ “ŚĞůƉĂůůƐƚĂĨĨĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞƚŚĞŝƌƌŽůĞŝŶŚĞůƉŝŶŐ
ƚŽ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐ ǁŝƚŚ ĂŶ ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂů ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ
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 “ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ĞĂĐŚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ?
(Training Review Document). Detailed questionnaires to measure patient satisfaction 
were given to patients as they were discharged. In addition, communication from 
management often stressed how the work of the ISTC would be judged on keeping 
patients happy; 
 ‘ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞǀĞƌǇƉĂƚŝĞŶƚŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚĞĚ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? tŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚŶĞĞĚƐ ŝƐ
ƉĂƌĂŵŽƵŶƚ ? ŵŽƐƚ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇ ?  ďŝƚ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ ǁŚĂƚ / ?ǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ŝŶ
 ?ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ? ? ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ŝƚ ?Ɛ ŶŽƚ ũƵƐƚ ŶƵƌƐŝŶŐ ƐƚĂĨĨ ? ŝƚ ŐŽĞƐ ŚŝŐŚĞƌ
ƚŚĂŶƚŚĂƚ ? ?dŚĞĂƚƌĞEƵƌƐĞ) 
For some staff, this focus on patient satisfaction could indeed be seen in some ways 
as extending aspects of certain job roles. Contradicting the view of more limited 
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞ ǁŽƌŬ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĞƌĞ ƐŽŵĞ ƐŝŐŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ Ă  ‘ĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌ ŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?
was extending the usual responsibilities of some staff. An example of this was in the 
HCA patient escort role, in which they guided outpatients through the system, 
making sure they arrived at each diagnostic appointment on time and in the right 
order so as not to disrupt the patient flow. This allowed them movement around the 
ISTC and to work more closely with different grades of clinical staff, and in part direct 
the flow of activity.  
In general however, the focus of management was on compliance to guidelines and 
set procedures, sometimes seen as limiting the scope of professional practice and 
individual decision making. Although some aspects of nursing practice remained 
similar, it could be suggested that the management were trying to instil a particular 
version of nursing work. In this, there is some evidence that a different approach to 
work was indeed introduced. For example, daily schedules, theatre lists and planning 
timetables were stuck to fairly consistently; with senior managers often pushing 
departmental managers on the need to make sure individuals were maintaining their 
activities in line with ISTC goals. Evidence that this was achieved is provided by a host 
of perfŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ <W/ ?Ɛwhich indicated procedures were 
indeed being closely following including the generally short waiting times, and 
meeting the contracted capacity for operations and procedures. Also, there was 
constant pressure from senior managers to make sure new DoH guidelines, such as 
rules governing the way patient information was kept, and recording practices, were 
strictly adhered to. Again collected statistics support this, such as the 100% rate of 
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reporting of operation details for the National Joint Register, compared with an 
average in 2008 of 83% for NHS organisations and 93% for other private 
organisations in the region (njrcentre.org, 2008). Respondents also reported a push 
for all surgical sessions to start and finish on time, and the need to continue working 
until all patients had been seen;  
 ‘ůŝŬĞ ǁĞ ƐƚĂƌƚ ǁŝƚŚ ŽƵƌ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŚĞƌĞ Ăƚ  ? Ž ?ĐůŽĐŬ ĂŶĚ ďǇ  ? Ž ?ĐůŽĐŬ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ
patient will have been operated on and in recovery.  In the NHS, the staff will 
ƐƚĂƌƚ ĚƵƚǇ Ăƚ  ? Ž ?ĐůŽĐŬ ĂŶĚ ďǇ  ? ? Ž ?ĐůŽĐŬ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
ƚĂďůĞ ? ?ŝƌĞĐƚŽƌŽĨEƵƌƐŝŶŐ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ) 
 ‘dŚĞĐůŝŶŝĐĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĂĐƵƚ-ŽĨĨƉŽŝŶƚ ?ŽƌƚŚĞůĂƐƚĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚĨŝǀĞŽ ?ĐůŽĐŬ ?
and if there was 10, 20 or one patient to be seen, staff stay until that clinic 
finished with that last patient, that last patient has been seen off the 
ƉƌĞŵŝƐĞƐ ? ?ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚŶĂesthetist)  
Interestingly, it was recognised by management that the lack of experience and 
established approach to work of many employees increased their control over staff. 
dŚŝƐĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŚĞŵƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ?dĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂŶĚƐŚĂƉĞƉĞŽƉůĞƐǁŽƌŬƚŽ
the managerial, contractual and regulatory goals of the TC: 
 ‘ŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇǁĞŚĂĚƚŽƌĞĐƌƵŝƚĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌ ?ŶŽŶE,^ ?ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐŽƌĨƌŽŵ
ŶƵƌƐŝŶŐŚŽŵĞƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇůĂĐŬĞĚƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ŶĚǁŚĞŶǇŽƵ ?ǀĞŐŽƚƚŚĂƚ
calibre of staff, you can educate them and adapt them to the way you want 
your unit to run.  And just really educating staff and sort of teaching them 
the efficiency of improving the service and what are the results at the end of 
ŝƚ ? ? ?,ĞĂĚŽĨEƵƌƐŝŶŐ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ) 
^Ž ?ǁŚŝůĞĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ  ‘ĐĂůŝďƌĞ ? staff may have been forced on the ISTC, this 
handed management increased authority to regulate practices and enforce rules.  On 
the other hand, closely regulating practices seemingly had a number of negative 
consequences from the point of view of both management and staff. For example 
there is some evidence that while this may have resulted in compliance, regulation 
also involved perceptions of reduced autonomy of decision making. It also could be 
seen as contributing to a workplace that was generally seen as a short term job 
rather than career or vocation.  Aside from the costs of recruitment and agency staff, 
this was seen as causing difficulties for both remaining employees and management.  
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In particular, people pointed to the difficulties in establishing stable working 
patterns, practices and relationships. Many respondents described a situation in 
which practices changed on a daily basis as different departments learned to cope 
with the type and quantity of work, and changes in personnel:  
 ‘ĞĐĂƵƐĞĂƐ / said, when they first opened, like all paperwork was ... watch 
this space, it changed as often as you changed your socks, the paperwork did, 
ĂŶĚǇŽƵǁĞƌĞĐŽŵŝŶŐŝŶĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇĂŶĚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐǁĂƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ? Q ?ĞĐĂƵƐĞ
there was no plan as such you know, how each department was going to be 
ƌƵŶ ? ŶĚ ŝƚǁĂƐ ũƵƐƚ ůŝŬĞƐƚƵŵďůŝŶŐĂůŽŶŐƵŶƚŝůǇŽƵŐŽƚƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŝŶƉůĂĐĞ ?
(Theatre Nurse) 
 ‘dŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ?Ɛ ŶĞǁ ŵĞĂŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ǇĞĂŚ ? ƉĞŽƉůĞ ĂƌĞ Ɛƚŝůů ůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ďĞƐƚ
ǁĂǇƐ ŽĨ ŐŽŝŶŐ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ĂŶĚ ƐŽ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ?Ɛ Ă ƐŽƌƚ ŽĨ Đonstant feeling of 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ƵƚƚŚĞŶ ?ŝĨƚŚĂƚ ?ƐƚŚĞǁĂǇƚŚŝŶŐƐĂƌĞ ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐƚŚĞǁĂǇƚŚŝŶŐƐĂƌĞ ?^Ž
ƉĞŽƉůĞĚŽŶ ?ƚƌĞĂůůǇǁŽƌƌǇĂďŽƵƚŝƚ ? ? ?tĂƌĚ^ŝƐƚĞƌ ) 
Changes had to be made in response to any number of contingencies. To name a few 
common patterns, practices were altered to due to time constraints, bottlenecks in 
the flow of patients and communications between departments, patients and 
conditions that did not fit exactly into the patient pathway decision diagrams, 
different ways of working bought in by medics staff and departmental managers, the 
skills and competencies of the employees, glitches in the computer system, problems 
due to lack of patient information available from local NHS Trusts. For each individual 
contingency, a multitude of different forces and interests how individual issues 
ƉĂŶŶĞĚŽƵƚ ?ďƵƚ ŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƚŚĞƐĞĚŝĚŽĨƚĞŶŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞǆĂĐƚŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ
jobs and responsibilities altered on a day to day basis as new solutions and ideas 
were brought in. This offered a limited scope for clinicians to assert their own 
approaches to practice, with managers relying on departmental managers and staff 
to tell them how things need to be done. Furthermore, contradicting efforts to relate 
particular tasks to job roles and staff grades, responsibilities were often strongly 
ĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ? ƚĞŶƵƌĞ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ŝŶ ůŝŐŚƚ ŽĨ
frequent staff changes. So people who had been present longer in a particular 
department often found themselves taking on additional roles, regardless of their 
training. For example, following the rapid departure of three radiographers, two 
junior employees were asked to take over management of the imaging department;  
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 ‘/ĐĂŵĞƚŽŶŐůĂŶĚƚŽƚƌĂǀĞů ?ĞĂƌŶƐŽŵĞŵŽŶĞǇ ?ŚĂǀĞĂůŽŽŬĂƌŽƵŶĚ ?ƚŚŽŵĞ ?
in New Zealand, I was a junior radiographer, I was 12 months qualified. We 
came here and within a month and a half/two months of being here, Cath 
[other junior radiographer from New Zealand] and I were the only two 
people remaining in this department [...] And so I went from being a junior 
radiographer with no responsibilities to being a junior radiographer with the 
ĞŶƚŝƌĞƌĂĚŝŽůŽŐǇĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽŶŽƵƌƐŚŽƵůĚĞƌƐ ? ? ?ZĂĚŝŽŐƌĂƉŚĞƌ ) 
At the time of the above interview, an imaging department manager had been 
recently employed over them, although it was evident that the junior radiographers 
were, to a large extent, training him in the ISTC systems and IT, and by the time the 
research was complete he had again left (and so too had both of the New 
Zealanders). Equally, other staff who had remained at the ISTC for the first two years 
often took on additional responsibilities and training roles regardless of position: 
 ‘tĞůůďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ? ? ?ǁĞůů ?ǁŚĞŶǁĞĨŝƌƐƚŽƉĞŶĞĚƚŚŝŶŐƐǁĞƌĞĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐŽŶĂĚĂŝůǇ
basis and I had to try and get everything as well run as possible.  So ... and 
then any other staff that came after that, I trained them you know, what we 
ĚŝĚŽŶĂĐůŝŶŝĐĚĂǇ ? ?dŚĞĂƚƌĞ, ) ? 
On the other hand, more experienced staff in either temporary roles or who were 
new to the ISTC were limited in the scope of their practice due to the time taken to 
learn the new systems:  
 ‘/ƚ ?ƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝŶƚŚĞKƵƚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŐĞƚƚŝŶŐĂŐĞŶĐǇƐƚĂĨĨďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇ
ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁƚŚĞƉƌĞ-ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?^Žŝƚ ?ƐĚĞďĂƚĂďůĞĞǆĂĐƚůǇŚŽǁŵƵĐŚ
of a help they can be. So they tend to take on a far more junior role than 
ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞƉƌŽďĂďůǇĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨĚŽŝŶŐďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞĐĂŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞŵƉƌĞ-assessing. 
^ŽƚŚĞǇŵĂŝŶůǇŐĞƚ ƚŽĚŽƚŚĞĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƐ ? ŝĨ ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĂŶǇ ?ĚŽŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŽďƐ
you know, I think they find it a bit borŝŶŐ ?ũƵƐƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚ ?ƐǀĞƌǇƌĞƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŶŽƚƌĞĂůůǇƵƐŝŶŐĂůůƚŚĞƐŬŝůůƐƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞ ? ?KƵƚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ^ĞŶŝŽƌEƵƌƐĞ ) 
The lack of experience in the organisation, absence of established actions and 
patterns of behaviour, combined with gaps in staffing stood somewhat in the face of 
certainty required for managers to maintain control. So while senior managers were 
keen to enforce certain rules and guidelines for individuals to ensure the contract 
was maintained and targets and regulations were met, what these were and how 
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these fitted together changed very frequently as the ISTC developed. Alongside lack 
of room for development, the restricted nature of the nursing and other job roles 
could also help explain the rapid turnover of staff in roles which required more 
experience, such as theatre nurses. It could be suggested that management were 
able to push through their approach only at the expense of having continually find 
new staff willing to accept less clinical input, as well as the uncertain, temporary, 
employment relationship.  
Therefore, the processes for producing high volume elective care surgery were built 
ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂů ‘ĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚĂƐŬƐĂŶĚ
their division between groups made more explicit. However, the emerging roles of 
different groups were also tied with the process and challenges of setting up the 
centre, including significantly the regulations over employment, as well as the 








Chapter 6 Case Study Two: General ISTC 
6.1 Introduction 
The second case study focuses on a large general ISTC (General-ISTC) located within a 
large English city opening in 2008. This represented the first major contract for 
BritHealth, a UK start up private health company. This ISTC was based within a large 
purpose built extension to the rear of an existing large general teaching hospital, 
itself employing approximately 6000 people and part of a larger city-wide Acute 
Trust.  The annual value of the contract was £40 million over an initial term of five 
years. The main Project Agreement was signed by seven sponsor PCTs in the region, 
from which patients were to be referred. 
The original contract specified 13 specialities were to be transferred from across the 
Acute Trust. Namely the specialties transferred were Cardiology, Respiratory 
Medicine, Diabetes, Rheumatology, Dermatology, Orthopaedics  W General and Hand, 
Gynaecology, Colorectal Surgery, Vascular Surgery, Hepatobiliary Surgery, 
Gastroenterology, Pain Management and Oral Surgery. These were gradually 
transferred across from the Trust to the ISTC over a period of approximately two 
years. This original schedule for transferring each specialty was periodically modified 
as different issues arose, with specialties often partially transferred for a given time. 
For example in some cases, clinics for seeing patients pre and post operatively took 
place on certain days of the week in the ISTC, and on the others within their original 
location within the Trust. Levels of service were based on outturn levels in the year 
previous to the treatment centre opening.  
The contracted activities of the treatment centre were specified in the main Project 
Agreement which outlined precisely the services that the ISTC would supply, 
involving agreements with the PCTs commissioning the services and referring 
patients and with the Acute Trusts in terms of which services would be replaced in 
the adjoining hospital and the associated management arrangements. Governance 
and performance management involved a complex structure of committees, 
schedules for inspections and review, performance indicators, throughput volume 
requirements, and quality and safety checks. In most cases these involved 
participants from the sponsoring PCTs, as well as representatives from the acute 
trust. As patient pathways often crossed between the Acute Trust and the ISTC, some 
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of the review systems involved reviews of activity that encompassed both 
organisations.  
Two additional important initial contracts were drawn up during the planning stages, 
binding the ISTC to the Acute Trust. The first covered the purchase of clinical services 
and facilities management by Brithealth from the acute trust through Staff Services 
ŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ  ?^^ ?Ɛ ) ? dŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ ƚŚĞ supply of services needed to support 
the ISTC, such as diagnostic services, known as Service Level Agreements (SLAs), 
some of which took place both within the ISTC and the General hospital. For the most 
part, medics working in the ISTC retained their original contracts, but saw some of 
their sessions moved over to the ISTC.  In practice, both of these involved the 
secondment and physical transfer of staff and managers to the ISTC, while they 
retained the employment conditions of the NHS in terms of pay, benefits and 
employment conditions.  
In a similar structure to the previous case this chapter presents a description of 
employment activities within the ISTC. The first section examines the origins of 
General-ISTC, illustrating how this could be seen as an extension of existing 
organisational activities in the Acute Hospital Trust, rather than a distinct break from 
the past. The second section examines the overriding character of the centre with 
regards to the nature of employment and the mixed workplace within the Genera-
ISTC resulting from the secondment of NHS employees working alongside directly 
employed staff. The final two sections discuss the roles of medical and nursing staff, 
emphasising the interplay of existing professional groups, as well as the influence and 
divisions of the multi-employer workplace in the emerging norms of work, jobs 
content, divisions of labour, and medical and healthcare practices.  
6.2 Foundation of the ISTC: Transferring the Service  
In line with national policy, amongst the early team of BritHealth and seconded 
managers involved in starting up the ISTC, there was an expectation that the new 
organisation could be a catalyst for wider change. One manager interviewed in the 
year preceding the opening of the new ISTC facilities emphasised ideals of change, 
efficiency and patient focus: 
 ‘dŚŝƐ ŝƐƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚĐĞŶƚƌĞ ŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉůĂĐĞ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞ
trust to engage in it and for it to be a catalyst for change, and it would kind of 
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shine a light on the way we do things at the moment. And we would get real 
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĞ ĐŽƵůĚ ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌ ĨƌŽŵ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ƚŽ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?  ?ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚ
Clinical Planning Manager) 
However, although General ISTC may have been intended as a new venture intended 
to introduce innovation in many ways it can be seen as connected to the existing 
general hospital with several aspects of continuity as well as change. In the previous 
chapter it was described how Orthe-ISTC was created away from existing NHS 
organisations, with the managers and staff bought together from a wide variety of 
cultural and organisational backgrounds. General ISTC was from the very beginning a 
completely different proposition. Many parts of treatment centres development 
were bound up within the activities of the acute trust, and involved many of the 
same stakeholders, including managers, medics, other healthcare professions, 
patients and representative groups. This led to widespread perceptions of continuity 
of existing practices and norms from the general hospital to the ISTC.    
Perhaps the most important source of this continuity was the arrangements for 
employment, which were written into the contracts of the ISTC. In the main following 
the agreements noted in the introduction, it could be said staff within the ISTC were 
employed in four different ways.  The first group of clinicians, and some 
administrators were seconded full time from the local NHS hospital under the SSA 
ŵĂŬŝŶŐƵƉƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƐƚĂĨĨǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ/^d ?dŚĞŵŽĚĞůĨŽƌ^^ ?ƐŚĂĚĂůƌĞĂĚǇďĞĞŶ
negotiated nationally between the DoH and the main union leaders, and locally with 
staff representatives and were seen as a way of preserving employment of staff 
within the NHS while transferring staff to new organisations, sidestepping the 
opposition to more common TUPE arrangements (Kerr and Radford, 1994), and avoid 
perceptions of potential threats to pension rights and other benefits. The second 
ŐƌŽƵƉŽĨƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƐƚĂĨĨǁĞƌĞƐĞĐŽŶĚĞĚƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ^>ƐŽŶĂ  ‘ƐĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ?ďĂƐŝƐ
from the Trust, with a large pool of staff (approximately 1300) each working within 
the ISTC on a varying number of days per month. Again, their primary organisational 
and employment base remained the NHS hospital, but a number of their working 
days were undertaken in the ISTC. Third, similar arrangements were made for 
medical staff such as surgeons, anaesthetists, and radiologists, retained their original 
contracts but saw a number of their clinics and work commitments transferred from 
the NHS to the ISTC, and again visited the ISTC sessional basis, with most of their 
working time remaining within their home hospital department. Finally, a smaller 
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group of staff directly employed by BritHealth in a minority of clinical roles (approx 
20%) but largely based in administrative and management roles.    
The nature of these staffing arrangements were of crucial importance in 
understanding the emerging character of the ISTC. In broad terms, the various 
secondment agreements stated that the day to day management of the staff fell 
under the jurisdiction of the ISTC management, with staff expected to carry out their 
ǁŽƌŬĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŝƌũŽďĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂŶǇĚƵƚŝĞƐ ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇ ?ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚŽĨƚŚĞŵ
by ISTC management. However, the ISTC management could not make explicit 
changes to the staff terms and conditions, with the ultimate responsibility of 
employment falling under the jurisdiction of the acute trust.  This meant the HRM 
department within the acute trust retained responsibility for maintaining the level of 
staff and skill mix needed to service the agreement, including finding replacements 
for departing staff or cover for sickness and annual leave of those under the 
agreement. Other key aspects of employment management, sickness absence, 
employee grievances, and payroll remained with the NHS Trust. For the seconded 
staff there were, therefore, many features of employment continuity, but for ISTC 
managers there were clear constraints to the ability to re-configure or transform 
working practices and arrangements.  
 ‘KďǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ŵake for [the seconded 
staff]. It can be very difficult to make sure they stick to our type of practice, 
because obviously we only get some of the staff once or twice a month, so by 
the time they come back to us they have forgotten everything. We have to 
baƐŝĐĂůůǇďĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ? ?,ZDĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚ ) 
Where whole departments had been transferred to the ISTC, many of the existing 
occupational hierarchies and interpersonal networks also remained intact, further 
inhibiting the scope for change. In some cases, seconded staff were supervised on a 
daily basis by line managers who were also transferred from the NHS Trust. In 
addition, over time some of the HRM responsibility that ostensibly lay with the 
BritHealth HR manager began to be influenced by the NHS staff.  A key example of 
this was in recruitment. At the set up of the ISTC, the BritHealth HRM department 
had been responsible for selecting the directly employed staff. However, following 




they employed and were allowed the final say on who was recruited to their 
department.  Equally, where BritHealth HR managers sought to enforce NHS terms 
on seconded staff during the time the staff were inside the ISTC, this was usually 
done in negotiation with trust HR managers. For example, when the Brithealth 
managers wished to warn staff over sickness absence, this was not done 
independently, but through contacting acute trust HR managers who would visit the 
ISTC for collective meetings. 
The continuity created by transfer of staff from the trust to the ISTC was joined by 
additional pressure for continuity in the process of designing and transferring 
services. In a number of ways the development and planning of the ISTC was tied up 
with the ongoing organisational issues within the Acute Trust, rather than being a 
clean break from existing activities. For example, before the services could be 
transferred over they had to be accurately defined and decoupled from other 
services. An important part of the planning process was therefore identifying the 
precise nature of existing services and the services the ISTC was contracted to supply. 
Also, the exact staffing requirements for each department and associated costs had 
to be agreed upon by all parties. It was realised that extracting existing services from 
their location within the hospital would not be a straightforward task, as each 
department was not an autonomous units, but enmeshed within a web of mutually 
dependent relationships across the whole hospital:  
 ‘ƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŐŽŝŶŐĂƌĞŝŶĐƌĞĚŝďůǇĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚ ?ƐŶŽƚĂƐŝĨǇŽƵ
can just physically detach from the trust and the various connection that 
ƚŚĞǇ ?ǀĞŐŽƚ ĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌĞĂƐŝůǇŽǀĞƌƚŽƚŚĞƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚĐĞŶƚƌĞ ?/ƚ ?ƐůŝŬĞƉƵƐŚŝŶŐ
over a set of dominoes you change one thing and the fact that someone else 
ŝƐ ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƵƐĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ĂƐ ǁĞůů / ŵĞĂŶ ŝƚ ?Ɛ
incredibly complex when you start moving sĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ?  ?ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚ
Clinical Planning Manager) 
To get the ISTC up and running it was therefore necessary to fully understand how 
ĞĂĐŚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞǁĂƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇƌƵŶ ?ĂŶĚŚŽǁŝƚĐŽƵůĚďĞ ‘ƵŶďƵŶĚůĞĚ ?ĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů
activities. Departments and services had been developed over many years, and how 
each one worked on a day to day basis, and how they related to each other, had in 
many cases never been made fully explicit. A new head office was set up in a new out 
of town business park to map out the processes involved in each service, to design 
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new patient pathways through the system and to work out how the ISTC would fit 
with existing services. An important consideration was how different streams of 
income and incurred expenses would be distributed to between organisations and 
departments. In order to make the complex tasks and relationships involved in each 
department explicit, managers from all of the impacted services were bought on 
board, either fully through part time secondment agreements to Brithealth, or 
partially through the increasingly frequent inter-organisational meetings and data 
collection exercises over the two years prior to the ISTC opening. Therefore, although 
there was then an emphasis on service redesign, much of the planning was based 
around existing managers working on identifying established practices and how they 
could be removed and re-constructed within the new building and organisation. Part 
of the reason for this was that plans had to include how the services once transferred 
would be integrated back into the system that they had been removed from. In 
addition, internal hospital managers were also integral to working out the staffing 
numbers and costs of providing the services that would form the basis of the SLA and 
SSA contracts, basing the supply of staff and other services on what they already did.  
 ‘ǁŚĞŶǁĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ĚŝĚ ƚŚĞ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ůĞǀĞů ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ ǁĞŚĂĚƚŽ ĚŽ ƚŚĞŵ ũƵƐƚ ƚŽ
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ ƚŚĞ ďĂƐŝĐ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĂŶĚ ǁŚĂƚ ǁĞ ĐŽƵůĚ ƐƵƉƉůǇ ǁĞǁĞƌĞŶ ?ƚ ƚĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐ
against any specification so we kind of did it in a vacuum in that way. 
ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚŽ ?ĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĚŝĚƐŽǁĞũƵƐƚƚƌŝĞĚƚŽ
ĚŽŝƚĂƐǁĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ? ? ?,ŽƐƉŝƚĂůŝĂŐŶŽƐƚŝĐƐ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐDĂŶĂŐĞƌ ) 
In describing how these services were run and identifying how agreements to supply 
them could be planned out, managers partially or fully situated within the Trust were 
inevitably influenced by the existing norms, values and organisational politics of their 
home organisation. For example at the time of the ISTC planning, the Acute trust was 
going through a large merger in which two large hospitals were joined, with 
ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐďĞŝŶŐŵŽǀĞĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ ? ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐďĞŝŶŐ ƌĞĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĞĚĂŶĚƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ?
roles being changed. The implications of this had to be taken into consideration 
during on the ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ? assessment of how services would be provided by the Trust, 
their costs, and the need for large contingencies: 
 ‘ĂŶǇǁĂǇ ?ƚŚĞdƌƵƐƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŵĂƐƐŝǀĞƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐƐŽŝƚǁŝůůĐŚĂŶŐĞ
the way the service agreements operate and that will have a knock on effect 
and they will have to be reworked. So later when things are up and running 
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ǁĞǁŝůůŚĂǀĞĂŶŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨƵƚƵƌĞƚŽƌĞǀŝƐĞ ŝƚ ? ?  ?,ŽƐƉŝƚĂůŝĂŐŶŽƐƚŝĐƐ
Services Manager) 
In view of this, rather than seeking to bring in dramatic changes straight away as the 
treatment centre opened, the large uncertainties meant that managers were initially 
concerned with ensuring the service was satisfactorily established, with a view to 
ĂůƚĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? were better 
understood.  
Leading up to the transition from Acute Hospital to the ISTC, the operations of the 
two organisations became further entwined as managers and staff had to work out 
the practicalities of the centre operating on a day to day basis. Delays on completing 
the building and facilities meant the start date of the ISTC was put back on several 
occasions, and when finally complete there was very little opportunity for trial runs, 
staff induction or training in the new ISTC facilities. Negotiations between the Trust 
and the ISTC management had failed to meet an agreement on who would bear the 
costs for the loss of service that would have been required for staff to familiarise 
themselves with the new building, equipment and IT. For the initial departments to 
be transferred there was almost no preparation time at all. The units in the old 
hospital closed down at the normal time on Friday evening, and patients started 
arriving into the new building for surgery at 8am on Monday morning. Although staff 
had been asked to come and look round the new facilities at the evenings and 
weekends, unsurprisingly most declined to give up their free time, and many entered 
the building for the first time alongside the first patients: 
 ‘ŶŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƵƐ ŚĂĚ ŚĂĚ ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐƵƚĞ dƌƵƐƚ ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ
want to release us, this is what I heard, so BritHealth  did put out feelers and 
asked the question of whether people would be prepared to either stay on in 
the evening or come in over the weekend to have this training and of course 
everybody said no, because this was only a few weeks before we moved over 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞĨĞĞůŝŶŐǁĂƐ ‘ǁĞůůǇŽƵŚĂǀĞŬŶŽǁŶĨŽƌůŽŶŐĞŶŽƵŐŚƐŽŶŽ ?ǁĞĂƌĞŶŽƚ
ĚŽŝŶŐ ŝƚ ? ƐŽŶŽďŽĚǇĚŝĚ  ? Q ?ǁĞ ůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇŚĂĚ ƚŽĚƵŵƉƚŚŝŶŐƐĂŶĚĐŽŵĞŽǀĞƌ
here because ǁĞ ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ ŚĂǀĞ ĂŶǇ ƚŝŵĞ ƚŽ ĐůĞĂŶ ƵƉ ƚŚĞŵĞƐƐ ?  / ĨĞůƚ ? ŚĂǀŝŶŐ
worked there since 1991, I felt awful because of the state it was left in when 
ǁĞǁĞŶƚ ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚE,^EƵƌƐĞ ) 
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Individual members of nursing staff who were due to be seconded were asked to 
work through the details of their role to prepare what they needed to produce the 
same service in the new centre. By this stage patient pathways had been worked out 
in some detail, with folders in each department full of process maps specifying each 
individual task, the order in which they were to be done, and assigning them to a 
specific job role. There was though initially very little time for individuals to refer 
directly to these in order to make decisions on how things should be done. In the 
rush to get things up and running staff were largely expected to get on with the work, 
picking up where they left off and, in general, produce the same services they were 
doing previously in the general hospital: 
 ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ ŵĞ ĂŶĚ Ă ĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞ ĂŶĚ ƐŽǁĞǁĞƌĞ ĂƐŬĞĚ ƚŽ ůŽŽŬ Ăt processes 
and sort of get it going once we moved over here.  But everything we had 
ĂƐŬĞĚƚŚĞŵƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĨŽƌƵƐǁĂƐŶ ?ƚŚĞƌĞƐŽǁĞŚĂĚƚŽƌƵƐŚĂƌŽƵŶĚŽŶ&ƌŝĚĂǇ
afternoon. When the first patient turned up on Monday we just had to get on 
with it. We managed to cobble together quite a lot of things on the Friday 
ĂĨƚĞƌŶŽŽŶ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƌŽŽŵƐ ĂƌĞŶ ?ƚ ƚŚĂƚ ďŝŐ ďƵƚŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇǇŽƵ ŚĂĚ ƚŽ ĨŝŶĚ
where things were such as cards for blood tests and stationary, all the basic 
ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ďĂƐŝĐĂůůǇ ǁĞ ũƵƐƚ ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ ŚĂǀĞ ? ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ůŝŬe a diary, but luckily we had 
brought our old diary with us and communication things that we need when 
ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ŽƵƚ ŚĞƌĞ ?  tĞ ĐŽďďůĞĚ ŝƚ ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ďǇ DŽŶĚĂǇ ŵŽƌŶŝŶŐ ?  ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚ
E,^EƵƌƐĞ ) ? 
Again this suggests a large crossover of activities of the hospital and the ISTC, as the 
actual tasks associated with producing the service were improvised by staff based on 
established ways of working. When the transfer actually did occur, on the face of it 
there were several areas of continuity for the staff. Over the course of a weekend, 
whole departments moved over to the Treatment Centre together, with people 
doing roughly the same tasks, within the same teams, treating the same patients, 
under the same employment contract on Monday morning that they had been doing 
on Friday evening and only five minute walk across the hospital car park from their 
old department.  In addition, contact with Trust continued to occur on a daily basis 
with many aspects of service delivery intertwined, for example through shared 
resources, and with staff and patients moving between the organisational sites. This 
also included continuation of the clinical teaching and research activities, with 
trainee nurses and junior doctors having a full role in service delivery 
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However, when staff arrived for their first day of work in the ISTC, they found 
themselves in a very different organisational context, with new priorities, objectives 
and expectations. The ISTC was run by a private company, employing a completely 
different set of managers, with their own objectives, approaches and techniques. 
Perhaps the biggest departure from life in the general hospital was that all parties 
were initially faced with was the mix of employment models that saw fully 
ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĞĚE,^ƐƚĂĨĨ ?  ‘ǀŝƐŝƚŝŶŐ ?E,^ƐƚĂĨĨĂŶĚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ employed private sector staff 
working side by side and often in the same roles. This had important implications for 
how work practices were decided, lines of hierarchy and control.  
6.3 The Nature of Employment: The Multi-Employer Workplace  
Aside from physically moving to the new building and adapting to the new layout, 
and facilities, perhaps the greatest organisational change was the new arrangements 
for employment. As outlined above, the majority of clinical tasks were undertaken by 
seconded staff from the adjacent large acute hospital. This included the transfer of 
nurses, operating department practitioners (ODPs) and Health Care Assistants 
(HCAs), and administrators who were mostly seconded full time for the duration of 
the contract, as well as Surgeons and Anaesthetists, as well as radiographers and 
specialist practitioners who visited the treatment centre for 1-6 clinic or theatre 
sessions a fortnight. These were joined by the directly employed BritHealth staff who 
took a minority of clinical nursing/ODP/HCA jobs, as well as the majority of senior 
management and administrative roles. Middle management, in other words the 
nursing leads who ran each department on a day to day, was more evenly split 
between the two groups, with a concerted effort by senior managers to balance the 
transferred NHS sisters with a cadre of directly employed nurse managers. This 
presented a dramatically changed employment landscape in which there were 
several different employment systems at work side by side, involving for example, 
different terms and conditions, different implicit and explicit incentives, mixed 
opportunities for promotion and job security. In addition there were great 
differences in the organisational and professional backgrounds of the two groups of 
staff and a corresponding disparity in terms of skills, norms, values and employment 
expectations.  
Perhaps the most immediately noticeable consequences of this, and for the 
transferred staff the largest break from how the services were provided in the Trust, 
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were clinical staff employed through different organisations working alongside each 
other in the same roles. As the services were transferred over to the ISTC, the staff in 
each department were introduced to a whole group of new clinical staff who were to 
be working alongside them. As the work got underway, these two groups had to get 
to know each other quickly, including working out the areas or practice they were 
capable of working in, their skills, preferences and levels of experience. This caused a 
number of points of friction. On an individual level people were keen to point out 
that they were happy to work alongside people from the other group, and 
downplayed any personal differences: 
 ‘dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚƐƚĂĨĨĂŶĚ/ŐĞƚŽŶǁŝƚŚĞǀĞƌǇďŽĚǇ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƉƌŽďlem, 
ǁĞ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?  / ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ƐĂǇ  ‘ǇŽƵ ĂƌĞ ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚ ƐƚĂĨĨ ? ǇŽƵ ĂƌĞ ĐƵƚĞ
,ŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐƚĂĨĨ ?ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚĚŽƚŚĂƚ ?ǁĞĚŽǁŽƌŬƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ/ĨŝŶĚ ? ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚE,^
Nurse) 
However, on a group level, most of the respondents working full time in the ISTC 
reported some ĚĞŐƌĞĞ ŽĨ ƐƉůŝƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘E,^ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚ ? ƐƚĂĨĨ ? tŚŝůĞ
obviously a sensitive issue that involved talking about relationships with immediate 
colleagues, a number of people up front about the divisions, and described in detail 
areas of emerging tension: 
 ‘dŚĞŽŶůǇĂƌĞĂƐƚŚĂƚ/ŚĂǀĞƐĞĞŶǁŚĞƌĞƚŚŝŶŐƐĚŽŶ ?ƚƉĞƌŚĂƉƐǁŽƌŬĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ
they should do is the mixture between BritHealth staff and NHS staff.  We 
have a lot of lip service about saying we are one staff group but decisions are 
occasionally made ǁŚŝĐŚŵĂŬĞŝƚĂǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚ ‘ƚŚĞŵĂŶĚƵƐ ?ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?E,^
Seconded Nurse) 
 “tĞůů ǇĞƐ ďƵƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ? ĂŐĂŝŶ ĨŽƌ ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚ ƐƚĂĨĨ ? ƚŚĞǇ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ůŝŬĞ ŝƚ ŝĨ ǇŽƵ
point anything out to them.  With the other staff there is no problem, you 
ũƵƐƚƐĂǇƚŽĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ‘ŝƐƚŚĂƚĂůƌŝŐŚƚ ? ?dŚĞǇƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĚŝĚŝŶŽƚŚĞƌ
ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚ ĐĞŶƚƌĞƐ Žƌ ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ ŝƐ ďĞƚƚĞƌ ? ďƵƚ ǁĞ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ƐĞĞŝƚ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĂǇ ? ǁĞ
think our practice is good. Sometimes it is not easy for them to make the 
changes I suppose.  It is not about getting them to switch to our ways of 
ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ? ŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞ ŝĨ ƚŚĞǇŚĂĚŶ ?ƚ ĨŝůůĞĚĂ ĨŽƌŵ ŝŶŽƌƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ůŝŬĞƚŚĂƚ ? /
think they sometimes think it is NHS staff ganging up on them, even though 
there is a BritHealth Sister, but they think it is that way because they are 
BritHĞĂůƚŚƐƚĂĨĨ ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚE,^EƵƌƐĞ ) 
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Some interviewees explained the increased separation they noticed between the 
staff groups as a part of integrating new employees, becoming comfortable with each 
ŽƚŚĞƌĂŶĚůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƐŬŝůůƐ P 
 ‘ĞĨŽƌĞ ǁĞ ǁŽƵůĚ ũƵƐƚ ƐƉĞĂŬ ƚŽ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ĂŶĚ ƐĂǇ  ‘ŽŚ ŝƐƚ ĂůƌŝŐŚƚ ŝĨ / ďƌŝŶŐ Ă
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŝŶ ĨŝǀĞ ŵŝŶƵƚĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ ŝƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ůŝŬĞ  ‘ǇĞƐ ǇĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ĨŝŶĞ ?
ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐŶŽǁǁĞŚĂǀĞŶĞǁƐƚĂĨĨǁŚŽǁĞŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚŚĂĚĐŚĂŶĐĞƚŽŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚǁŝƚŚ ?
It is better with staff that we have known previously although I feel that our 
relationships are breaking down even with people we have worked with 
ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ?ďƵƚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŶĞǁƌŝƚŚĞĂůƚŚƐƚĂĨĨǁŚŽŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚŚĂĚĂĐŚĂŶĐĞƚŽ
ďŽŶĚǁŝƚŚƵƐ ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚE,^EƵƌƐĞ ) 
As a new directly hired Sister observed, for the transferred staff the fact that so many 
colleagues had joined an established group was alone was a significant challenge to 
existing relationships: 
 ‘dŚĞƐƚĂĨĨƚŚĂƚĐĂŵĞŽǀĞƌĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƚƌƵƐƚŚĂĚƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶůŝƚƚůĞĐŽƌŶĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌ
status, but it was then integrating the BritHealth staff into what was 
effectively a comfortable little clique.  All of a sudden there were new staff 
and more staff than would normally come all at once.  To introduce one new 
member of staff is ok, but all of a sudden they were introduced to I think it 
ǁĂƐƐĞǀĞŶĚŝƌĞĐƚŚŝƌĞƐĂůůĂƚŽŶĐĞ ? ?ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚEƵƌƐĞ^ŝƐƚĞƌ ) 
Others pointed to the different approaches, skills and abilities of the two groups, 
with contrasting stereotypes of NHS staff and BritHealth staff becoming apparent. 
The emerging consensus amongst the transferred staff was that the BritHealth staff 
were lower skilled with less clinical experience and fewer areas of expertise. NHS 
staff often said they had to make allowances for BritHealth staff and NHS sisters 
planning the skill mix in each area were often careful to mix BritHealth staff amongst 
 ‘ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ ?ŶƵƌƐĞƐ P 
 ‘dŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƌŽůĞƐďƵƚǁŚĂƚǁĞŚĂǀĞĨŽƵŶĚŝƐĂƐůŝŐŚƚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?tĞ
had an interview process for the ones that were appointed for us and in 
terms of the experience that they have got, it is probably not what I would 
have appointed at the trust because they do often have to have a lot of 
support in getting them involved in all the clinical areas.  Their 
documentation tends to be quite poor for example and some of their nursing 
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practice tends to be generally poor compared to NHS staff.  A lot of my time 
ŝƐǁĂƐƚĞĚƚŽďĞŚŽŶĞƐƚŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌƐƚĂĨĨƚŽďĞĨĂŝƌ ? ?E,^^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚ^ŝƐƚĞƌ ) 
dŚŝƐ ǀŝĞǁ ǁĂƐ ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚ ƐƚĂĨĨ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵs 
ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞǁŚŝĐŚ ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚůǇ ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇŵĂƌŬĞĚ ƚŚĞŵ ĂƐ  ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌƐ ? ?
That BritHealth staff had generally been employed from other private hospitals and 
nursing homes was in itself seen with some suspicion: 
 ‘ŝƚĐĂŶďĞƐƵŵŵĞĚƵƉďǇƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĂƚyou have to ask yourself why they are 
not NHS employees to start with.  One or two people we have who are really 
brilliant and they are out of NHS employment for very good reasons, but I 
would say that the greater percentage of BritHealth staff have not been NHS 
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞǇ ĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ ŐĞƚ E,^ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ?  ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚ E,^
Nurse) 
On the other side of the equation, the BritHealth staff could be seen reacting to this 
lack of acceptance by the pre-formed cliques of transferred staff. Perhaps reflecting 
their minority status, directly employed staff was less open in criticising their NHS 
counterparts, but did on a number of occasions suggest that NHS staff were resistant 
to change, and felt left out of decision making process:  
 ‘ƐŝŶĐĞ / ƚƌĂŝŶĞĚ /ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƉrivate and before that I was untrained staff in 
NHS hospitals.  The mentality here that I find because mainly in this building 
there is NHS seconded staff, I think the difficulties come in because they 
want to run it like the NHS, and it is not NHS but it is NHS patients.  We are a 
ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?ǁĞĂƌĞŶŽƚE,^ ? Q ?/ĐĂŶŐŽƌŽƵŶĚĂŶǇĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚŝƐďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ
ĂŶĚŝƚǁŝůůďĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ‘ŽŚǁĞůůǁĞƵƐĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞƚŚĂƚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƌŽĂĚĂŶĚǁĞ
ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ĚŽ ƚŚŝƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ƌŽĂĚ ? ĂŶĚ / Ăŵ ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ  ‘ŐĞƚ Ă ŐƌŝƉ ?
(BritHealth Principle ODP) 
The above statement reflected the emerging language of everyday practice, in that 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ƚĂůŬĞĚ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŽůĚ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŶĞǁ ? ?  ‘E,^ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚ ? ? ĂƐ
ǁĞůůĂƐ ‘ƵƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞŵ ? ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ǁŚĞŶŵĂŬŝŶŐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚĂůlocating staff to 
different areas, NHS nurse managers would often talk about making sure there were 
ĞŶŽƵŐŚŽĨ ‘ŽƵƌ ?ƐƚĂĨĨŝŶĞĂĐŚƚĞĂŵƚŽŵĂŬĞƐƵƌĞƚŚŝŶŐƐǁĞƌ ‘ĚŽŶĞƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ ? ?ĚĚŝŶŐ
to the day to day impressions of separation and division, staff frequently commented 
on the different terms and conditions between the two groups. While the basic 
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salaries for the directly employed staff were similar to those of the seconded NHS 
staff which were based on the nationally negotiated agenda for change agreements, 
there were variations in other benefits. Those that were most frequently discussed 
was annual leave allowances: 
 ‘dŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ŶŽ ĐůĞĂƌ ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƵƐ ? ďƵƚ ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐŝƚ ŝƐ Ă ďŝƚ ůŝŬĞ  ‘ŚŽǁ
come you have seven weeks annual leave when we have to take our leave 
ĨƌŽŵ:ĂŶƵĂƌǇƚŽĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ?ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐůŝŬĞƚŚĂƚ ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚE,^EƵƌƐĞ ) 
And also the degree to which time off sick was scrutinised; 
 ‘dŚĞƐŝĐŬŶĞƐƐƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞƉĞŶƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚŝŶŐƐ ůŝŬĞƚŚĂƚ ŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ? /Ĩ
they take a day of sick, they seem to come down on them much harder, they 
ŐĞƚĐŚĞĐŬĞĚƵƉŽŶŵŽƌĞ ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚE,^KW ) 
In both cases, the seconded staff were seen as having significantly more favourable 
ƚĞƌŵƐ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐĂŶĚďĞŝŶŐ ‘ƚŝŐŚƚĞŶĞĚƵƉ ? ?ĨŽƌ
example in the detail of how sick absence was allocated and the degree of notice for 
leave allowed: 
 ‘ǁĞĚŝĚŚĂǀĞŵŝǆĞĚŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐŽŶǁŚĂƚŽƵƌƐŝĐŬŶĞƐƐƉŽůŝĐǇǁĂƐ ?>ŝŬĞ/ŚĂĚƚŚĞ
day off with my little boy last week because he was really poorly and 
BritHealth policy is very ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞĐƵƚĞdƌƵƐƚ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇ ? KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞǁĞ
ĚŽ ĨŽůůŽǁ ĐƵƚĞ dƌƵƐƚ ?Ɛ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ǁĞ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŽ ? ďƵƚ / ĚŝĚĨ ŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚ ?Ɛ
ŝŶƉƵƚǁĂƐĂďŝƚůŝŬĞ ‘ǁĞůůǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚĚŽƚŚŝƐĂŶĚǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚĚŽƚŚĂƚ ? ?^ŽŝĨŝƚŝƐĂƚ
ƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞǇƚend to go towards BritHealth rather 
than how the Acute Trust would have done it before. In the past I had always 
ƚĂŬĞŶŝƚŽĨĨĂŶŶƵĂů ůĞĂǀĞ ?ďƵƚŶŽǁ/ŚĂǀĞƚŽƉĂǇďĂĐŬŵǇŚŽƵƌƐ ? ?  ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚ
NHS Nurse) 
Although employment terms and conditions for NHS staff were on the surface 
maintained, this suggests that BritHealth management were seeking to enforce their 
own terms in marginal cases and more ambiguous situations. Few people described 
the exact contractual differences between the two companies, but these were a 
frequent topic of conversation and joked about on the shop floor of the ISTC. Many 
people were, on the face of it willing to accept these differences as part of the 
 ‘ƌĞĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ŽĨ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ /^d ? ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŝŶŐ ĂŶǇ ĚŝƐƉĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ĂƐ Ă




are after all pack animals and people of different colour, creed or whatever, 
will all want to group together, that is just human nature and /ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ƚŚŝŶŬ
that is anything to worry about at all and I think that to a certain extent it 
gives people identity so you just have to get the balance right.  I think it is 
ĂůǁĂǇƐĂƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨďĂůĂŶĐĞĂŶĚǁĞŐĞƚƚŚĂƚďĂůĂŶĐĞƌŝŐŚƚ ? ?ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚKW ) 
However, separation between the two groups was not solely based on the fact that 
ƐŽŵĞ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘ŶĞǁ ? ĂŶĚ ƐŽŵĞ  ‘ŽůĚ ? ? ďƵƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ĂůƐŽ ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ
basis for their employment. The fact that the transferred staff were not employed 
directly by the company running the ISTC was in itself of great importance, and 
breaks with traditional conceptions of the employment relationship (Simon, 1951). 
Rather than having direct authority over these staff and the ability to explicitly 
control their behaviour, including requesting changes to previous practice in line with 
a new production orientation, the management of the ISTC officially had only indirect 
authority over the staff in the form of a services contract for services with their 
employers. This difference between the direct authority over employees and indirect 
authority over non-employees was not a mere technicality, but fundamentally 
shaped the degree to which managers felt they could exert control. Issues relating to 
absence and performance were in theory dealt with by the central human resource 
management of the acute trust, although they only stepped in extreme cases, for 
example in the case disputed long term sickness absences, and were reluctant to get 
involved in the day to day management of staff. Therefore, the ISTCs own HR 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂĚƚŽƌĞůǇŽŶŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ǁŝŶŶŝŶŐŽǀĞƌ ?
the clinical leads of each department to try to influence NHS staff towards 
ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚ ?Ɛ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ? /Ŷ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ƚŚĞ ,Z ŵanager also 
suggested there had been a conscious effort to create a mix of directly employed and 
seconded departmental lead nurses. These met on a regular basis, and it was hoped 
that directly employed nurses could help spread BritHealth practices: 
 ‘tĞ ŚĂǀe tried to do that, to mix the group up, then when they all get 
together and share their results, it could create a bit of an incentive for 
[seconded lead nurses] to keep up to speed with what is going on and 
ŚŽƉĞĨƵůůǇƐƉƌĞĂĚĂďŝƚŽĨƚŚĞŐŽŽĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?ritHealth HR manager) 
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It also influenced how ISTC staff understood their roles, as well as the interpersonal 
relationships and lines of authority between managers and staff. The NHS staff had a 
degree of separation from management, and realised that there were limits to how 
much they could be controlled: 
 ‘/ƚŚŝŶŬŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĨĂŝƌĞƌƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĂƚ ?ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?
think differently from the NHS, they are governed in a different way and so 
their responsibilities are different and it would be wrong of us to undermine 
what is required so we will play ball for the moment.  We will question things 
ĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞĂŶĚǁĞǁŝůůƐĂǇ ‘ǁĞůůǇŽƵǁŝůůŚĂǀĞƚŽĐŽŵĞďĂĐŬƚŽƵƐĂƚĂůĂƚĞƌ
ƐƚĂŐĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞĂƌĞŶŽƚƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚŝƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚE,^EƵƌƐĞ ) 
And in some cases staff were ultimately aware that they were not subject to formal 
sanctions internally in the treatment centre: 
 ‘ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞĐĂŶ ?ƚďĞƐĂĐŬĞĚŚĞƌĞ ? / ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞ ĨĞĂƌŽĨďůĂŵĞŚĂƐĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĞĚ
ŚĞƌĞ ?/ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚƐĂǇƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞǁŽƌƌǇĂďŽƵƚĐŽŵŝŶŐƚo work on a daily basis 
ŝŶĐĂƐĞƚŚĞǇŐĞƚƚŽůĚŽĨĨĂďŽƵƚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐǁŚĞƌĞĂƐƚŚĞǇƵƐĞĚƚŽ ?  ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚ
NHS Nurse) 
In this way, it could be said that as well being outside of the established bureaucratic 
control of the NHS, the seconded staff also felt in some ways protected from the ISTC 
management. On the other hand, this picture was very different for the directly 
employed staff who were in a far more conventional employment relationship and 
under BritHealth managements ? direct control. These staff were in much more 
frequent contact with the internal HRM manager, who was involved in their 
recruitment, performance reviews, pay, promotions and disputes alongside 
departmental managers.  
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ƚŚŝƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞǁĂƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞǁŝĚĞǀĂƌŝĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌpretation 
of who they were working for. The split between professional loyalties and 
commitment to a particular organisation was stretched further as some groups were 
placed into multi-layered relationship between their employer, their professional 
group, their place of work, as well as their new and old colleagues. Balancing these 
involved different considerations on each side of the equation. Firstly, those 
employed directly by the Treatment Centre came mainly from other private sector 
companies as well as directly from training and had a relatively traditional view of 
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their relationship, viewing themselves as mainly working for the ISTC Company itself. 
Perhaps reflecting their perceptions of comparatively weaker position in the 
employment market, or lack of experience, several BritHealth respondents reported 
a relatively positive evaluation of the terms and conditions of their employment:  
 ‘/ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĂƉƉůŝĞĚĨŽƌĂŶĂƵǆŝůŝĂƌǇŶƵƌƐĞƉŽƐƚďƵƚƚŚĞǇŽĨĨĞƌĞĚŵĞĂƉŽƐƚĂƐĂ
qualified nurse instead. I was over the moon because I had had eighteen 
ŵŽŶƚŚƐŽƵƚǁŝƚŚŶŽƉŽƐƚƌĞŐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽŝƚǁĂƐůŝŬĞ ‘ŽŚǁŽǁ ? ? ?ƌŝƚŚĞĂůƚŚ
HCA) 
However, the presence of different factions of the organisation meant that 
commitment to the ISTC Company was not always straightforward even for these 
staff. Working alongside NHS staff, and sometimes under NHS middle managers, 
meant that prioritising company objectives and ways of working required the directly 
employed staff to balance between the organisation and their immediate colleagues:     
 ‘ƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚĐĞŶƚƌĞŚĂǀĞƚĂŬĞŶĂĐŚĂŶĐĞďǇĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐ
me on a very reasonable salary and to me I have got to honour that and 
repay that.  I have a small debt to them because they took me on chance, 
they took my references and they ƐĂŝĚ  ‘ǇĞƐ ?ǁĞǁŝůůƚĂŬĞĂĐŚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐ
ŐƵǇ ?ĂŶĚ/ƚŚŝŶŬǇŽƵŚĂǀĞŐŽƚƚŽŚŽŶŽƵƌƚŚĂƚƐŽǇĞƐ ?/ǁŝůůƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝƐĞƚŽƚŚĞŵ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ E,^ ŝŶ ƐŽ ŵƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ĚŽ ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ /ĨĞĞů ŝƐ
detrimental to patient care, if they did I would address it and take relevant 
ƐƚĞƉƐ ? ?ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚKW ) ? 
Turning to the seconded staff, a far more complex and uncertain understanding of 
the employment relationship and their commitments to the Treatment Centre was 
described. In general, people saw themselves as working only partially for the ISTC, 
partially for the Acute NHS Trust, or some combination of the two. Respondents 
reported recognition of the split employment relationship and somewhat divided 
loyalties between the Trust and the ISTC. Divisions in loyalty appeared to be tied to 
ďŽƚŚ  ‘ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ ?ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ  ‘ĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů ?
reactions to their own predicament.  For example, some people expressed their 
views in terms of a personal choice over their relative job prospects in each 
organisation, for example in terms of their future career, more options were 
available within the NHS, as well as the fact that the NHS currently provides their 
employment benefits, training and development opportunities and pensions: 
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 ‘/ǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞƚŽƐƚĂǇŚĞƌĞ ?ďƵƚ/ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚůŝŬĞƚŽǁŽƌŬĨŽƌƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ŚĂǀĞ ůŝŬĞ ƚŚĞ ƐŝĐŬŶĞƐƐ ƉŽůŝĐǇ
and the pension and things like that is not the same.  Saying that, in five 
years I will be retirement age so I have got that option as to whether I stay 
with BritHealth or with Acute Trust if they would let me move over given my 
ĂŐĞ ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚE,^EƵƌƐĞ ) 
 ‘KďǀŝŽƵƐůǇǁĞŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐĞĐŽŶĚĞĚƐŽƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĐůĂƵƐĞŝŶŽƵƌĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ?ďƵƚŝŶ
terms of picking up training or development I would probably have to go 
back to the trust but to be honest, I am happy where I am at the minute.  
&ĂŵŝůǇůŝĨĞŝƐĐŽŵŝŶŐĨŝƌƐƚĨŽƌŵĞĂƚƚŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚ ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚE,^^ŝƐƚĞƌ ) 
Others expressed having far more mixed feeling towards the two organisations, often 
related to views on working for the public sector and private sector more generally. 
For example, some of the transferred staff felt extremely let down, or even betrayed, 
by the NHS Trust for the way the move was handled and seconding them out. This 
did not necessarily mean their previous attachment was displaced to the ISTC, and 
this appeared to open the possibility for confusion about the nature of their role: 
 ‘tĞůů/ĚŽŶ ?ƚĨĞĞůůŝŬĞ/ĂŵĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚƚŚĞdƌƵƐƚĂŶǇŵŽƌĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞůŝŬĞ
I said, we haǀĞŶŽƚŚŝŶŐƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵŶŽǁ ?ǁĞĨĞĞůůŝŬĞǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚĞǆŝƐƚŽǀĞƌ
ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂŶǇŵŽƌĞ ?  tĞ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ƐĞĞ ĂŶǇďŽĚǇ ƐŽ / ĨĞĞů / ǁŽƌŬĨŽƌ ƚŚŝƐ ƉůĂĐĞ  ?ƚŚĞ
dƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ĞŶƚƌĞ ? ? ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ / ĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ ƚĞůů ǇŽƵ ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇǁŚŽ ? / ũƵƐƚ ĐŽŵĞ ŝŶ
and do what I am told to do by the senioƌ ƐŝƐƚĞƌ ƵƐƵĂůůǇ ?  ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚ E,^
Nurse) 
Others retained a stronger attachment to the Trust, related to notions of security 
that they say the NHS as providing: 
 ‘/ƐĞĞŵǇƐĞůĨǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞĐƵƚĞ,ŽƐƉŝƚĂůďĞĐĂƵƐĞ /ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐĞĐŽŶĚĞĚ
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌĞ ?  /ĚŽŶ ?ƚƐĞĞ myself as working for BritHealth, no, definitely not.  
And I am hoping that if there is any problem it will go to the QMC human 
ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐǁŚĂƚ/ĂŵŚŽƉŝŶŐ ?/Ĩ/ŚĂǀĞĂƉƌŽďůĞŵ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŐŽƚŽŽŶĞŽĨ
the BritHealth Managers, I go to one of our old sisters who have moved 
ĂĐƌŽƐƐŚĞƌĞǁŝƚŚƵƐ ? ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚE,^KW ) 
 ‘ŝƚǁĂƐĨƌŝŐŚƚĞŶŝŶŐĂƚĨŝƌƐƚƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚĂƚǁĞǁĞƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽĐŽŵĞŽǀĞƌŚĞƌĞĂŶĚ
become the private sector and knowing that they work a lot different to us, 
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but we are not, we are still NHS and we still have all the powers of the NHS.  
If they want us back over theƌĞ ?ǁĞĐĂŶŐĞƚƚĂŬĞŶŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƌĞ ? (NHS Seconded 
Nurse) 
These comments point to enduring feelings of separation between the two groups, 
supported and reinforced through separate systems of employment. There were 
significant differences between the directly employed staff and the transferred NHS 
staff, both in terms of the actual mechanisms of employment, as well as in the 
perceptions of the nature of work. This did not only have the potential to create 
intergroup tensions but also came into play in shaping the character of peoples jobs 
and work roles. The conflicting interests and mixed lines of authority involved in two 
distinct employee groups the divisions of tasks, hierarchical divisions and the content 
of roles were negotiated. The following two sections illustrate the work roles arising 
in the ISTC, taking into account the mixed lines of authority, control and commitment 
at play in this environment.  
6.4 Medical Roles in General-ISTC 
Beginning with medical staff, the degree to which managers in the BritHealth 
managers could shape medical work was severely limited as much of the medics 
work remained outside the confines of the ISTC. In the vast majority of cases doctors 
continued to be employed by the acute trust and were situated for the majority of 
ƚŚĞŝƌ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ƚŝŵĞ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ  ‘ŚŽŵĞ ? ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐ ƐŝƚƵĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ
hospitals bought together in the recent merger. There was therefore no possibility 
for BritHealth managers to dramatically change the terms, conditions or working 
patterns of these staff, given for example their work within the ISTC had to fit with 
their timetable and commitments elsewhere. In this case most medical staff 
responded that in many ways the content of their clinical work remained similar to 
previous experiences within the Trust.  
 ‘KŶ Ă ĚĂǇ-to-ĚĂǇ ďĂƐŝƐ ƚŚĞ ŶƵƚƐ ĂŶĚ ďŽůƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐƵƌŐĞƌǇ ŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚ ƌĞĂůůǇ
changed.  We have probably got more equipment but a similar number of 
consultants.  I think the biggest impact has been in terms of procedures and 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƚĂŬŝŶŐĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐĚŽǁŶƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ŶƚŚĚĞŐƌĞĞ ?ŝƚ
ĐĂŶďĞǀĞƌǇƚŝŵĞĐŽŶƐƵŵŝŶŐ ? ?E,^ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚ^ƵƌŐĞŽŶ ) 
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This continuity could be seen as especially true for medics, who in any case often 
caƌƌŝĞĚƐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞĂƚƌĞƐŽƌĐůŝŶŝĐƐĂƐ ‘ǀŝƐŝƚŽƌƐ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ĞǀĞŶďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞ
move to the ISTC. When the day surgery was located within the general hospital, 
surgeons and anaesthetists would arrive and carry out their lists, before returning to 
thĞŝƌŽǁŶĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐŽƌ ‘ŵĂŝŶ ?ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƚŚĞĂƚƌĞƐ ?/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂĨĨ
within each department had been transferred they were often working with the 
same teams of scrub nurses, ODPs, and HCAs within theatres, and organising work 
with the same administrative staff and lead nurses as they had done previously.  
When changes were sought to be introduced by ISTC management, these were 
strongly resisted by medical groups. Many elements of the emerging relations 
between medics and managers can be illustrated through the system of scheduling 
patients. A major change initially introduced by BritHealth management was a 
ĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐĞĚ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŽĨ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŝƚŚ Ăůů ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ďŽŽŬŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?
appointments, patient communication and the order and timing of clinical and 
theatre sessions conducted together away from the clinical front line. In the past 
individual medics, or individual specialties and departments had organised their own 
work, and centralising administration aimed to give the Treatment Centre more 
authority to plan the work themselves, giving them greater control over what was 
being done and when. For example, rather than individual consultants having their 
own lists of patients waiting for an operation, the ISTC could distribute patients 
amongst the theatre sessions themselves to fit with their own targets and deadlines 
specified in the contract for patients to be treated within 18 weeks of referral. This 
was done by establishing an off-site call centre staffed with a pooled resource of 
administrators, many of whom were new to health care, offering a potential 
efficiency savings from replacing individual medical secretaries were replaced with 
less experienced staff in a narrower role. 
However, as soon as the ISTC was open, this innovation was strongly resisted by all 
groups of clinical staff, with a variety of complaints and problems a constant source 
of discussion between the visiting medics and the ISTC BritHealth managers:  
 ‘^ŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ  ?ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚ ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ? ǁŝůů ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĂŶĚ ǁĞ ǁŝůů ƐĂǇ
 ‘ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇǁĞŶĞĞĚƚŽĚŽŝƚƚŚŝƐǁĂǇ ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĞƉŝƐŽĚĞƐůŝŬĞƚŚĂƚ ?KŶĞ
of the classic cases was to do with the call centre at the business park which 
was a stupid system. The theatre lists are made up there and they required 
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us to do the vetting because there are no medical staff over there and they 
ĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞĂŶǇŵĞĚŝĐĂůƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞũƵƐƚƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌŝĂůƐƚĂĨĨĂŶĚƚŚĞǇ
ĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ǁŚǇ ǁĞ ǁĞƌĞ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? dŚĞƌ  ǁĞƌĞ ƐĞǀĞƌĂů
factors that governed a list of operations and that was not being adhered to.  
So when the patient arrived we would find we needed to juggle the list 
around to the correct order, then we would have to look and check they had 
got the correct time, then there would be little complications like the wrong 
patients would turn up for the wrong operations at the wrong times and we 
ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŶŽƚĞƐ ? tĞ ŐŽƚǀĞƌǇ ĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ ĂƐ ǁĞǁĂŶƚĞĚ ƚŽ ŐĞƚŽŶ
ĂŶĚŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ? ?E,^ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚ^ƵƌŐĞŽŶ ) 
Another commented: 
 ‘ǁĞůůƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ /ǁŽƵůĚ ũƵƐƚƐŝƚĚŽǁŶǁŝƚŚŵǇƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇĂŶĚǁe would take 
into consideration all the things we needed to take into consideration and 
generally we got it right. But here you had no idea how many patients were 
on the list and how many would turn up. It could be two it could be twenty, 
and it was just iŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ?E,^ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚ^ƵƌŐĞŽŶ ) 
Within the first few months of the ISTC opening, medical resistance and the above 
problems meant that this arrangement became untenable and the decision to 
 ‘ŽĨĨƐŝƚĞ ?ďŽŽŬŝŶŐĂŶĚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐǁĂƐƌĞǀĞƌƐĞĚ ?ůů of the booking staff 
were moved back inside the ISTC building, as close to the departments for individual 
specialties as could be found office space for. This not only changed the physical 
location of the function but also the structures in terms of management. Rather than 
placed under the control of one single central BritHealth manager, the responsibility 
for booking and scheduling was returned to within the departments themselves. 
Therefore, each department had a group of administrators with a nominated 
manager, who would then work closely with the lead nurse in the department, and 
ĞĂĐŚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌŐŝǀĞŶĂŶƵƌƐĞƐŝƐƚĞƌ  ‘ďƵĚĚǇ ?ƚŽĐŽŶƐƵůƚŽŶĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ
when addition patients to a particular list. Again many of these lead nurses and 
sisters had been transferred from the hospital and were familiar to the medics 
visiting the departments. Frequently then scheduling decisions would be discussed 
between the nurse buddies and the medics responsible for carrying out the 
procedure, either in person or via emails between the ISTC and the medics home 
ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ ďƵĚĚŝĞƐ ĂĐƚĞĚ ĂƐ Ă ŬŝŶĚ ŽĨ ‘ďƵĨĨĞƌ ? ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ
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medics and the BritHealth administers, for example informing the administrators 
what the medics would normally accept or asking the medics to get their input into 
scheduling decisions.   
In effect then this put the scheduling of appointments and arranging of lists to a 
partially back under medical control, but with some input from the BritHealth 
administrative team. Medics now had the final say on the booking decisions. Within 
this picture, the lead nurses had to balance both the demands of the medics who 
would frequently go to see them when unhappy about aspects of practice within the 
ISTC, and the demands of the BritHealth administration, who were concerned with 
meeting the waiting list and output targets. This often resulted in ongoing 
negotiations between the medical, administrative and nursing groups. For example, 
there was some degree of pressure on administrators to schedule appointments so 
that patients did not breach their waiting list targets. This was backed up by weekly 
meetings in which the administrative managers would identify breaches that had 
either happened or looked likely to happen, and question the administrator in charge 
of booking their appointment. Therefore, when this was likely to happen the 
administrators would look for a way to fit the patient into the existing schedule. This 
was sometimes supported by the administrative manager who would look for the 
possibility of adding additional overtime theatre lists, and discuss the proposals with 
the lead nurses, who would have to decide whether the request was possible in 
terms of their own staffing arrangements and the reaction of the medics involved. 
This process happened on a continual basis with lead nurses and administrative leads 
in continual discussion about difficulties of scheduling potential solutions. The degree 
ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ůĞĂĚ ŶƵƌƐĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƌĞĂĚǇ ƚŽ  ‘ĚĞĨĞŶĚ ? ƚŚĞ ŵĞĚŝĐƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŚĞĂůƚŚ
demands depended on a number of things, including their relationship with the 
medic, the degree to which they would resist and make complaints about changes 
and the length of the breach. For their part, medical often based their resistance to 
changes on their specialist knowledge and concern for clinical outcomes. For 
example, pointing to the quality concerns of adding additional patients without 
sufficient notice or onto clinical sessions. In some areas of the booking process the 
medics gained complete control. For example, BritHealth managers made some 
effort to set the order of theatre lists before it was commenced. It was suggested 
that over time they might seek to stagger the arrival of patients, rather than have 
them arrive all at once before the list began as pre-surgery waiting times was seen as 
157 
 
a major source of patient complaint. Also, it was suggested that knowing the order of 
patients would help to plan the workflow, for example placing patients in the 
morning list with a longer recovery time at the beginning of lists to make sure they 
were ready to leave before afternoon patients arrived. However, the pre-planned 
order of lists was rarely carried out. Medics freely moved patients around the list, 
citing the practicalities and necessities of clinical practice: 
 ‘ǇĞĂh I renumber that [the list] as soon as I arrive.  I like to do all the left 
hands (on a carpel tunnel surgery list) first as you can set up the room and rip 
through them. Or if the next door theatre is free and you have someone with 
you you can set up both at the start, one for the left and one for the right 
ĂŶĚĚŽƚŚĞŵďĂƐŝĐĂůůǇƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ ? ? ?E,^ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚ^ƵƌŐĞŽŶ ) 
Away from scheduling patient appointments, this partial regaining of control by 
medics and re-establishing existing norms of work could also be seen in many other 
examples. A relevant example is in attempts to pay medics individually for agreeing 
to take on existing work, particularly conducting theatre sessions on the evening and 
at weekends. This was done to some extent unofficially, but reported to me by a 
number of medics and BritHealth managers. Rather than paying a set fee for all 
overtime theatre lists, managers including some medical managers working for 
BritHealth had attempted to weight payments as they saw necessary to induce 
medics into working the extra lists, largely based on how open they were to extra 
work and how hard they negotiated. This meant that different medics were paid very 
different rates for similar tasks, unrelated to their NHS pay scales. It was also 
suggested by one manager that this could be used as a way to sidestep the initial 
staffing agreement with the acute trust, for example by directing a greater number of 
ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƉĂǇŵĞŶƚůŝƐƚƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŵĞĚŝĐƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽĨŝƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ/^d ‘ǁĂǇƐŽĨ
ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ? ? ,Žǁever it was also later reported that this practice had been stopped 
following complaints from individual medics and concerns that these types of 
payments should be set across the medical staff.  
One factor that could be said to affect the balance of control over work was between 
the clinical content and the wider context of work. That is, doctors largely held sway 
over the clinical content of work while managers were more able to alter its context. 
For example, the visiting medics would respond to any managerial interference in the 
provision of direct patient care or decisions that could be seen as having a negative 
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effect on it. For example, there was little acceptance of managers attempts to 
ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŝƐĞ ĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ ƵƐĞ Žƌ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŝŵĞĚ Ăƚ  ‘ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŝŶŐ ? ǁŽƌŬĨůŽǁ
processes.  For clinical processes, medics remained largely in control over how tasks 
were done by both themselves and the other nursing staff working with them. To 
give one example of how this was done across both the hospital and ISTC site, one 
ƐƵƌŐĞŽŶ ŚĂĚ ĚƌĂǁŶ ƵƉ Ă  ‘ŵĂƉ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞĂƚƌĞ ? ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐ ƐƚĂĨĨ ĂƐ ƚŽ ŚĞƌ
preferred positioning of the operating table, equipment, and team members such as 
the scrub nurse. This was stuck to the whiteboard within the theatre with 
instructions to consult it before her arrival on site. In addition, the degree of change 
that medics were prepared to accept placed limits on the degree to which 
management could re-organise tasks. Doctors working across boundaries between 
the local trust and General-ISTC persistently challenged managerial decisions that 
they viewed as impinging on their work. A key part of this picture was that the ISTC 
was only one location of the medics hospital work, including the wider teaching and 
training duties. The consultants overseeing medical work were joined by medical 
students, senior house officers and registrars. As in general teaching hospitals, 
clinical sessions were often used for training altering the tasks, pace and order of 
work depending on the exact personnel present. Given the requirements of training, 
with allowances written into the contract, BritHealth managers had little choice but 
to leave many of the activities to medical discretion.    
However, managers were more able to exert their influence on the wider context in 
which the direct clinical work took place. To some extent this was done prior to the 
ISTC opening with the design of the building and purchase of equipment. Within the 
theatre department, one of the most commented upon differences to work in the 
hoƐƉŝƚĂů  ‘ŵĂŝŶ ? ƚŚĞĂƚƌĞ ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĂďƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ Ă ĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ĂŶĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐƐ
room, with general anaesthetic administered within the main operating theatre. The 
reason commonly cited for this design was in terms of patient safety, as patients did 
not need to be moved from where they were anaesthetised to where they operation 
took place. However, both surgeons and anaesthetists often remarked how this 
dramatically changed their daily work as they had to wait for one case to be 
completely finished and the patient moved out of the theatre before anaesthetising 
the next patient could begin. It also meant that both the anaesthetic and surgical 
teams worked closely, side by side throughout the procedure. Perhaps paradoxically 
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giving the ISTC emphasis on workflow and efficiency, this was generally seen as 
ƐůŽǁŝŶŐĚŽǁŶƚŚĞƚŚĞĂƚƌĞ ‘ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶůŝŶĞ ? ? 
 Aside from the physical environment, certain purposeful changes to the 
administrative systems were placing some additional managerial controls over 
medical work. For example, there was some effort to standardise the arrival times for 
medics to an hour prior to theatre lists scheduled start time. Similarly, there was 
ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŽ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƚƉƵƚ ŽĨ ŵĞĚŝĐƐ ǁŚŽ ǁĞƌĞ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ  ‘ůŽǁ ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞƌƐ ?
towards the average for each specialty. As it would have been virtually impossible for 
ƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽŶ-ĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌƐ ?ƚŽĞŶĨŽƌĐĞ this through overt sanctions, this type of control was 
attempted through publicising performance lists, printed out and stuck on the wall 
near the theatres, including average cases performed as well as arrival times. These 
attempts at increased managerial control were widely recognised as such by the 
visiting medics, with some reacting against it: 
 ‘/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŝŶŚŽǁƚŚĞƐƚĂĨĨǁŽƌŬ ?ďƵƚ/ĚŽƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞƌĞ
are differences with the management, a different style, more aggressive. I 
think ŝƚ ?ƐĂŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞŵĂŶĂŐĞĚĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ
ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ŽŶ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ? /ƚ ?Ɛ ŵƵĐŚ ŵŽƌĞ Ă ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ
ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƚŚĂŶŝƚǁĂƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ? ? ?E,^ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚŶĂĞƐƚŚĞŝƐƚ ) 
Another anaesthetist stated: 
 ‘ŝƚ ?ƐĂŶĞǁƚǇƉĞŽĨƉŚŝůŽƐophy, and most surgeons have been doing surgery 
for a long time. There is sense of why change things that have always worked 
efficiently and we have always had lots of happy patients. And the reason is 
its now run by a commercial company and they have different overriding 
goals to the NHS. These are not necessarily competing ideals, but not always 
ĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďůĞ ? ? ?E,^ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚŶĂĞƐƚŚĞƚŝƐƚ ) 
Although the changes that were made were largely to the administration of the ISTC, 
the separation between content and context is slightly artificial as these type of 
changes inevitably had a knock on effect on the clinical work, decreasing the 
availability of staff or changing the opportunities for interaction. For example when 
administrators were successful in placing extra patients on lists, or when more lists 
were scheduled simultaneously with the same number of nursing and support staff, 
this had the effect of reducing the time possible to be spent on each case, or reduced 
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breaks between cases. In general, the medical respondents were generally negative 
about these changes, with these feelings often tied to general frustrations of the 
problems of moving their work to the ISTC. However, it was recognised that some did 
 ‘ďƵǇŝŶ ?ƚŽƚŚĞŶĞǁŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůƐƚǇůĞĂŶĚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶthroughput: 
 ‘ƐŽŵĞĚŽĐƚŽƌƐŵĂǇƚŚŝŶŬŝƚƐďƌŝůůŝĂŶƚƚŽƌƵƐŚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŶĚŵĂŬĞůŽƚƐ
ŽĨŵŽŶĞǇ ?ŽƚŚĞƌƐŵŝŐŚƚďĞŵŽƌĞƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶƚƚŽƚŚĂƚ ? ?E,^ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚ^ƵƌŐĞŽŶ ) 
In general however, again given that work in the ISTC made up only a fraction of their 
whole work role, the overall picture here was one of continuity of previous work, 
with continued attempts by management to seek ways to begin to impose new 
restrictions and controls on the time spent within the ISTC.  
6.5 Nursing and other Work Roles in General-ISTC 
A similar picture portrayed in relation to medical work between continuity and 
managerially imposed change can be seen in the work of nursing staff, including 
Nurses, ODPs, and HCAs. As describe in the previous sections, in many ways there 
was no clear break from practice within the general hospital and as staff moved over, 
they often brought with them established ways of working including the way tasks 
were divided and carried out. Again respondents often commented that on a day to 
day basis the content of their work in the TC was very similar to how it had been 
previously: 
 ‘tĞůů ĂƉĂƌƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĞ ŚĂǀĞ ŐŽƚ Ă ŶĞǁ ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ŶĞǁ
ĞƋƵŝƉŵĞŶƚ/ǁŽƵůĚƐĂǇƚŚĂƚŝƚƌĞĂůůǇŚĂƐŶ ?ƚĐŚĂŶŐĞĚĂŶĂǁĨƵůůŽƚ ?ŝƚ ?ƐũƵƐƚƚŚĂƚ
the environment that we are in is a lot bigger and therefore it is little things 
like having to walk much further now, things like that.  Generally speaking I 
ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚƐĂǇŵǇũŽďŚĂƐĐŚĂŶŐĞĚǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚĂƚĂůů ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚE,^EƵƌƐĞ ) 
In addition, to some degree the continuation of prior NHS practices extended to the 
minority of directly employed BritHealth clinical staff, as the norms of practice were 
transferred and continued to be set by the majority NHS staff. For example, 
BritHealth staff recruited from other private providers described a less directly 
financially driven environment: 
 ‘dŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ Ă ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŚĞƌĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚŝƐ ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů
where I worked, at the other place it seemed that a lot of the surgeons, their 
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main aim was to get the patients out as quickly as possŝďůĞ ? Q ?tŚĞƌĞĂƐŚĞƌĞ
it seems to be less financially driven I would say whereas in the other place 
they were banging them through as quickly as possible because they did a lot 
ŽĨE,^ǁŽƌŬĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŽĨŝƚŵĂƌŐŝŶŝƐǀĞƌǇƐŵĂůů ? ?ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚKW ) 
However, unlike the medics, many of these other occupational groups worked full 
time in the ISTC, and reported being generally more heavily affected by the changes 
to the working environment. Aside from the cross-organisational employment 
system, a number of additional differences shaped the nature of work. Major 
changes for staff within the new facilities included a greater use of IT, altered care 
pathways, different processes for booking and communicating with patients and a 
focus on audit and performance measurement. On top of these, BritHealth managers 
had attempted to introduce numerous changes to the day to day clinical practice, 
such as changes to the order of work and division of tasks. Many of these were laid 
out explicitly in the workflow diagrams that complimented patient pathways, 
specifying which work role should carry out each part of the service production. 
Again, these were not straightforwardly implemented and in many instances 
attempts at re-configuration met with resistance or indifference from staff.   
To provide an example of this, the theatre department had been designed by the 
managers to separate the discharging of patients from the pre-operative ward. This 
ǁĂƐĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚĂƐĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ƚŽ ƌĞƉůŝĐĂƚĞĂĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŽƵƐ  ‘ĐŽŶǀĞǇŽƌďĞůƚ ? ƚǇƉĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ
journey as they seamlessly flow through various stages of treatment without 
doubling back on themselves. This was attempted in both architectural design, for 
example, with a new clinical space was created to move patients from recovery into 
rather than back to the wards,  and through work re-design, for example with a new 
 ‘ĚŝƐĐŚĂƌŐĞ ? ƌŽůĞ ĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞĚ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ƚŽ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ Ğǆŝƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ?
However, many of the practices necessary to enact this process were not put into 
place. Although staff were aware that the department had been intended to support 
ĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ‘ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚ
had been developed in the general hospital and transferred to the ISTC. Instead, 
discharging patients continued to be done the general ward nurse, and the intended 




 ‘tŚĂƚƐŚŽƵůĚŚĂƉƉĞŶŝƐĂƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐŚŽƵůĚŐŽƚŽƚŚĞĐƵďŝĐůĞ ?ŐŽƚŽƚŚĞĂƚƌĞ ?ŐŽ
ƚŽƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŚĂƌŐĞůŽƵŶŐĞ ?ŶŽǁƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚ ?ƚŚĞǇŐŽto the cubicle, the theatre, 
recovery, back to the cubicle because at the moment we are not running five 
theatres, when we go to five theatres we are not going to have enough 
room, there is going to be a bottleneck, so I suspect we will have to start 
revieǁŝŶŐƚŚŽƐĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ? ?ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚ^ŝƐƚĞƌ ) 
Translating the plans for work process change into practice required all groups to be 
willing and able to change their established practices and enact them through their 
work. For a number of reasons this was often not the case. To some extent there 
were complaints about the nature of the changes themselves, with the changes in 
ůĂǇŽƵƚƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽďǇŶƵƌƐĞƐĂƐĂǁĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐŚĂĚďĞĞŶ ‘Americanised ? ?
Respondents frequently reported the impracticality, wastefulness or confusing 
nature of the managerially endorsed practices, and emphasised how they had 
attempted to push for more suitable arrangements for work. However, the basis for 
this resistance was in many ways different to that of the medical groups, with an 
ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ŽŶ  ‘ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ƐĞŶƐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŝŵĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ũŽď ŽǀĞƌ ĞǆƉĞƌƚ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? KĨƚĞŶ
nursing staff emphasised their experience and insights that came from working in a 
particular role on a daily basis:  
 ‘/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁǁŚǇ ?ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚDĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞǇĐĂŶĐŽŵĞƵƉǁŝƚŚďĞƚƚĞƌ
ways of doing our job than we can. Some of us have been doing this together 
for about twenty years, if there was a way to save time and make things 
more efficient do you not think ǁĞǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞĚŽŶĞŝƚďǇŶŽǁ ? ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚ
NHS Sister) 
 ‘tĞƵƐĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞƚŽŐŽƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞůĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƚŚĞƵŶŝƚ ?ǇŽƵŬŶŽǁƚŚĞůŝƚƚůĞďĂǇ
on its own? That was the only place we could get food or drink for the 
patients, so if your patient was at the top end and they wanted drinks and a 
sandwich you had to walk all the way to the bottom, fetch it and bring it back 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚƐĂǇ ‘ĐĂŶ/ŚĂǀĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĐƵƉŽĨƚĞĂ ?ƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚĂǁĂǇ
ǁĞ ƐĂŝĚ ŝƚ ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐůŝŶŝĐĂů ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ? ĂŶĚ ǁĞ ũƵƐƚĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ŝƚ ?
(Seconded Ward Nurse) 
Where management did seek to force through changes, these were often met with 
overt rule breaking and non-compliance, as in this account theatre staff breaking 
waste bin lids counter to new infection control policies: 
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 ‘dŚĞďŝŶŚŽůĚĞƌƐǁĞƌe ordered with lids on which makes them quite difficult 
to use and we were told that we had to have lids on the bins for certain 
infection control policies or whatever, even though we had never used lids 
on our bins over at the Main Hospital theatres, neveƌ ?  tĞ ƐĂŝĚ  ‘ůŽŽŬ ? ǁĞ
ĐĂŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĞůŝĚƐŝƚŝƐĚƌŝǀŝŶŐƵƐĂůůŶƵƚƐ ?zŽƵĂƌĞƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽƉƵƚƐƚƵĨĨŝŶ
bins with one arm and doing things with the other arm and it is really 
ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ? ?ƚŽƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚǁŚĞƌĞŽŶĞŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƐƚĂĨĨŚĂĚďƌŽŬĞŶƚŚĞůŝĚŽĨĨƚŚĞ 
bins.  Now it is a case of having lots of broken bins and that is how, if we 
want things to change [...] it is, a lot of it is down to what we can get away 
with and which boundaries we are willing to push and which ones we are 
ŶŽƚ ? ? (Seconded Theatre Nurse) 
In some ways, the resistance could be seen in terms of attempts to assert 
professional autonomy and control over work. However, characterising the action of 
staff looking to reinstate previous working practices as reactivate resistance to new 
management control may be slightly simplistic. Given the number of transferred staff 
on the shop floor as well as in middle management, there was often considerable 
support throughout the organisation for clinical staff wishing to alter new practices 
and work routines in line with their knowledge and experience. Transferred staff 
presented themselves as in a more legitimate position to shape effective work 
practices. They often held stronger relationship with other NHS staff higher up the 
organisation, particularly senior medics and clinical leads, than the privately 
employed BritHealth middle managers. This meant that the BritHealth managers 
themselves often suggested they were outnumbered and isolated, trying to enforce 
particular policies or practices amidst groups of non-employees. In an extreme 
illustration of this, when the ISTC first opened a directly employed BritHealth 
manager was put in control of the day surgery department. The large majority of 
staff in the day surgery had been transferred together including the group of sisters 
who had previously run the department, but were placed under the control of this 
new BritHealth manager. Despite this, the staff saw themselves as answering to the 
transferred sisters for whom they had previously worked. Rather than submitting to 
the authority of the new manager, they viewed her as suspicious and saw her as 
imposing unfairly and arbitrarily on their work: 
 ‘DǇŽǁŶƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŽƉŝŶŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĂƚƐŚĞŚĂƐŐŽƚŚĞƌŽǁŶĂŐĞŶĚĂ ?^ŚĞŝƐŐŽŝŶŐ




She has lost sight of the patient as a person and the patient has become a 
ĐŽŵŵŽĚŝƚǇƚŽŚĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐŵǇŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬƐŚĞĐĂŶƵŶĚĞƌstand that 
one pre-assessment can take ten minutes and another can take an hour and 
a half, she expects everybody to get through within the set time of twenty 
ŵŝŶƵƚĞƐĂŶĚŝƚŝƐŶ ?ƚĂůǁĂǇƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚE,^EƵƌƐĞ ) 
Following a long period of disharmony including accusations of bullying and 
complaints from the NHS staff and sisters, as well as similar views from visiting 
medics, the departmental manager was asked to leave by the BritHealth board. 
Regardless of the actual content of these claims, this could be seen as an explicit 
consequence of pre-existing hierarchies, norms and values, and the limited 
possibilities of overt displays of control by the minority BritHealth management.  
/ŶůŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚŝƐ ?ŽƚŚĞƌŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌĂŵŽƌĞ ‘ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽnary rather 
ƚŚĂŶƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ ? ?ZŝƐŬĂŶĚ^ĂĨĞƚǇDĂŶĂŐĞƌ )ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?DŽĚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽ
transferred practice were often limited to smaller post-ŚŽĐ ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ƚŽ  ‘ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞ ?
work processes, cutting resource waste, for example by improving the utilisation 
times of theatres and clinics by organising extra sessions in the evening and 
ǁĞĞŬĞŶĚƐ ?ůƐŽ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐŚĂĚƚŽƐĞĞŬĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ ‘ďƵǇŝŶ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞŵĂũŽƌĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ
were made. For example, frequent improvement and involvement events were held 
in which staff themselves were asked to look for ways to improve the efficiency of 
the service:  
 ‘ǁĞǁĞŶƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ŝŶĨŽƌĂƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ
what happens on the ward and in theatre to break down those processes and 
see what is good and bad, whether we needed to make any changes and 
ǁŚĞƌĞ ǁĞ ŶĞĞĚĞĚ ƚŽ ƉĂƚ ŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ďĂĐŬ ĂŶĚ ƐĂǇ  ‘ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ǁĞ ŚĂǀĞ
ĚŽŶĞǀĞƌǇǁĞůů ? ? ?ƌŝƚ,ĞĂůƚŚDĞĚŝĐĂůŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ) 
At the same time, managers still found themselves under pressure to meet 
specification of the contract and performance indicators, increasing the adherence to 
audit requirements around waiting times and safety procedures. And despite the 
participative rhetoric and more incremental pace of change, staff from an NHS 




 ‘/ ŚĂĚ ŶĞǀĞƌ ďĞĞŶ ŝŶ Ă ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ / ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚ ŬŶŽǁ ŚŽǁ ƚŚĞǇ
functioned.  It is so different to the NHS and even now I would say that the 
standards of care and what is expected from you is different there is a lot 
more audit work and in the trust they would never really come around 
looking at what you are doing. Yes, you are much more under the spotlight 
which is a good thing, but I think expectations, even my expectations and 
those ŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂĨĨ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬǁĞǁŽƵůĚďĞĂƐĐůŽƐĞůǇŵŽŶŝƚŽƌĞĚĂƐǁĞĂƌĞ
being. [things like]: Documentation, theatre practice, general people 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚE,^^ŝƐƚĞƌ ) 
The tension between managers needing to act to fulfil ISTC goals, and being in a 
position where explicitly and overtly changing working practices created a workplace 
ƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚďĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚĂƐĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇƉŝĞĐĞŵĞĂůŽƌ ‘ĐƌĞĞƉŝŶŐ ?ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?
Rather than definitive accounts of smaller roles, tightly defined processes or tight 
control, staff reported a more gradual squeeze on their work, and attempts to 
redefine their roles at the fringes of practice. In this environment respondents often 
described their actions in terms of surface compliance: 
 ‘dŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂŶĞǁŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐƚƌucture recently and people have gone 
and different people are in and they have new ideas and the workload is 
going to increase because we have got to get the workload through.  We 
have eighteen week deadlines to meet and I think that is part of the 
agreemeŶƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ E,^ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ? / ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ŬŶŽǁ ? ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ŵǇ
ĚŽŵĂŝŶ ĂŶĚ / ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ŽĨ ŝƚ Ăůů ĂŶĚ ǁŚĂƚ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ
ĂŐƌĞĞĚ ? Ăůů / ŬŶŽǁ ŝƐ ǁŚĂƚ / ĚŽ ĂŶĚ ǁŚĂƚ / ŚĂǀĞ ŐŽƚ ƚŽ ĚŽ ? ^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚ E,^
ODP) 
Ǉ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŽ  ‘ũƵƐƚ ? ĨƵůĨŝů ŶĂƌƌŽǁ ũŽď Ěescriptions and work demands can be 
seen to suggest strong opposition and resistance to the goals of management, with 
individuals unwilling to align themselves with the new TC or go beyond the minimum 
that is required of them. This is reflected in increasing questions raised over the 
meaning of work and the purpose of their role. For many, placing themselves in 
relation to the TC was not straightforward, and people reported increasingly 
uncertain about who or what they were working for: 
 ‘ŝŶ ƚŚĞďĂĐŬŽĨǇŽƵƌ mind you know you are seconded means that in a way 
you feel like you are not totally part of the company and you perhaps feel a 
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bit like an agency nurse.  I suppose I see myself as an NHS employee working 
for an organisation that is working alongside the NHS.  I think it is at the 
forefront of your mind when you are having a bad day and you are thinking 
 ‘ǁŚŽĂŵ/ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĨŽƌ ?ǁŚǇĂŵ/ĚŽŝŶŐŝƚ ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚE,^ ƵƌƐĞ ) ? 
Staff often described confusion about the aims of the organisation and what was 




ĂůůƵƉ ? /ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ know.  Primarily the role they do is look to see if we are 
being as effective and as economic with our equipment, we have changed to 
ĂŶĂǁĨƵůůŽƚŽĨĚŝƐƉŽƐĂďůĞƐƚƵĨĨǁŚŝĐŚǁĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞďĞĨŽƌĞƚŽĐƵƚĚŽǁŶŽŶ
waste, but that is all it really boils down to.  In terms of anything else I just 
ƚƵƌŶĂƌŽƵŶĚĂŶĚƐĂǇ ‘ƚŚĂƚŝƐŶŽƚŵǇƉƌŽďůĞŵƚŚĂƚŝƐĂŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?
ǇŽƵƐŽƌƚŝƚŽƵƚ ? ?^ĞĐŽŶĚĞĚE,^EƵƌƐĞ ) 
This does not necessarily imply there was less clarity from management than in the 
NHS; rather these types of dispute appeared to suggest that there were only limited 
foundations for mutual decision making. People strongly perceived the appearance 
of new managerial motivations, expectations and ideals, and there was therefore 
more suspicion over the purpose of decisions and in whose interest they were being 
made. Combined with the fragmentation associated with the multi-employer 
workplace this resulted in a low likelihood of decisions being followed unquestioned. 
dŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞǁĂƐŶ ?ƚƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĞĚƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůy from the general hospital, rather 
there were the longstanding staff attempting to re-create previous practices, taking 
into account new constraints and opportunities. Staff across all groups persistently 
challenged managerial decisions that they viewed as impacting on their work. Many 
of these conflicts were gradual in nature, overlapping with no clear point of 
resolution. These were played out in a new employment environment characterised 
by divergent groups often with contradictory ideas and interests. No single group 
was allowed complete control of the way things in the treatment centre were done. 
In some areas of practice the old NHS staff were able to dominate, for example 
where clinical concerns were seen as taking precedent, whereas on other occasions 
BritHealth managers and administrators were able to introduce changes and enforce 
167 
 
them through for example by appealing to new policy requirements, legal issues, the 
interests of patient safety and efficiency. These altered social dynamics played out 




Chapter 7 Comparing the Cases: Joined Vision - Divergent 
Social Relations 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the differences between the two ISTC described in the two 
previous chapters (5 & 6), bringing together the exploratory descriptions of the two 
organisations in the previous two chapters to form a comparative picture of the PPP 
context. The management of both ISTCs envisaged comparable consumer orientated 
health production systems, influenced by organisational forms and approaches in 
other private sector industries. However, the ability of managers to bring about 
aspects of these production systems differed markedly between the two sites, and as 
strongly influenced by the nature of the partnership arrangements. These 
partnerships were underpinned by contractual as well as socio-cultural relations 
between the various groups coming together to form the ISTC, establishing the 
relational dynamics between partnership organisations, between various 
occupational and professional groups, and between employees and managers. The 
first section summarises how Orthe-ISTC was in some ways more representative of a 
 ‘ŚĞĂůƚŚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞĚďǇŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?dŚŝƐ ŝƐƚhen explored through a 
comparison of inter-organisational, inter-professional/occupation and manager-
employee relations in both sites.  
7.2 ISTCs as a Health Production System? 
The first area in which to compare the two ISTCs was the degree to the two centres 
adopted distinct working practices line with the ISTC ideals envisioned by 
management. In both centres the managers described the ISTC project as a way to 
fundamentally change the way elective care surgery was produced through 
introducing organisational innovations. Although there were differences in the 
approach taken by the two management teams, in both cases a more 
efficiency/production orientated approach to healthcare was advocated focusing on 
throughput, outcomes and consumer perceptions. Efficient production was 
frequently cited as a reason for the ISTCs establishment and implicit in the 
managerial attitudes to healthcare work. Common ways in which managers sought to 
enact this approach were standardising routines of production, reducing unit costs by 
cutting down on wasted resources and increasing focus on consumer preferences. 
169 
 
Prevalent areas for managerial scrutiny across the two sites were increasing 
utilisation of the fixed assets, e.g. increasing the number of theatre sessions including 
evening and weekends; improving the efficiency of working practices, e.g. reducing 
the amount of downtime between cases and altering the skill mix; decreasing the 
costs of equipment usage e.g. monitoring daily use of clinical supplies; improving 
patient experience e.g. conducting all pre-operative tests, consultations and 
scheduling in a single visit. Illustrative of this approach, managers in both cases called 
upon metaphors of budget airlines as an ideal approach. These were held up as a 
model industry that was profitable, met modern consumer demands, maintained 
basic safety and quality requirements, sought to continually cut costs and allowed 
savings to be passed on to the customer (or in the case of the ISTCs, the taxpayer).  
In neither case was this vision completely representative of the experience of 
respondents. Managers had to seek ways to interpret the general approach to the 
specific context they were faced with, such as the actual nature of the treatments in 
the contract, the various staff groups required, the types of patients, the physical 
environment and the resources available. At all levels contingencies were 
encountered that meant practices frequently had to be improvised, with emerging 
practices dependent on for example the local knowledge and skills responded to the 
given environment. For example both ISTCs produced detailed process maps of 
patient pathways in the early stages of development, plotting each stage of the 
 ‘ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ƚƌĞĞƐ ?ĂďƌĞĂŬĚŽǁŶŽĨ ƚĂƐŬƐďǇ ũŽď ƌŽůe and 
measures for monitoring and reviewing patient flow. However, these were subject to 
frequent change for example in response from demands from outside organisations 
such as the primary care trusts for different regimes of appointments, treatment or 
discharge. Also in neither case were pre-defined models reported as closely followed 
in daily practice. Often the individual practitioners carrying out the details of 
treatment and adapting to the specifics of each case continued to be led by historic 
norms and personal professional judgement.  
Moreover, creating these efficiency/production orientated workplaces involved 
asserting a managerial model of healthcare work which was in many ways counter to 
the traditional views of healthcare present amongst the clinical professional groups. 
Managers remained reliant on gaining the active input of doctors, nurses and other 
clinical groups with specialist knowledge and legitimacy to diagnose and treat 
patients. In both sites there was scepticism and resistance from clinical staff towards 
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this approach. For example, key areas of concern for nursing staff was the level of 
audit and paperwork, the degree of managerial involvement in how day to day tasks 
were done, narrowing of job roles and general work intensification. For doctors, key 
areas of concern were in the control they had over the treatments/procedures 
selected, having sole responsibility of individual patients and the scheduling of work. 
Across all groups of clinical staff questions were raised about the ownership of the 
treatment centres, the purpose of their work and the appropriateness of the profit 
motive. Therefore, in both sites, managers had to engage with embedded 
professional norms value and interests, and overcome difficulties to enact the health 
production organisations.  
However, it could be seen that practice in Orthe-ISTC developed more in line with the 
managerial vision. Recalling the differences between the sites, four examples provide 
points for direct comparison and illustrate how organisational innovations were more 
straightforwardly introduced in Orthe-ISTC than General-ISTC. Firstly, Orthe ISTC re-
organised hospital departments to compliment a new production system, with 
 ‘ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ůĂƌŐĞůǇ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ ĨƌŽŵ  ‘ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? &Žƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ŝƚ ŝŶƚƌŽduced a 
centralised scheduling system in which all patient bookings and associated 
administration were conducted by a single office. A very similar approach was 
attempted at General-ISTC, but this was deemed unworkable by clinical staff who 
were used to having control over how each session was organised including the 
number, type and order of patients being treated. Over time the booking and 
scheduling staff were broken up and moved back within each department where 
they could be more tightly watched over by the medics and other clinical staff. 
Secondly, clinical roles were more easily altered in Orthe-ISTC towards those 
ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ Ă  ‘ŵĂƐƐ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ
narrowing jobs. For example it reduced medical consultant wŽƌŬƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?
parts of their role, focusing on a small range of procedures, and removing their 
involvement in wider learning, teaching or research activities. In General-ISTC, major 
changes to roles such as these would have been impossible given the majority of 
clinical staff continued to be employed by the NHS trust under nationally agreed 
terms and conditions. Thirdly, in Orthe-ISTC company policies in line with new audit 
and administration regimes were enforced, with managers in a stronger position to 
directly ensure that clinical staff followed. These included booking patients based on 
waiting time targets rather than clinical priorities, the auditing of paperwork and 
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following new rules for handling patient information. In General-ISTC administrative 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ŶŽƚ ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ǁŝƚŚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ? ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ
enforce new regimes often constrained. Fourthly, in Orthe-ISTC the focus remained 
on small range of pre-specified orthopaedic treatments, providing the opportunity to 
specialise and streamline activities. General-ISTC offered a much wider range of 
treatments in the first instance requiring a greater range of expertise, support and 
equipment. Moreover these were subject to more alteration over the study period 
with new treatments and additional services being introduced, closely tied to the 
ongoing reorganisation of activities in the wider trust. 
Therefore it can be stated that managers in Orthe-ISTC were generally able to push 
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ Ă  ‘ŚĞĂůƚŚ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ? ĂůƚŚŽƵŐh this in itself could be seen as 
introducing a range of new challenges and growing difficulties, particularly in 
retaining staff and maintaining quality. Managers in General-ISTC on the other hand 
faced myriad obstacles in terms of embedded norms culture of the transferred 
professional groups and struggled to bring about the envisaged changes, although 
the move to the ISTC did change practice in a number of ways. Alternatively stated, it 
is suggested that the sites differed in the amount of power managers held over other 
staff groups to bring about new forms of healthcare delivery. This can not only be 
seen in the direct displays of authority of the managers, but also in the degree to 
which the new order of the health production system was internalised and accepted 
across the two organisations (Lukes, 2005). Even when there were no outwards signs 
of conflict, instilling the managerial agenda of what each /^d  ‘ǁĂƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ? ĐĂŶ ďĞ
seen as demonstrating a degree of power and control. In order to unpick the reasons 
for the differences in the power relations between in the two sites, the next sections 
explore these by considering the relationships within and between organisational, 
professional and occupational groups and directly between management and staff. 
These are compared below. 
7.3 Inter-Organisational Relations 
Orthe-ISTC was to a greater extent separate and distinct from existing local health 
care organisations. Although built within the grounds of an existing general hospital, 
the ISTC was not a direct replacement for existing facilities (although it had itself 
been subject to recent department closures and redundancies)  W rather it offered a 
new amalgamated orthopaedic service for the region. Management and evaluation 
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of the contract performance was done only by offsite contract managers based in a 
separate NHS Trust, with contact at this level only on occasions of official review and 
audit. For this reason, Orthe-/^d ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ ƵŶĚĞƌ ŽŶůǇ  ‘ĂƌŵƐ ůĞŶŐƚŚ ?
contractual control.  
General-ISTC was to a far greater extent integrated into existing health organisations, 
with established relationships between both individual actors both within the ISTC 
and across the boundary with local NHS Trust. Contact with NHS Trust occurred on a 
day to day basis and many aspects of practice were intertwined through for example 
shared resources, staff moving between the Acute Trust and the ISTC, patients being  
treated across both sites as doctors moved the location of clinics, and knowledge and 
ideas were exchanged. Input from the local NHS trust occurred on a formal 
contractual as well as informal basis as non-employees carried out their work within 
the new workplace, influenced by existing norms and culture. In this way General-
ISTC was under much closer scrutiny by one of the organisations involved in 
managing the contract. This could, in some ways be related to the ideals of 
partnership based on trust and reciprocity (Hornby, 1993), but included here should 
be a recognition of the multiplicity of actors and objectives bridging the two 
organisations, not merely senior managers with mutual organisational goals. 
Interpersonal networks between the two organisations existed at all levels, with for 
example nurses and doctors still involved in the hospital community, carrying with 
them the pre-existing professional and departmental loyalties and commitments (See 
figures 2 and 3 overleaf). 
These inter-organisational relations were reflected to some extent in how staff 
viewed their roles and the basis for their work. In general Orthe-ISTC staff generally 
saw themselves as working for the ISTC, on a short or medium term basis, albeit with 
a relatively low commitment to it. For the most part, staff in felt separate from the 
mainstream NHS and cut off from wider professional institutions and tended to refer 
to their peer group as either colleagues in their home countries, or a small network 
of fellow countrymen working temporarily in the UK, or other international workers. 
DŽƐƚǁĞƌĞ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌƐ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞE,^ ?EŽƚŽŶůǇǁĞƌĞƐƚĂĨĨĚƌĂǁŶĨƌom a wide variety 
of national cultural backgrounds, they were also disconnected from other local NHS 
health organisations which viewed the ISTC with distrust. In this case, there was no 




of training. Indeed it appeared that employees that had spent the most time within 
the NHS were the most critical of ISTC practice. 
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In General-ISTC there was a greater mix and less clear picture of who staff felt they 
worked for. With some exceptions, the full time seconded NHS staff were generally 
resistant to the idea of the ISTC. Some of these sought to emphasise their continuing 
commitment to the acute trust, for example seeing their future careers back within 
the trust following a short period within the ISTC. Other full time seconded staff were 
more hostile towards the acute trust, which they blamed for being  ‘ĨŽƌĐĞĚ ?ƚŽŵŽǀĞ
to the ISTC. Similar to the findings of Hebson and Grimshaw (2002) in some ways 
these respondents felt betrayed by being exposed to private management, as though 
they had been pushed aside following in some cases years of service. Even these 
however usually retained some contact with colleagues within the local NHS, albeit 
weaker than before to the move, and also their wider professional membership. 
Moreover, those who worked only partially or occasionally within the ISTC remained 
strongly attached to their home departments, seeing the ISTC as separate from their 
ŵĂŝŶƉůĂĐĞŽĨǁŽƌŬ ?ZĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌŝůǇ ‘ďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ ?ƉĂƌƚŽĨĂŶĞǁŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?
with full recognition of ISTC management structures, ways of working, aims and 
visions, these staff broadly saw the ISTC as a new set of facilities or work area, rather 
than requiring a new form of organisational commitment. Alternative forms of 
practice encouraged by ISTC managers became something to cope with while 
temporarily working within the new building. Occasionally, actors on either side of 
this relationship- BritHealth managers or visiting staff- would find the actions of the 
other group unacceptable, and there was then a degree of negotiation to find 
mutually acceptable ways of working. For the most part however, the ISTC 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇďƌĞĂŬĨƌŽŵ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůǁŽƌŬ ? ?ĂŶĚ/^dŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞĚ
to exert what they thought was a reasonable level of control. Full time BritHealth 
employees had a far more straightforward relationship with BritHealth as their direct 
employer. In some ways the BritHealth managers attempted to use these staff under 
direct authority as a point around which to spread changes, for example trying to 
place some BritHealth staff within each department. However, aside from the senior 
management team these represented a minority of clinical and administrative staff, 
often in less influential roles, and outside of the established networks and 
professional groups transferred from the acute trust. This is discussed further in the 
section below.   
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7.4 Occupational and Professional Relations  
The second category of relationships that appeared to differ markedly between the 
two organisations was those within and between occupational and professional 
groups internally to the ISTCs. The two organisations drew together a collection of 
employees which varied in terms of their professional and cultural backgrounds and 
in terms of their familiarity with each other. Although inevitably each inter-personal 
relationship was shaped by wide range of factors, in general, Orthe-ISTC could be 
characterised as promoting more instrumental relations between professionals. 
Relations within the centre were more tightly limited to functional interaction that 
took place within the comparatively narrower jobs in terms of task and role variation. 
This was underpinned by the more transient nature of the workforce and lack of 
homophily in terms of organisational, cultural and national backgrounds. In General-
ISTC longstanding patterns of relations were largely transferred into the treatment 
centre from the local general hospital, but altered by aspects of the new organisation 
including the multi-employment system, the architecture of the building and working 
across organisational/sectoral boundaries.  
This can be seen firstly in the extent to which the professional and occupational 
groups in each centre saw themselves as a cohesive group. The international cohort 
of staff working in Orthe-ISTC had a highly restricted network of professional 
relationships, with those who had come directly from overseas limited in their 
contact in the UK to others working directly beside them in the ISTC. Other staff had 
been drawn together from a wide variety of organisational backgrounds with prior 
interpersonal relationships only between individuals rather than as a whole group, 
for example when staff had been recruited together or through networks, rather 
than on a collective basis.  This can be seen with the medical staff who had been 
bought in through personal networks, but split between distinct national groupings, 
that continued to remain separate with language playing an important role: 
 ‘ƵƚŚĞƌĞǁĞŚĂǀĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚǁĞĐĂŶĚŝƐĐƵƐƐ QĨŝŶĚĂǁĂǇƚŽ
manage.  Because the Germans, they are very different to Swedes and 
,ƵŶŐĂƌŝĂŶƐ ?ǁĞŚĂǀĞĂůůĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ? /ĚŽŶ ?ƚŵŝŶĚŝĨƉĞŽƉůĞƐƉĞĂŬ ŝŶ
their own language.  But maybe what should happen next day or something 
ƚŚĞǇ ? ŵĂǇďĞ ƚŚĞǇ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ƚĞůů ŵĞ ƚŚĂƚ  ? Q ? / ŵŝƐƐ ƚŚĞ ĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ŽĨ ĐŽůůĞŐŝĂůŝƚǇ ? ?
(Consultant Anaesthetist  W Orthe-ISTC) 
176 
 
This could be seen as illustrative of fragmentation within professional groups across 
the Orthe-ISTC. Equally, relations between different professional groups, such as 
between medical and nursing staff, were reported as being more distant within 
Orthe-ISTC. Although the consultants were mostly working full time in the ISTC 
alongside the nursing staff, they were seen as a largely separate group with a 
different culture, and subject to different rules, incentives and pay levels (for 
example with a bonus scheme for consultants based on extra productivity). As well as 
the heterogeneity of the staff pool in general, divisions between professions can also 
be related to the nature of the roles for different groups, the distribution of work, 
and also the large difference in experience between the consultant grade medics and 
often inexperienced nursing staff. As previously stated, in order for the consultants 
to concentrate on surgery and seeing patients in clinic, nurses had to take on 
additional administrative tasks, but also stick to guidelines and follow the orders of 
medics and take fewer independent clinical decisions. In addition, the newness of the 
TC and rapid turnover of staff created less opportunities for individual relationships 
to develop that may bridge the gap between staff groups. Together these 
contributed to a perception of greater detachment between nursing and medical 
staff, particularly from more experienced nursing staff:  
 ‘ŝƚ ĐĂƵƐĞƐƵƐĂ ůŽƚŽĨƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?  /ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ƚŚŝŶŬ ƐŽŵĞof the surgeons believe 
that nurses are valuable. They are still very much into the mindset of when I 
ƚƌĂŝŶĞĚďĂĐŬŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƚŚĞĚŽĐƚŽƌ ?ƐŚĂŶĚŵĂŝĚĞŶƐ ? ?dŚĞĂƚƌĞ
Nurse  W Orthe-ISTC) 
With the cultural background of the medics again sometimes coming into play in 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐŽĨĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ P
 ‘/ ?ŵŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƐŽƵŶĚĂďŝƚƌĂĐŝƐƚŚĞƌĞďƵƚƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĂůůĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ?
ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ĂŶĚ ^ǁĞĚŝƐŚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂǀĞ Ă ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ  Q
ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƉůĂĐĞ ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇƚĂůŬƚŽǇŽƵ ?^ŽƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐǀĞƌǇ
 QƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŶŽƚƋƵŝƚĞĂƐŽƉĞŶƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶĂƐƌŝƚŝƐŚĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ? ? ?^ĞŶŝŽƌEƵƌƐĞ W 
Orthe-ISTC) 
However, while differences in cultural background may have played a part in creating 
or exaggerating perceptions of distance between staff groups, there was a feeling 
from respondents that it was the specific working practices of the ISTC and its 
adherence to production goals and regulations also supported divisions between 
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groups. For example, in order to achieve throughput volume, roles were described as 
tightly defined so as to minimise the time taken on each case by the more 
specialised, and highly paid, medical staff. Rather than merely reflecting practice in 
the medics home countries, in some cases this contradicted responĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ
experience; 
 ‘KŬĂǇ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁĂďŽƵƚŚŽǁŝƚǁŽƌŬƐŝŶƚŚĞh<ďƵƚŝĨ/ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞƚŽ ?ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? ŝŶ ^ǁĞĚĞŶ ? ƚŚŝƐ ǁŽƌŬ ŝƐ  Q ŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƐƵƌŐĞŽŶ ŝƐƚŚĞ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ĂŶĚ
everything is made to facilitate for the surgeon to do his work. so they can sit 
ĂŶĚƐĞĞƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐ QďĞŝŶƚŚĞĂƚƌĞĂƐŵƵĐŚĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?^Ž Q
ĂŶĚŝŶ^ƚŽĐŬŚŽůŵ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞ QƚŚĞŶƵƌƐĞƐŚĂĚĂůŽƚŽĨŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞǇ
ǁĞƌĞ QŝƚǁĂƐŶ ?ƚďƵŝůƚƵƉĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞĚŽĐƚŽƌƐƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ?ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǁĂǇ ?^Žŝƚ
ǁĂƐŶ ?ƚ ƚŚĂƚ ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƐƵƌŐĞŽŶ ǁĂƐ ĚƌŽǁŶĞĚ ŝŶƉĂƉĞƌǁŽƌŬ ?
(Consultant Surgeon  W Orthe-ISTC) 
In comparison, within General-ISTC the staff who had been transferred together 
remained in longstanding groupings, with established patterns of relationships within 
and across professional groups staying largely intact. As previously discussed medical 
staff remained for the most part within their home departments in local NHS 
hospitals, visiting the ISTC as previously they had visited theatre departments and 
clinics, and retaining their existing wider professional networks. Therefore, in a 
continuation of previous working practices they stayed for the most part separated 
from the other occupational groups who worked together day by day within each 
department, and who largely built close relationships amongst. However, given that 
the personal remained the same, several close relationships had been built up over 
the years that bridged professional divisions, for example within theatre teams 
existing relationships between surgeons and scrub nurses, and anaesthetists and 
ODPs continued largely as they had done previously. Some important changes were 
having a more subtle impact on the nature of relationships, for example the changes 
to the size and physical layout of the building, the large number of new staff and the 
different working patterns broke up some existing groupings. While some 
respondents felt this allowed a greater freedom, more often these changes were 
described negatively, in that that they made interpersonal relations more difficult 
and fragmented. In general however, most respondents in General-ISTC emphasised 




One important area which contradicted this picture of generally stronger intra and 
intra professional relations was the state of relations between groups of staff 
working for different employers within the two ISTCs. Specifically, there were more 
noticeable signs of strain and tension between staff working for the two main 
employing organisations in General-ISTC, namely those seconded from the NHS Trust 
and the Brithealth directly employed staff, than they were between the WorldHealth 
and separate site services staff working in Orthe-ISTC. Two reasons for this suggested 
themselves. First, within Orthe-IST, there was a far clearer separation of roles 
between the two main employing companies, with the staff from the services 
subcontractor employed only in non-clinical roles. Although staff these often 
required BigServices staff to interact with patients and work side by side with 
WorldHealth Staff, or in comparable roles such as reception and secretarial staff, 
each specific job role was filled only by staff from one or the other organisation. For 
example, the building reception was staffed by services staff whereas each 
departmental reception was staffed by WorldHealth staff. This meant that norms for 
ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĐŽƵůĚďĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĚŝƌĞĐƚĞŶĐƌŽĂĐŚŵĞŶƚŽŶŽŶĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĂƌĞĂƐ
of work.  In contrast to this, in General-ISTC there was a large overlap between the 
roles in each company, with staff from both employers working in clinical, 
administrative and site service roles. Often these were directly interchangeable, with 
clinical and administrative staff from each employer used in the same role on 
different occasions. This opened up far more potential for comparison, cross 
evaluation and conflict as staff employed through the two organisations went about 
the same tasks in different ways, under different pressures and managerial 
expectations. For example, the priorities of directly employed staff that closely 
following company procedures were viewed with suspicion by transferred staff.  
Second, employment for both sets of employees in Orthe-ISTC could be seen as being 
founded on a more equal basis. Both groups of staff were employed by a profit 
making organisations, directly under management working within the ISTC, and 
according to private sector norms and priorities. The two main employing 
organisations were operating on a comparable contractual basis, with their outcomes 
evaluated on Key Performance Indicators by a contract manager. In this way both 
ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ŝŶ ƐŽŵĞ ǁĂǇƐ ĂƐ  ‘ƉůĂǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ŐĂŵĞ ? ? ǁŝƚŚ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů
concerns amongst management. This meant that similar values expressed by 
management on both sides:  
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 ‘tĞ ?ƌĞ ŶŽƚ ŚĞƌĞ ƚŽ ƌŝƉ ƚŚĞ ďĂĐŬƐŝĚĞ ŽƵƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ? ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ĨƌŽŵ ĚĂǇ
one they knew what it was that we were going to make out of this contract, 
ĂŶĚ ĂŐƌĞĞĚ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ĞŶĚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚĂǇ ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞ Ă ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ĂŶĚ 
ƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞŚĞƌĞƚŽŵĂŬĞĂƉƌŽĨŝƚ ?KŶE,^ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐǁĞŚĂǀĞǁŽƌŬĞĚŽŶŝƚŝƐŵƵĐŚ
ŚĂƌĚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĂůǁĂǇƐƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽƵƐŽĨǇŽƵƌŵŽƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?ŝŐ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐDĂŶĂŐĞƌ ) 
This convergence of managerial values meant policies and practices could be sought 
that were mutually beneficial for both sets of managers. For example, as the 
performance of both was judged to some extent on the feedback of patients, both 
ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚĂ  ‘ĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌ ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ ?ŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŵŽŶŐƐƚƐƚĂĨĨ ?ƉƵƐŚŝŶŐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂů
aspects of service to be maintained across the board. In addition, although the 
workplace was structured along professional and occupational lines, the contractual 
nature of the organisations meant staff from both companies were in a similar 
position in terms of the fragility and uncertainty of their employment status, reliant 
on contractual renewal. Therefore, it could be seen that all employees in Orthe-ISTC 
were working under similar pressures and the fact that there were multiple 
employers made less difference to the comparatively weak intra and inter 
professional/occupational relationships that characterised the site.  
In General-ISTC a different picture was apparent. The foundations for the two main 
employing organisations, and the nature of employment for the two groups of staff 
were fundamentally different. Public and private sector employees had different 
organisational backgrounds, norms values and expectations, and were under 
markedly different pressures and priorities. Therefore, while it could be said that 
while there was a stronger basis for occupational and professional relations amongst 
the transferred public sector staff working in General-ISTC, this was in some ways 
disrupted by the arrival of a private sector partner.  
7.5 Management and Staff Relations 
The final category of relationships implicated in the distinct partnership 
ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ/^d ?ƐǁĂƐƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ
employees. The possibilities for management to influence the activity of the ISTCs 
towards a health-production system differed markedly between the two sites. From 
the other side of the relationship, it could also be said that there were differing 
possibilities for professional and occupational groups to resist management control. 
Given the multiple perspectives of the various occupational and professional groups 
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involved in healthcare, bringing about the managerial vision of the ISTC depended in 
ƉĂƌƚŽŶŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĚŝƌĞĐƚƚŚĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚ
it. This frequently involved seeking to change peoƉůĞƐ ? ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ ĂŶĚ
overcoming resistance. While within the bounds of both ISTCs managers were 
officially in a position of formal authority, many other considerations entered into 
the balance of power between staff and management. Of particular relevance was 
challenge to managerial authority caused by distortion to lines of hierarchy within 
the partnership structure.  
Within Orthe-ISTC managers played a greater role in defining the character of work 
than they did in General-ISTC. This difference in the comparative balance of power 
can be related to a number of factors, but perhaps most clearly to the structure of 
the two partnerships, the relationship Orthe-ISTC had with other healthcare 
organisations and the arrangements for staffing. To begin with WorldHealth 
managers had a more straightforward employment relationship involving the 
standard range of hierarchical powers and control. This includes the capacity to hire 
and fire staff, manipulate rewards for example through promotion, training, 
remuneration and bonuses, as well as the holding the power to penalise staff 
through limiting career progression, harming reputation for future employment and 
ultimately through the threat of employment termination. Within General-ISTC on 
the other hand, these hierarchical powers were heavily curtailed. The fully and 
partially transferred staff that remained in the employment of the NHS trust stayed 
on the terms and conditions set by their existing employment contract, virtually 
regardless of their actions within the ISTC. The managers could therefore only offer 
only very limited incentives and rewards for those performing extra work or working 
in ways that were in line with treatment centre objectives. For example, the 
managers in Genera-ISTC were not in a position to offer non-employees a promotion 
to higher clinical grades, aside from when a position was opened up by a seconded 
member of staff vacating a role that was in the Staff Services Agreement. Even in this 
case, promotion decisions were ultimately in the hands of the acute NHS Trust. 
On the reverse side of this, General-ISTC managers had only limited degree of 
influence to directly prohibit non-employees against acting in ways that countered 
ƚŚĞ ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ? ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ /^d ? ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŝŶ ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ ĐĂƐĞƐ of breaching the 
employment contract the ISTC managers could contact the Acute Trust HRM 
department with a view to inducing formal discipline procedures, this was a far more 
181 
 
distant threat than would be the case in a more direct employment relation. Many of 
the front line transferred staff were overseen on a day to day basis by line managers 
who had themselves been transferred from the NHS Trust. Therefore, ISTC managers 
were reliant on NHS line managers reporting their NHS colleagues, many of whom 
had worked together for many years. Only then could they seek to take up issues 
with the management of the acute Trust. This meant that many front line staff were 
partially protected from any threat to employment. Further, many General-ISTC staff 
were only working in the ISTC for a small proportion of their working time. In these 
ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? ƚŚĞ ĂďŽǀĞ ůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ /^d ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ? ƉŽǁĞƌƐ ǁĞƌ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ
increased. Not only were they only in indirect control of their employment, in these 
cases they were also only able to seek to assert indirect control on an infrequent 
basis. In this case, BritHealth managers recognised it was very rarely worth seeking to 
change the behaviour of individual staff directly, and found it difficult to encourage 
staff to adhere to ISTC rules.  
Aside from the direct control over staff, a further extension of management influence 
in Orthe-ISTC came from the type of work offered in the two sites. Although most 
Orthe-ISTC staff were on permanent contracts, work was relatively insecure in 
comparison to that in the public sector, and dependent on WorldHealth continuing 
to make a profit or win contracts past the initial first five year term. This changed the 
basis on which staff viewed managerial working practices oriented towards servicing 
the contract. For example focusing on meeting targets and achieving positive 
 ‘ĐƵƐƚŽŵĞƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ƌĂƚŝŶŐƐǁĂƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇƐĞĞŶĂƐ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽŵĞĞƚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůĂŝŵƐ
but also to increase the chances of receiving ongoing employment. In General-ISTC, 
there was a greater continuation of a more traditional approach to healthcare work. 
dŚĞ /^d ǁĂƐ ƵƐƵĂůůǇ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ ĂŶ ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? E,^ ǁŽƌŬ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ĂŶ
alternative form of employment that required a different orientation to work. For the 
most part, staff had not consciously accepted a more routine role, and indeed 
continued to see themselves as part of existing NHS employment systems, career 
paths and professional development arrangements. Many staff worked only partially 
in General-ISTC and saw this as only a minority part of their job role and 
correspondingly remained attached to the NHS. For the full time seconded staff, 
continued employment was protected in the SSA agreement, and in general 
respondents felt that they were able to continue their career for the long term 
elsewhere in the NHS Trust if they so wished. This was of course not the case for 
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directly employed staff in General-ISTC, who may have been willing to accept a 
different approach to work. 
Finally the balance of power between management and staff can also be seen in light 
of the degree of integration into wider health institutions. Coming from overseas or 
direct from training, staff in Orthe-ISTC often expressed uncertainty over norms of 
UK healthcare practice, standard conditions of employment, clinical responsibilities, 
and the expectations of management. In addition, Orthe-ISTC staff had a smaller 
potential pool of personal social and support to draw on in any challenge to 
management control, and less established alternatives to the managerial vision.  In 
contrast, within General-ISTC the health care staff retained more conventional 
relationships with wider professional institutions both in terms of personal 
communication with colleagues in other health organisations and formal professional 
membership. Here, challenges to managerial authority were more commonplace 
with people drawing on pre-existing interpersonal networks of professionals 
encompassing medical and nursing staff as well as middle management within the 
ISTC. These provided a basis for staff to explore and put forward alternative points of 
view, and greater foundation for these alternatives to be seen as legitimate, 
particularly on clinical issues where existing notions of professional autonomy and 
expertise continued to take precedent.   
The different balance of power between staff and management in the two sites can 
be illustrated by the degree to which staff felt obligated to work over and above their 
contracted roles. In general, the managers in Orthe-ISTC were in a far stronger 
position to persuade staff to take on extra work, and increase the pace of work, than 
in General-ISTC. Viewed from the other side of the relationship, the staff in General-
ISTC were in a far stronger position to resist managers wishes, particularly those that 
had been partially or fully transferred from the local NHS Trust. This point is born out 
in the following two exchanges, in which an Anaesthetic Consultant in Orthe-ISTC and 
a Theatre Nurse in General-ISTC discuss their response to the drive from 
management for them to take on extra volume of work. In the first extract from 
Orthe-ISTC although the respondent says there are disagreements, these are 
understood on the terms of the management and a mutual understanding that the 
ĂŝŵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ŝƐ ƚŽ  ‘ŐĞƚ ŝŶ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ?  /Ŷ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚƌĂĐ ĨƌŽŵ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů-ISTC, the 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƐ Ă ƐĞƚ ŽĨ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂů ǀĂůƵĞƐ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ  ‘ŵŽŶĞǇ ? ĂŶĚ
 ‘ƚŚĞďŽƚƚŽŵ ůŝŶĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŐŽĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚŽƐĞŽĨ  ‘ƚŚĞŽůĚƉůĂĐĞ ? ?ŶĂŵĞůǇŐŝǀŝŶŐ  ‘ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ
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ƚŚĞŝƌŶĞĞĚ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨ ƚŚĞƋƵĞƵĞďĞhind them. Rather than accepting these new 
values and only questioning individual decisions based upon them, the respondent 
appears to be questioning the basis for the changes. Interestingly he also suggests he 
is using the indirect relationship with management to pre-emptively protect himself 
from any changes that are introduced. 
Orthe-ISTC 
 ‘ƵƐƵĂůůǇ ǁĞ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŽ ǁŽƌŬ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ǁĂǇƐ ĂƐ E,^ ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐ ǁŚĞƌĞ / ŚĂǀĞ ĂůƐŽ
worked, seven sessions a day, seven clinical sessions and three other sessions for 
administƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?  Ƶƚ ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ŝƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ  Q ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ?ƚ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞ ŽƵƌ ũŽď ũƵƐƚ ƐĞǀĞŶ
sessions this way and three other sessions that way.  And the management always 
wants us to work more and more and to evolve our admin sessions to the clinical 
sessions because we can do the procedures and we can increase the number of 
cases.  So there are some disagreements but we try to sort it out and I do not think 
ŝƚ ?ƐĂďŝŐƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ƵƚƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞ QǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞĂŝŵŽĨƚŚĞŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůŝƐũƵƐƚƚŽ
get in patients that we can show the NHS and of course we can treat people properly 
ĂŶĚ ŝƚ ?Ɛ ǀĞƌǇ ŐŽŽĚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ ǁŚǇ ƵƐƵĂůůǇ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ŵĂŬĞƉĂǇŵĞŶƚ ĨŽƌ ĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐ
because we are happy to do it. Even it is in our admin sessions. Okay, but sometimes 
ŝƚ ?ƐƚŝƌŝŶŐ ?ĂƐǇŽƵƐĞĞŶŽǁ ?ŝƚŝƐ ?Ž ?ĐůŽĐŬĂŶĚ/ũƵƐƚŐŽƚ ŚĞůĂƐƚŽŶĞĂƚŚĂůĨƉĂƐƚ ? ?
I Right.  And how do you feel about keeping up with that pace of work? 
zĞĂŚ QŽŬĂǇ ?ǁĞĐĂŶĐŽƉĞǁŝƚŚŝƚ ?ƐŽŝƚ ?ƐŶŽƚĂďŝŐƉƌŽďůĞŵƵƐƵĂůůǇ ?:ƵƐƚ/ǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽ
tell you that in the beginning you do not know what the management wants exactly 
sometimes and you have got a normal regular way what you do.  And sometimes 
ƚŚĞǇ Q/ŵĞĂŶĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝĨǇŽƵŚĂǀĞŐŽƚƐŽŵĞǁŽƌŬĂŶĚǇŽƵŬŶŽǁƚŚĂƚǇŽƵŚĂǀĞ
to do that work and one of your colleagues are on holiday, you have to change your 
plan, you have to change your daily routine, you have to take home your files and 
ĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ?ũƵƐƚƚŽƐŽƌƚĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐŽƵƚ ? ? ?ŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚŶĂĞƐƚŚ ƚŝƐƚ W Orthe-ISTC ) 
 
General-ISTC 
 ‘/Ŷ ĂůůƐĞŶƐĞƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŚĞƌĞŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚƉƵƚĂŶǇƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞŽŶƵƐĂŶĚƐŽ/ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ
say there is a tension now although I am mindful that there could be tension if they 




to see where there is spare time to do operations within the time scale that is 
required.  If they can do four easily could they possibly do five?  Whereas over in the 
hospiƚĂů ǇŽƵĂƌĞ ƐĂǇŝŶŐ  ‘ǁĞŚĂǀĞŐŽƚ ĨŽƵƌƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐǁŚŽŶĞĞĚ ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƐŽǁĞ
ǁŝůůŐŝǀĞĨŽƵƌƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐƚŚĞŝƌŶĞĞĚ ? ?/ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚĞǀĞŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂƋƵĞƵĞ
ďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞŵďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĂƚǁĂƐŶ ?ƚŵǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ?/ǁĂƐũƵƐƚƉƌĞƐŶƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨŽƵƌĂŶĚ
I would do tŚĞĨŽƵƌ ?/ĂŵŶŽǁŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŽůŽŽŬĂůŝƚƚůĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĂŚĞĂĚďƵƚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƵŶĚƵůǇ
ǁŽƌƌǇĂďŽƵƚŝƚ ? ? 
/ P  Q  ‘ǁŚŽ ĚŽ ǇŽƵ ƐĞĞ ĂƐ ĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨ ǇŽƵƌ ǁŽƌŬ ĂŶĚ ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐ
ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚŽĨǇŽƵ ? ?
 ‘/ƐƚŝůůƚĞŶĚƚŽƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŵǇŽǁŶƚĞƌŵƐĂŶĚƌĞƉŽƌƚďĂĐŬƚŽŵǇůŝne manager who is an 
NHS employee and basically my sister.  I always report back to her but she has to 
ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌĂďŽǀĞŚĞƌĞ ? /ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ƌĞƉŽƌƚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇƚŽ ƚŚĞŵƐŽ /ƐŝƚŽŶĞ
ƐƚĞƉ ĂǁĂǇ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ Ă ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐ ƐƚĞƉŽŶŵǇ ďĞŚĂůĨ ƐŽ / ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ŐĞƚinvolved in the 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐƚŽŽŵƵĐŚ ? 
I:  So it is almost like the levels of hierarchy can protect you 
  ‘ďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇ ?/ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĂƚŝƐǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƉĂŝĚĨŽƌ ? 
(Seconded NHS Nurse  W General-ISTC) 
 
For the above reasons, it could be said that Orthe-ISTC managers had greater degree 
of control of the work activities within their ISTC. In General-ISTC the balance of 
power between staff and management was more visibly contested, with relations 
perhaps best seen as a continuation of those well reported in mainstream public 
healthcare organisations. The divisions of a multi-employer workplace are imposed 
on top of, rather than in place of, these inter and intra groups relations.  
These three relations between organisations, between professional groups, and 
between management and employees make up make up the context of HRM. The 
next section discusses this context in relation to the research questions and in 
relations to theoretical concern of HRM, healthcare management and public policy.  
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Chapter 8 Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
This discussion reflects on the research question and consideration points posed in 
section (2.5), with respect to the literature covered in opening chapters. It seeks 
particularly to relate the findings emerging from the three key areas of literature, 
identifying how issues of generic models of HRM, translation to the public sector, and 
issues of permeable workplaces have been brought to light by the findings within 
ISTCs. In doing so it highlights numerous challenges and contradictions between the 
aspirations of policy over HRM, the managerial vision for the ISTCs, and the 
experiences of professional employment within healthcare. It finishes by reflecting 
back on the nature of inter-organisational relations. It suggests that the 
categorisations of partnerships in strategic terms may struggle to explain the 
emerging social order within current partnerships, and points to the ongoing 
interactions between actors at all levels within the organisation that contributed to 
the nascent character of HRM. 
8.2 Facets of HRM 
8.2.1 HRM Strategy and Style 
This section reflects on how the findings relate to prescriptive strategies and styles of 
employment management. Key questions arising from the literature related the 
extent to which ISTCs sought and were able to define and enact consistent HRM 
strategies  W across practices, time, occupational groups and departments - and how 
these were affected by partnership arrangements.  
In some respects the HRM practices across the two sites are best be described as 
contingent, with no wholly consistent or pre-planned HRM strategy put into action. 
Employment practices were often established on an ad-hoc basis, in response to the 
unique pressures of their operating environment, staffing arrangements, and service 
expectations of the ISTC. In the face of contractual requirements to begin service 
production and maintain output levels there were few opportunities to align 
different HRM elements across the organisation, with different practices emerging in 
response to immediate operational requirements. For example in Orthe-ISTC, 
different criteria for recruitment, selection and promotion were used in different 
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departments, depending on immediate need to fill vacancies. In General ISTC, 
employment practices were observed as changing as the relationship between front 
line NHS staff and private management developed during the research period. In 
both cases, different departmental managers developed their own approaches to 
handling staffing issues in response to the varied challenges of establishing a new 
hospital service. As well as this, the nature of the partnership foundations placed 
additional constraints on the degree to which managers within either ISTC could 
ƐĞůĞĐƚĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ůŝŵŝƚƐŽĨĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů pressures 
and market environment, the contractual nature of the organisation involved a 
number of national and local rules on employment.  
'ŝǀĞŶƚŚŝƐ ?ĂŶĚŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ?ƚŚĞůĂďĞůŽĨ,ZD ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?- either pre-
planned or emergent - would appear to overstate the coherence of employment 
practices across the two sites (Legge, 2004). The conceptual ambiguity and evolving 
nature of ISTC policy meant there was little opportunity to pre-identify a single 
strategy; rather managers and employees alike had to be reactive and fit in with their 
rapidly changing circumstances. Consistency over time was also challenged in a 
number of ways, particularly brought about by the limited lifespan of the contract 
and also due to fact that the intricacies of operation only became slowly apparent 
during the start-up period. Both main health provider companies were relatively new 
entrants to the market and during the time of research were in an almost continued 
state of flux, not least in terms of turnover in management personnel. The start of 
the contracts called for a large focus on attaining minimum requirements to become 
operational; the recruitment of the right number of suitable employees in Orthe-ISTC 
and the arrangement of appropriate service level agreements in General-ISTC. 
Following this period and well into the contracts life, managers and employees can 
be seen responding to the great number of challenges encountered in the 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ŵĞĚŝĐĂů ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?  ‘dĞĞƚŚŝŶŐ
problems ? ǁĞƌĞ ĐŝƚĞĚ ĂƐ ĂŶ ŽŶŐŽŝŶŐ ŝƐƐƵĞ ŝŶ ďŽƚŚ ĐĂƐĞƐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŽŶůǇ ŚĂĚ Ă ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ
period to get things up and running and meet the contractual obligations. This led to 
a constant pressure for change, with perceptions of inconsistency perhaps inevitable 
as fixes and solutions were bought in as problems arose.    
Recognising the emergent and fragmented nature of practices separates this analysis 
from attempts to describe HRM activities as fitting wholly into any discrete 
normative category. On a comparative basis however some observations can be 
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made regarding the developing character of HRM practices found within the ISTCs 
and their relationship to generic HRM models. Although no comparison can be made 
with other industries or cultural environments, between the two sites, Orthe-ISTC 
ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ ĨŝƚƚŝŶŐ ŵŽƌĞ ĐůŽƐĞůǇ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽƐƚ ƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ďǇ
Shuler and Jackson (1987), with many of the observed practices indicative of a lower 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚŽƌ ‘ůŽǁĞƌƌŽĂĚ ? ?zŽƵŶĚƚĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? )ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽ,ZD ?dŚŝƐŝncluded an 
emphasis on standardisation of work practices and job roles, perceptions of tight 
management control and a seeking where possible to minimise employment costs. 
Ɛ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŚĞĂĚ ĐŽƵŶƚ ? ǁĂƐ ƚŽ ƐŽŵĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ĨŝǆĞĚ ? ƚŚŝƐ ůĂƌŐĞůǇ ƚŽŽŬ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵ ŽĨ ǁŽƌŬ
intensification rather than reducing staff numbers, for example trying to fit more 
patients onto theatre lists or expectations of staff working past contracted hours. Pay 
was largely based on market rates associated with the general grade of staff 
required, rather than an internal pay scale with wider reference to skills and 
ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? dƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ ǁĂƐ ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ ŽŶ  ‘ĨŝƌĞĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ ?ƚŽ ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? dŚĞƌĞ
was little provision for career progression within the company except on an ad-hoc 
basis, and although most of the staff were on permanent contracts, there were many 
concerns over job security following the end of the first five year agreement. 
DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ƚŚŝƐĐŽƵůĚďĞƐĞĞŶŝŶƚŚĞĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĨŽĐƵƐǁŽƌŬŽŶ ‘ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ
with an absence of many of the wider provisions associated with public sector 
professional employment; internal career planning, long term security, professional 
development.  
Taking this further, it could be suggested then that within the confines of Orthe-ISTC, 
this amounted to some degree of objectives-HRM fit (Shuler and Jackson, 1987), with 
a general managerial emphasis on production volume apparently matched by a HRM 
approach focusing on cost minimisation through lower-cost and low commitment 
practices. This type of approach has often been seen where human capital is replaced 
with technological and mechanical developments, reducing the requirements for 
labour in both the number of staff and the skill requirements of the staff remaining.  
In a similar way to that reported by Helfgott, (1988), this was enacted here through 
more standardised production processes, more structured jobs and reducing 
requirements for individual decision making in theory reducing the cost of staff. 
Within manufacturing this type of approach has been advocated by Youndt et al 
(1996) in view of strategies focused on reducing costs and eliminating uncontrollably 
behaviours.  However, a number of important points problematise the logic of this 
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approach and suggest limitations in its appropriateness for a healthcare 
environment, from the perspective of management and clinical staff. First, many of 
the HRM practices were not designed specifically with organisational aims in mind, 
but imposed upon the Orthe-ISTC by the nature of partnership and surrounding 
regulation. Although there was little interference in the day to day management of 
staff from the partner NHS organisations, in other ways the ISTCs hand was forced by 
the nature of the contract, rules surrounding the ISTC and employment market, given 
the dominance of the NHS as an employer. Significantly, rules of additionality meant 
that the company was forced to look outside the NHS and were often able to recruit 
relatively low skilled staff or those unfamiliar with UK practice. This influenced the 
character of many the HRM practices. For example, training had to remain the level 
of basic skills, and many jobs were difficult to fill. In addition, output levels and 
payment had already been agreed, meaning there was little opportunity to adjust 
these in the face of shortages of staff. In turn, this resulted in departments lacking 
ƚŚĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƐŬŝůůŵŝǆ ?ŽƌŚĂǀŝŶŐƚŽ ‘ĐĂƌƌǇ ?ĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĂŐĞŶĐǇƐƚĂĨĨǁŚŽǁĞƌĞŽĨƚĞŶ
generally experienced but unfamiliar with Orthe-/^d ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ůůŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ
limitations were to some extent written into policies, regulations and contracts 
preceding the establishment of the ISTC. Therefore, rather than a purposeful 
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ůŽǁ-ĐŽƐƚ ? ,ZD ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ Ă ďǇ-product of the ISTC 
foundations. This would then appear to lend support to previous studies which 
suggest that such outsourcing relationships are increasingly likely to bring about 
 ‘ůŽǁĞƌ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? ůĞƐƐ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƐƚĂĨĨ ĂŶĚ ůĞƐƐ ǁĞůů
developed HRM practices (Rubery, 2004; Kinnie et al, 2005). 
In addition, while the low-cost HRM character appeared to fit in some ways with a 
production orientation, it could also be seen that specific elements of HRM practice 
did not have a straightforward relationship with wider organisational objectives. For 
example the prescribed roles and increasing demarcation between staff ostensibly 
appeared to fit with both low-cost HRM and increasing production outputs. At the 
same time, the relatively narrow scope of jobs, the separation from NHS 
employment, lack of career progression and the insecure nature of were all seen as 
contributing to rapid turnover of employees and a generally more transient 
workforce. In the healthcare context, the low cost strategies were causing serious 
difficulties for continued provision of services. Short term efficiency gains were in 
part off set by wider costs of employment due to high levels of agency staff, ongoing 
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recruitment and training new staff. This also led to a lack of people trained into the 
ISTC system and job roles were felt to occasionally threaten the production output as 
ŶĞǁ ƐƚĂĨĨ ŚĂĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂůůǇ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚ ĂŶĚ ƚŽŽŬ ƚŝŵĞ ƚŽ ŐĞƚ  ‘ƵƉ ƚŽ ƐƉĞĞĚ ? ?
Further, while the use of agency staff is typically associated with organisations 
seeking flexibility (in terms of employee numbers to meet short term demand) at the 
expense of quality (Kalleberg, 2001), in this case the opposite was sometimes true, 
with agency staff often having greater experience and higher levels of training than 
internal staff but at greater cost. FurtŚĞƌ ? ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŚĂƐ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ  ‘ůŽǁ ĐŽƐƚ ?
employment strategies with moderate or low concern for quality (Schuler and 
Jackson, 1987; Arthur, 1994).  
Although no direct comparisons can be made here of the quality output with other 
NHS services, other studies have tended to find associations between lower cost 
employment practices, less stable workforces and lower levels of quality and safety 
(Hendrix and Foreman, 2001; Tourangeau et al 2002; Ticker, 2002; Kovner, et al 2002; 
Clarke et al 2002; Eaton, 2000). As Hunter (1996) states high trust relations have 
traditionally been central to professional forms of organisation, and these lie counter 
to the low trust management practices of the type identified here. Indeed the serious 
failings in treatment centre clinical quality found by Kempshall, et al (2009) and 
White et al (2009) were within an ISTC under rules of additionality and composed of 
staff drawn from outside the NHS, although the reasons for this are not explicit in 
these studies.  Staff shortages and turnover were also seen as a major difficulty for 
the ISTC management, who felt to some extent powerless to reduce turnover or 
increase commitment in the face of employment restrictions. These problems bring 
to mind the common tensions of employment management found throughout 
private industry, in particular the conflicting interests of management requiring both 
control over employees while also maintaining their active and willing input (Watson, 
1986). This is explored further below (section 8.2.4). Although on the surface free 
from the prescriptions of NHS employment structures, this case would suggest that 
the contractual/partnership basis of the organisation limited the degree to which 
management could potentially act to balance these conflicting interests. This tension 
ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ůĞĂĚ ƚŽ ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ  ‘ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ǀĂůƵĞ ǁĂƐ
guaranteed for five years and barring serious incident appears likely to continue for 
that period. However, without a stable workforce being established, the viability of 
the organisation in the current form beyond this initial contract may be questionable.  
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Turning to the General ISTC, the emerging HRM character did not resonate so clearly 
with any generic HRM model. For seconded staff, in comparison with Orthe-ISTC it 
ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƐĂŝĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŵĂŶǇŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ Ĩŝƚ ŵŽƌĞ ĐůŽƐĞůǇ ǁŝƚŚ Ă  ‘ŚŝŐŚ
ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ? ƐƚǇůĞ Žƌ ǁŝƚŚ ^ŚƵůĞƌ ĂŶĚ :ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? )  ‘ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞŵĞŶƚ ?
strategy.  For the most part, retaining NHS employment meant pay and employment 
conditions were maintained, including wider pensions and sickness benefits and 
comparatively long term job security. Employees continued within the same 
nationally agreed systems of training and development, theoretically linked to work 
tasks and pay scale and career development, representing a comparatively 
structured and planned career path. As well as these explicit, formal employment 
practices, in some ways the aspects of employment dependent on interpersonal 
relationships such as trust and participation in decision making were also carried over 
to General-ISTC. Work practices, job roles and some established relationships 
between professional groups, and between middle managements and front line staff 
were largely transferred from the NHS trust. In view of this, employees held 
comparatively more autonomy and greater involvement and participation with 
decision making. In some respects these interpersonal aspects of the employment 
character were spread to the directly employed ISTC staff, as the workplace norms 
were set by the majority of NHS clinical staff. 
Previous studies have shown how high commitment practices have been associated 
ǁŝƚŚ ŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐ  ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ? ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ƚŚĞ organisation 
amongst employees (Guest and Conway 1997; Patterson et al. 1997), with these 
findings repeated within the UK public sector (Gould Williams, 2004; 2007). However 
given the split between private top management and NHS staff and the multiple 
arrangements for employment there appeared to be little opportunity for working 
towards overall consistency or purposefully matching the HRM character to the 
overall managerial vision of the General-ISTC. This led to unavoidable differences in 
the conditions of employment amongst staff, with directly employed staff not 
receiving the same wider benefits and pension provisions as NHS seconded staff, 
tighter management of absence for sickness and different terms for holiday 
allowance. This could be seen as undermining the basic premises of HRM and the link 
to wider strategy.  As has been frequently identified, employment practices in 
themselves should not be seen as intrinsically motivating. Rather they are perhaps 
more usefully seen as part of the overall work environment. Explicit employment 
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practices are just one aspect of tŚĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ  ‘ĚĞĂů ? ? ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ? ǁŚĂƚ ŝƐ
seen as appropriate and what is fair in the relationship between employees and 
managers (Watson, 2005; Hallock, 2009). As Watson (2004) states,  high commitment 
practices are led by a principle of building a close long term relationship between 
managers and employees, with the implication that this may under certain 
circumstances lead to the active and cooperative involvement of employees. 
Similarly, and with specific reference to the current UK public sector environment, 
Gould-Williams (2007) argues that high commitment HR practice are an indication 
from management that they wish to engage in a positive exchange relationship.  
These notions have been explored in theories of social exchange and norms of 
reciprocity (Eisenberger, et al 2001 & 1990). Employees have been found to interpret 
HR practices and the trustworthiness of management as indicative of the personified 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŵ  ?tŚŝƚĞŶĞƌ ?  ? ? ? ? ? <ŽǇƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? /Ŷ ƚƵƌŶ ?
perceptions of the deŐƌĞĞ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ďǇ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ĂƌĞ  ‘ƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĚ ? ďǇ
employees in terms of their level of trust and commitment to the organisation (Shore 
and Wayne, 1993).  
/Ŷ ƚǁŽ ǁĂǇƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŵƵůƚŝ-ĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ? ǁŽƌŬĨŽƌĐĞ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞ ƚŚŝƐ
presumed link between HRM practices and employee behaviour. First, it creates a 
break in the direct relationship between those supplying the employment practices 
and the organisation to which employees work is contributing. Staff seconded from 
the acute trust saw their pay, pensions and wider career opportunities continuing to 
be supplied by the NHS, and these were not seen as a part of their relationship with 
the ISTC management. Therefore the nature of the existent employment practices 
may not lead to greater commitment to the treatment centre, regardless of their 
perceived quality, fairness or favourability. Indeed, there was some suggestion that 
the fact that NHS employment terms had had to be protected contributed to an 
environment of distrust towards the new private management who may have 
otherwise sought to cut pay or levels of staff, and in general undermine values seen 
as present within the NHS.  Second, the split in terms and conditions of the two 
groups of staff in some cases reduced perceptions of the fairness and cohesiveness of 
the overall work environment, central to models of high commitment HRM. 
Perceptions of equity and fairness of HR practices have been found in quantitative 
work to be associated with perceptions of management support and trustworthiness 
in general (Whitehead, 2001; Koys, 2005). Here, for seconded staff the presence of 
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directly employed private staff was seen as creating new tensions and lack of group 
cohesiveness, and underlined the potentially conflicting motivations of management. 
For directly employed staff, comparing their own employment conditions 
unfavourably against their NHS colleagues who were in nominally identical roles may 
have detracted fƌŽŵĂŶǇ ‘ŚŝŐŚĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŐŶĂůƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? 
Therefore, in seeking the appropriate character of HRM, managers within both of the 
ITCSs could be seen as struggling to balance the competing requirements for 
investing in staff and reducing costs in view of the demands of policy, partnership 
and their constituent workforce. The policy impetus for organisations supplying high 
volume, routine surgical procedures was matched in these cases by managerial 
visions within ISTCs of increasing standardisation and efficiency. Until recently, 
surgical health services have generally remained outside employment trends towards 
rationalisation and standardisation widely seen as advancing in other areas of 
industry (Littler, 1990; Braverman, 1974; Kitchener, 2000). The professional 
organisation of work, the status of the NHS, and the nature of healthcare practice 
afforded both organisations and employee groups some degree of autonomy and 
freedom from directly controlling forms of financial management. More recent 
analysis has suggested this is changing, or at least is subject to attempted changes 
from policy and managerial arenas (Kitchener, 2000; Harrison, 2002). ISTCs could be 
seen as a route to possibly sidestep the issues of control and autonomy in medical 
and healthcare work, and install efficiency orientated production manufacturing 
management approaches as far as possible within the healthcare. By recruiting from 
outside of the NHS, and often from outside of the UK, Orthe-ISTC was able to bring 
about these systems to a greater extent. However in breaking with established 
practices, this model of ISTC has already been found to be unsustainable and 
dropped from national policy. In General-ISTC employment arrangements introduced 
a break in the employment relationship and a greater fragmentation of the 
workforce. This would suggest that in neither case did contracting health services 
provide the opportunity to work towards more integrated, coherent systems of 
strategic HRM.    
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Table 8 Cross case comparison of employment Practices and consistency 






Based on employment 
market requirements, 
but limited to 
predefined contract 
budgets.  
Based on historical 
professional /nationally 
negotiated T&Cs for 
seconded staff, and mix 
between labour market 
and public sector norms 
for directly employed 
staff 
Work Roles Set up for health 
production orientation. 
Narrow roles, stronger 
demarcation.  
Continuation of existing 
professional roles, with 





immediate skills gap 




Ad-hoc, based on 
labour market 
shortages 
Based on professional 
roles, but divide 
between seconded and 
directly employed staff 
Overall HRM approach   ‘>ŽǁĞƌZŽĂĚ ?ǁŝƚŚ





with some pressure 
 ‘ĚŽǁŶǁĂƌĚƐ ?ƚŽĨƵůĨŝů
commercial objectives. 







and dominance of NHS 
as employer and 
predefined production 






by existing practices, 
staffing agreements, 
contract and regulation 




by low commitment 
based on transactional 
approach to 
employment 
Low: Continued public 
service terms and 
professional orientation 
undermined by 
perceptions of being 
pushed out of the public 
sector, and multi-
employment system  
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Internal consistency with HRM 
agenda: Employment practices 
 ‘Ĩŝƚ ?ǁŝƚŚ/^dŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ 
Medium: control 
practices to enhance 
compliance to 
contractual terms. Low 
commitment and 
turnover confounded 
some aspects of 
healthcare. 
Low: Employment 
systems geared to 
generic NHS context 
External consistency with HRM 
agenda: Employment practices 
with wider policy objectives 
Low. Transactional 
nature of employment, 
and lack of integration 
into wider health 
economy, career paths, 
skills framework.  
Medium. National policy 
continued to apply to 
seconded but not to 
directly employed staff 
 
8.2.2 Innovation and Workforce Reconfiguration 
Policy surrounding ISTCs promotes the logic and priorities of manufacturing 
operations management, such as flow through stages of the production process, 
volume of throughput and reduction of waste. Within this approach, improvements 
in outcomes are seen as coming primarily through innovative managerial action to 
 ‘ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐĞ ?ĂŶĚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞ ?ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŽǀĞƌĂŶĚĂďŽǀĞƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ
new medical knowledge. In terms of workforce reconfiguration and new working 
practices, such innovation ĂƌĞƐĂŝĚƚŽƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵƵƚƵĂů ‘ǁŝŶƐ ?ĨŽƌŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ
and employees, as for example more routine tasks are passed down to lower skilled 
members of the workforce (DoH, 2002a), who themselves see up skilling of their role. 
As part of the push for greater productivity, ISTC management across both sites could 
be seen as seeking to introduce various innovations and changes to workforce 
organisation. For example both ISTCs produced detailed process maps of patient 
pathways in the early stages of development, plotting each stage of the production 
process, including decision trees, a breakdown of tasks by job role, and measures for 
monitoring and reviewing patient flow. The central question here relates to the 
extent to which partnership arrangements within ISTCs aided or further prohibited 
the degree to which new working practices could be introduced. 
In many ways the strongly managerial design of work promoted within ISTCs 
contrasts with existing forms of healthcare practice (Harrison, 2002; Harrison et al, 
2002). The established role of hospital doctors in the UK is spelled out by Kitchener 
(2000) who stated that since the inception of the NHS, hospital doctors have typically 
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maintained technical autonomy in their role, and been handed control decisions over 
qƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂů ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? dŚŝƐ ǁĂƐ  ‘ǁŽŶ ? ĂƐ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ŽǀĞƌ
remuneration was handed over to the state in the establishment of the NHS. 
Administrators were not expected to intervene in clinical areas, and in general, 
quality concerns took president over productivity and efficiency. While this has long 
been seen as changing, with the power of managers in the ascendancy and that of 
professionals is in decline (Ferlie, 1994; Harrison and Ahmed, 2000, Harrison, 2002), 
there is still frequently strong opposition to managerial led change and limits on 
managerial and bureaucratic control (Harrison and Ahmed, 2001). Alterations to roles 
and workforce organisations often involve movement in the boundaries between 
professional groups (Hyde, 2006), and the further elevation of managerial ideals 
above professional autonomy (Harrison, 1999; Hunter, 1996; Light, 1997). Therefore, 
changes to job roles can rarely be introduced unilaterally by managers or policy 
makers (Hyde et al., 2005; Currie, et al, 2009a). 
As well as this, previous studies of partnerships and networks have suggested that 
workforce reconfiguration is made problematic by disruptions to employment 
relationship (Hunter et al 1996; Grimshaw and Hebson, 2005). In this study, the 
capacity of management to introduce new working practices is perhaps best seen in 
view of the balance of power between management and clinical staff. The 
partnership relations changed the balance of power through changing the 
relationships that clinicians held with wider health institutions, organisations and 
professional groups. In Orthe-ISTC pushing through changes associated with a 
production system was made possible by sidestepping the existing power structures, 
norms and culture of the NHS and imposing changes on more insecure or transient 
workforce. In General-ISTC where clinical staff retained stronger relationships with 
existing healthcare institutions, changes were commonly resisted or ignored, with 
professional autonomy remaining comparatively intact. This could suggest that 
where outsourcing arrangements undermine the status and autonomy of healthcare 
professionals for example by separating them from existing national structures, 
managers may be able to bring about greater degrees of workplace reform. Where 
partnerships undermine managerial hierarchical authority, changes to existing 
practice were more overtly contested and the divisions of a multi-employer 
workplace are imposed on top of, rather than in place of, existing dynamics of power 
and inter-groups relations.  
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Reflecting on this, the ISTCs could be seen as at forefront of the promotion a form of 
ŵĞĚŝĐĂůƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚďǇ,ĂƌƌŝƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? )ĂƐƚŚĞ&ŽƌĚŝƐƚ  ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ-ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐ ?
model of medicine. In contrast to other approaches to medical care supported at 
different times and by different groups, the scientific-bureaucratic model stresses 
that knowledge is only valid when it comes from external research findings rather 
than personal experience, and that motivation for putting any particular piece of 
knowledge into practice in a given situation is that practices are written into 
organisational rules and protocols rather than due to a process of autonomous 
decision making. Harrison (2002) argues that this approach implicitly underlies much 
healthcare policy making by the New Labour government. Importantly here, given 
the emphasis on the adherence to rules and hierarchies of decision making, this 
ŵŽĚĞůĂůƐŽĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƐǁŚĂƚ  ‘ůŽŽŬƐǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚ ůŝŬĞĂ&ŽƌĚŝƐƚůĂďŽƵƌƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ĨĞĂƚƵƌŝŶŐ
increasing degrees of specification, standardisation and centralisĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?
(Harrison, 2002: 475). These themes were key aspects of the managerial efforts for 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ǁŝƚŚ/^dƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐĂŶĞǁ ‘ĨƌŽŶƚŝĞƌ ?ĨŽƌ&ŽƌĚŝƐƚůĂďŽƵƌƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ
with healthcare. Over and above the introduction of any particular new workforce 
reconfiguration or innovation, ISTCs also mark an additional step in the ongoing 
political interface between medicine and management.   
8.2.3 Consistency in Employments 
In many ways this study reflects previous findings on multi-organisational 
partnerships in that show how such arrangements can involve the fragmentation of 
the workforce and introduces points of inconsistencies in the basis of employment 
(Morgan and Allington, 2002; Rubery et al, 2002; Cooke et al, 2004). While previous 
studies have mostly looked at the impacts of such inconsistencies for lower status 
staff groups such as services staff as well as contract managers (Hebson and 
Grimshaw, 2003), this study illustrates these processes in terms of the impact on 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐĂŵŽŶŐƐƚ ‘ĐůŝŶŝĐĂůŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂĨĨ ?ĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƐ ?ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
aspects of the ISTCs created additional potential sources of differentiation; between 
organisations, between professional and occupational groups and between 
employers. The increases in inconsistency and the changing basis on which to judge 
 ‘ĨĂŝƌ ? ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚ ŶŽƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ǁŽƌŬ ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ
employees in each centre saw themselves as a cohesive group.  
The two ISTCs opened up the potential for different sources of inconsistency. Within 
Orthe-ISTC inconsistency stemmed from the greater differentiation between 
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professional groups based on the nature of work, insecurity of employment and 
larger demarcation between roles. Within General-ISTC, inconsistency stemmed from 
the mixed employment system involving directly employed, full time seconded, and 
visiting staff. Therefore, in various ways ISTCs can be seen as challenging policy 
aspirations for open and consistent systems of employment for people working 
under the banner of the NHS. As stated by Rubery (2004) this opens up challenges for 
management in terms of gaining the willing contributions of staff, as well as legal 
issues around equal treatment of employees.  When multi-organisational 
partnerships lead to different terms of employment within one workplace, or even 
amongst colleagues in notionally identical roles as seen here, the challenge to 
consistency would appear even more immediate and likely to lead to tension.  
WŽůŝĐǇƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐĂƌŽƵŶĚƉƵďůŝĐƐĞĐƚŽƌĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƌŽƵŐŚůǇĂůŝŐŶĞĚǁŝƚŚ  ‘ďĞƐƚ
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ,ZD  ?Ž, ?  ? ? ? ?Ă ) ? &Žƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŶĚ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ
frameworks were promoted on the basis that position on the pay scale would match 
knowledge, experience and efforts (DoH, 2001).  Contracting work out has generally 
been seen to contrast with these goals, as certain aspects of work are passed to the 
private sector with different norms and standards of employment (Morgan and 
Allington, 2002). Previously this has been seen as leading to a two-tier workforce, 
with high status professionals given secure careers and enjoying wider employment 
benefits and other staff groups employed on fixed term contracts with little job 
security (Sachdev, 2001). Some ISTCs take these trends further as full time 
professional posts were themselves taken out of national system, and were similarly 
based on fixed term agreements with no direct integration into standard career 
paths or pension schemes. In Orthe-ISTC some of the medical respondents appeared 
to be consciously selecting these types of roles as they offered a break from normal 
hospital duties. It could be suggested then that a lack of wider employment benefits 
did not appear to impact negatively on high skilled and well paid groups, who may 
benefit from a wider variety of work opportunities, giving them increased flexibility 
with less need for commitment to the organisation. While for those who are less able 
to pick and choose their work, non-standard employment contracts are usually 
assumed to pose a greater risks (Wooden and Warren, 2004), such as less career 
progression, training and development or intrinsic job satisfaction (Booth et al., 
2000). However, Hoque and Kirkpatrick (2003) warn against simplistic assumptions 
around professionals in non-standard employment, finding that even at higher levels, 
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those on fixed term or part time contracts and particularly women are also 
vulnerable to marginalisation in the workplace, in terms of consultation and training 
opportunities. Indeed, it was the lone female medical respondent in Orthe-ISTC that 
most clearly vocalised their discomfort and feelings of detachment from working 
away from their home country with little professional support or collegiality. This 
may well have reflected the national groupings within the ISTC rather than indicative 
of gender differences in experiences of insecure work.  
8.2.4 Commitment and Ethos 
A cornerstone of mainstream HRM theory posits that greater commitment and 
motivation stems from high quality employment practices (Guest and Conway 1997; 
Patterson et al. 1997) with a growing body of evidence that a link may occur through 
norms of reciprocity (Eisenberger, et al 1986 & 1990; De Vos et al, 2003; Tzafrir et al, 
2004). This has been looked at in various ways, for example through ideas of an 
implicit or psychological contract (Rousseau, 1989; Rousseau and Aquino, 1993), and 
through notions that HRM practices act as a signifier which indicate the 
trustworthiness of managers which under certain ciƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚ ?ďĞƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĚ
by the level of efforts and inputs of staff (Tzafrir et al, 2004). One consequence of 
partnership organisational structures already identified above is that they may 
disrupt this chain between HRM practices, perceptions of trust, norms of reciprocity 
and organisational commitment. Further, in these cases, it was not simply that the 
ůĞƐƐ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝǀĞ ,ZD ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ůĞĚ ƚŽ  ‘ůŽǁĞƌ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞůǇ
higher quality practices that remained in General-ISTC engendered higher 
commitment. Rather, the practices need to be seen in light of the broader context of 
the differing employment relationships between the two sites and wider public 
sector norms.  
To characterise the employment relationship, in Orthe-ISTC where staff were directly 
employed by WorldHealth, the employment relationship could be summarised as 
ďƌŽĂĚůǇ  ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶĂů ?  ?ZŽƵƐƐĞĂƵ ?  ? ? ? ? ? <ĂůůĞďĞƌŐ ĂŶĚ ZŽŐŶĞƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? WĞŽƉůĞ
generally saw their work within the ISTC as a more short term, financial transaction 
with tightly defined tasks undertaken without the prospects of long term 
employment or job security. This could be said to have resulted in people viewing 
ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚĂůŽŶŐ ƚŚĞ ůŝŶĞƐŽĨ  ‘ŶĞǁƌĞĂůŝƐŵ ?  ?,ĂǁŬŝŶƐ ? ?  ? ? ) ? ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƉĞŽƉůĞŚĂĚ
little expectation of wider employment support or career development, but then 
sought to move on at the first better opportunity. This model contrasts markedly 
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with established notions within both the public sector and amongst health 
professional groups (Boyne et al 1999), although there is some evidence that this 
picture is changing. Jones and Green (2006) suggest that in some areas of medicine 
expectations of professional devotion and long term commitment may be receding, 
with a greater acceptance of more transactional approaches to work and less 
responsibility in return for a better work/life balance. In the responses here there 
was some evidence of this attitude present amongst the well remunerated medical 
consultants and other individual staff member. These respondents looked upon the 
/^d ĂƐ ĂŶ ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ Ă ďƌĞĂŬ ĨƌŽŵ ŵŽƌĞ ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ
while pursuing wider personal interests and moving to a new country. These staff 
were apparently willing to accept less responsibility in exchange for more routine 
work, while giving less commitment. On the other side of this they could be said to 
be taking more responsibility for their own careers and long term security. Rather 
than a vocation, the ISTC offered staff work that was attractive for generally extrinsic 
or  ‘ŚǇŐŝĞŶĞ ?  ?,ĞƌǌďĞƌŐ ?  ? ? ? ? )ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞůǇŚŝŐŚƉĂǇ  ?ĨŽƌŽǀĞƌƐĞĂƐ
staff), convenience, or availability. In contrast, others staff groups reported less 
satisfied with their roles and stated their intention to move on.  Indeed, within 
Orthe-ISTC this was causing difficulties in terms of generally low commitment to the 
organisation, skills shortage and staff turnover as they struggled to find the right 
calibre of employees willing to work in the jobs offered. 
The employment relationship emerging in ISTC-General was far from straightforward 
and not easily placed along the continuum of transactional-relational employment 
(Kalleberg and Rognes, 2000). Rather there were multiple relationships between 
BritHealth management, their own staff and seconded staff, which could not easily 
be placed within a single category. In General-ISTC there was a greater mix and less 
clear picture of who staff felt they worked for, and whose interest they were working 
in. With some exceptions, the full time seconded NHS staff were generally sceptical 
and resistant towards the ISTC, despite terms and conditions being protected. For 
example, key areas of concern for nursing staff was the level of audit and paperwork, 
the degree of managerial involvement in how day to day tasks were done, narrowing 
of job roles and perceptions of work intensification. For doctors, key areas of concern 
were in the control they had over the treatments/procedures selected, having sole 
responsibility of individual patients and the scheduling of work. Across all groups of 
clinical staff questions were raised about the ownership of the ISTC and the purpose 
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of their work. In line with previous studies, there was certainly distrust of the profit 
motive amongst a number of respondents (Sachdev, 2001, Pollock, 2002). However, 
ƚŚŝƐĚŝĚŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇůĞĂĚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇƚŽůĂĐŬŽĨ ‘ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽůĞĂĚŝŶ
some cases to a reconsideration of the purpose of their work. Some respondents 
sought to emphasise their continuing commitment to the acute trust, for example 
seeing their future careers carrying on back within the trust following a short period 
within the ISTC. Other full time seconded staff were more hostile towards the acute 
ƚƌƵƐƚ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞǇ ďůĂŵĞĚ ĨŽƌ ďĞŝŶŐ  ‘ĨŽƌĐĞĚ ? ƚŽ ŵŽǀĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ /^d ? ^ŝmilar to the 
findings of Hebson et al (2003) in some ways these felt betrayed by being exposed to 
private management, as though they had been pushed aside following in some cases 
years of service. Even these however usually retained some contact with colleagues 
within the local NHS, albeit weaker than before to the move, and also their wider 
professional membership.  
Mirvis and Hall (1996) state that under relational contracts, employees should be 
more likely to identify with the organisation as they are promoted, mentored and 
socialisĞĚ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůůǇ  ? ‘/ ǁŽƌŬ ĨŽƌ ǆ ? ) ? KŶ ƚŚĞ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŚĂŶĚ ? ƚŚŽƐĞƵŶĚĞƌ ƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶĂů
contracts should be more likely to utilise their individual skills and competencies as 
ƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ  ? ‘/ĚŽz ? ) ? /ŶŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂre these conceptions 
may already be more problematic as professionals are likely to have an existing split 
in loyalty and identification between their organisation and their profession (Hutton 
and Massey, 2006). PPPs may add an additional level of complexity in that 
employment may remain internal to the state employer, but work is externalised to a 
third party. This leads to multiple possible sources of identification and commitment 
ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ŐƌŽƵƉ ? ĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ? ĂŶĚ ǁŽƌŬƉůĂĐĞ  ? ‘/ Ăŵ ǁ ? ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ Ĩor x, 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ǌ ? ) ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ĐĂƐĞ ? ŽƐƚĞŶƐŝďůǇ ŵŽƌĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ƚŽ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ŵĂǇ
well be associated with lower levels of identification and commitment as the 
organisation in which they work, if outsourcing involves reductions in trust and 
undermining intrinsic values. Tzafrir, (2004) states that over and above any individual 
ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐƐĞĞŬŝŶŐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶ ?ĂŶĚ
nourish a high trust environment, and thus, need to provide strong backing and 
demonstrate their commitment to open communication, empowerment, and a just 
ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?  ?dǌĂĨƌŝƌ ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? /ƌŽŶŝĐĂůůǇ ? ŝŶ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů-ISTC, the endurance of a 
relatively secure formal contract with the NHS employer may well have provided the 
security to resist changes being made by the non-employer managing their work. 
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8.2.5 Training, Learning and Development 
Within the case study sites, formal arrangements for training reflected directly the 
issues presented in national debates over ISTCs, in terms of the opportunities of 
training, the division of training responsibilities between partnership organisations, 
and in terms of integration into wider training and development programs. In 
addition, the cases highlight the consequences of these for both individual members 
of staff and the wider organisations.  
In Orthe-ISTC training and development opportunities were comparatively restricted. 
Many of the distinctive features of the ISTC including the limited range of lower risk 
procedures, the nature of job design, employing only consultant grade medics and 
the absence of teaching facilities meant that training activities were dramatically 
reduced in comparison to similar NHS facilities. The training activities that did take 
place were to address the basic skills shortages stemming from the low skill levels of 
many nursing staff. This situation mirrored concerns raised over the impact of wave 
one ISTCs on the NHS; namely that such arrangements reduced the number of 
routine operations on which junior doctors could potentially train. However, no 
straightforward conclusions can be drawn from this case about the effects of this 
type of work on the training of the general health workforce. Within the ISTC, 
individuals did not respond passively to the lack of training opportunities, with a 
collection of people going out of their way to find other forms of training and to 
 ‘ŬĞĞƉ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŚĂŶĚ ŝŶ ? ? ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ĚĂǇƐ ŽĨĨ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ E,^ Žƌ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ
facilities and seeking greater involvement in professional networks than demanded 
by daily activities. Others recognised the limited scope of practice and room for 
development and were conscious that they would need to move on to progress their 
careers. This model of ISTC could then be seen as passing the responsibility of 
training and career planning from the organisation to the individual. This represents 
a dramatic break from well established practice within healthcare and also counters 
the aims portrayed in national HRM training and development policy (DoH, 2001, 
2002a). 
In General-ISTC, training activities were protected and to a certain extent were 
merged with existing arrangements within the adjacent general teaching hospital. 
Junior doctors and student nurses were continuously on site. Although the time ISTC 
staff dedicated to supervising trainees had been agreed within the partnership 
contractual arrangements, on a day to day basis these were not referred to as 
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training continued under the supervision of hospital consultants and nurse mentors 
who maintained established norms. A similar case could be seen in the continuing 
development of full time ISTC staff, who continued to have access to Trust wide 
training opportunities. The major issue referred to as problematic in relation to 
formal training was in regards to the period of transfer. Due to negations between 
the organisations over transfer dates, little preparation time was available, with most 
respondents reporting difficulties and concerns over safety during the first weeks of 
operation. 
Aside from these formal training elements, across the two sites there was little to 
suggest that learning had taken a higher priority or had been improved through 
changing interpersonal relationships. Indeed, the findings suggest that the particular 
history, management style and organisational context of ISTC may present additional 
barriers to open communication and the development of the close interpersonal 
relationships. This is view of discussion on the inter-professional barriers to 
knowledge sharing within healthcare settings, and the importance trust amongst 
colleagues and in management for learning sharing (Hartley and Bennington, 2006; 
Mooradian, et al 2006). These barriers can be seen in the more instrumental nature 
of relationships identified across Orthe-ISTC, and in the low trusting, often tense 
relationships identified between different employee groups. In general this study 
would suggest that within ISTCs, existing institutional barriers are joined by 
additional factors which may reduce the organisations conduciveness to learning, 
including the contractual arrangements, regulatory context performance measures, 
and the increasing demarcation between occupational and professional groups. 
8.2.6 The role of the HRM function  
The final aspect of HRM to consider is that of the activities, position and prospects 
for the HRM function within the ISTC organisations. This has been to some extent 
covered in the previous sections which have discussed in a general sense the people 
management activities dispersed throughout the organisations. Here we consider the 
ƉĂƌƚƐŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇƐĞĞŶĂƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬŝŶŐ ‘,ZD ? ?/ƚ
has been suggested by policy and market reform advocates that within smaller, more 
independent units, HRM may take on a more strategic role, able to drive through 
employment innovations and achieve greater flexibility to make managerial practices 
fit with organisational objectives (Bosenquet et al, 2006). Across the two ISTCs the 
HRM function took on different roles and guises, with varied issues to contend with 
203 
 
during the establishment of the organisations. The complications and idiosyncratic 
challenges of the organisations opened up new roles and types of activities for the 
Human Resource Managers.  
In Orthe-ISTC the HRM department itself took on a central role in the establishment 
of the centre, particularly with regards to recruiting a sufficient workforce. 
Regulations surrounding employment and the limited employment market outside of 
the NHS meant this was a central focus of senior management during the early stages 
of the ISTC, ongoing throughout the research period. In contrast to reports from 
other healthcare settings (Proctor and Currie, 1999; Lupton and Shaw, 2001) this 
placed the HR manager firmly at the centre of the developing organisation. However, 
this central role for the HR manager should not be seen as necessarily indicative of 
the wider acceptance of normative HRM ideals across senior management. Nor did it 
necessarily lead to any overarching consideration of the most appropriate or 
collectively acceptable ways of managing the employment relationship given the 
character of work, nature of employees and objectives of managers and employees. 
In these respects the activities of the HRM department could be seen as less well 
established and more informal, a trend observed as common across SMEs in 
comparison to larger organisations (Dundon and Wilkinson 2003; Earnshaw et al, 
1999). Although subject to the health regulatory environment that meant certain 
roles had to be fulfilled, the practicalities of starting up the ISTC overrode any 
objectives for long term HRM strategic planning that may have been present. In 
order to get sufficient numbers of staff to become operational, recruitment was a 
primary and continuous activity and often had to be done an ad-hoc basis, rather 
than retaining strict criteria for selection. This focus on recruitment was continuing to 
take the majority of the HRM ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƐ ? time, leaving them little opportunity to 
develop other aspects of managing the employment relationship. This extended into 
the day to day management of staff, where the HRM department had only recently 
ĂŶĚ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůůǇ ďĞŐƵŶ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ  ‘ƐƚǇůĞƐ ? ŽĨ ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ƐƚĂĨĨ
involvement and communication. Only given the ongoing problems caused by the 
level of turnover and difficulty retaining staff was the HR manager beginning to 
consider the tensions surrounding employment in the ISTC.  
In the General-ISTC, the HR manager was in a very different position, and one which 
in many respects reflected the issues bought up by previous work on partnerships 
and networked organisations (Colling, 2005). That is, the role, responsibility and 
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jurisdiction of the internal HR department were not immediately clear and were 
influenced by the inter-organisational relations. By the HR managers own admission, 
there were limited in the degree to which they could directly influence people to the 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ƐŽǁŶ ‘ǁĂǇƐŽĨǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ?ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞŝƌŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŽǀĞƌŶŽŶ-employees, 
particularly those only working partially within the ISTC. TŚĞ ‘ƵƐƵĂů ?ƚĂƐŬƐŽĨ,ZDŚĂĚ
to be shared with both the main HRM department within the acute Trust, and the 
seconded line managers. Examples of this included seeking compliance to the 
procedures for sick leave and holiday entitlement. These differed between the two 
employee groups, and the BritHealth manager could not seek to monitor or enforce 
compliance for the NHS employed staff. Instead they had to negotiate with line 
managers the acute trust HR manager to enforce these aspects of employment. 
Further, in the key issue of recruitment responsibilities were divided, with the trust 
HR department responsible for replacing their own staff working inside the ISTC. 
Even for directly recruited staff, seconded NHS line managers had reported having an 
increasing degree of influence over who was employed, with early appointees seen 
ĂƐŶŽƚƵƉ ƚŽ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚďǇ ƚŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚĞĚ ůŝŶĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?ǁŚŽƐƚĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞǇ  ‘ǁŽŶďĂĐŬ ?
the final say on later recruits. In light of this, the HRM department in this case could 
be seen as taking on ĂĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌ ‘ǁĞĂŬ ? ?>ƵƉƚŽŶ ? ? ? ? )ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞĨĂĐĞŽĨ
professional power in healthcare. This could be seen as increasing as the BritHealth 
HRM department suffered from lower organisational status as well as lower 
professional status in comparison to the NHS doctors and senior nurse managers. 
Although they were more able to make some decisions for their own staff in ways 
that did not directly impact on seconded employees more independently, the power 
relations in partnership meant that prospects for spreading a single, consistent 
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐ ‘ŚƵŵĂŶƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?ĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞ/^dǁĞƌĞĐƵƌƚĂŝůĞĚ ? 
Therefore, in different ways, new opportunities and limits for the HR departments 
across both cases arose from the nature of the inter-organisational arrangements. 
Many of the tasks traditionally associated with HRM may become more central to the 
operation of organisations as they are required to find solutions for problems of 
managing employment in complex inter-organisational relations (Hickson, et al 
 ? ? ? ? ) ? &Žƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ƚŚƌĞĞ ŽĨ ƌŽůĞƐ hůƌŝĐŚ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ,ƵŵĂŶ
Resource Managers should seek to take on appear likely to be in demand in the 
transition to partnership working. Namely those of providing employee support in 
periods of change, providing expert administrative and legal advice and acting as a 
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bridge between employees and managers. At the same time ambiguities within 
partnership relationships and indirect employment may make these tasks more 
challenging and require ongoing monitoring of legal precedents and norms for staff 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ? DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ? hůƌŝĐŚ ?Ɛ ĨŽƵƌƚŚ ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ ĂůŝŐŶŝŶŐ
HR practices to global business aims may also be more difficult to achieve. The 
opportunities for HRM were not necessarily directly linked to any single wider 
ĞƐƉŽƵƐĞĚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůŐŽĂůƐŽĨƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ?,ƵŶƚĞƌĞƚĂů ?Ɛ
(1996) proposal for new HRM roles within networks focused on how clients may 
encourage HR systems within their suppliers that matched their strategy such as cost 
reduction or quality improvement. Here, looking from the suppliers perspective, 
there was little attempt from either side to align HRM efforts in any consistent 
approach across the partnership. Instead the ISTC HRM had to cope with the 
demands of the NHS on a national level, in terms of regulatory frameworks for 
healthcare employment in general and the specific rules for staffing ISTC, as well as 
on a local level in terms of meeting contracted outputs, staffing levels and other 
performance indicators.  In addition, where feasible they sought to fulfil their own 
corporate aims, which mainly took the form of efficiency improvements. HRM could 
be seen as reacting to the various demands within the specific local context and 
configuration of interests. This indefinite role of HRM could be seen as reflecting the 
blurred lines of partnerships across the public and private sector. This is explored 
further in the final section of this discussion below.  
8.3 HRM and PPPs: The Sector Divide Outside and Inside the 
Workplace 
Previous studies have suggested an exploration of the structure of contractual 
relationships with types of employment practices (Hunter, et al 1996; Scarborough, 
2000). Reflecting on this, this section attempts to consider the interaction between 
types of partnerships seen here and the HRM practices identified above. The 
categorisations presented in section 2.4 by Child (1987) and Bovaird (2006) are useful 
but also in many ways appear inadequate when looking at the processes and 
interpersonal/intergroup relationship of inter-organisational partnerships. These 
taxonomies of partnership have tended to focus on the level of the organisation, for 
example attempting to draw a line between characteristics of the market and the 
structure of agreements between organisations. Both of the cases presented here 
were in these respects fairly similar; both ISTC companies had a single customer and 
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service levels and prices were agreed and fixed over the medium term. This would 
appear to fit with ideas of relational or co-ordinated contracting. A link here could be 
presumed between this overall partnership type and employment practices that 
could support them. However, it would be difficult to relate these directly to 
behaviours associated with ideals ŽĨ ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ? dŚĞ  ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉƐ ? ǁĞƌĞ
not a single relationship between organisations, but ongoing relations between 
individuals, work groups, departments, both within and across hierarchies. They 
could also be seen changing over time, not merely in logical stages or partnership life 
cycles (as identified by Lowndes and Skeltcher, 1998), but with degrees of 
cooperation, trust and control altering on a case by case basis.  
Within the cases, many instances could be pointed to of active co-operation and 
areas of mutual interest. Agreements were negotiated and routines were developed 
to aid interaction between groups within both sectors. At the same time, in neither 
ĐĂƐĞ ĚŝĚ  ‘ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ĂƉƉĞĂƌ ƚŽ ůĞĂĚ ƚŽ ĂŶǇ ůĂƐƚŝŶŐ Žƌ ǁŚŽůĞƐĂůĞ
convergence between partner organisations and there were points of tension 
between actors at all levels. Therefore rather than a direct relationship between 
partnership structure and employment practices, the way market interactions were 
structured and regulated altered the context in which these day to day interaction 
were played out. In Orthe-ISTC, the boundary between public and private existed 
outside of the workplace and the bounds of the ISTC. The contract and regulatory 
framework stipulated approximate expectations and levels of output, and 
negotiations over these took place between senior managers of the ISTC and the 
contract managers within the NHS. Separated by distance, this was done by contract 
negotiation, formal communications and scheduled meeting. Tensions within the 
workplace, for example over the pace of work, were on the level of management-
staff relations. In General-ISTC the boundary between sectors was not as clear cut. 
Discussion and disputes between the public and private sector on the norms of 
practice took place on a day to day basis, for example as managers sought to increase 
the patient throughput and meet contractual obligations.  Although this could be 
seen as bringing sectors closer together and increasing interaction, it could also be 
seen as amplifying the tensions, as disparities and divergent interests were 
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂůůǇƉůĂǇĞĚŽƵƚĂůŽŶŐĂŐƌĞĂƚůǇĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚ ‘ĨƌŽŶƚůŝŶĞ ? ?
A concept that may help to describe the nature of these inter-sectoral relations is 
that of a negotiated order. Negotiated order has been frequently applied to a 
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healthcare context (Strauss, et al 1963; Svensson, 1996; Allen, 1997; Currie; 1999), 
most often in the portrayal of the relationship between professional groups, such as 
the interplay between doctors and nurses or between management and employees. 
Broadly this suggests that in contested or uncertain areas of work not governed by 
explicit rules or policies, different interpretations of the nature of the area or activity 
and its meaning come into play. Without reviewing these insights here, this concept 
accents both the context, in terms of the intuitively accepted relationship between 
groups as well as more unmoving rules and hierarchies, and the micro processes of 
interaction in determining how work tasks, responsibilities and areas of control are 
split between groups. These are mutually constitutive with existing social order giving 
form to negotiations, and negotiation contributing in part to the constitution of social 
order. Each group may attempt to portray their own actions as legitimate by for 
example by calling on various rationales, values or moral discourses in support of 
their position. These are, in part, based on the existing social order and the roles that 
each occupational or work group play within it. Instances from the case studies, 
particularly the multi-employment environment of General-ISTC suggest that 
negotiations such as these came into play as the bounds of the work activities of the 
public and private employees were founded. The most salient example is perhaps in 
the instance of the ISTC manager dismissed from the company in the face of 
complaints and disharmony from the NHS staff. Similar processes could be seen in 
the daily discussions between ISTC administrators and clinical staff over the number 
of patients seen, paperwork completed, equipment used, speed of work, 
timekeeping and order and division of work. Within these disputes familiar 
ideological concepts associated with the public and private sector as well as the 
public sector management (Pettigrew et al, 1992) often came into play. On the side 
of private management: value for money efficiency, reducing waste, rationalising, 
streamlining and output. On the side of healthcare clinical workers: expert 
knowledge, experience, patient care, and process (Harrison, 2002). It is on 
negotiations within this context that the employment practices that do emerge are 
contingent. 
In this way PPPs shift the divide between public and private sectors in the provision 
of services inside the workplace. When the sectors are closely intertwined, the 
dividing line between the two are as much between actors at the individual level as 
between organisations. In these instances, sectoral boundaries were no longer 
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separated on the basis of industry or service provided, but on the level of individual 
relationships between management and employees, between colleagues and co-
ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?/ŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůW&/ ‘ĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ďƵŝůĚ ?ĂŶĚŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ?ƐĐŚĞŵĞƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂ
degree of separation between sectors in the form of a dividing line between different 
functions of the organisation with contract managers undertaking negotiations over 
levels of service and performance standards (Grimshaw et al, 2002). While these 
would often require interaction across groups, there was a point at which the jobs of 
those in one sector are separated from those of another by titles, responsibilities and 
job descriptions (Hebson et al 2003). In the case of ISTCs where people from different 
sectors have ostensibly the same job titles, but with different priorities and under 
different pressures, it could be increasingly difficult to distinguish between the two, 
even if for internal actors the differences are stark and important parts of their 
understanding of the organisation. There remained differences in perceptions of the 
two sectors, and these may be most apparent and important for people working on 
the front line, for example as they are compelled to cope with the actions of others 
on the other side of the divide. Given this, within PPPs the boundaries between 
sectors are not removed or perhaps even diminished. Instead they are complex and 
ŝŶƚƌŝĐĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĚĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŽŶƐĞůĨĂŶĚŐƌŽƵƉŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌ
colleagues, and everyday disputes as well as forms of cooperation at work. When 
people from both sectors work together on the same activities in structured 
relations, boundaries are to some extent constructed with respect to the ongoing 
process of daily practice. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusions  
9.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter draws together the research findings and summarizes the 
theoretical contributions to the three areas of literature informing the study; namely 
Human Resource Management, Health Care Management and Public Private 
Partnerships.  It also reflects on the practical implications of the findings, particularly 
for HR managers. Finally it points to a number of limitations of the study and future 
research directions.  
9.2 Contributions and Practical Implications 
The overall contribution of this study lies in extending research into the relationship 
between new organisational forms and employment into the highly professionalised 
field of healthcare and considering the implications for HRM. Previous studies have 
shown how inter-organisational relations can lead to tensions in the employment 
relationship, a break between employers and employees and more controlling forms 
of management as dominant organisations seek to influence employment across a 
supply chain network. This study contributes to this literature, supports previous 
findings and illustrates how employment practices are shaped by the particular 
structure of contract relations involved in two Independent Sector Treatment 
Centres. More uniquely it also illustrates how the additional factor of inter-
professional relations was altered within this context and played into the emerging 
relations between organisations and between managers and employees. The break in 
the employment relationship not only reduced managers responsibilities towards 
 ‘ŶŽŶ-ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ ? ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ ƐĞĐƵƌĞ ĐĂƌĞĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ
opportunities, but also changed the basis on which healthcare professionals and 
managers both employing and non employing interacted.   
This introduced new contingencies for public sector HRM. Inter-organisational 
relations played out on top of existing inter-professional and managerial-clinical 
relations, which already place restrictions in the degree to which managers can shape 
employment practice. At the broadest level, normative HRM theory suggests that 
managers should seek implement HRM practices that support the organisational 
aims and will benefit overall organisational performance. Although ISTCs represented 
smaller, operationally more focused organisations than general NHS teaching 
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hospitals, they did not appear to offer a greater opportunity for more purposefully 
tailored HRM practices. Where staff retained their existing employment contracts 
and remained within existing professional networks, the existing barriers between 
managers and clinical staff were increased across organisational boundaries. On the 
other hand, where there was greater independence from national employment 
structures and professional institutions placed managers in a greater position of 
power over clinical staff. However, rather than presenting the HRM department with 
an opportunity to  freely select HRM practices in tune with the overall managerial 
objectives, the nature of the contract ultimately led the organisation towards lower 
commitment forms of HRM.  
Within this picture, the study raises important points for current HRM theorising. At 
the broadest level HRM theory remains concerned with the link between adoption of 
HRM practices and overall organisational performance. Studies continue to both seek 
the link between the adoption of HRM practices and overall performance, and seek 
to identify underlying reasons for such an association (Marchington and Zagelmeyer, 
2005). This study suggests that any link is very difficult to assume when employees 
work is separated from their employers, with people conscious of who supplied the 
employment benefits and who profited from their work. This suggests that HRM 
theory seeking to link practices with outcomes should pay much greater attention to 
the interpretations of the wider context of employment, not merely an association 
between certain behaviours and the presence or absence of, for example, job 
security or particular training regimes. In terms of fairness and consistency, this study 
generally supports previous studies which have highlighted how inter-organisational 
contracts open gaps for inconsistencies in employment and the application of 
management practice. An important extension to this found here is in terms of 
inconsistency across the public sector workforce as a whole, as different contract 
arrangements and regulations between the sites investigated here led to an entirely 
different form of employment relationship.   
For healthcare management the study illustrates new dimensions of the interface 
between management and clinical practice. For management, ISTCs were generally 
interpreted as an opportunity to install a healthcare production system. That is, a 
form of surgery and diagnosis that promoted volume, efficiency, output, streamlining 
workflows and meeting consumer demands.  This can be seen extending the ongoing 
ƉŽůŝĐǇ ƉƵƐŚ ĨŽƌ  ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ-ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐ ? ĨŽƌŵƐ ŽĨ ŵĞĚŝĐŝŶĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
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managerial logics within healthcare (Kitchener, 2000; Harrison, 2002).  The cases 
presented here show how the nature of the relationship between managers and 
professional groups are not uniform, but are impacted by the power dynamics 
supported by the organisational structure, here shown by the contrasting outcomes 
in different partnership arrangements. By sidestepping existing health institutions, 
one of the ISTC was able to make certain changes away from more traditional forms 
of healthcare provision. However in doing so, many aspects of emerging practice 
appeared to counter prevalent ideas on quality. Further, without the support of the 
professional associations, and following questions over training and impact on 
existing services, ISTCs operating completely outside the NHS proved impossible to 
sustain at the level of public policy, with subsequent ISTCs integrated more fully with 
the NHS. This would suggest that while the direction of change in healthcare may be 
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐŵŽƌĞ  ‘ŵĂŶĂŐĞĚ ? ĨŽƌŵƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐŶŽ ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĞŶĚƉŽŝŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ
process, with managers and policy makers unable to introduce change outside of the 
influence or involvement of health professional groups.  
Reflecting on the studies contribution to the field of public private partnerships, the 
study provides an illustration of the interaction between sectors not just on a 
strategic, organisational level but on the level of individuals carrying out their work. 
Part of third way rhetoric claimed that policy ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ  ‘ďĞǇŽŶĚ ĚŽŐŵĂ ?
and not related to ideological standpoints. Within the study sites there was little 
indication that tensions or differences between the public and private sector have 
disappeared. For some, these were experienced more starkly in the day to day 
activities of healthcare practice. The findings would appear to have ongoing 
relevance for public policy. In its final two years in office, the 1997-2010 New Labour 
government appeared to have rowed back on some of its original predictions for the 
level of involvement for the private sector in public services, for example revising 
estimates of the amount of elective surgery to be provided by ISTCs from 15% to 5% 
(DoH, 2008 a&b). In addition, it has been suggested that a number of the facilities 
already open are to be purchased back by local NHS trusts, and other contracts with 
ISTC providers cancelled after the first term following changes in economic 
conditions and implications for the most pressing health service demands. While the 
ISTC program may have fallen out of fashion with policy makers, new forms of 
organisation that include relationships between private sector companies and public 
services are set to take their place. This is especially true in light of recent economic 
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conditions and the current emphasis on cutting budgets and reducing costs. In light 
of the association between markets, private interest and improvements in efficiency 
and value for money in neo-classical economic theory, calls for increased 
involvement of the private sector in public services are almost certain to increase. 
The incoming Conservative-Liberal Democrat government are again strongly invoking 
market ideals as the means to cut waste, and advocating an expanded role for the 
private sector.  In February 2010, plans had already been announced for private 
ƐĞĐƚŽƌŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŽƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌ ‘ĨĂŝůŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚŚĞĂǀŝůǇŝŶĚĞďƚĞĚE,^ŚŽspital. Many of 
ƚŚĞĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇǁŽƵůĚĂƉƉĞĂƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚĨŽƌƐƵĐŚĂŶ ‘ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
mixed hierarchies between public sector staff and private management, conflicting 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚŽƐĞ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ŽĨ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ĚŝƌĞct employer 
(TimesOnline, 2010).  
The findings of the study have practical implications for all groups involved in public 
service provision, for public policy, health service management and professional and 
employee groups. To begin with, the study highlights some of complexities involved 
in cross sector partnerships, and the unintended consequences of contracting out 
aspects of service. Although literature on partnership frequently stresses the 
requirements of inter-organisational trust for supply relationships to run smoothly 
and efficiently, the study shows political and cultural tensions can surface during 
partnership arrangements that have a bearing on the extent to which contracts can 
reach their managerially desired objectives. Therefore those making decisions on 
whether to contract out should be alert to the fact externalising work is not risk free. 
This is especially true in the public sector context, where the contracting organisation 
is often seen in the eyes of the public as retaining responsibility for supplying the 
service. In decisions to contract services out, the perceived efficiency or competency 
benefits of bringing external suppliers needs to be balanced with the continued 
requirements of accountability and control. More specifically this balance also relates 
to how HR managers within partnerships understand their role. The transition to 
partnership working requires knowledge of the legal issues involved in transferring 
staff between sites and employers and equal opportunities regulation to ensure that 
employees under different contracts are treated fairly.  In the highly regulated public 
sector, responsibility for managing subcontracted staff may be shared between 
partnership organisations in ways that are not immediately apparent from the initial 
contract. The ability to influencing activities across organisational boundaries 
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depends on numerous contextual factors and may continue to change and evolve in 
an ongoing basis. Finally, for occupational and employee groups this study points to 
some of the opportunities and threats of working within partnership arrangements. 
Even when work is protected, the nature of jobs may change incrementally under 
new management, with only indirect routes available to make the voice to 
management heard. Partnerships may however offer the possibility for changing 
working practices and potential career development opportunities for those in 
occupational groups under-supplied in the labour market. This includes the possibility 
of striking a different employment deal to those usually expected within a healthcare 
environment.  
9.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
Limitations can be identified with several aspects of this study. Qualitative case study 
research is always to some extent necessarily incomplete as artificial boundaries 
have to be drawn in terms of scope and time.  Here we focus on the limits of the 
interpretations and the wider applicability of the findings. As identified in the 
methodology chapter, qualitative research in general and case studies in particular 
do not allow for straightforward statistical generalisation. Therefore, no a priori 
assumptions can be made as to the applicability of the findings reported here to 
other PPP contexts, or even other ISTCs.  In light of the high degree of variation 
observed even between these two cases, caution should be exercised in viewing 
ƚŚĞƐĞƚǁŽŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŚĞƌĞĂƐ ‘ƚǇƉĞƐ ?Žƌ ‘ŵŽĚĞůƐ ?ŽĨ/^dƐƚŚĂƚŵĂǇďĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞŽĨ
other sites where similar rules for staffing or structure of inter-organisational 
relations can be found. Only through additional experience could a reader of the 
research identify which findings reported here are repeated elsewhere. The 
discussion covered above does however help to place the study in relation to 
previous theory and research, helping to build cumulative knowledge on the 
interaction between organisations and its impact on healthcare employment and 
management. Further caution is also necessary about generalisations within the 
cases. In general this study has attempted to look for trends and themes within each 
case site, through which comparisons between the two cases could be made. 
However, there could equally have been description of variations within each case, 
ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ Žƌ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŝŵĞ ? ĂĐŚ /^d  ‘ĐĂƐĞ ? ŝŶ ĨĂĐƚ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ Ă
collection of individuals that could be compared in any number of ways such as social 
class, gender, personal history or national background, and not merely on how and 
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where they were employed.  Assumptions cannot be made about the behaviour of 
non-respondents, or that of people acting in ostensibly similar circumstances.   
Some of these limitations in terms of generalisability could be partially addressed in 
future studies investigating inter-organisational relations and employment in public 
services. For example, some attempt could be made to quantify certain findings in 
order to identify wider trends. Little is currently known about the job security, 
turnover and levels of employee satisfaction within ISTCs, and this type of data would 
appear highly useful to inform policy, managerial and job seeking decisions. 
Addressing a more theoretical question, one possible route for study that would 
appear to build on existing attempts in HR to investigate link between employment 
practices and ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞ ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŚĞŶ ŵĂŶĂŐĞĚ ďǇ  ‘ŶŽ 
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌƐ ? ƚŚĞ ůŝŶŬ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ
commitment may be reduced. One problem with these types of studies is the large 
degree of variation that is likely to exist between each instance of independent 
sector service provision. Given the rapid pace of policy change and the continued 
shifts in regulation surrounding the engagement of independent providers with the 
NHS, ongoing exploratory qualitative work would appear necessary to maintain 
knowledge of contemporary organisational arrangements within healthcare.  Over 
time these could contribute to a greater understanding of the dynamic interactions 
of independent sector organisations, the state and professional groups in a 
healthcare environment that is increasingly characterised by a plurality of provision. 
For example, from a HRM perspective studies in this vain may draw out the 
relationship between different contracting models and the degree of influence HRM 
departments hold over shaping job content. Greater emphasis could be placed on 
identifying the factors that determine the respective jurisdictions of HRM 
departments in supplying and contracting organisations. This type of work may 
simultaneously contribute to study on the sociology of professions, investigating how 
the stratification within particular professional groups is impacted by the varying 
degree of movement to independent providers. For example, does externalising 
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇƉĞƐŽĨĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇůĞĂĚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ĚŽǁŶŐƌĂĚŝŶŐ ?ŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌďƌĂŶĐŚĞƐŽĨƐƵƌŐĞƌǇĂƐ
work in these areas is routinised and tightly managed? Alternatively does this offer 
an opportunity for surgeons to become more involved in the management of 
independent providers and gain greater independence from the state? This type of 
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research would appear necessary in order to understand the nature of a healthcare 
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